COVID-19 four years later: Examining Americans’ continued anger and responses to media calls for pandemic forgiveness

Although moral disgust is one of the most important moral emotions, there is limited evidence about the antecedents of it in China. This paper aimed to discuss the linkage between childhood maltreatment and moral disgust, and investigated the specific mechanism between these two variables from the perspective of emotional development and moral development, respectively, based on the Tripartite Model. By combining random sampling and cluster sampling, this study recruited 968 participants from college. Then, childhood maltreatment, moral disgust, emotional intelligence, and empathy were measured separately by using the Childhood Trauma Questionnaire (CTQ), Moral Disgust Scale (MD), Wong Law Emotional Intelligence Scale (WLEIS), and Interpersonal Reactivity Index–C (IRI). Additionally, the results of the mediation model analysis show that childhood maltreatment is negatively predictable of moral disgust. In addition, the mechanism by which childhood maltreatment influences moral disgust could be explained by the effect of emotional intelligence on empathy. To sum up, this study explored and explained the specific mechanism between childhood maltreatment and moral disgust, replenishing previous achievements and providing support for the design of intervention on moral disgust by improving emotional intelligence and empathy.

In recent years, moral psychology has undergone a renaissance characterized by two dramatic changes (Haidt, 2007). First, the scientific study of morality has become a broad, interdisciplinary enterprise, drawing on insights and methods from philosophy, neuroscience, economics, anthropology, biology, and all quarters of psychology. Second, emotion now plays a central role in moral psychology research. This special section on Emotion and Morality is a testament to the ingenuity, openmindedness, and energy that has infused this field. Today’s moral psychology is quintessentially experimental, trying new things. In this spirit, the present volume is itself an experiment. The new moral psychology is exciting, not because of the longstanding questions it has definitively answered, but because of the novel questions it is asking. The canonical format of the review volume, however, threatens to make a weakness of this strength. With this in mind, the present volume, rather than collecting ten or so lengthy review articles, presents a tasting menu of concentrated ideas. This volume’s contributors were asked to prepare for the readers of Emotion Review an “amuse-bouche”—a short article presenting a new question, an intriguing observation, a morsel of new data, a prediction about the future of the field, etc. My hope is that this non-traditional, more prospective format will stimulate new research by giving readers dots that invite connecting. Lest we sacrifice all depth for breadth, this volume begins with three longer theoretical pieces, to anchor and complement the thirty bite-sized articles here assembled. Daniel Batson (2011) hypothesizes that moral problems arise, not primarily from poor moral judgment, but from lack of moral motivation, which may in turn arise from a lack of genuine moral emotion. Horberg, Oveis, and Keltner (2011) provide a framework for organizing moral emotion, arguing that distinct moral emotions amplify different kinds of moral judgments. Finally, Sherman and Haidt (2011) present a theory of the “cuteness response” as a humanizing moral emotion and the functional opposite of moral disgust. The next four articles, like the two preceding, present functional frameworks that explain what different moral emotions do and the relations among them. Robert Frank (2011) recapitulates the argument made in his path-breaking book Passions within reason (1988), according to which moral emotions facilitate solutions to social problems that can only be solved through the subversion of narrow self-interest. Chapman and Anderson (2011b) distinguish different moral emotions based on their eliciting appraisals and argue that the causal arrows run both ways, with emotions influencing appraisals as well. Gray and Wegner (2011) present a two-dimensional framework for organizing moral individuals (and the emotions they elicit) based on the valences of their actions and their levels of agency. Finally, Fiery Cushman (2011) relates a scientific parable underscoring the value of functional thinking in moral psychology. The articles that follow carry the functionalist banner while focusing on specific moral emotions. Simone Schnall (2011) argues that feelings related to cleanliness influence both moral and non-moral behaviors and may have their functional origins in the grooming behaviors of non-human primates. Pizarro, Inbar, and Helion (2011) ask whether moral disgust is a moral emotion and argue that the evidence for disgust as a moralizing emotion is weaker than some researchers assume. Royzman and Kurzban (2011b) challenge Chapman et al.’s (2009) claim that moral disgust is truly (non-metaphorically) disgust. In a lively exchange, Chapman and Anderson (2011a) respond and Royzman and Kurzban (2011a) press their critique further. In the spirit of Robert Frank (1988, 2011), Valdesolo and DeSteno (2011) argue that some morally unappealing emotions such as jealousy may play indirect roles in promoting social welfare and thus stabilize moral systems. Finally, Adina Roskies (2011) poses a puzzle about empathy based on apparently contradictory lessons from studies of psychopathy and autism. The next six articles examine (or resist examining) moral emotions within a dual-process framework (Sloman, 1996; Chaiken & Trope, 1999) according to which automatic and controlled processes exert distinctive, and in some cases competing, influences on moral judgment. Van den Bos, Muller, and Damen (2011) document effects of behavioral disinhibition on

