Coups: Different Mechanisms and Their Consequences for Institution Change

It is paradoxical that authoritarian leaders often hold power for long periods of time, despite their states being chronically plagued with rebellion. This tendency has been explained in part by studies that have argued the practice of coup-proofing both increases the mobilizational capacity of dissidents and reduces the military effectiveness of the state (Roessler 2011; Powell 2014b). However, these arguments are lacking on one major respect: though regular armed forces are often allowed to whither when coup-proofing, the state could possess substantial military capabilities in the form of a well-armed and well-trained coup-proofing apparatus. I theorize that a missing part of the coup-proofing and rebellion story is the willingness of autocrats to deploy their paramilitaries. In short, I argue that coup-proofing is more likely to contribute to rebellion when leaders are most hesitant to deploy the units associated with the practice: when coup risk is high. The theory is empirically tested using a global sample for the years 1971-2011. Results indicate that heavily coup-proofed authoritarian regimes do in fact see a considerable increase in civil war likelihood when the risk of a coup is high. In contrast to prior studies, the results also suggests that a stronger coup-proofing apparatus is not associated with rebellion when coup risk is low.

Objective We develop a new measure for selectorate's theory central concept, winning coalition size, using indicators developed by the V-Dem project. Methods To demonstrate the measure's efficacy, we examine its ability to account for government provision of public and private goods, a central prediction in selection theory. The winning coalition measure is compared to eight widely used indicators of regime type in analyses of 30 measures of government policy provision. Results Based on Vuong tests and Akaike information criteria, the new measure generally outperforms the alternative regime measures whether the assessment is across all regimes, within nondemocratic regimes or within democratic settings. Conclusion The new indicator provides an improved tool for testing the nuances of selectorate theory.

A new measure for selectorate’s theory central concept, winning coalition size, is developed using indicators developed by the V-Dem project (Coppedge et al., 2021). To demonstrate the measure’s efficacy, we examine its ability to account for government provision of public and private goods, a central prediction in selection theory. The winning coalition measure is compared to eight widely-used indicators of regime type in analyses of 30 measures of government policy provision. Based on Vuong tests and Akaike information criteria the new measure generally outperforms the alternative regime measures whether the assessment is across all regimes, within non-democratic regimes or within democratic settings. The new indicator provides an improved tool for testing the nuances of selectorate theory.

Military interventions continue to be prevalent in Africa. In the 21st century alone, 14 coups have been successfully staged. Whereas most studies of coup risk examine how militaries are organized or what structural conditions are associated with coups, we take a novel approach. We explore how coalition politics relate to coup risk. It has long been observed that regimes try to hold power by buying off urban consumers. We argue that focusing on urban consumers actually makes regimes more prone to military intervention. Instead, leaders who ally with established rural elites are more effective at thwarting coups. To test our hypothesis, we develop a unique data set of rural political strategies, coding regimes in 44 sub-Saharan countries from 1960 to 2000. Using a continuous-time Cox proportional hazards regression model, we find a robust correlation between policies supportive of rural elites and lower coup risk.

Comment on Shepsle's “On the Size of Winning Coalitions”

Why do states realign their foreign policies toward a major power? Conventional wisdom holds that change in political leadership tends to result in less drastic foreign policy realignment in countries with large winning coalitions. The current study capitalizes on this conventional wisdom by invoking a key insight of the selectorate theory, the non-linear welfare function. Since the welfare of coalition members falls before it rises as the size of winning coalition becomes larger, one should expect the stabilizing effects of winning coalitions to be the weakest for low-to-medium sized winning coalitions. Thus, leadership turnover in countries with middle-sized winning coalitions is expected to result in greater foreign policy realignment than in countries with very large or very small coalitions. We test this theoretical proposition by studying the foreign policies of 154 countries towards China from 1972 to 2015. With newly constructed measures of leadership turnover and winning coalitions size, the evidence supports a non-linear relationship between change in leadership and foreign policy realignment along the continuum of winning coalition size.

Selectorate theory proposes that authoritarian regimes supply fewer public goods than democracies. Smaller winning coalitions make it less costly for autocracies to maintain support among critical groups by providing private goods. Democracies, with large winning coalitions, find it cheaper to provide public goods. In contrast, we argue for a conditional effect of winning coalition size on public good provisions: Many public goods require considerable state capacity to plan, legislate, and implement. Moreover, leaders with short-term horizons are unlikely to invest in public goods that take considerable time to provide. Therefore, our modified selectorate theory suggests that governments will provide public goods if the size of the winning coalition is large enough, state capacity is great enough, and a priori regime durability is long enough. We test our theory on air pollution. While selectorate theory receives little empirical support, our findings cohere with modified selectorate theory. In particular, core democracies—defined as those with large winning coalitions, considerable state capacity, and high regime stability—perform better than autocracies in controlling air pollution.

