CORRUPTION AT THE CROSSROADS OF SECURITY: EXPOSING THREATS, BUILDING DEFENCE/RESILIENCE

FDI has undergone a process of liberalisation over the last three decades. However, and despite the existing position in favour of this attitude, states have always maintained barriers of different natures and scopes to control it. The reasons for these barriers may have varied over time, and likewise the level of restriction on investment flows from abroad, but they have always existed. Nevertheless, as a general trend, barriers to foreign investment have been lowered steadily in recent years and there is now an attitude in favour of the liberalisation of FDI. However, and despite this positive approach to FDI, some major changes have been taking place worldwide in recent times. The economic crisis, the atmosphere of increasing securitisation, and the geostrategic changes that have come about since 2007 have led many countries to ‘reassess their investment policies’, in many cases on the basis of national security or national essential security interests grounds. Reasons for limits on FDI, which have always existed and are present in many IIAs, have gained further strength in the past decade, to the extent that national security and related grounds are nowadays considered one of the primary justifications for barriers to FDI. Indeed, it is in the field of FDI, more than in international trade, that national security interest exceptions may be truly tested. As national security concerns of all kinds multiply, more and more countries, even developed countries, are tempted to create – or have actually created – obstacles to foreign investment based on these kinds of grounds. Host states fear that foreign investors will gain control of essential security-related technology, compromise access to it or act in a way that advances the goals of foreign states. These fears are not new. Moreover, they are not related solely to FDI, either private or sovereign-driven, but also to other areas of the economy, and they have been to some extent anticipated by existing IIAs. As previously mentioned, the notion of ‘national security’ has evolved and now includes national interests or similar, concepts very closely linked to strategic sectors and national champions. IIAs already address the economic, political or security concerns that FDI, both private and public, poses.

The purpose of the article is to suggest ways to improve the legislation on national security in order to increase the effectiveness of preventing corruption offenses in the military command and control bodies. The article focuses on the fact that activities to prevent corruption offenses cannot yet be considered fully effective due to the influence of a number of factors of a legal, organizational, theoretical and methodological nature. This requires systematic, comprehensive work aimed at developing a solid theoretical and methodological basis for preventing corruption offenses in military command and control bodies. Features clarified the reflection of the prevention of corruption in national legislation from 2003 to the present. The statement is made that the effectiveness of the functioning of the legal mechanism for ensuring national security depends on an integrated approach to security threats. A high level of corruption offenses in the state can offset achievements in other areas: political, economic, military, public security and law enforcement, etc. Of particular danger is the commission of corruption offenses by military officials, since during the period of armed aggression of the Russian Federation against our state, the significance of the duties assigned to them increases significantly, and their improper performance can affect the level of the state's defense capability. The article determines that the phenomenon of corruption has a very wide range of understanding options, therefore, in our opinion, it would be more correct to investigate the features of corruption offenses (the list of which is closed) or corruption risks. It is concluded that the improvement of the national security legislation as a factor in increasing theeffectiveness of preventing corruption offenses in the military administration requires amendments to the Law of Ukraine "On the National Security of Ukraine". This Law should be supplemented with an edited concept of national security, which would include as an element the construction of "prevention of corruption", as well as the systematization of activities to prevent corruption offenses in the National Security Strategy of Ukraine.

The article examines the problematic issues of implementing the National Security Strategy with regard to current threats in the information sphere, ensuring the achievement of the priorities for protecting the right to information and personal data protection, and decisions of the national security entities on additional restrictive measures (sanctions) for individuals and legal entities in case of violation of legislation in the information sphere. The analysis confirmed the concept of the possibility of limiting the right to information by law in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public order, to prevent riots or criminal offenses, to protect public health, to protect the reputation or rights of others, to prevent the disclosure of information received in confidence, or to maintain the authority and impartiality of justice. The author notes that insufficient attention is paid to the development of public law mechanisms for restricting the right to information in the interests of national security. The author separately analyzes the mechanisms of "restriction of human and civil rights and freedoms", "restriction of the right to information in the interests of national security", and identifies "constitutional and legal", "administrative and legal", "economic and legal", "civil and legal", "international and legal" mechanisms of restriction of the right to information, and other public and legal mechanisms of restriction of the right to information. The author emphasizes the need to study them separately in the systems of: specific and individual restriction of the right to information; general restriction of the right to information and introduction of a ban on a certain type of information activity, content of a certain content; control of restriction of the right to information.

