“Correspondence” (dang 當) and “Cultivating Perfectness” (Yang Zheng 養正): On the Concept of Perfectness (zheng 正) in the Yijing

This study addresses a common concept, ethical school culture, in 30 countries. It presents and outlines its dimensions, based on an analysis of their codes of ethics for teachers. The findings generated a multi-dimensional model of ethical school culture that included six dimensions: caring for the pupils, teachers' profession, teachers' collegial relationships, parental involvement, community involvement, and respecting rules and regulations. The study indicated that “ethical school culture” generates from the interaction between the formal ethical aspects, such as educational policy that encourages high standards, and informal ethical aspects, such as ethical norms that perceive teachers’ role modeling as important for maintenance of the profession’s status. In addition, the findings elicited that schools with an ethical culture are not closed educational systems but rather open educational systems that ensure that knowledge will flow from the school to the community and vice versa. This flow of knowledge is in accordance with the ethical goals that advance equity and opportunity for all pupils. Moreover, the similarity that exists between the dimensions in this study and the dimensions in the corporate ethical virtues (CEV) model expand conceptual validity to the generated multidimensional model. In general, this study reveals that schools have an ethical culture characterized by a teachers’ active approach toward promoting their pupils’ ongoing learning and well-being, initiating collaborative learning with colleagues, and promoting parental involvement. This study generated the common meaning of ethical culture in schools, based on teachers’ interactions with colleagues, pupils, parents, community, and regulations. Understanding the meaning of an ethical culture in schools, can help promote ethical teachers, who will know what is expected from an ethical teacher and help promote an ethical culture in their schools. In addition, the findings of this study support the universal nature of the concept ethical school culture and provide deeper insight into the concept of ethical culture in educational systems. This study hopes to encourage the promotion of teachers’ continuing professional development, which focuses on the proposed six dimensions that can lead to a consistently applied ethical school culture.

In seeking an appropriate approach to the ideal society in Chinese thought, the present study comprises two main parts. The first part deals with a debate in Chinese philosophy concerning the possibility of an inner or immanent transcendence as a way of defining Chinese culture. As this debate unfolded, it became clear that Chinese philosophers—especially on the mainland—do not regard the transcendent–immanent distinction as applicable to Chinese culture and philosophy. In short, this culture and its philosophy simply has no need for transcendence. Instead, other terms are needed, especially those drawn from a tradition that “secularised” them many millennia ago: moral cultivation, regeneration, home, and intimacy. In this light, the second part of the study deals with two approaches to the ideal society: the Confucian “Great Harmony [大同 datong]” and the short story “Peach Blossom Spring [桃花源 taohuayuan]”. These terms are mediated by a treatment of the “Three Worlds Theory [三世说 sanshishuo]”, developed most fully by He Xiu (129–82 CE). The outcome of this investigation is that the ideal society is very much part of this world. It can be known only through direct observation, empirical investigation, and it is achievable only by detailed planning. It is nothing less than home.

Joel J. Kupperman, 1936–2020 Diana Tietjens Meyers (bio) It is with deep sadness that I report the death of Joel Kupperman, University of Connecticut Board of Trustees Distinguished Professor Emeritus. He died in Brooklyn, New York on April 8, 2020. Joel received both his B.A. and M.A. from the University of Chicago and his PhD from Cambridge University. He joined the Philosophy Department at the University of Connecticut in 1960. Except for visiting Trinity College, Oxford as a lecturer in 1970, two years supported by NEH fellowships, and fellowships at Clare Hall, Cambridge and Corpus Christi College, Oxford, he remained at UConn until his retirement from teaching in 2013. In addition to these major national and international awards, Joel received the Faculty Excellence in Research award from the UConn Foundation in 2004. A widely recognized and influential scholar, Joel specialized in ethics, aesthetics, and Asian philosophy. He published numerous journal articles and chapters in all three fields. Two early books resist subjectivism in ethics: Ethical Knowledge (London: Allen & Unwin, 1970; reprint Routledge, 2002) and The Foundations of Morality (London and Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1983; reissue from Routledge, forthcoming in 2022). In his monographs, Joel’s long-standing interest in Chinese philosophy first became prominent in Character (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991) and Value . . . And What Follows (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999). Joel’s scholarship in Asian philosophy long predated the recent professional awakening to non-Western philosophical traditions. Initially, he studied Chinese philosophy with H. G. Creel at the University of Chicago, and in 1967 he traveled to Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Japan to continue his studies. In the 1980s he created Asian philosophy courses at all levels of the UConn undergraduate and graduate curriculum. His scholarship and pedagogical initiatives were visionary. Regarded as a classic by many in the field, his Learning from Asian Philosophy nimbly integrates insights from classical Chinese and Indian philosophy as well as Western philosophy into nuanced accounts of the self, choice, moral psychology, moral requirements, and interpersonal communication (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999; Chinese translation, Beijing: Renmin Press, 2009). That Joel delivered the keynote lecture at the [End Page 1] conference honoring the ninetieth anniversary of the Peking University Philosophy Department as well as the keynote lecture at the Society for Asian and Comparative Philosophy’s 2011 meeting in Hawai‘i are two measures of the importance of this book. Click for larger view View full resolution Joel Kupperman (1936–2020) during his keynote speech at the Society for Asian and Comparative Philosophy 43rd annual conference, May 25–28, 2011 in Honolulu. In addition, Joel published books that would be valuable to professional philosophers and that would also reach college students and the larger educated public. Notable among these are Theories of Human Nature (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2010), Ethics and Qualities of Life (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), Six Myths about the Good Life: Thinking about What Has Value (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2006), and Classic Asian Philosophy: A Guide to the Essential Texts (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001; second edition, 2006). When it became possible for Chinese students to come to the United States to study, Joel attracted some of them to the UConn philosophy department. Like all the graduate students, they studied Western philosophy. But thanks to Joel, they were able to study Chinese philosophy as well. Joel received the Faculty Excellence in Teaching award from the UConn Foundation in 1973. Upon his retirement, two of his Ph.D. students, Chenyang Li and Peimin Ni, celebrated his career by publishing a festschrift containing chapters by leading scholars: Moral Cultivation and Confucian [End Page 2] Character: Engaging Joel J. Kupperman (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2014). Joel is survived by his wife, Karen Ordahl Kupperman, his two children, Michael Kupperman and Charlie Kupperman, and a grandchild, Ulysses Kupperman Dougherty. His colleagues and many students join me in sympathy over their loss. His singular voice and distinctive presence are irreplaceable. In honor of Joel and his philosophical legacy, the department and Joel’s family have set up a graduate fellowship fund in his name to provide some financial support for Ph.D. students in the UConn Philosophy...

