Coups and Punishment in the Constitutional Order

Is the United States polarized? In order to address this question, this dissertation explores three dimensions of political polarization. Three related, but independent, essays on political polarization provide information on questions concerning polarization, First, the studies on polarization themselves appear to be polarized. Chapter 2 focused on reviewing past studies on polarization. Still, one side argues that American citizens are severely polarized, while the other side argues that polarization is an illusion (Abramowitz and Saunders 2008; Abramowitz 2010; Fiorina 2014, 2017; Mason 2016). A sample is carefully chosen from the sociological and political science SCIMAGO rankings. Since almost all measures of polarization used in earlier works can be classified as a single type of polarization, all measures of polarization are coded into four types: issue consistency, issue divergence, affective polarization, and perceived polarization. Based on the systematic review and meta-analysis in Chapter 2, no strong evidence supports the idea of a "polarized America." One interesting finding is that the majority of the studies that produced significant results used ANES data, with a secondary group using the GSS. While there are many differences between the two surveys, the key distinction is the timing of the field surveys. Second, Chapter 3 begins with the premise that political interests will be deeply related to political action, and so will political polarization. For example, recent studies present evidence that political interest can vary depending on the political context (Prior and Bougher 2018). Political interest also ebbs and flows with politically salient events, especially federal elections. In Chapter 3, the focus is whether polarization is a stable characteristic of the electorate, like political interest or partisanship. Previous scholarship emphasizes the "situational" characteristics of interest for change and adaptation to a new environment as opposed to the "static" characteristics of interest (Featherman et al. 1994; Prior and Bougher 2018). Therefore, the research question centers on political polarization, as under the same presumption, the degree of political polarization within the general public is influenced by political interest and electoral circumstance. Using data from two nationally representative surveys, the ANES and the GSS, the level of issue polarization increases similarly in both sets of data, but the patterns of sorting are different. The level of sorting in the ANES fluctuates, whereas instability shows a more dramatic increase in the GSS. In contrast, the overall level of sorting in the ANES is higher than in the GSS. Thus, the difference in the level of polarization between two surveys comes from the timing of the surveys. While the ANES is typically conducted from August to December in the midst of the election campaign, the GSS is typically conducted from February to May. Since the GSS and the ANES surveys do not conduct surveys in non-election years, it is difficult to isolate the effect of elections on the level of polarization. The Pew Research Center conducts annual political polls. Using Pew political surveys, I investigated the difference in the level of polarization between election years and non-election years and between presidential elections and midterm elections. The findings demonstrate that the timing of a survey has a significant effect on the level of polarization (i.e., sorting) in general. This finding suggests that elections are a key determinant of the intensity of the level of polarization, partisan strength, and political views. The level of polarization, like measures of political interest and party affiliation, is not stable. There are fluctuations in the level of polarization that are associated with points in time within the electoral cycle, and citizens are more likely to show more polarized attitudes as a function of the proximity of an election. Chapter 4 focused on the level of polarization at the state level. Studies of polarization have received more attention at the national level due to the difficulty of collecting enough samples. The CCES provides enough samples of between 30,000 and 50,000 individuals every year to make it possible to examine the state level of polarization. In particular, Chapter 4 investigates the relationship between state swing in a presidential election and state polarization. The fourth chapter examined the potential relationship between the phenomenon of state swing or state competitiveness in presidential elections and the state's level of polarization. By concentrating on sorting, the connection between polarization at the state level and swing states, including those that are competitive in presidential elections, is analyzed. Swing states should have more polarization than safe states like California and Texas. Using an independent sample t-test, the degree of polarization between swing states and safe states is significantly different. The effects of polarization on the potential for state swing, or the likelihood that the state will be competitive in presidential elections, are examined. Sorting has a sizable magnitude and significant impact on the probability that a state will change its support in presidential elections, using a logistic model. States are more likely to change their support in presidential elections as the degree of polarization within those states rises or falls. The impact of partisan composition within a state is one of the chapter's more intriguing findings. The findings show that a more balanced partisan composition within a state increases the likelihood of switching support from one party candidate to another in presidential elections and makes the state's presidential elections more competitive. In addition, possible connections might exist between a swing state and a person's degree of polarization. Using the same four categories of swing states, there might be differences in which groups of citizens are more likely to be polarized than others, depending on the state in which they live and the circumstances surrounding the state election. Based on an OLS model, mixed results were obtained regarding the prediction of the impact of the state's electoral circumstances (competition, TV ad spending, and campaign events) and the swing experience on the degree of polarization. The three essays on political polarization in the United States suggest several implications. First, based on meta-analysis in chapters 2 and 3, I concluded that Americans are still not polarized as Fiorina (2018) recently contended. While some types of polarization are, arguably, on the rise and pervasive in the mass public, scholarly findings still do not reach a consensus. It is too early to conclude that the United States is polarized. One of the most challenging aspects of previous and recent research on polarization is that it is almost entirely based on survey data collected in the midst of presidential or midterm elections (i.e., the ANES, the GSS). The campaign season accentuates partisan polarization for the average citizen in a way other times do not. The findings in Chapter 3 follow this notion and suggest that the level of polarization among the mass public can be influenced by external factors such as electoral circumstances. Future research should evaluate the reasons behind each type of polarization and how the political circumstances and the survey instrument may influence measures of political polarization. Also, it should be examined how these conditions affect different political outcomes. Second, scholars should be careful when evaluating polarization at the sub-national level, as shown in Chapter 4. It is easy to conflate the concepts of geographical polarization and state polarization. There are two distinct ideas here. This dissertation shed some light on the distinction between state-level and geographic polarization. It also contributed to clarifying the difference between the state-level concept of polarization and the national one. In conclusion, polarization is a complex concept that demands careful discussion. This dissertation presents several original perspectives and ideas that will be helpful for future studies on political polarization in the United States and other democratic societies.

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The United States has a presidential system, and presidential elections are held every four years. The American presidential election system is an electoral college system. According to the 22nd Amendment to the current U.S. Constitution, the term of office of the President of the United States is four years, which can be re-elected. The presidential candidates are Republican candidate Donald Trump and Democratic opponent Joe Biden. Because they come from different political parties, their ruling ideas are very different. This topic is to discuss the influence of American election.The two presidential candidates have different political positions and administrative plans on key issues such as national economy, immigration, education, etc. The election of different candidates and their different ruling styles and policies will affect different development models of the global economy. This will also have an impact on America's own economy.