People often appear to conflate anger and disgust, seemingly using expressions of both emotions interchangeably in response to moral violations. Yet, anger and moral disgust differ in their antecedents and consequences. These empirical observations are associated with two broad theoretical perspectives: one describes expressions of moral disgust as metaphors for anger, whereas the other describes moral disgust as functionally distinct from anger. Both accounts have received empirical support from separate and seemingly inconsistent literatures. The present study seeks to resolve this inconsistency by focusing on the different ways moral emotions have been measured. We formalise three theoretical models of moral emotions: one in which expressions of disgust are purely associated with anger (but not physiological disgust), one in which disgust and anger are fully separated and have distinct functions, and an integrative model that accommodates both metaphorical use in language and distinctive function. We test these models on responses to moral violations (four studies; N = 1608). Our results suggest that moral disgust has distinct functions, but that expressions of moral disgust are sometimes used to convey moralistic anger. These findings have implications for the theoretical status and measurement of moral emotions.

With the recent upswing in research interest on the moral implications of disgust, there has been uncertainty about what kind of situations elicit moral disgust and whether disgust is a rational or irrational player in moral decision making. We first outline the benefits of distinguishing between bodily violations (e.g., sexual taboos, such as pedophilia and incest) and nonbodily violations (e.g., deception or betrayal) when examining moral disgust. We review findings from our lab and others' showing that, although many existing studies do not control for anger when studying disgust, disgust at nonbodily violations is often associated with anger and hard to separate from it, while bodily violations more consistently predict disgust independently of anger. Building on this distinction, we present further empirical evidence that moral disgust, in the context of bodily violations, is a relatively primitively appraised moral emotion compared to others such as anger, and also that it is less flexible and less prone to external justifications. Our review and results underscore the need to distinguish between the different consequences of moral emotions.

Punishment facilitates large-scale cooperation among humans, but how punishers, who incur an extra cost of punishment, can successfully compete with non-punishers, who free-ride on the punisher’s policing, poses an evolutionary puzzle. One answer is by coordinating punishment to minimise its cost. Notice, however, that in order to effectively coordinate their punishment, potential punishers must know in advance whether others would also be willing to punish a particular norm violator. Such knowledge might hinder coordination by tempting potential punishers to free-ride on other punishers. Previous research suggests that moral emotions, such as moral outrage and moral disgust, serve as a commitment device and drive people to carry out the costly act of punishment. Accordingly, we tested whether the perception of socially shared condemnation (i.e., knowledge that others also condemn a particular violator) would amplify moral outrage and moral disgust, and diminish empathy for the violator. Study 1 (scenario-based study) revealed that perceived shared condemnation was correlated positively with moral outrage and moral disgust, and negatively with empathy. Study 2 experimentally demonstrated that information indicating that others also condemn a particular norm violation amplified moral outrage. Lastly, Study 3 (autobiographical recall study) confirmed the external validity of the finding.

Determining neurophysiological responses to physical and moral disgust elicitors-A systematic literature review.