This essay shall discuss the moral feeling of “being morally moved” (daode gandong 道德感动) and explore its philosophical significances in understanding the nature of virtue ethics, especially that of Confucian ethics as exemplary ethics. I would like to argue that the feeling of being morally moved, similar to other feelings such as resentment or indignation, should be seen as one of the most important testimonies or manifestations of our morality or moral consciousness. It has played a very important role of moral judgment and moral cultivation in the history of Chinese moral philosophy and in its everyday moral practices. Instead of being a testimony of morality as cold laws or norms, “being morally moved” is a testimony to our moral virtues, and it should be a living motive of our moral actions as well.

Is Confucian Discourse Philosophy? Eske J. Møllgaard (bio) Recently some philosophers have claimed that it is a scandal that non-Western traditions are excluded from the curriculum in Western philosophy departments. I consider the case of Confucianism and argue (1) that the central features of Confucian discourse are different from those of philosophical discourse, (2) that the historical conditions that gave rise to Confucian discourse sets it apart from the formation of Western philosophy, and (3) that Western philosophers often misread Confucian discourse because they assimilate it to philosophical discourse. I conclude that in order to do justice to the Confucian masters we must read their discourse in accord with its own nature and aims. The question whether there was philosophy in traditional China has been discussed for a century. In the beginning of the twentieth century Chinese scholars argued that ancient Chinese thought had to be systematized using Western categories in order to become philosophy. In this way "Chinese philosophy" (Zhongguo zhexue 中國哲學) was created.1 After the rise of China as a global power some Chinese scholars opposed this assimilation of traditional Chinese thought to Western philosophy.2 The question whether traditional Chinese thought is philosophy has been debated in the West as well. Many articles and whole issues of journals of Chinese and comparative philosophy have been devoted to this question.3 The following is a contribution to this ongoing debate but is limited to considering Confucian discourse. I dispute the claim that Confucian discourse is philosophy and best understood when discussed by philosophers. I agree that Western philosophy should open up to non-Western philosophy, but accepting non-Western discourses as philosophy should be based on rational debate and not on moral outrage at being excluded. To be sure, there is a certain violence in exclusion, but there is also violence in inclusion,4 and perhaps philosophy must be violent in order to maintain itself and not sink into syncretism. And many Confucians would be sad to see Confucian thought being assimilated to analytic philosophy with its set of problems and record of solutions taught in universities in the kind of English that is now used for global communication. [End Page 1029] In a recent book Brian Van Norden argues for the inclusion of non-Western philosophy in the curriculum of Western philosophy departments. Van Norden is a specialist in Confucianism, and in order to show Western philosophers that Confucian discourse is philosophy, he highlights an argument by the important early Confucian Mencius 孟子 (born around 380 b.c.e.), namely Mencius' "reduction ad absurdum against the claim that human nature is reducible to desires for food and sex."5 There is much to admire in Mencius, but skillful argumentation is not what first comes to mind. Mencius himself says that he does not like to engage in argument, and nobody in the Confucian tradition admired Mencius because he was skillful in his argumentation. Confucians read Mencius because they believed that he was able to speak the words of the sages. According to Mencius, there is a certain rhythm in history: now order, now disorder (yizhi yiluan 一治一亂). In times of disorder, the difference between humans and animals disappears and wild animals take over the world of human beings. Order comes about when a sage again separates beasts from humans. In Mencius' own day humans were again sinking to the level of animals, and it was Mencius' ambition to follow in the way of the former sages and, by opposing the teachings of Yang Zhu 楊朱 and Mo Zi 墨子, separate humans from animals. Mencius says: I too want to correct the hearts of men, put an end to depraved doctrines, oppose one-sided actions, and banish excessive words and phrases, and thus continue the [work of] the three sages [Yu 禹, the Duke of Zhou 周公, and Confucius 孔子]. How could I be fond of argumentation!? The case is that I have no other recourse. He who can oppose Yang and Mo with words is a follower of the sages.6 Mencius does not like to argue (bian 辯), but he wants to speak the words (yan 言) of the sages, or, as Mencius calls it, the "one good word" (yi shanyan 一善言). This word...