Approaching the May 2023 Turkish presidential and assembly elections seemed to promise a challenging situation for the incumbent Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP). The significant influx of refugees since the onset of the Syrian civil war introduced a reactive public agenda marked by occasional violent clashes in neighbourhoods with high refugee populations. This eventually spilled over to the national political agenda. A new political party, the Victory Party (Zafer Partisi, ZP), emerged with an anti-Syrian sentiment platform, gaining traction amongst young voters and expanding its electoral appeal. After the 2018 elections, the opposition parties united under the Nation Alliance (Millet İttifakı, MI), bringing together social democrats, liberals, nationalists and pro-Islamist conservatives to broaden the opposition's appeal and resistance to the ruling AKP. Additionally, the Erdoğan government's policy performance was also deteriorating. The economy deteriorated due to the President's reliance on strict monetary controls and disregard for market dynamics, leading to a depreciating national currency. The opposition's control of the largest cities since 2019 limited the cabinet's ability to regulate projects and manage clientelist networks. The resulting insecurity and vulnerability tarnished the government's image as a stability and good governance provider. The twin earthquakes on 6 February, 3 months before the elections, exacerbated the administration's failure to respond effectively to the disaster. The affected southeastern provinces, home to nearly 10% of the population, suffered extensive loss of life and infrastructure damage. The AKP's 21-year rule seemed to be ending due to poor performance in economics and democratic governance, leading to a potential electoral defeat. However, Erdoğan won the presidency in the second round, and his People's Alliance (Cumhur İttifakı, CI) secured a comfortable margin for controlling the Turkish Grand National Assembly (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi, TBMM).1 The question remains: what factors contributed to Erdoğan's remarkable survival against all odds? Who were Erdoğan's supporters, and on what issue bases did they cast their votes for him?2 I examine the factors contributing to Erdoğan's re-election using individual-level post-election data and I argue that his success was primarily based on his performance in various policy areas, such as protecting moral values and easing the use of turban in public spaces, as well as his handling of security and foreign policy. However, his performance in other areas, such as resolving the Kurdish problem, reducing inflation, providing economic welfare and addressing the LGBTQ community's demands, was perceived as relatively low. This duality in his performance allowed him to strategically shift the agenda in favour of more advantageous issue areas, which were favoured by large nationalist and pro-Islamist constituencies. By successfully positioning himself on these key issues, Erdoğan secured a considerable electoral gain. Optimistic prospective rather than retrospective pocketbook evaluations and support from low-educated middle-to-older age groups, right-wing voters and those who are not problematized by the state of Turkish governance all significantly contributed to Erdoğan's support. However, ethnic and sectarian minority groups, such as Kurds and Alevis, were negatively predisposed to voting for him. The misinformation campaign against the opposition appears to be ineffective in shaping the Erdoğan vote. Turkey has been designated as a candidate for EU membership, but its accession negotiations have been halted since 2018 on account of worries about the rule of law and democratic values. The two election candidates cannot be easily categorized as pro- or anti-EU. Although Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, the opposition candidate, was hesitant towards the EU, he promised to regain trust in Western allies, which was unprecedentedly low. Erdoğan's broader alliance now comprises partners with more conservative right-wing and pro-Islamist viewpoints, further constraining his capacity to adopt a more Western-oriented foreign policy approach. Erdoğan's eventual victory reinforces his control over Turkish politics, which does not bode well for enhancing Western relations.3 The 2018 elections sparked speculation about an early election in the country. The economic crisis, which significantly depreciated the Turkish lira against the US dollar, further fuelled this expectation. However, the politicization of the financial crisis is mainly due to the AKP candidates' significant losses in the 2019 local elections. This gave new momentum to the opposition and provided potential challengers to Erdoğan's electoral dominance. The 2019 local elections resulted in significant losses for the incumbent CI in major metropolitan areas like Istanbul and Ankara, which had been under conservative control since the mid-1990s.4 Furthermore, the main opposition party, the Republican People's Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP), and independent candidates secured victories in coastal municipalities across the Aegean, Thrace and Mediterranean regions. Although the CI maintained a dominant electoral appeal, securing over 50% of the votes for municipal council and mayoral elections nationwide, they lost control of the largest metropolitan centres. Due to the fragmented support for opposition parties, an alliance was seen as the only viable option for the 2023 elections. The opposition vote base grew in 2018 when the Good Party (İyi Parti, IYIP) entered the electoral scene after splitting from the MHP, attracting centrist AKP supporters who were disenchanted with the party. Although the IYIP held only five seats in the TBMM, CHP leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu helped by loaning 15 CHP representatives. This allowed IYIP to form a parliamentary group and avoid collecting signatures for their party leader, Meral Akşener, to run against Erdoğan in the presidential election. The IYIP joined the MI with the CHP, SP and DP in the TBMM elections, securing 9.96% of the vote, whilst Akşener garnered 7.3% (Table 1). The opposition alliance attracted conservative voters away from the AKP-MHP, with many choosing the more centrist IYIP and other right-of-centre parties like the pro-Islamist SP. As the 2023 elections approached, new opportunities arose to expand MI further. Two influential figures from the AKP, the former foreign affairs minister and prime minister Ahmet Davutoğlu and the former foreign affairs minister and deputy prime minister responsible for the economy Ali Babacan, each established their own political parties, the Future Party (Gelecek Partisi, GP) and the Democracy and Progress Party (Demokrasi ve Atılım Partisi, DevaP), respectfully. These high-profile exits from the AKP were interpreted as a sign that disenchanted AKP supporters could be courted. Ultimately, both GP and DevaP joined the MI, forming a so-called 'six-legged table' comprising three splinter parties from AKP and MHP—IYIP, GP and Deva—one pro-Islamist SP, one minor centre-right DP and the main opposition social-democratic CHP. MI's main promise was a return to a fortified parliamentary system, dismantling Erdoğan's presidential system. A long and detailed list of policy promises primarily focused on a rational economic policy and reformed merit-based public sector.5 Kurdish voters' support was also crucial, given the expectation of a close presidential race in 2023. The Kurdish vote already held significant weight with many parliamentarians in the TBMM. The Peoples' Equality and Democracy Party (Halkların Eşitlik ve Demokrasi Partisi, DEMP) decided after lengthy negotiations and the Labor and Freedom Alliance's inner deliberation against fielding a separate presidential candidate, as this individual would have no chance of triumphing over the other major contenders. In this context, the implied support of the DEMP could be instrumental in determining the election's eventual winner. However, given the nationalist sensitivities and ties of the Kurdish parties with the Kurdish Workers' Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê, PKK), considered a terrorist organization by the Turkish state, the United States and the EU amongst other states, any covert or direct appeal via the political parties and their representatives in the TBMM carried considerable political risks that could backfire amongst certain electoral constituencies. Despite the Constitutional Court's threat of closure of the Peoples' Democratic Party (Halkların Demokratik Partisi, HDP), the party refused to sever any ties with the PKK. The MI argued that the HDP should be treated like any other legal party and engaged in official or unofficial talks with them. The AKP-MHP campaign, which continued to associate the HDP with the PKK, deterred the