The article is devoted to topical issues of national security. Its purpose is to justify the need to review approaches to the partnership of special services of Ukraine and private companies. The current state of threats to national security from the aggressor country is characterized within the scope of scientific research. Attention was drawn to the fact that after the attack of the Russian Federation on Ukraine, there were changes in the security paradigm and approaches to national security and the world system as a whole, and the need, in this connection, to find additional resources to counter the Russian Federation, to develop new effective models of organizing the activities of national special services by involving the potential and resources of non-state institutions in this activity. It was established that the effective partnership of special services and private enterprises in the interests of national security is a stable international practice, and in some cases, the only means of increasing the effectiveness of special services in conditions of shortage of personnel and resources, which meets the requirements of international and national legislation. The international experience of such a partnership is characterized using the examples of the “Griffin”, “ECSA – CERBERUS”, “ProtectUK” projects, as well as the activities of private intelligence and security companies. Prospective directions for strengthening the capabilities of Ukraine’s special services through partnership with private enterprises and their security structures are highlighted, including: creation of security platforms (educational and informational and communicative in nature); obtaining operationally significant information in the interests of ensuring state security both in the country and abroad, including its processing; assistance in the use of existing and development of new software products for the search and identification of persons who pose a threat to the state security of Ukraine, the recording of their criminal activities, etc.; carrying out analytical studies, summarizing a large array of data in the interests of national security; personnel training for work in modern conditions, including using the latest technologies. The need for clear legal regulation of the rights and obligations of the parties to such a partnership is emphasized.

In the introductory part of the paper, the author defines the terms of policy and strategy for national security. Furthermore, the author determines the national security policy of Montenegro in accordance with the National Security Strategy of Montenegro from 2006, 2008, and 2018, as well as the components of the national security policy, such as national security interests and goals with special reference to strategic interests, overview of the global and regional environment, and security risks and threats. At the end of the paper, the author outlines the external components of national security policy – cooperation with European countries in responding to modern challenges, risks and threats, Montenegro's possible response to security risks and threats, and developing a crisis management system and participation in missions. The content will be based on an analysis of foreign literature and the use of electronic content. The subject of research in this paper is the national security policy of Montenegro in modern global conditions. The purpose of this study is to focus on the importance of national security and global security in the scientific literature. Keywords: national security policy, national security strategy, security interests and goals.

The influence of intellectual property on ensuring national security and defense of Ukraine is considered. The importance of implementing measures to unconditionally ensure the protection of intellectual property, especially in the militarytechnical sphere to neutralize the threats to state security in the field of intellectual property. Threats to the national security are constantly being transformed, the spheres of their influence are expanding. Today, radical new threats are being added to traditional threats, the occurrence of which is due to the development of science and technology, the processes of globalization and other factors. The processes of globalization determine the main trends of the world economy and politics, and also cause radical changes in the international security environment. In the structure of the national interests, the possession of advanced technologies, the latest means of communications and communications comes to the first place. Modern technological, economic, informational development has led to the appearance of a wide range of threats of a new type and it enhances the effect of already known threats. These threats include, in particular:uncertainty of the state scientific and technological policy; uncontrolled leakage of intellectual and scientific potential beyond Ukraine;scientific and technological lag of Ukraine from developed countries. So, there is a growing need for theoretical studies that would conceptually define and substantiate the role of intellectual property in the field of national security and defense. The complex study of various approaches to the analysis of scientific and technical policy is relevant in view of the need to prioritize the role of intellectual property in ensuring national security and national interests of the Ukrainian State. In modern conditions, the concept of national security is expanding due to the inclusion of all the new spheres of public life in it. National security of Ukraine is a complex multifaceted concept, and in the social spheres of functioning includes the following types of security: political, economic, military, state, informational, scientific and technological, ecological, epidemic, security of cultural development of the nation and other security (financial, fire, food, security of trade, etc.). In order to neutralize the existing challenges and threats, it is not enough to rely only on the advanced achievements of the military-defense complex or the accelerated growth of the gross domestic product.Therefore, the national security is unthinkable without consideration of intellectual property as an integral part of national security. Intellectual property itself is a connecting element in the chain between science that produces new knowledge and technology, and industrial production, where they are implemented. Therefore, learning to effectively manage intellectual property is an important task for raising the level of economic security of Ukraine. Considering the threats to the national interests and national security of Ukraine in the defense sector, specialists also note the problems of intellectual property that arise, including in cooperation with foreign defense industry companies (investments, joint production, procurement of technologies, etc.). Recent developments of major defense or economic significance are, to a large extent, belong to the state secrets and they are the subjects of the state protection. However, each new development, by definition, contains the objects of intellectual property rights, which are the integral part of it. Therefore, the state is obliged to secure and protect its right to the objects of intellectual property rights related to the development of new models of weapons and military equipment or their modernization. This is especially true of measures of state defense orders and state programs for the development of weapons and military equipment. It is precisely in the course of the implementation of the research and development work and state programs the objects of intellectual property rights, which belong to the sphere of national interests, are created, and the state is obliged to ensure their protection and ownership of these objects. The question of the effective protection of rights of the objects of intellectual property rights related to the development of new models of weapons and military equipment or their modernization is both in the context of ensuring the national security of the state and in the economic plane. This is a reduction in the cost of development, and the protection against the claims of anyone in the mass production for their own needs and for export, and the possibility of profit from the sale of licenses. A deliberate and purposeful modernization of the intellectual property sphere can act as a powerful factor in the transformations in the economy in whole, the engine of the transition to advanced technological processes, the development of new knowledgeintensive industries. Taking into account the above mentioned features, at the present stage, the urgency of optimization of the state management of the scientific sphere, stimulation of the development of innovation sectors of the national economy, and the strengthening of international cooperation is increasing. The issues outlined need a comprehensive consideration by the professional community and take into account the actual security aspects of the development of education and science. Further research of these issues should be aimed at improving the conceptual foundations of the relevant state policy of Ukraine and, in particular, developing a unified approach to defining a system of protection of intellectual property as an integral part of the sphere of ensuring national security and defense.