The subjects of the article are to discover the origin and meaning of PSl. suffix * -ak- and determiners * v ьχ ak ъ and * edinak ъ /* ed ь nak ъ formed with that suffix as well as to establish evolutionary paths and motivation senses as a result of which function meanings of derivatives of the determiners in question have been specified in Slavic languages. The description of their origin and development plays an important role both in determining the etymology of such words as Czech vsak and jednak , and in examining theoretical issues on depronominal function words. The article offers some methodological solutions for examining the history of contemporary metatextual and metapredicative expressions. The study of the origin of the linguistic phenomena connected with the semantic development of the object level of language into the metatextual level requires not only considering the characteristics of these expressions at the relevant lexical level, but also in interaction with morphological and syntactic levels, and perhaps the phonological level as well (cf. questions of apocope and phonological changes related to the transition of given expressions to the class of enclitics). Etymological research, in special cases, should be supported by both the analysis of language systems lower than the examined one (which is in fact the basis of the contemporary etymological observations) as well as an analysis of language systems higher than the examined one, which is a special procedure in etymological description of conjunctions, particles, metapredicative operators etc. Further syntactic and textual analysis in etymological research can shed different light on the etymology of metatextual phenomena.

The article deals with the critical issues of teachers’ training for the new Ukrainian school. The author argues that a future choreography teacher should not only be able to utilize modern pedagogical technologies, but also have high moral culture, since it is the teacher’s moral culture which influences the level of spiritual and ethical development of the younger generation. The study suggests the definition of the concept "future choreography teacher’s moral culture", seen as an integrated quality of an individual that includes a scope of knowledge of moral values, ethical behavior and mores, their compliance with national and universal ideas about the nature of moral values; implying the formation of value orientations, empathy, tolerance, ability for reflection and self-regulation and manifesting itself in self-realization and an active life position of the individual. The following criteria for determining the level of formation of future choreography teachers’ moral culture were distinguished: motivational and cognitive, emotional and value-based, creative and reflexive. It was proved that folk dance is a very efficient means of forming individual’s moral culture in the system of artistic education as it accumulates the artistic and historical experience of generations, reflects the moral values of human relationships, the wealth of civil virtues, encourages education rooted the local culture. The author presents some methods of forming future choreography teachers’ moral culture, which were carried out taking into account personality-oriented, axiological, creativity and activity-based approaches and principles that represent the basis of the organizational and methodological system of forming future choreography teachers’ moral culture, namely: humanization, value-based attitude to the educational process; visibility, continuity.

In the context of globalization and cultural diversity, educational philosophy, as a key core carrier of cultural inheritance and value construction, has always been deeply integrated and constrained by the internal logical context of cultural identity in its historical evolution and contemporary transformation process. This article takes cultural identity as the starting point, systematically sorts out the historical context of Chinese and Western educational philosophy, analyzes the differences and integration trajectories of the two in cultural genes, value orientations, and practical paths, and reveals their implications for contemporary education in cultural inheritance, value integration, and model innovation. Research has shown that Chinese educational philosophy has undergone paradigm shifts from Confucian ethics, Western fusion, to modern reconstruction, while Western educational philosophy has shown a spiral upward trend of rationalism, empiricism, and criticism; The two complement each other in the tension of cultural identity, providing historical insights and theoretical support for the construction of a Chinese characteristic educational philosophy system.

This article, based on a crticism of Chu His's moral philosophy, aims to provide a reflection and an interpretation of moral education. First, according to Tai Chen's argument against the ”moral principle of transcendental form” in Chu Hsi's philosophy, I point out the paradoxical relationship between ”Killing man by the name of reason” and moral cultivation, Second, I analyse the inner logical relationship between the ”moral principle of transcendental form” and the ”absolute dominative principle”. Third, I explore the deep structure of the ”original personalistic ethics” of Confucianism, and point out its relationship with the ”dominative subordinate ethics”. Then, I disclose the ”causal logic of enchantment-practice” in Chinese philosophy and attempt to deconstruct the complex relationship between the ”original personalistic ethics” and the ”dominative subordinate ethics”. Finally, I emphasize that we should transform the ”original personalistic ethics into” the ”communicative ethics in our life-world”.