MI, particularly the IYIP leadership, from further engaging with the HDP. Although the opposition united against Erdoğan's candidacy in 2023, this unity did not last throughout the campaign. The internal disagreements within the opposition alliance significantly aided Erdoğan's success in the 2023 elections. Opposition leadership competition garnered attention equal to economic crises and natural disasters. The opposition could not easily identify a presidential candidate. Negotiations for the alliance's presidential candidate collapsed a month after the earthquake (see Baruh and Çarkoğlu, 2024). IYIP, the second-largest party in the alliance, expressed dissatisfaction with choosing a winning candidate for the upcoming presidential election. They argued that Kılıçdaroğlu would not secure the presidency if nominated and advocated finding an alternative candidate, suggesting the names of Istanbul and Ankara's metropolitan mayors. Both mayors, CHP members, hesitated to challenge their party leader. The opposition alliance's chances improved with the addition of Ankara and Istanbul's mayors as Kılıçdaroğlu's running mates. However, the alliance's co-operative and competitive dynamics were severely damaged, ultimately hindering a successful campaign. The economic crisis after the 2018 elections was predicted to cause an early election before the crisis's full impact hit. Turkey's economy rebounded strongly after COVID-19, with 5.6% growth in 2022, down from 11.4% in 2021. Exports, investment and manufacturing activities all lost momentum, and the deteriorating external environment and heterodox monetary policies caused the economy to slow down. Despite the central bank's estimated intervention of $108 billion, the Turkish lira fell by 30% in 2022.6 Inflation, which was 20.3% in 2018, escalated to 64% by 2022. Despite the economy's negative impact on the incumbent CI and Erdoğan's electoral chances, the opposition MI's internal issues were the main focus. A major natural disaster disrupted the election agenda, diverting the nation's focus from the incumbent's shortcomings and concentrating more on pressing survival issues. On 6 February, 2023, two major earthquakes significantly impacted 11 provinces, affecting approximately 16.4% of the population and 9.4% of the economy. Direct losses from earthquakes amounted to $34.2 billion, and reconstruction needs could double that amount. Earthquakes exacerbated the delicate macro-financial landscape. The World Bank acknowledged that pre-election spending and reconstruction efforts could promote growth, which is projected to exceed 3% by the end of 2023.7 Indeed, the country's overall GDP growth was 4.5% in 2023. Despite the economic difficulties, the incumbent Erdoğan maintained control over the reconstruction efforts. He used the earthquake's aftermath to regain credibility by providing economic relief, especially as the election neared. Last-minute wage increases and early retirement proposals were implemented to attract key voter groups.8 Erdoğan's campaign relied heavily on his ability to control the media. Turkey ranked 165th out of 180 countries in 2023 in the World Press Freedom Index, dropping from 100th in 2002.9 As such, the country is a typical example of competitive authoritarian regimes that allow for some competition and limited information access in the electoral sphere. However, in these closely orchestrated elections, the cards appeared stacked to favour the incumbent's continued rule (Bermeo, 2016). Independent journalism in these regimes is severely constrained. Media outlets face pressure through arrests, assaults, threats, fines and censorship. Websites and social media platforms are also targeted by trolls. Pro-regime media bias towards favourable coverage of the ruling party leads to a significant disparity in information access for voters (Levitsky and Way, 2010). Opposition's media coverage in May 2023 was limited compared to the ruling alliance and its candidate.10 Erdoğan's messages aimed to distance him from the opposing side, polarizing both ideologically and affectively to bolster nationalist conservative support. Whilst ideological polarization may be providing voters with clear choices (Barber and McCarty, 2015), the growth of social distancing, animosity and incivility amongst political factions is damaging to a healthy democracy. Affective polarization erodes trust, impedes co-operation and leads to discriminatory behaviour towards opposing partisans outside the political sphere (Iyengar et al., 2019). Wagner (2021) ranked Turkey as one of the countries with the highest levels of affective polarization worldwide. Erdoğan's discourse provides clear reasons for escalating affective polarization in Turkey. Often, he claimed the opposition worked with the PKK separatists. Erdoğan claimed during a Konya rally that the opposition follows PKK's Kandil leadership whilst his People's Alliance obeys God's instructions.11 He presented a fabricated video of Murat Karayilan, a co-founder of the PKK, endorsing Kılıçdaroğlu in a rally to prove alleged collaboration. Erdogan's claim of opposition being anti-Islamic and pro-LGBTQ sparked conservative Islamist sentiments.12 Although the EU did not occupy a significant space in the election campaign, Erdoğan claimed Kılıçdaroğlu to be a 'puppet of the West' to complement his portrayal of him as an unpatriotic collaborator with Turkey's nemeses.13 The opposition has similarly spread false information to stereotype refugees and migrants negatively. Kılıçdaroğlu adopted a nationalistic tone in the second round to appeal to voters influenced by Erdoğan's forceful campaign, accusing Erdoğan of bringing 10 million refugees into Turkey and committing himself to returning the Syrians back to Syria if elected. However, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees reports that the actual number of refugees in the country is approximately 4 million.14 Although both sides used these misinformation messages, it is unclear to what extent different party constituencies found them convincing. Polarized opinions on both ends have intensified the deep rifts surrounding the nature of Turkey's political institutions. One group believes that Turkey is an autocratic regime with oppressive policies, biased media and unfair election practices. The other group sees Turkey as a thriving democracy with considerable influence in global politics. Consequently, the level of satisfaction with the current political system is anticipated to have a varying impact on voter preferences in the upcoming presidential election. In the first round of the presidential election, the sitting President, Erdoğan, and the opposition CHP's candidate, Kılıçdaroğlu, competed against Muharrem İnce, who was the MI candidate in the 2018 election, and Sinan Oğan, a former MHP parliamentarian (see Table 1). İnce's campaign aimed at the opposition rather than the incumbent alliance. He withdrew from the competition 3 days before the election day due to claims regarding his financial status and personal life. The late withdrawal resulted in over 230,000 votes being wasted as his name remained on the ballots. Oğan was part of the Ancestral Alliance (Ata İttifakı, AtaI), a nationalist-conservative group with the ZP and Justice Party (Adalet Partisi, AP). He received over 2.8 million votes (5.2%) and backed Erdoğan in the second round, causing the alliance to disband. The initial round of the presidential election yielded a turnout rate of 87.04%. Turnout was notably higher in the western provinces. The low voter turnout in East and Southeast Anatolia, where most Kurdish voters supporting the opposition candidate resided, suggests that low turnout in these regions mainly hurt the opposition. The turnout in the second round was approximately three percentage In the second round, Kılıçdaroğlu his votes but remained million votes The turnout in and southeastern was the opposition's The vote received by Erdoğan in the 2023 elections in the second was nearly to the he received in the 2018 elections Kılıçdaroğlu a in the first round of 2023 compared to the MI candidate Muharrem in 2018 This suggests that a considerable number of who for HDP candidate and IYIP candidate Akşener in 2018 have their support to Kılıçdaroğlu in 2023, the opposition votes his Sinan of Erdoğan may have the in Erdoğan's However, the of after ZP and both of the opposition candidate Kılıçdaroğlu suggests that Oğan may not be in control of his supporters in the second pressure Erdoğan's campaign in the second round, Kılıçdaroğlu's campaign adopted an nationalistic and discourse to attract and ZP voters and promised to return Syrian refugees to their home country. This appeal to the nationalists have worked against both the Kurdish voters and his CHP supporters to not vote in the second of voting behaviour in Turkey are on based on and economic voting to Turkish politics, which is by a dominant and that controls a and state The comprising mainly and