Counterfactual thinking and regulatory focus: implications for action versus inaction and sufficiency versus necessity.

Abstract

Counterfactual thinking is associated with regulatory focus in a way that explains previous empirical incongruities, such as whether additive counterfactuals (mutations of inactions) occur more or less frequently than subtractive counterfactuals (mutations of actions). In Experiment 1, regulatory focus moderated this pattern, in that additive counterfactuals were activated by promotion failure, whereas subtractive counterfactuals were activated by prevention failure. In Experiment 2, additive counterfactuals evoked a promotion focus and expressed causal sufficiency, whereas subtractive counterfactuals evoked a prevention focus and expressed causal necessity. In Experiment 3, dejection activated additive counterfactuals, whereas agitation activated subtractive counterfactuals. These findings illuminate the interconnections among counterfactual thinking, motivation, and goals.