Problem setting. This article deals with the modern world, where young people live and develop in the environment of many different sources of powerful influence on them, both positive and negative, which everyday impacts on the unsustainable intellect and feelings of youth, the sphere of morality that is being formed. The morale of the young generation is falling rapidly, causing anxiety in the society and the need to take measures to improve the moral situation. Today in society there is a need, and in the state - a social order for a spiritual and moral personality. However, at the state level, there is virtually no regulatory framework and other documents that would deal specifically with moral education, which would regulate the goals, tasks, principles, ways of forming the moral benchmarks for young people. Recent research and publications testify the attention of many scholars to the problem of the fully developed personality formation in particular, moral development and upbringing. Each era advanced new and new complex features of morality, became deeper aware of the mechanisms of its functioning, however, the fact that the need and relevance of moral and educational activities of person and society. Despite of deep-seated work of scientists on these issues, the problem of moral education, the formation of the moral culture of youth remains relevant, and because of the lack of development this problem in terms of modern realities and problems that have arisen in Ukraine, and weak orientation of research into contemporary social and pedagogical reality. Paper objective. Consider some aspects of the significance of moral and morality, find out the problems of modern youth moral education, as well as identify possible ways to solve them. Paper main body. Social life is carried out with the help of many instruments, the most important of which are the morality, which ensures the preservation and support of the collective way of people’s life, the establishment of relations, life takes place, self-actualizing members of society, etc. Through observance of moral principles, harmonization of relations is ensured, which creates conditions for the maintenance and reproduction of the actual human way of life. The phenomenal nature of the human invention - morality - is precisely that one person can only act in accordance with morality. Consequently, being moral means to be human. Morality is not a natural characteristic of man, and it is impossible to teach a person moral choice as a certain mathematical formula. However, morality can and should be formed purposefully and persistently. That is the content of moral education. Moral education is one of the types of educational system; it is aimed at influencing people in order to form their moral consciousness, moral qualities and abilities that meet the needs of social life and self-actualization of the individual. The task of upbringing morality gradually disappeared from the list of urgent problems of a developing country. The lack of organized targeted activity to reproduce and develop the morality of the people, first of all, the young generation, is a threat to the viability of both society and the state. The implementation of moral education system and creating social conditions for positive social upbringing today there are many problems that require the search for solutions to them. Among the most important, in our opinion, are the following: social and political, and economic situation of modern Ukraine; lack of communication between the government and society for mutual adequate awareness and mutual influence; the destruction of the traditional way of life, the crisis of the family, the very low moral culture level of most modern parents; the lack of ethical education and the concept of moral education; negative influence of mass media, social networks; insufficient role of religion and church in the moral revival of Ukraine. Conclusions of the research. Some aspects and problems of moral education of young people in Ukraine are not exhaustive. There are both objective and subjective problems,. Morality and moral culture are a purposeful process of education, up-bringing and self-education. The significant role is played by society and the state, which have the duty to create and provide conditions for the moral, and in general, the spiritual development and existence of each person.

Integration of legal and moral in the Cultivation of Ethics and Fundamentals of Law teaching faces some reality constraints.As the dual interpretation of the moral and legal is not exhaustive,we ought to seize the key chapters,while focusing on the selection of typical cases,case teaching.Dual analysis of Xiao Yue-yue case and YA0 Jia-xin case provides a good template for the integration path in legal and moral.The pursuit of morality is not empty talk,it is a rational thinking,only the combination of the dual analysis of the instance can continue to promote the rational and mature mind,this is the spiritual essence of the integration of legal and moral. Key words: Cultivation of Ethics and Fundamentals of Law; Moral and legal integration; Implementation path ; Teaching case

Among contemporary scholars of Chinese Philosophy, Thaddeus Hang is most famous for his concern with methodological problems in studying Chinese Philosophy. This paper contains two parts: first, an exposition of Thaddeus Hang's own method of studying Chinese Philosophy; second, a deeper reflections on methodology in studying Chinese philosophy. Thaddeus Hang proposes a method of studying Chinese Philosophy by dominant themes. For him there are eight major dominant themes in Chinese philosophy: Politics, Morality, Heaven as Ruler, Mutual affection/response between All things and Human Affairs, the Origin of all things, the Constant Way of all things and Human Affairs, Unity of Heaven, Earth and Man, and, he added later, the Nature. For him, we can take these eight dominant themes as criteria to judge the difference and development of different schools and philosophers in Chinese philosophy. These eight dominant themes should be applied on the following four methodological lines: first, one should trace the origin in the history of philosophy, including the investigation by evidences; second, one should look for the fusion of horizons as emphasized by contemporary hermeneutics and avoid subjective arrogance by emphasizing one’s idiosyncrasies on irrelevant matters; third, one should use logical analysis and semantic analysis; fourth, one should do some comparison with Western philosophy. In the second part, I redefine Chinese philosophy and propose several levels of methodological principles in reading and philosophizing on Chinese philosophical texts: First, on the level of general hermeneutic, I propose the principle of intra-textuality; the principle of coherence, the principle of minimum emendation, and the principle of maximal reading. Second, we should pay attention to the hermeneutic characteristics of Chinese philosophy: targeting Idea-Image rather than Pure Ideas, Chinese philosophy prefers to show the movement of meaning by metaphors more than concepts, narrative of inner connected events more than logical argumentation. Third, one should pay attention to the hermeneutic principles or philosophy of language proposed by the author or the school of thoughts under investigation. The historical contextualization and comparative studies should base themselves on the previous work. Most importantly, an original way of philosophizing, based on analytic and critical skills, is invited in any philosophical study, no matter Chinese or Western.