is and the In the Republican the is by and a nationalist The is a that the efforts and and ethnic with and The bases of the are to into an after the AKP's of the state and of this in voting behaviour is found in with a pro-Islamist conservative amongst relatively in the of large metropolitan cities and who to support the right-of-centre pro-Islamist and nationalist The central constituencies have relatively higher and values A significant of economic evaluations has also been with and the use of misinformation in and social media is with for vote choices and the democratic in the country over more than a during Erdoğan's presidential vote are also to not only on evaluations of performance in different policy areas but also on the overall satisfaction with the Turkish democracy an into Erdoğan was to secure a winning I on a and a post-election One that from these data is that performance evaluations across 15 issue areas a issues are considered when not based on the of LGBTQ and Kurdish issues is relatively low. and economic welfare are closely by national Despite on conservative and nationalist issues such as the use of turban and in public spaces, Syrian refugees or moral values these are of The of issues increases from to as the campaign but back to the initial as the public in The performance evaluations of Erdoğan's are The first together issues that favour the which has relatively higher evaluations compared to the second which together issues the opposition with a relatively performance This is strongly with foreign policy and as well as conservative like the turban issue and the of moral LGBTQ and Kurdish issues, which have the and economic issues such as the of economic welfare and bringing which have amongst the performance all in the second suggesting that this is the that together issues that favour the opposition. These evaluations also a with AKP voters significantly higher The performance are higher for the first for both the AKP and CHP the AKP, the the two is than for the CHP. and of economic evaluations for the and be used to economic voting a prospective evaluations of or pocketbook are more during the 2023 campaign from to May 2023 and during the post-election in Turkey than retrospective (see also 2024). The retrospective evaluations negative and evaluations from to but significantly in the post-election AKP supporters are more and CHP supporters are more than the overall In the of performance evaluations gave Erdoğan a chance to his losses in one of issues, the Syrian Kurdish and issues, with in relatively evaluations in foreign national security and conservative issues such as the turban use in public These performance evaluations also a deep providing an to the in Erdoğan's favour via evaluations also a and to be relatively which provides more for reducing the negative influence of retrospective on the the two candidates in the second round of the May 2023 presidential election, who Erdoğan's voters is no the two but age was a significant in the election, with relatively voters to vote for high and level is already these voters are relatively low voters who are high and are significantly more to vote for the opposition candidate, In to in or in different from of the metropolitan centres. and ethnic of and Kurds are than the Turkish to vote for As the of the the to vote for Erdoğan also to the end of the are significantly more to vote for the prospective pocketbook some amongst the economic As prospective evaluations of the the of voting for Erdoğan the performance of the Erdoğan on the economic before the elections, this finding his electoral Erdoğan's to the economic of the by the wage and providing early retirement to a significant group of to have the damaging influence of retrospective the appeal of the promises for the which relatively more prospective appears to his the two performance the first those issue areas with that favour the the of voting for The of this impact is the largest amongst all Erdoğan's on foreign and security policies and issues for the conservative constituencies gave his campaign an over evaluations in the second which is over different issues not to have affected the vote towards Erdoğan the misinformation claim that opposition alliance the the claim that opposition alliance has entered into with a terrorist who are more with the the Turkish democracy to to vote for the Kılıçdaroğlu voters are more to be amongst the relatively This finding is in with an by that Turkish voters who are on the winning and to in the performance of the country's polarization in the evaluations of the of the political Although the overall level of satisfaction with democracy does not to be high or the of the the in these evaluations attract those who are to vote for in shaping vote opposition party and The expectation of improved performance evaluations in these areas may have Erdoğan's focus on security and foreign policy. The performance foreign policy and security as well as other issues for conservative have a significant impact on the to Erdoğan over that the vote voters who not have a high or higher are more to vote for Kurdish and sectarian of were both negatively predisposed to vote for After controlling for and no of areas or the of metropolitan Erdoğan's vote from right-of-centre voters who high democratic has over the Erdoğan appears to attract voters who are with the Turkish regime of Erdoğan voters are more and Kılıçdaroğlu voters are The misinformation campaign claims the opposition with a organization or supporting the LGBTQ agenda did not have a significant impact on the vote Erdoğan and were not due to issues on the LGBTQ demands, Syrian refugees or the of against as to in economic policy. The the issues the of the Kurdish problem, or the the and more in determining the vote Erdoğan and the presidential system in Turkey was by the those who favoured it The opposition on the issue of the presidential system and its for all However, the of the May 2023 elections it that Turkey to a parliamentary system Erdoğan his is that these elections were but not The of and on democratic and the rule of law are to the the opposition on the and Erdoğan on the winning for campaign on the country's agenda. However, the factors the Erdoğan vote remained Erdoğan relied on his conservative constituencies with low-educated performance in of issues conservative security and foreign policy helped him The election's had for Turkey's democratic and foreign policy Erdoğan adopt a rational economic policy to economic with and growth before the elections. to his due to political like the Istanbul and could his leading to more in economic and other policy areas to opposition these policy areas, security and foreign policy are to occupy an space due to his already credibility and success in the face of his conservative his victory and the resulting over all Erdoğan is to of his and new foreign policy right-wing in is also to more to the other as Turkey's democratic to which is for Erdoğan, who on his conservative to control of the Turkish Grand National in a of the status and continued on the a new electoral of to Erdoğan's is that this from the of and election a new of with the Erdoğan democratic the opposition leadership does not to their for democratic are

THE STORY OF AMERICAN STATE BUILDING is one in which crisis, once episodic, has become a routine feature of American politics. At the heart of this development is the modern executive: emergency powers are presidential powers. The principal objective of this article is to highlight institutional developments since the late 1960s that framed the Donald Trump administration's actions during the COVID-19 pandemic and currently roil the American state: the expansion of administrative power in the White House, which is largely unconstrained by the institutional imperatives of the bureaucracy, Congress, or state governments, and the emergence of the modern executive as the repository of party responsibility, with both Democrats and Republicans dependent on presidents for messaging, fundraising, mobilization, and programmatic action. Together, these developments form a dynamic of executive-centered partisanship—a merging of partisanship and executive prerogative characterized by presidential unilateralism, social activism, and polarizing struggles about national identity that divide the nation by race, ethnicity, and religion. Our account of executive-centered partisanship and how it affected the Trump administration's response to COVID-19 sheds new light on contemporary crisis management and the political nature of administrative power. Other presidents would have responded differently, perhaps with greater success in stemming the spread of the virus; other presidents might have attempted to centralize administrative power more aggressively in fighting the pandemic, rather than deflecting responsibility to states and private entities. Nevertheless, Trump's actions were not irresolute. They