Crime and Punishment: Do Politicians in Power Receive Special Treatment in Courts? Evidence from India

Abstract

An independent and impartial judicial system is essential for a well-functioning democracy and the economy. Despite constitutional guarantees, elected politicians may substantially influence the legal system. This paper studies whether politicians in power get special treatment in courts when facing criminal accusations. I construct a unique panel of over 1,300 criminal cases for candidates for state legislative assemblies in India from 2004 to 2013. Using a regression discontinuity design, I compare the probability of a pending criminal case being closed without conviction at the end of a legislature for politicians who marginally won the election against those who marginally lost it. This paper uncovers significant opposite effects of winning office, depending on the political alignment with the state ruling party. Winners from the state ruling party are 17 per cent more likely to get their pending criminal cases closed without conviction during their period in office. In contrast, winners from other parties are 15 per cent less likely to get their pending cases closed without conviction during the same time-frame. The result is consistent with the misuse of attributions vested on those in power within the executive to affect the career of legal officials.