A commentary on Neural correlates of moral sensitivity in obsessive compulsive disorder by Harrison, B. J., Pujol, J., Soriano-Mas, C., Hernandez-Ribas, R., Lopez-Sola, M., Ortiz, H., et al. (2012). Arch. Gen. Psychiatry 69, 741–749. In a recent issue of Archives of General Psychiatry, Harrison et al. (2012) provided the first evidence of neural correlates on moral sensitivity in Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (OCD), which is believed to be heightened in this clinical population. This study aimed to explore whether subjects with OCD showed increased ventromedial prefrontal and orbitofrontal cortex responses in a functional magnetic resonance imaging study of difficult moral decision-making. These brain areas were found to be active on healthy humans experiencing moral emotions such as indignation or moral disgust (see Moll et al., 2005 for a complete review). The results are striking in so far as they show that patients with OCD demonstrated significantly increased activation of the ventral frontal cortex, particularly of the medial orbitofrontal cortex. Moreover, significant positive associations were documented between the patients' DY-BOCS ratings of total symptom severity and the activation of the anterior insula (Harrison et al., 2012). The evidence from this study offers the opportunity to discuss two emerging related issues. First, it adds further support on a clinical model to the view that visceral and moral disgust share, at least in part, common neural and cognitive mechanisms (Jones, 2007). In fact, OCD is also characterized by an altered representation of disgust at sensory (Tsao and McKay, 2004) and affective (Shapira et al., 2003) level. Thus, their heightened moral sensitivity might reflect an enhanced disgust for immoral outcomes. This hypothesis is supported by previous evidence coming from neuroimaging studies. For instance, an overlapped recruitment of ventromedial prefrontal and orbitofrontal cortices have already been reported during the processing of both sensorial and moral disgust (Moll et al., 2005). A similar result was announced for the insula. For example, Wicker et al. (2003) have discovered that the anterior insula was activated both during the observation of disgusted facial expressions and during the feeling of disgust evoked by unpleasant odors. Moreover, Sanfey et al. (2003) found an activation of this region in healthy subjects who received unfair monetary offers, which are known to elicit moral disgust. All these findings suggest that, the heightened moral sensitivity in OCD can be grounded on the same neural mechanisms responsible for their altered sensitivity to outcomes which can induce sensory and emotional disgust (Shapira et al., 2003; Tsao and McKay, 2004). Another remarkable aspect deserving some discussion is that OCD participants were not different from healthy control subjects in the subjective rating of the moral dilemmas, despite the difference reported in neural activation. This result, which probably argues some distinction between the patients' increased neural responses and their perceived emotional experience during a moral dilemma (Harrison et al., 2012), can be discussed calling into question the interoceptive awareness which might be deranged in this clinical population. This suggestion is supported by the recent evidence of a negative correlation between interoception and anxiety (Pollatos et al., 2009), which is known to affects OCD. Moreover, Zaki et al. (2012) have recently found a common cluster of activation for interoception and emotional experience in the anterior insula, a region clearly deranged in this clinical population (Song et al., 2011).

Recently, many critics have argued that disgust is a morally harmful emotion, and that it should play no role in our moral and legal reasoning. Here we defend disgust as a morally beneficial moral capacity. We believe that a variety of liberal norms have been inappropriately imported into both moral psychology and ethical studies of disgust: disgust has been associated with conservative authors, values, value systems, and modes of moral reasoning that are seen as inferior to the values and moral emotions that are endorsed by liberal critics. Here we argue that the meta-ethical assumptions employed by the critics of disgust are highly contentious and in some cases culture bound. Given this, we should avoid adopting simplified meta-ethical positions in experimental moral psychology, as these can skew the design and interpretation of experiments, and blind us to the potential value of moral disgust harnessed in the service of liberal ends.

The sense of responsibility can play an important role in the behavior of college students involved in cyberbullying incidents. Research on the relationship between the sense of responsibility and bystander behavior in cyberbullying is limited. This study examined the relationship between the sense of responsibility and prosocial cyberbystander behavior in cyberbullying, focusing on investigating compassion as a mediator and moral emotions (i.e., moral outrage and moral disgust) as a moderator in this relation. A total of 1,114 Chinese college students (35.4% female), aged from 18 to 23 years (M = 19.55, SD = 1.05), completed an online questionnaire. Results showed that compassion played a partial mediating role in the relationship between the sense of responsibility and prosocial cyberbystander behavior. Moral outrage moderated the relationship between the sense of responsibility and prosocial cyberbystander behavior. Specifically, among participants with higher levels of moral outrage, the relationships between the sense of responsibility and prosocial cyberbystander behavior became much weaker. These results provide a new direction for promoting prosocial cyberbystander behavior.

Disgust is a basic emotion that increases the organism's survival success by preventing the transfer of pathogens. In this regard, it directs cognitive processes and motivates avoidance behaviors that prevent pathogens from entering the body. Moreover, disgust has many specific characteristics that distinguish it from other basic emotions. Firstly, unlike other basic emotions, it contaminates neutral objects around it and causes difficult-to-change learning. Another specific characteristic of disgust is that it depends on ideational processes. Objects, situations, and behaviors that do not contain pathogens can also cause disgust. In this regard, disgust appears not only as a basic emotion but also as different adaptations in different fields. In this context, two distinct adaptations of disgust stand out: sexual and moral disgust. These two adaptations of disgust benefit from disgust-related behaviors and motivations in different ways. Sexual disgust works as a gene protection mechanism, while moral disgust helps maintain social rules. The specific characteristics of disgust and its effects on cognitive processes such as attention and memory interact. In conclusion, the multifaceted structure of disgust shows that it needs to be studied more in the subfields of psychology. (Strohminger, Philos Compass 9:478-493, 2014) defines disgust as a psychological nebula that needs to be discovered. However, it is observed that disgust has not been adequately addressed. This review aims to comprehensively explore unique characteristics and diverse aspects of disgust, shedding light on its significance from various perspectives. This study underscores the broader understanding of disgust and its pivotal role in psychological research.