were defined by a purposeful pursuit of partisan objectives: a denigration of bureaucratic expertise and an attack on the “deep state”; the politicization and racialization of federal administrative procedures to crack down on legal and undocumented immigration; a campaign of “law and order” to quell civil rights demonstrations; and a punitive form of federalism, defined by partisan retaliation against “blue states.” Contrary to dominant analyses that paint an administration in disarray, we argue that the Trump administration responded to the crisis through a tactical redeployment of national administrative power to fulfill partisan goals, within a party system beholden to executive power.11 Nicholas F. Jacobs, Desmond King, and Sidney M. Milkis, “Building a Conservative State: Partisan Polarization and the Redeployment of Administrative Power,” Perspectives on Politics, 17 (June 2019): 453–469. As such, we conclude that given the current political and institutional context, American presidents are less likely to offer unifying leadership during national crises, or to suffer the political consequences for failing to do so. Instead of subjecting his party to the “blue wave” many Democrats hoped for, Trump's polarizing leadership agitated a highly mobilized and fiercely contested election that sharpened, rather than ameliorated, partisan conflict. Republicans did better than pre-election prognostications implied down ballot, where they gained 11 seats in the House and maintained control of most state legislatures. Moreover, Trump's term in office enabled Republicans to solidify a conservative majority in the courts. As a result, his successor, Joe Biden, came into office having to navigate public health and economic crisis with a bare majority in the Senate, statehouses and governors more deeply divided than Congress, and a judiciary in which 28 percent of all sitting judges were appointed by Trump, including three new justices on the U.S. Supreme Court. Most tellingly, despite his personal defeat, Trump reigned over his party and reveled in the adulation of its base supporters. In short, the American state offers modern presidents not only the opportunity to strengthen their commitment to partisan tactics under the cover of national emergencies, but also the power to do so without the traditional constraints of party, Congress, and the states. That this strategy mobilized the Republican base and did not arouse a national repudiation of the president's leadership is evidence of the power bestowed on the modern presidency to advance partisan objectives in a deeply divided nation. The article proceeds as follows: First, we argue that while the government's response to COVID-19 is an exceptional case, scholars often learn much about the operating dynamics of the American state by exploring how crises shape and transform certain governing commitments. Students of American politics have long argued that national crises have been central to major political developments. Therefore, the absence of transformative change in the wake of the COVID-19 crisis—the stubborn persistence of the polarizing struggles over American identity that have intensified since the late 1960s—poses hard challenges to this prevailing perspective. Second, we argue that executive-centered partisanship explains the discrepancy between received wisdom and the contemporary battle for the services of the administrative state. We identify three ways in which the Trump administration's actions revealed and reinforced the dysfunctionalism of executive-centered partisanship during COVID-19: the delegitimization of bureaucratic expertise in partisan politics; the decay of constitutional forms that sustain the division and separation of powers; and the politicization of administrative procedures and policy implementation, now central to the partisan struggle to contend with a diversifying and politically fragmented America. Each of these factors, we argue, is symptomatic of the political pathologies that fester under executive-centered partisanship. We conclude with an analysis of Trump's legacy and its effect on the first few months of Biden's presidency. We do not mean to suggest that Biden's leadership is equivalent to Trump's, or that the Democratic and Republican Parties share equal blame for routinizing presidential partisanship. Not only does the base of the Republican Party not apologize for violent insurrection and embrace conspiratorial tales about election fraud, Republican Party leaders in Congress and the states openly question foundational rules and precedent for short-term advantage. Nevertheless, from the early days of his presidency, Biden has struggled to escape from the cultural and institutional forces embedding executive-centered partisanship in American democracy. Despite claims to the contrary, Biden's early performance in office, especially with respect to the COVID-19 crisis, has reinforced the essential features of presidential partisanship.22 Nicholas F. Jacobs and Sidney M. Milkis, “Get Out of the Way: Joe Biden, the U.S. Congress, and Executive-Centered Partisanship during the President's First Year in Office,” The Forum 19, no. 4 (2021): 709–744. Trump's presidency, therefore, has further fused partisanship and executive administration, fanning, rather than dousing, the flames of social discord, all while testing the “resilience” of American democracy.33 Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt, How Democracies Die (New York: Broadway Books, 2019). Emergencies have routinely engaged the potential power of the American state and served as a rallying cry to unify the nation. Yet the public health and economic crises wrought by COVID-19 revealed how the worst emergency since the Great Depression failed to free American politics and government from the conditions that deeply divided the nation. Therefore, there is a need to distinguish COVID-19 from previous crises in American political development, and to reconsider the ways in which earlier emergency responses have affected the development of the American state. To do so, we place the emergence of COVID-19 as a national crisis within a richer historical context, one that accounts for the secular development of a politicized administrative state and the deterioration of partisan organizations. Likewise, although the COVID-19 pandemic has been unique in many ways, it is a telling case for understanding the underlying factors that influence the partisan imperatives to use public crises and the authority they confer for partisan advantage. Indeed, unlike other crises fabricated for partisan objectives—for example, the “war on drugs” that Richard Nixon declared in 1971—COVID-19 posed and proved a dire threat to public health. Paradoxically, the Trump administration sought to exploit the public health emergency, even as it denied its severity. As a result, COVID-19 deepened a political crisis that for decades had politicized the administrative state, subjecting it to a contest between liberals and conservatives for its services. Our analysis takes a broader understanding of the American state. The idea of a “state” cannot be encompassed by Max Weber's definition of “a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory.”44 Max Weber, “Politics as Vocation,” in H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, eds. and trans., From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), 77–128 (originally published 1919). Especially in the United States, with its fragmentation of power, the state should be understood as “negotiated arrangements between the central government and powerful subnational units, patterns of competition and contestation among political parties, and relations among ‘public’ and ‘private’ providers of social welfare.”55 Desmond King and Robert C. Lieberman, “Review: Ironies of State Building: A Comparative Perspective on the American State,” World Politics 61 (July 2009): 547–588, at 549. The American state is not easily characterized as weak or strong—its power derives from a centralizing ambition amid a complex system of institutions that seeks to cultivate or impose a specific type of American community. This American state is a legacy of unintended consequences, historical contingency, and the unique position of the presidency in the constitutional order. In particular, the rise of the modern state, especially in a political culture that presumes to proscribe centralized power, is inextricably connected to American wars and domestic emergencies, which are frequently characterized as the moral equivalent of wars. Unlike some other republican charters, the U.S. Constitution does not have formal provisions that establish prerogative executive power in times of emergency.66 For example, Article 16 of the French Constitution explicitly allows the president to take exceptional measures “where the institutions of the Republic, the independence of the Nation, the integrity of its territory or