This paper focuses on studying the prioritization process of national interests of energy import-dependent states. In particular, considering the energy strategy formation processes of Georgia and Lithuania, it explores the interrelation among the objectives of supply security and national security challenges. The reason behind the choice of the given countries was that energy security policies of both countries were formed based on identical characteristics after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Analysis of the mentioned cases offers a good opportunity to explain how foreign policy threats affect national energy security decisions. The study also examines the major factors affecting prioritization of national security interests, providing a possibility to answer the main research question of the paper - what prompts states to pursue less rational policies in terms of energy security, justified by maintaining state sovereignty? Using the securitization concept, the paper also explains what leads to taking steps aimed at solving national security challenges, which may, in turn, lead to the emergence of new types of security challenges. Analysis of the mentioned cases offers a good opportunity to explain how foreign policy threats affect national energy security decisions, whether such threats cause new energy challenges to be subject to political interests and whether it is appropriate for states to pursue such energy policy with the motive of maintaining state sovereignty. The paper indicates that energy policies purely formed based on political interests, may not face the main energy security challenges of the country.

The work deals with the issues of determining the balance of private (individual) and public (state) interests in terms of admissibility of limiting human rights and freedoms in cases where it increases or prevents threats to national security. This was the aim of the study, as this issue has become highly relevant because of the growing number of hybrid threats to national security, which can be countered through the introduction of separate restrictions on human rights by the state. The systemic approach, the hermeneutic, and doctrinal approach were used to conclude that almost all constitutions, constitutional acts and constitutional laws of the EU and NATO member states provide for the possibility of restricting human rights. Such restrictions are imposed for the purposes of national security, public necessity or national interests of the state. Moreover, the list of cases where the restrictions on civil rights may be applied in the national security interests in national legislation is often much wider than in international legal acts. This demonstrates the primacy of national interests over individual interests, which is defined by national legislators as the common good at the constitutional level. The lack of detailed cases and models of state response to these processes determines the conclusions on the need to introduce a system of legally determined conditions for the application of restrictive measures. That is why further research should focus on identifying and detailing the criteria for applying measures to restrict civil rights for the purposes of national security at the constitutional level. Received: 15 May 2023 / Accepted: 21 June 2023 / Published: 5 July 2023

