Abstract
The state audit in the new era focuses on strengthening the restriction and supervision of public power, and it will inevitably require strengthening the audit and supervision of administrative institutions, which leads to the discussion of the efficiency of the internal supervision institutions in administrative institutions. In order to effectively control the finance internal supervision risk, a moral hazard monitoring model with a two-tier game mechanism is proposed. In the model, it establishes an upper-level game and a lower-level game analysis framework for the "lazy" and "Free-riding" behaviors in moral hazard. Combining the equilibrium conditions to explain the game results, and put forward the overall risk monitoring countermeasures for the two behaviors.
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