the fulfillment of its international commitments are under serious and immediate threat” (see https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/France_2008). This provision was an important template of the Fifth Republic, formed in 1958, which transformed a parliamentary into a presidential system. However, crises have created opportunities for presidents to cut through the normal working arrangements of American politics. The central role of the presidency as a vanguard of institutional change has long been understood by scholars; furthermore, territorial expansion, globalization, and the nationalization of American political culture have encouraged the consolidation of an executive-centered state. The imperative to act—especially when confronted with the existential possibility of the state's destruction—leads to creative extensions of existing administrative power and social policy.77 Suzanne Mettler, Soldiers to Citizen: The G.I. Bill and the Making of the Greatest Generation (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005); William J. Barber, Designs within Disorder: Franklin D. Roosevelt, the Economists, and the Shaping of American Economic Policy, 1933–1945 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Karen Orren and Stephen Skowronek, “Regimes and Regime Building in American Government: A Review of Literature on the 1940s,” Political Science Quarterly 113 (Winter, 1998): 689–702; and Sheldon D. Pollack, War, Revenue, and State Building; Financing the Development of the American State (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2009). Emergencies are not only instrumental in episodic bouts of executive aggrandizement; crises and presidential emergency powers have also entrenched the American state's more permanent features.88 Robert P. Saldin, War, the American State, and Politics since 1898 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010). Especially during major episodes of bellicosity, the terms of political conflict are redefined, and wartime presidents are central actors in defining these terms. Indeed, David Mayhew has written that wars “seem to be capable of generating whole new political universes.”99 David R. Mayhew, “Wars and American Politics,” Perspectives on Politics 3 (September 2005): 473–493, at 473. All-consuming emergencies open up space for presidents to act unilaterally, permitting political outcomes in both foreign and domestic policy that are largely inconceivable absent the nationalizing and centralizing tendencies of national crises.1010 William G. Howell, Saul P. Jackman, and Jon C. Rogowski, The Wartime President: Executive Influence and the Nationalizing Politics of Threat (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013). As John Lapinski demonstrates, “crises often delegitimize existing government policies that are directly and, in some cases, indirectly linked to the event.”1111 John S. Lapinski, “Policy Substance and Performance in American Lawmaking, 1877–1994,” American Journal of Political Science 52 (April 2008): 235–251, at 238. Although Congress and the courts do not vanish during protracted states of crisis or war, “modern presidents are undoubtedly the preeminent actors.”1212 Douglas L. Kriner, After the Rubicon: Congress, Presidents, and the Politics of Waging War (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010). “Reconstructive presidents,” Stephen Skowronek argues, can bring about new political orders, but they typically do so only when the prevailing regime is in disarray—after the extant regime's internal weaknesses are exposed, often because it cannot contend with governing exigencies.1313 Stephen Skowronek, The Politics Presidents Make: Leadership from John Adams to Bill Clinton, revised ed. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997). Therefore, for liberals and conservatives alike, the grandeur of an energetic executive has been forged during the country's most perilous, unpredictable moments in history. More often than not, war and crisis are understood to be central to the development of foreign policy institutions within the presidency, such as the National Security Council.1414 Bryan Mabee, “Historical Institutionalism and Foreign Policy Analysis: The Origins of the National Security Council Revisited,” Foreign Policy Analysis 7 (January 2011): 27–44. However, the fact that foreign crises are so central to redefining domestic priorities for presidential administrations suggests that emergency powers cut more deeply into the fabric of the modern political system. Presidential state building is nurtured by large-scale, national crises, but the modern executive, dependent on loyal partisans, is not an institution that works on behalf of the “whole people” or rallies the country to tackle national crises through enduring reforms. Even in the work of administering less politically charged programs, such as disaster funding or decisions to close military bases, the modern presidency is electorally motivated and often acts to serve its core constituency.1515 Douglas L. Kriner and Andrew Reeves, The Particularistic President: Executive Branch Politics and Political Inequality (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015). During emergencies, well-organized and highly motivated factions within a single party can leverage the institution to enact unpopular and divisive schemes.1616 Daniel DiSalvo, Engines of Change: Party Factions in American Politics, 1868–2010 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012). Moreover, the reliance on unilateral administrative measures to advance party objectives—disingenuously justified in the name of the “national interest”—further enfeebles legislative institutions during moments of crisis.1717 Neomi Rao, “Administrative Collusion: How Delegation Diminishes the Collective Congress,” New York University Law Review 90 (November 2015): 1463–1526. With the country sharply divided by deep cultural rifts, such presidential unilateralism arouses fundamental struggles over inclusion. For a time, the executive-centered administrative state was sustained by a fragile consensus that obscured partisan conflict over national administrative power. The extraordinary crises of the Great Depression and World War II led to institutional changes and policies that subordinated partisanship to administration, consolidating a New Deal state committed to a “coalition” between partisans of executive power and the proponents of expertise, or “neutral competence.”1818 Herbert Kaufman identifies the “quest for neutral competence” and the “quest for executive leadership” as core commitments in the development of the administrative state. See Kaufman, “Emerging Conflicts in the Doctrines of Public Administration,” American Political Science Review 50 (December 1956): 1057–1073. Politics was then a search for pragmatic solutions to the challenging responsibilities that America had to assume, at home and abroad, to secure economic and national security. However, public support for the New Deal state fractured in the wake of the cultural and political upheavals of the 1960s.1919 Hugh Heclo, “Sixties Civics,” in Sidney M. Milkis and Jerome Mileur, eds., The Great Society and the High Tide of Liberalism (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2005), 53–82. The attempt to realize the Great Society exposed the liberal state's central fault lines (notably racial inequalities), and with violent upheaval in Vietnam and in the nation's urban core, the pragmatic center that buttressed the New Deal disintegrated. Once contested by conservative Democrats and Republicans as a threat to constitutional government, national administrative power gained acceptance on the right as liberalism expanded throughout the 1960s. In the wake of the cultural revolution of that decade, Republicans built a conservative base whose foot soldiers, most notably the Christian Right, rallied around the belief that liberalism had so corrupted the country that the national government had a responsibility to aggressively protect “traditional values” and uphold “law and order.”2020 Nicholas F. Jacobs and Sidney M. Milkis, What Happened to the Vital Center? Presidentialism, Populist Revolt and the Fracturing of America (New York: Oxford University Press, 2020), chaps. 