Commentary to: The Johannesburg Principles on National Security, Freedom of Expression and Access to Information 1 Sandra Coliver (bio) I. Introduction National security and freedom of expression and information are often viewed as pulling in opposite directions. On the one hand, governments, particularly those that feel threatened by external or internal violence, maintain that disclosure of “secret” information or airing of critical opinions can undermine the very institutions that protect the security and well-being of law-abiding citizens. On the other hand, human rights defenders point to government suppression of speech on national security and related grounds [End Page 12] as having paved the way for some of the worst human rights violations, subversions of democracy, and threats to peace experienced in the last half of this century. Yet, national security is not fundamentally at odds with freedom of expression and information. To the contrary, a clear-eyed review of recent history suggests that legitimate national security interests are, in practice, better protected when the press and public are able to scrutinize government decisions than when governments operate in secret. 2 Freedom of expression and access to information, by enabling public scrutiny of government action, serve as safeguards against government abuse and thereby form a crucial component of genuine national security. Equally, national security is a pre-condition for the full enjoyment of all human rights, including freedom of expression. Undeniably, there are circumstances in which national security and freedom of expression clash head on. For instance, protection of a genuine national security interest requires the suppression of sensitive defense information or speech likely to promote violence against the state. The conflict is exacerbated by the fact that national security and related concepts (such as “state security,” “internal security,” “public security,” and “public safety”) are so imprecise that they may be, and frequently have been, 3 invoked by governments to suppress precisely the kinds of speech [End Page 13] that provide protection against government abuse, such as information or expression exposing circumvention of the democratic process, attacks on opposition parties, damage to the environment, corruption, wasting of public assets, and other forms of wrongdoing by government officials and their associates. Moreover, courts in countries around the world demonstrate the least independence and greatest deference to the claims of government when national security is invoked. This deference is reinforced by provisions in the security laws of many countries that trigger exceptions to ordinary rules of evidence and due process upon a minimal showing by the government of a national security risk. A government’s claim of a security threat can deal a knockout blow to the main institutional safeguards against government abuse: independence of the courts, due process of law, freedom of the press, and open government. The tension between expression and national security is particularly vexing because there is little margin for error and much at stake. Quick action often is necessary to thwart a genuine threat to national security but restraints on political speech can trigger an inexorable slide into tyranny. The more fragile the democracy, the less likely it is to be able to tolerate [End Page 14] either a threat to its genuine security or the suppression of legitimate political debate. It is this profound tension that led Article 19, the International Centre Against Censorship, to convene a group of independent experts to draft a set of principles that would adequately safeguard both the right to freedom of expression and information as well as the prerogative of governments to limit the right when necessary to protect a legitimate national security interest. The result was the Johannesburg Principles on National Security, Freedom of Expression and Access to Information. 4 The Principles are based on international and regional law and standards relating to the protection of human rights, evolving state practice (including judgments of national courts), and general principles of law. While some of the Principles undoubtedly are more protective of freedom of expression than widely accepted international norms, they reflect the drafters’ view of the direction in which international law is, or should be, developing. Thirty-seven experts, hosted by the Centre for Applied Legal Studies of the University of the Witswatersrand, participated in the drafting, representing...

The Hong Kong National Security Law specifies the specific targets of sanctions, and the legislative content of the law on criminal jurisdiction objects clarifies the scope of behaviors protected and prohibited by law. Chapter 3 of the Hong Kong National Security Law specifies four types of crimes that endanger national security, including the crimes of secession, subversion of state power, terrorist activities, and collusion with foreign or overseas forces to endanger national security. From the perspective of legal interpretation, by grasping the dual elements of criminal intent and criminal behavior, the specific composition of the criminal jurisdiction objects stipulated in the law is clarified, revealing the particularity and strictness of the Hong Kong National Security Law in safeguarding national security. The normative interpretation of the specific criminal jurisdiction objects of this law can clearly stipulate the constituent elements of specific criminal acts, provide strong guidance for the effective jurisdiction of crimes that endanger national security in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, strengthen the prevention and crackdown on acts that endanger national security, and effectively safeguard national sovereignty, security, and development interests.

The need to combine free trade and FDI with the protection of national essential security interests and policies has led to the incorporation of ‘non-precluded measures provisions’ in IIAs (whether BITs or FTAs) that include FDI provisions. These kinds of provisions are not new. National interest exceptions have long been found in international agreements and treaties on international trade. They have played a significant role in international trade and now have a growing impact in the field of international investments. The absence of a common universal legal framework for FDI and the enormous fragmentation of the international investment legal system, plus the non-existence of an explicit national security exception in customary international law, gives these sorts of exceptions an important role to play in relation to FDI. These special rules have been drafted in order to limit or derogate from obligations that arise under specific treaty in which they are embodied on grounds of national security. These rules recognise the right of states to ‘self-defence’, although there is much debate about the exact terms on which this defence may be actually implemented. Trade and investment are increasingly linked to security and national security. These sorts of provisions are currently gaining in importance and are increasingly applicable to FDI ex post , as a general rule, as well as ex ante in a limited number of agreements. Many of these sorts of clauses in IIAs replicate – or are based on – provisions found in the WTO treaties. The interpretation of these provision by WTO Panels and case law is extrapolated to FDI. There is support for a broadening of the scope and goals of these non-precluded clauses and for an objectification of criteria and standards on which they are based and interpreted, as well as for an adaptation of the clause to the various kinds of threats that trade and investment may generate nowadays. There are concerns about the ability of national security clauses in their current form in the WTO system and many IIAs to cope with modern-day security challenges and the need for the state to have enough power to safeguard public policy. ARTICLE XXI GATT AS THE MODEL FOR NATIONAL SECURITY PROVISIONS Article XXI GATT constitutes the model for the national security provisions. It is reproduced in GATS and in many BITs and FTAs.