Reviews 237 NOTES1· Benjamin Schwartz, The World ofThought in Ancient China (Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London: Harvard University Press, 1985), pp. 67-85. 2. Translation adapted from D. C. Lau, trans., Confucius: The Analects (Penguin, 1979). $ <§? Henry Rosemont, Jr., editor. Chinese Texts and Philosophical Contexts: Essays Dedicated to Angus C. Graham. Critics and Their Critics Series, vol. 1. La Salle, Illinois: Open Court, 1991. xviii, 334 pp. Hardcover $49.95, Paperback $22.95. Chinese Texts and Philosophical Contexts is a fascinating and at times even moving book, valuable both for its scholarship and as a chronicle of the current debates surrounding the study of Chinese thought. It is the first volume in Open Court's "Critics and Their Critics" series, which collects essays on the work of an eminent scholar accompanied by the responses of the honorée. Graham, who died shordy after the publication of this book, was a man whose immense talents were complemented by a wide array of interests, which resulted in groundbreaking work in several related areas and some unrelated ones, as well. His doctoral dissertation on the Cheng brothers, published in 1958 as Two Chinese Philosophers (and republished under the same name by Open Court Press in 1992), is still one of the best books available on Neo-Confucian philosophy. Graham wrote highly specialized articles on technical aspects of ancient Chinese language and literature in addition to translating two volumes of poetry. His work on Mencius' notion of xing, "nature," and the logic of the later Mohists not only shed light on previously poorly understood subjects but also set new standards for scholarship on Chinese thought. As his career progressed, Graham became particularly interested in the fourth century b.c. philosopher Zhuangzi, on whom he was the undisputed authority in Western languages, and later still in the purely philosophical problems of rationality and value. In 1985 he published Reason and Spontaneity (Barnes & Noble), in which he attempted to ground value judgments in spontaneous inclinations , the best judgments coming when people are most completely aware of their situations. With such a diverse set of issues to address, it is not surprising that the essays© 1994 by University composing this volume should be somewhat scattered. They converge on the ofHawai'i Presswork of Professor Graham, as editor Henry Rosemont notes in his introduction (p. xi). But since Graham is no longer among the readers, there will probably be few others who have the background necessary even to understand, much less to 238 China Review International: Vol. 1, No. 2, Fall 1994 appreciate fully, what all the essays collected here have to say: some, like Edwin Pulleyblank's "Some Notes on Morphology and Syntax in Classical Chinese," require a sophisticated understanding oflinguistics while others, like Rosemont's "Who Chooses?" presuppose more than a passing familiarity with contemporary moral and political thought. The book is divided into three convenient sections, however, starting with grammar and philology, moving on to historical and interpretative issues, and culminating in the philosophical questions concerning reason and value. Graham tends in the first two sections to outshine the contributors to his volume , his responses lifting the discussion from technical details to more general reflections on the methods and goals of studying a people as remote from ourselves as the ancient Chinese. The opening essay by D. C. Lau deals with the phrase zai you, which is the title of the eleventh chapter of the Zhuangzi and may also occur in a corrupted form in the second. Graham translates the phrase as "keeping in place and within bounds" and identifies it as a doctrine central to what he describes as the "Primitivist" contribution to the Zhuangzi. Lau amasses examples of the occurrence of the same or variant characters in surrounding texts, on the basis ofwhich he proposes a different translation and a subsequent revision of the nature and lineage of the Primitivist position. In his response, Graham argues effectively for the inadequacy of a purely textual analysis of this sort. As important as textual analysis is, no examination of the characters alone can ever tell us what those characters mean or how they got there unless it is supplemented by philosophical and historical reflection. Graham's response to Lau does more than just collect the insights ofdifferent disciplines; it demonstrates the interdependence of those disciplines and the need to combine all of them in order to master any. In his essay on the mass noun hypothesis, Christoph Harbsmeier turns his attention to the idea, first presented by Chad Hansen, that Chinese nouns function as mass nouns like "water" or "fury," which need to be accompanied by sortais like "a pailful" or "a burst of" as opposed to count nouns like "chair" or "groan" that come, as it were, already in prepackaged units. Harbsmeier marshals impressive linguistic evidence demonstrating that Chinese nouns are in fact better understood as falling into three categories: count, mass, and generic. In his response, Graham generally concurs with Harbsmeier's analysis and then goes on, in the offhand style that was so characteristic of him, to derive a penetrating and illuminating insight from this seemingly inert linguistic fact: That horses and chariots will be counted in only one way goes without saying irrespective of one's language, but it does seem that Classical Chinese, because it does not assimilate all nouns to count nouns by number terminations, escapes our tendency to assimilate things in general to the organisms and artifacts which stand out from their surroundings as discrete individuals, (p. 276) Reviews 239 Unlike most European languages, the grammar ofClassical Chinese does not suggest or substantiate the notion ofa world already full ofthings just waiting to be named, a presupposition which is not only pervasive in the history ofWestern thought but difficult to excise even in the present. Subtle observations like this, which not only transform our understanding ofwhat is going on in a place like ancient China but in the process add new depth to our understanding ofourselves , are the raison d'être of comparative philosophy and one of the pleasures of this volume. Graham shines similarly in his response to Hansen's own essay, titled "Should the Ancient Masters Value Reason?" Hansen describes reasoning as the process of drawing conclusions from given premises: axioms, definitions, or some description of the facts. Chinese philosophers, he argues, were concerned with the problem ofhow to divide the world up into things and classes, that is, with establishing the proper way to describe the facts. Since logical analysis of the facts can start only after some description of the facts is established, Hansen concludes that reason was of only limited use to