4 and 5. As presidents have the of partisan leadership and as partisans their political to the president's personal it has become more to national from the president's In the institutional of the presidency with the of the American emergencies offer even greater opportunity for presidents to they act on behalf of their partisan As a partisanship in the United is a struggle over the of the state. has become an executive-centered struggle for the services of national administrative power. The of executive has been deepened by partisan in which Democrats and Republicans not only on of and policy but also their as existential to the American of J. H. C. David G. J. J. S. and in Science no. of this party conflict it First, since the struggles over and have partisan fundamental about it to be an have been further by the expansion of presidential power, executive to partisan conflict. As party wars have Congress, the legislative have become more dependent on presidents to cut through the and advance through executive action. During the and both Democrats and Republicans dependent on presidents to their and advance partisan through unilateral Sidney M. Milkis, H. and J. Happened to and the New American Party Perspectives on Politics Indeed, Republican presidents have the development of executive-centered partisanship. to the of social in the Richard Nixon was the first conservative president to the of national emergency with a partisan of American With a rallying cry of and Nixon new in the urban core, and abroad, in the of an presidential administration and a conservative modern Richard P. The Administrative (New York: As of the National at the time, conservatives only the work of the New Deal and Great Society the of a powerful president is to to war within his executive in to his Conservative National in in The New Republic, that the politicization of emergency powers did not at the the unilateralism in foreign had been a since the of the threat of an was to its partisan Andrew The New Presidential University of Press, the one foreign the funding of the in is an of that is in the of the American The President: (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, the other the administration's and use of presidential power a deeply partisan commitment to the and to the Republican Party with a of American power A the War on in an by modern embrace of a state. Not only did legal a of legal support for the constitutional independence under the of the in by Donald Trump's Supreme M. of during the and Law Review the White House also to centralize the Republican to transform the and into on the president's leadership in the War against Sidney M. Milkis and H. the Republican and the American Party Perspectives on Politics (September Democratic presidents have also the that crises in to their partisan dynamics are not dependent on the of the White they are to executive-centered partisanship. was on the of the economic that the country had in a presidency, it would be by the of the country of an economic despite and from partisans, the administration its partisan to health the most divisive and partisan policy with perhaps the of The consequences are Democrats in Congress from an with the legislative of his the and of crisis the president's governing strategy long the worst of the Great had As the president in the to the and Sidney Milkis, Partisan Polarization and the Administrative The Forum no. built the centralizing of his conservative and liberal to advance through executive the of a powerful but of the the and especially The 17 at 16 The of and of the to control the federal bureaucracy, and the of Richard its into the administrative presidential powers over and to management strategy directly to his for example, J. and L. and the Administration,” The Journal of 2011): and R. The of in Press, In political crises often leadership and we the for to around the political upheavals also in the community and should in the current of American presidents are to power for partisan are that presidents the were Donald Trump's of the worst national crisis since the Great Depression should have to the of “a late regime Herbert or in a political repudiation of a conservative political and the rise of a new Richard about Trump's and Biden's The Nation, at 16 The Trump presidency at of the At the Trump's about the spread of the his that the president has to battle the pandemic, Trump responsibility to state and governments, and, when for racial and in the of of for the and sought to the of public and for as the president's public amid the of the and did his months a of these only how the Trump administration failed to the threat that COVID-19 posed to public health and the D. and David Trump's The to Leadership on the New York at 16 and C. and Trump from the Trump the of partisan than attempt to the modern executive as the of the public as many and public had been to during a national crisis of the Trump further fused executive prerogative and partisanship. This was not a of Trump's many was to executive

Part I: The Constitutional Order 1. The American Nation, State, and Regime. Case Study: The Nation, State, and Regime in Poland. The American Nation. The Development of Nationhood in Comparative Perspective. The American State and Regime. Unusual Characteristics of the United States 2. The U.S. Constitution. Case Study: The South African Constitution of 1996. The U.S. Constitution: Brevity and Vagueness. The Process of Constitutional Change. Anachronistic Elements of the U.S. Constitution 3. Federalism. Case Study: The European Union. The Confederal Model. Case Study: The Unitary State in Japan. Unitary States: Centralized Decision Making. Case Study: German Federalism. The Federal Model 4. Separation of Powers. Case Study: The Westminster Parliamentary Model. The Fusion of Power in Parliamentary Government. Prime Ministerial Power. Other Checks and Balances? A Hypothetical Case Study: Parliamentary Checks and Balances. Prime Ministerial Accountability to Parliament Part II: The Institutions of Government 5. The Executive Branch: The Presidency and the Bureaucracy. Case Study: Variations in Executive Power in Southeast Asia. Nondemocratic Executives. Democratic Dual Executives. The American Presidency in Comparative Perspective. Other Presidential Systems. The U.S. Vice President, Cabinet, and Bureaucracy 6. The Legislative Branch: The Two Houses of Congress. Case Study: Legislative Variation in the Former British Dominions. Unicameralism. Asymmetric Bicameralism. Symmetric Bicameralism. The Dispersal of Power in the U.S. Congress. The Power of Congress in Comparative Perspective 7. The Judicial Branch: The Supreme Court and the Federal Courts. Case Study: The Judiciary in France. Impartiality and Independence. Courts as a Separate and Co-Equal Branch. Judicial Review Part III: Political Participation 8. Political Participation: The Spectrum from the Unconventional to the Conventional. Case Study: The Zapatistas and Indigenous Political Participation in Mexico. Political Violence. Non-violent Activism. Interest Group Activity 9. Voting and Elections. Case Study: Voting and Elections in Israel. Free and Fair Elections. Competitive Elections. Voter Eligibility and Turnout. The Winner-Take-All Electoral System. Peculiarities of the U.S. Presidential Elections 10. Political Parties. A Hypothetical Case Study: Electoral Systems and the Number of Parties. Single-Party Systems. Two-Party-Plus Systems. Multiparty Systems. The U.S. Two-Party System in Comparative Perspective 11. Public Opinion and Political Values. Case Study: The World Values Survey. United States Public Opinion in Comparative Perspective. Religiosity and Moral Values. National Pride but Skepticism about Big Government Part IV: Public Policy and Policymaking 12. Domestic Policy: Socioeconomic Policy, Civil Liberties, and Civil Rights. Case Study: Political Rights and Social Protections in Denmark. Socioeconomic Policy. Skepticism of Big Government. Civil Liberties. Civil Rights 13. Foreign Policy: The U.S. in the World. Case Study: The Foreign Policy of China. Foreign Policymaking in the United States. U.S. Foreign Policy: Realist and Idealist Perspectives Conclusion: The American Anomaly on Balance. Stability. Flexibility. Representation. Accountability For Further Study: A Brief Bibliographic Essay on American Exceptionalism

Although Article 3 of Protocol 1 to the ECHR, which guarantees the rights of individuals to vote or to stand in free elections, is provided only for elections in which the legislature is chosen, the term legislature has not been interpreted by the ECtHR in a manner that excludes all bodies other than national parliaments. Whether various elections fall within the scope of P1-3 has been determined by examining the nature of the rulemaking power of the body at stake. In various applications regarding presidential elections, the Court has examined the influence of the President on the Parliament and his/her power to issue decrees, but it has not applied P1-3 in any presidential election so far. While the parliamentary and semi-presidential systems that most European countries adopt justify that conclusion, Turkey, which switched from a parliamentary system to a presidential system that favours the President over legislative and judicial branches, presents a significant exception. In this regard, this Article analyzes the presidential system that Turkey adopted along with the 2017 constitutional amendments within the Court's case-law and shows why presidential elections held under this system should be and probably will be considered to be within the scope of P1-3.