This article investigates public and private goods provision in two hybrid regimes: Hong Kong and Singapore. We build on the selectorate theory, which analyses all regimes in terms of the size of their leaders’ support coalitions. This research follows a differences-in-differences design, with the exogenous political change in Hong Kong in 1997 as a treatment and Singapore as a control case. This study contributes to the literature in two ways. First, as the aim of the selectorate theory is to transcend traditional regime typologies, a focus on hybrid regimes provides another test of the theory beyond the democratic–authoritarian divide. Second, the distinctive comparative set-up allows us to disentangle the effects of the size of the winning coalition from those of supporter loyalty. The empirical results demonstrate that whilst public goods increase with the winning coalition size, private goods provision is not affected unless accompanied by a change in supporter loyalty.

Kevin Clarke and Randall Stone (2008) offer a methodological critique of some of our tests of the selectorate theory inThe Logic of Political Survival(Bueno de Mesquita et al.2003). We accept their critique of residualization for control variables in those tests, but reject the contention that the size of the winning coalition does not predict the provision of public goods and private benefits. We present new tests that control for elements of democracy other than W and that do not use residualization. These new tests show that selectorate theory is strongly and robustly supported. Our measure of the size of the winning coalition is in the theoretically predicted direction and is statistically significant for 28 out of 31 different public goods and private benefits. Aspects of democracy not contained in the selectorate theory explain less of the variance than does the theory's core factor, namely, winning coalition size, for 25 of the 31 public goods and private benefits.

While peacekeeping’s effects on receiving states have been studied at length, its effects on sending states have only begun to be explored. This article examines the effects of contributing peacekeepers abroad on democracy at home. Recent qualitative research has divergent findings: some find peacekeeping contributes to democratization among sending states, while others find peacekeeping entrenches illiberal or autocratic rule. To adjudicate, we build on recent quantitative work focused specifically on the incidence of coups. We ask whether sending peacekeepers abroad increases the risk of military intervention in politics at home. Drawing on selectorate theory, we expect the effect of peacekeeping on coup risk to vary by regime type. Peacekeeping brings with it new resources which can be distributed as private goods. In autocracies, often developing states where UN peacekeeping remuneration exceeds per-soldier costs, deployment produces a windfall for militaries. Emboldened by new resources, which can be distributed as private goods among the selectorate, and fearing the loss of them in the future, they may act to depose the incumbent regime. In contrast, peacekeeping will have little effect in developed democracies, which have high per-troop costs, comparatively large selectorates, and low ex-ante coup risk. Anocracies, which typically have growing selectorates, and may face distinctive international pressures to democratize, will likely experience reduced coup risk. We test these claims with data covering peacekeeping deployments, regime type, and coup risk since the end of the Cold War. Our findings confirm our theoretical expectations. These findings have implications both for how we understand the impact of participation in peacekeeping – particularly among those countries that contribute troops disproportionately in the post-Cold War era – and for the potential international determinants of domestic autocracy.

Under what conditions do political leaders enact ‘coup-proofing’ strategies? There is a broad consensus in the literature that political leaders who face a higher risk of a coup will employ coup-proofing strategies that reduce the military’s capabilities to organize a coup. A closer look at the theory and empirical analyses of earlier studies, however, suggests that the presumed relationship between coup risk and coup-proofing should be re-examined. Drawing on insights from formal studies of authoritarian power-sharing, this article proposes that political leaders become less likely to initiate coup-proofing efforts as the coup risk increases. The reason is that leaders’ coup-proofing actions in themselves could prompt the military to launch a coup and thus political leaders will hesitate to offend officers when they face a high risk of a coup. The statistical models in this article estimate a latent coup risk by aggregating multiple indicators that capture the military’s willingness and ability to organize a coup. The empirical results strongly support the proposition that coup-proofing efforts taken by leaders decrease as coup risk increases.

Coalition Formation in the Texas Legislature: Issues, Payoffs, and Winning Coalition Size

This chapter examines the effect of institutions on the use of AD measures. While existing research points to a positive relationship between democratic institutions and trade openness in general as well as traditional tariffs (see Sect. 2.1.2), their impact has been tested less extensively for other specific trade policy instruments. This analysis looks at measures of contingent protection, notably AD.

Coalition Formation in the Texas Legislature: Issues, Payoffs, and Winning Coalition Size

Can foreign aid reduce violence in recipient countries? Empirical studies on the aid–conflict nexus have had mixed results. This paper argues that foreign aid can alleviate political violence in the recipient country, especially when it contributes to economic growth. To test this hypothesis, I collected data on aid-receiving countries in Asia from 1980 to 2010 and empirically examined the relationships among development aid, winning coalition size, economic growth, civil wars, and domestic terrorism using a moderated mediation model. I find that the impact of foreign aid on economic growth depends on the size of the winning coalition. Countries with larger winning coalitions tend to have faster economic growth. And consequently, these countries are less susceptible to civil wars and domestic terrorist attacks.