the ancient Chinese. Graham points out that Hansen's claim is surely too strong if it is taken to mean that Chinese thinkers worry only about classifying terms and European thinkers worry only about analyzing them: Hansen manoeuvres himself into a position of making the Chinese preoccupation with dividing and naming the Chinese alternative to the Western with establishing truth by reason. He then continues: It seems to me to be crucial to maintain the distinction between the structures of thinking, which may be presumed to be transcultural (2 and 2 make 4 wherever you are), and its varying conceptualizations in different cultures, (pp. 292293 ) This is an important point that does a great deal to clarify what exactly it is that comparative philosophy does. We must assume that others, whether they be the ancient Chinese or our next-door neighbors, think similarly enough to ourselves at least so that we can come to understand them; if their thinking were entirely different, we would not only be unable to understand them at first but would have no hope of understanding them ever. The object of a study like this, then, is not the fundamentally different ways that people think but rather the relatively different ways that people think about thinking, the different styles of reasoning they employ, and the various advantages and limitations these different styles confer. But while it is necessary to posit a transcultural activity ofthinking in general, it is equally necessary to avoid confusing this broad category with our own provincial variation of it. One of the purposes of comparative philosophy, therefore, is to distinguish between who we are as inheritors ofparticular traditions and who we are simply as human beings. 240 China Review International: Vol. 1, No. 2, Fall 1994 The text ofthe Zhuangziwas edited into its present form by the fourth-century commentator Guo Xiang, who is known to have started with a fifty-two chapter version, which he condensed down into the present thirty-three. Harold Roth's article "Who Compiled the Chuang TzuV is an attempt to locate the origin of the original fifty-two chapter version. Taking excellent advantage of work done by Ma Xulun and Wang Shumin, Roth locates several incompatibilities in the text as it stands, passages that are juxtaposed but that represent such radically different agendas that they can only be explained by diversity of authorship. He argues that these incompatibilities were already present in the text received by Guo Xiang but that they must postdate the second century b.c. editor identified by Graham as the "Syncretist," whose programmatic approach would not allow for such inconsistencies . Roth argues effectively for the conclusion that there is a third hand in the text between the Syncretist and Guo Xiang, although he is able to amass only speculative and circumstantial evidence for his identification of this hand as belonging to an eclectic at the court of Huai Nan around 130 b.c. Roger Ames argues that xing, "nature," in Mencius should be understood as a goal to be achieved rather than as "a psychobiological starting point" (p. 143). What people are born with, he argues, taking his cue from Tang Junyi, "is simply the propensity for growth, cultivation, and refinement" (p. 152). "For Mencius," he continues, "the human being emerges in the world as a spontaneously arising and ever changing matrix of relationships through which, over a lifetime, his xing is defined" (p. 155, emphasis added). Animals have fairly little control over their characters, and plants have even less; what is different about people, according to Ames, is that we make ourselves who we are. Thus the "emergence" he describes is not the physical process of birth but the cultural and social process of becoming a person in the peculiarly human sense, that is, a distinct individual, occupying a unique place in the community in relation to others. If this is what it means to be human, then human nature is not something we start with but something we work toward. But while Ames makes a strong case that we ought to think of human nature in these terms, his argument that Mencius did so is inconclusive; if, as Ames suggests, human nature is what we make of it, then it is hard to see how Mencius could base any normative claims on it, which he clearly did. Indeed, the claim that "(t)he 'good' is not the actualization of some given potential, but the consequential optimization of the conditions defining of a particular thing over its history" sounds more like Zhuangzi than Mencius. Whether one is persuaded by the argument or not, however, Ames' essay sparks reflection on the unconscious conceptual translations we all make even when reading texts in the original. It is with David Nivison's essay "Hsun Tzu and Chuang Tzu" that the volume really begins to pick up speed. Nivison is another elder in the field of Chinese thought and will be the honorée of the third volume in this series. (Another contributor , Herbert Fingarette was honored with the second.) A distinctive and im- Reviews 241 portant feature ofboth Nivison's and Graham's interpretative method has been to focus attention notjust on isolated thinkers but on the influences and antagonisms between them. In this essay, Nivison speculates on the possible relation between Graham's own favorite thinker, Zhuangzi, and the third member ofthe early Confucian triumvirate, Xunzi, a thinker largely ignored in the past but apparently destined for greater attention in the future. Although Nivison's analysis of Zhuangzi is sketchy at points—it is not obvious either that Zhuangzi counseled a "literal withdrawal from the world" (p. 135) or that he aimed at "ataraxia as a supreme personal religious goal" (p. 136)—his account is generally in keeping with Graham's own interpretation ofZhuangzi as advocating the course ofaction along which one would be spontaneously moved in a state of impartial awareness. Nivison turns the tables, however, by arguing that Xunzi uses just such an approach to arrive at his own brand of Confucianism and that, if Zhuangzi had applied his own method scrupulously enough, he, too, "would have thought his way to the Confucian Tao" (p. 139). Graham's response to Nivison's good humored but ruthless thrust at his favorite thinker is brief, but is essential in understanding what goes on in the rest of the volume. He states, though without argument, first, that it simply is not true that an unprejudiced person who was aware of the situation would be moved toward Confucianism, and, second, that even if Xunzi were so moved, this is no guarantee that others would be, as well (p. 286). Graham does not elaborate on these points here. But it is taken for granted for the remainder of the volume that people's spontaneous inclinations from the standpoint of impartial awareness fail to confirm the status of the kinds of cultural commitments that are central to Confucianism. Pace Nivison, it is