Global Standards for Postgraduate Training in General Pediatrics: The International Pediatric Community Considers a Vision

One of the agendas and results of the I-IV Amendment to the 1945 Constitution is to strengthen the Presidential system. Strengthening the presidential system synergized with reforming the party and election system must be carried out in order to achieve the objectives of governance and institutions in the framework of Indonesia 2045. The 2019 elections are simultaneously legislative and presidential elections as stipulated in Law Number 7 of 2017 concerning General Elections. The purpose of this article, the first simultaneous election should be legislative, presidential and regional head elections simultaneously. Secondly, there are 4 (four) objectives: 1). Effectiveness and efficiency, 2). Righteous democracy, 3). creating a solid and effective government, 4). period (periodization) that is more organized. Using the optics of constitutional law studies, and socio-legal, strengthened and enriched historical studies of presidential, party and election systems in Indonesia and comparisons with the United States, Brazil, Argentina. There are seven recommended strategies offered in the article: 1) Synergizing the Presidential Election, Legislative Elections and Regional Head Elections simultaneously in 2029, 2) Preparing the Draft Law for Regional Head Election Courts, 3) Making a blueprint of the Presidential Institution Bill, 4). Simplify party systems with an electoral threshold, 5). Simplify the number of parties in parliament with parliamentary threshold, 6). Implement a threshold presidential order to create balance in a multi-party presidential system, 7). Make changes to the Election Law and Evaluate the Proposal Election system with the Sainte-Lague calculation method.

From the Department of Obstetrics and Gynecology, University of California School of Medicine, San Francisco, Calif

In the United States, the local arts council movement preceded the establishment of a national arts policy and institution, the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA). This chapter explores the early decades of the movement in the United States, beginning in Winston-Salem, North Carolina, where women in the voluntary sector established a local arts council in 1949. The chapter explores the role of women as arts advocates in their communities and the role of foundations and the private sector in creating an arts infrastructure at the city, county, and state levels in the United States.

THE RECENT CASE Of Baker v. Carr' may well be notable for a variety of reasons; certainly for its holding that the validity of Tennesee's legislative apportionment was justiciable when raised under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.2 But the decision may also have lasting importance for the light it casts on the guarantee clause of article IV, section 4, of the Constitution. That provision declares that the United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government ... . Although the particular issue involved in Baker v. Carr was disposed of solely by reference to allegations under the fourteenth amendment,3 the Supreme Court was afforded an excellent opportunity to comment on the present status of the republican form of government clause. That several of the justices actually felt impelled to do so, and at some length, may give cause for reflection about a constitutional provision long deemed beyond judicial purview. The objectives of this brief Article are limited. First, an attempt will be made to analyze Baker v. Carr as it sheds light on the justiciability of questions raised under the guarantee. The Court's discussion of this question, though extensive, fails to clarify the present state of the law. Second, an effort will be made to demonstrate that, despite the absence of a claim based upon the guarantee clause in Baker, the case is almost certain to encourage a related kind of apportionment suit whose resolution will inevitably require the judiciary to grapple with that provision. Finally, it will be concluded that the Court can successfully entertain this future class of apportionment suits on the merits. In such cases it will face no greater difficulties or more delicate matters than it did in Baker. More specifically, it will be able to construct satisfactory standards for applying the guarantee to these new situations. But in doing so, it should make clear that its decision is grounded on the guarantee. Otherwise, its action will only further obscure the real issue and render its proper analysis and solution more difficult.

Is divisive politics making Americans sick? Associations of perceived partisan polarization with physical and mental health outcomes among adults in the United States

II. Special Report: A Foundation's Response To The Need For Better Health Statistics

The 2019 presidential and vice presidential elections in Indonesia had complicated issues, including broken ballots, multiple voter lists, not registered as permanent voters, political money, transparency, administrative violations, electoral penalties, and high white numbers. These problems indicate that the values contained in the concept of good governance are not implemented in the election process. To analyze the issues, this paper uses normative method. The method is by analyzing the Laws. Especially when related to aspects of law enforcement in the principles of administrative law in good governance. This method will be formulated for implementing good governance in the election process. The results of the analysis have who that the electoral justice is very important to be achieved in the presidential election in Indonesia. the presidential system is in order to strengthen the presidential election. However, the presidential election as one of the recruitment in the Presidential in Indonesia system in election is against justice because do not use a good governance in election process. It is not supporting the electoral justice. Results of previous elections in Indonesia, it was found that the values of good governance have not been well implemented in all stages of the election, both in the pre-election stage, the election process until post-election. Especially when related to aspects of law principle in election. this research will be formulated with good governance system for implemented in election process. The paper will be socialized and implemented in the holding of presidential system election in Indonesia.