Factors associated with COVID-19 vaccination status: A cross-sectional study of California students in higher education

Anger and moral disgust, as the two most important moral emotions, have been studied for decades. However, a limited number of methods were used to measure these emotions, mostly by using similarity evaluation of facial expressions. In the current study, we introduced non-verbal vocalization of these emotions into the application of emotion endorsement measurement, combining with facial expression. 165 undergraduate students participated in the study. By recalling experienced anger or moral disgust event, participants completed a series of similarity evaluations of 36 facial expressions and 32 non-verbal vocal clips retrieved from Radboud Faces Database (RaFD) and non-verbal vocalization corpus of Sauter et. al (2010). Sets of factor analyses and internal consistency analyses were conducted. According to the results and the practicability in lab studies, we finally selected 6 facial expressions/vocal clips for each expression method per emotion respectively. These items will be used in further studies of the current project.

The article first discusses how crime fiction centrally activates moral emotions related to feelings of social trust and social conflicts. The article uses psychological theory to analyse audio-visual fiction, and it takes an evolutionary stance in relation to morality; within film studies, and especially within literary studies, the inspiration from evolutionary studies has been strong in the last decade. Humans are adapted to group living, and emotions linked to fairness have an innate basis. The article then shows how different crime stories activate different stages in Kohlberg’s functional typology of moral systems and how different stages relate to different social systems. Further, a functional description of the various moral emotions is used to characterize crime fictions. The use of moral emotions in crime fiction is exemplified in Oplev’s The Girl with the Dragon Tattoo (2009), angry vigilantism in Fincher’s Se7en (1995) and moral disgust, shame, embarrassment and guilt in the Showtime TV series Dexter (2006–).

COVID-19 vaccination refusal/hesitancy among patients with cancer has been reported to be high. This study aimed to assess vaccination status and attitudes towards COVID-19 vaccines in patients with cancer undergoing active treatment in a single center in Mexico. A cross-sectional, 26-item survey evaluating vaccination status and attitudes towards COVID-19 vaccination was conducted among patients undergoing active cancer treatment. Descriptive statistics were used to analyze the sociodemographic characteristics, vaccination status, and attitudes. X2 tests and multivariate analysis were used to evaluate associations between characteristics and attitudes with adequatevaccination status. Of 201 respondents, 95% had received at least one dose, and 67% had adequate COVID-19 vaccination status (≥ 3 doses). Thirty-six percent of patients had at least one reason for doubting/rejecting vaccination, and the main reason was being afraid of side effects. On multivariate analysis, age ≥ 60years (odds ratio (OR) 3.77), mass media as main source of information on COVID-19 (OR 2.55), agreeing vaccination against COVID-19 is safe in patients with cancer (OR 3.11), and not being afraid of the composition of the COVID-19 vaccines (OR 5.10) statistically increased the likelihood of adequate vaccination status. Our study shows high vaccination rates and positive attitudes towards COVID-19 vaccines, with a significant proportion of patients undergoing active cancer treatment with adequate vaccination status (≥ 3 doses). Older age, use of mass media as main source of COVID-19 information, and positive attitudes towards COVID-19 vaccines were significantly associated with a higher likelihood of adequate COVID-19 vaccination status among patients with cancer.

Studies that distinguish the role of dispositional and situational moral emotions in bullying situations remain limited in the international literature. This work, therefore, aims to analyze the role of dispositional and situational moral emotions in bullying and prosocial behavior in adolescents. Two studies were conducted: a cross-sectional study including 644 adolescents aged 14–18 years (M = 15.6, DT = 1.4) and a repeated measures design including 235 adolescents aged 10–15 years (M = 12.5, DT = 0.9). The objectives of Study 1 were 1) to validate two scales for the situational moral emotions elicited in bullying situations (elevation and moral disgust) and 2) to examine the relationships between dispositional and situational moral emotions and prosocial behavior toward victims and bullying behavior. The results show adequate psychometric properties for both elevation and moral disgust scales. Furthermore, both situational moral emotions are negatively related to bullying behavior, whereas dispositional emotions such as compassion and gratitude have a positive effect on prosocial behavior. Study 2 assessed the prospective relationship between dispositional gratitude and prosocial behavior toward victims and bullying behavior. The results of this study indicate that dispositional gratitude has a positive prospective effect on prosocial behavior towards victims and a negative effect on bullying behavior. In conclusion, the relevance of moral emotions for the prevention of bullying behavior is highlighted and the role that self-transcendent dispositional emotions have on prosocial behavior from the perspective of developmental psychology.