the ¿«compatibility of Zhuangzi and Xunzi that occasions the debate that closes the volume. Graham spent much of his later career defending the idea that what one ought to do is what one would be spontaneously moved to do from a standpoint of complete awareness. In "Reason, Spontaneity, and the Li" Herbert Fingarette questions whether awareness, or at least the right kind of awareness, is possible without presupposing certain social and cultural commitments represented by the Confucian Ii. Fingarette agrees with Graham in rejecting Nivison's assumption that cultural values are rules of thumb that an impartial and open-minded survey of the facts would prompt us to adopt spontaneously anyway. Someone who has made a promise to a friend, on Fingarette's view, would not necessarily be inclined simply on the basis of an impartial awareness of the situation to keep the promise if it were to her advantage not to do so; rather, her disinclination, if she felt any, would be premised on her prior commitment, not necessarily conscious or deliberate, to the value of fidelity. "(W)e learn and practice the Ii of our culture not because we find it to be right, but by virtue of its defining for us what we are to value as right" (p. 218). Certain things are bad for us because we have learned 242 China Review International: Vol. 1, No. 2, Fall 1994 to think of them as bad. We can be aware of their badness only after enculturation . Culture, therefore, has a logical priority over awareness. In the final essay, "Who Chooses?" Henry Rosemont sharpens this critique of Graham's notion of awareness. Graham himself acknowledges that complete awareness of everything is impossible; so he qualifies his position as calling for awareness only of the relevant facts, that is, those facts that would effect one's spontaneous inclinations. But, as Rosemont argues, the facts that are relevant to me vary depending on how I conceive of myself. Different things will matter to me, for instance, if I think of myself primarily as a member of a certain ethnic group or social class, as an isolated individual or as a human being, as someone with a whole life ahead of me or someone just struggling to get through this afternoon . The ways in which I can think of myself are infinite. Nor can one determine one's identity by an appeal to the relevant facts, since one cannot decide which facts are relevant until one has determined one's identity. It is our community that tells us who we are, according to Rosemont, confirming Fingarette's conclusion that awareness is dependent on culture. Both Fingarette and Rosemont doubt the possibility of ever stepping completely outside culture. And they agree further that, even if this were possible, it would not be desirable, since the right kind of awareness or self-conception is dependent on having the rignrkind of culture. This, of course, begs the question of what the right culture is and how much of it one should internalize; nor is there any obvious noncircular solution to this problem. And this is exactly where their disagreement with Graham lies. Fingarette and Rosemont argue from within an internallyjustified set of norms and values which they admit to be cultural products but in which they nonetheless believe; their concern is in understanding, administering , and preserving them. Graham argues from the outside; although he is not hostile to the values Fingarette and Rosemont take for granted, he is concerned with justifying and evaluating them and is always prepared, if necessary, to abandon them. This difference lurks in the background of the debate, and the reader wonders at times whether the writers themselves are fully aware of it. The closest it comes to being out in the open is over the question of whether cultural rules have a force that is logically prior to the spontaneous inclinations of individuals. For Fingarette and Rosemont they must; but Graham denies this is possible. He says: When community breaks up, as it hasfor us, how does one convert one's spontaneous preferences into a code with autonomous authority?. . . Any code they generate can only be a personal one, which at best will contribute to sowing the seeds of true community in thefuture, (p. 307, emphasis added) For Fingarette and Rosemont the community and its rules exist, and the question is how to sustain them. For Graham, on the other hand, the community is past, its rules have lost their force, and the question is how to survive and flourish in Reviews 243 their absence. It is no wonder they disagree over the solution when they have such fundamentally different notions ofwhat the problem is. Whether or not the community exists and whether cultural rules have independent normative force remain open questions at the end of the book and are left to the readers unresolved. The points at which the thinkers in this volume argue past one another are as informative as the points on which they clash. In their conflicting agendas and assumptions, particularly in their collective ambivalence toward traditional culture, readers recognize the forces that have shaped the study of Chinese thought in the West over the last several decades. At the same time, too, they are likely to recognize tensions that motivate and inform their own understanding of these subjects. Readers ofthe "Critics and Their Critics" series see more than just philosophy recorded; they see it happen. Paul Kjellberg Whittier College Harold D. Roth. The Textual History ofthe Huai-nan Tzu. AAS Monograph Series. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1992. xvi, 470 pp. Hardcover $36, Paperback $20. Required reading for anyone interested in the study of the Huai-nan Tzu, this work will serve as the authoritative historical and textual analysis of the Huai-nan Tzu for years to come. This book will be of interest to students of textual analysis, interpretation, publishing, and history. Roth's work is based on a critical application ofVinton Dearing's theoretical examinations of textual analysis, namely, A Manual ofTextualAnalysis (Berkeley, 1959) and Principles and Practice ofTextual Analysis (Berkeley, 1974). The text we know as the Huai-nan Tzu was one of three works completed under the patronage of Liu An, prince of Huai-nan, and was completed by 139 b.c. The essays were probably written by Liu An and a group of eight scholars. At least one copy, but possibly two copies, of the Huai-nan Tzu were placed in the imperial library before Liu Hsiang collated them in circa 10 b.c. Only two of the four, possibly five, commentaries written in the Han dynasty survived, those of Hsu© 1994 by University shen and Kao Yu. These two commentaries represent the two lines of transmisofHawai ?PresssjQn unti, ^6 fourm cgntuj-^when a recension was made by combining thirteen chapters of the Kao Yu edition with eight chapters from the Hsü Shen edition. The composite recension served as the basis for the three oldest extant redactions ...