National security has evolved both into a discipline of study and a sphere of policy application. It is a commonly used phrase in strategic literature and international statecraft. The modern concepts of national security arose in the 17th century during the Thirty Years War in Europe and the Civil War in England, and it was considered in terms of state sovereignty. In the aftermath of World War II, the concept of national security evolved into superpower contestation, also called the Cold War. During this period, national security had been seen through the prism of military security of the state against external threats – traditional security. In the US, the national security concept transited into a normative paradigm when President Truman signed the National Security Act on July 26, 1947, which also led to the establishment of the US National Security Council. Some 21 variants of the National Security Council exist in 51 countries today. The concept of national security is also seen from the prism of the concept of national power and elements of national power that include diplomacy, information operations, military, economic, financial, intelligence operations and law enforcement – commonly referred to as DIMEFIL. States either have national security policies or strategies and some – including Pakistan, publish an unclassified version for public distribution. Contemporary national security discourse adjusts to and even shapes the geopolitical environment. It has gradually evolved into a concept called comprehensive national security. It is an inclusive framework that encompasses all internal and external affairs of the state and society. Comprehensive national security helps safeguard both national security interests and human security requirements. Bibliography Entry Khan, Ehsan Mehmood. 2022. "Comprehensive National Security: Contemporary Discourse." Margalla Papers 26 (1): 1-17.

The chapter analyses the case law of the CJEU on national security and essential interests of member states security. It answers the following questions: what do the national security and essential security interests clauses in EU law actually mean, what is their content? What role do they play? What is the extent of discretion of the member states when applying those clauses? What are the requirements concerning an effective review of measures undertaken to protect security? The analysis leads to the conclusion that recent case law could be seen as the beginning of differentiation or stratification between clauses of public and national security. This case law is, however, contradicted to some extent by the interpretation of the ‘public security’ clause by the Court. Instead of demoting the public security to less crucial threats to ‘make room’ above for national security, the Court seems to continue to attribute to it fundamental importance (notably a threat to the survival of the population, as well as the risk of a serious disturbance to foreign relations or the peaceful coexistence of nations). Also, as concerns the role of the national security clause, the difference between national and public clauses seems to be only quantitative, not qualitative. For the Court, the national security clause does not seem to be about the question of delimitation of competencies between the EU and the member states.

The article analyzes the legal regulation on the prevention of corruption in the activities of the State Border Service of Ukraine (SBSU) during martial law. Corruption poses a significant risk to national security, the efficiency of public resource management, economic development, and the stability of government. The legal definition of corruption refers to the use of official powers to obtain an unlawful benefit. In the context of martial law, the DPSU faced increased threats of corruption, in particular when controlling the state border. The article analyzes the main categories of anti-corruption legislation, including the prevention, prevention, prevention and counteraction of corruption, and also examines measures that can effectively reduce corruption risks in public administration. The main initiatives for the prevention of corruption cover a wide range of legal, organizational and educational measures aimed at eliminating the causes and conditions that can contribute to the commission of illegal actions.Effective management and control of state borders becomes especially important during martial law, when national security depends on the reliability of anti-corruption measures. In this context, the improvement of the legislative framework regulating the activities of the State Border Service of Ukraine, in particular regarding granting it the status of administrator of the Unified State Register of conscripts, conscripts and reservists, is important for strengthening control and reducing corruption risks at the border. Such changes will not only ensure more effective monitoring and compliance of border crossers with military and legal obligations, but will also help prevent the illegal movement of people across the border. These measures play a key role in ensuring the country’s internal stability and defense capability, especially in the face of military threats. Updating the legislation will also strengthen the legality of border service actions and increase their transparency, which is necessary to maintain citizens’ trust in state institutions.

Nation-wide data on women in national security, partnered with individual interviews, paint a clear picture: the United States is a long way off from gender equality in national and space security positions. However, universities are poised to change that now more than ever before. This article gives a brief overview of the “business case for diversity” research trend showing the economic advantages of gender-diverse leadership and discusses women-focused professional organizations and female student interest in national and space security. This is followed by an introduction into U.S. space security policy and the roles women play in that sector’s development. The final section highlights efforts at the University of Nebraska and offers guidance to university educators on pedagogical approaches to support gender diversity in national space security.