The subject of the research is the philosophical ancient Chinese traditional and modern innovative views on the anthropological problem of human existence in the aspect of lifestyle, aesthetic knowledge in the Confucian worldview. The motive for addressing the topic was the desire to trace and present a philosophical thought about the path of development of Chinese culture in approaching the aesthetics of life as an opportunity to achieve a wonderful life. The relevance of the problem lies in the promotion at the present stage of the value of the sensual principle competing with rationality in thinking. The novelty is the anthroposocioecological approach in the comparative analysis of ancient Chinese philosophical texts, in which the problem of ritual and music occupied a significant place, and the modern new Confucian philosophy, which highlighted the aesthetics of life. The author pays special attention to the aesthetic value of music in Chinese philosophy. Axiological, hermeneutic, phenomenological, and historical methods are used. The introduction gives a brief idea of the essence of the anthroposocioecological approach applicable to Chinese philosophy and the value of music in the aspect of research. n the new Confucian concept of aesthetics of life by the modern Chinese philosopher Liu Yuedi. In the author’s conclusions, the concept of new Confucianism, which puts forward the pursuit of an ideal life, seems to be a utopian and at the same time fruitful idea in search of self-sufficient personal and interpersonal satisfaction. Liu Yuedi’s philosophy highlights such basic anthropological problems as the Chinese concept of life, the difference between a good and a beautiful, wonderful life, the value of the sensory-emotional component; the Confucian psychoanalytic approach in the philosophy of music is asserted. From a practical point of view, the modern Chinese concept of aesthetics of life and its modeling of a beautiful lifestyle mean creating conditions under which everyone could create their lives freely, as an artist creates art. Attention is drawn to sensual and intellectual intuition in creative activity and to the difference in approaches in Chinese and European philosophy regarding lifestyle in the dynamics of cultural development.

During his long career, John Dewey produced an almost endless number of pages of dense philosophical prose, giving those interested in his work plenty to do. Even scholars of rhetoric have found a host of reasons to return to Dewey's corpus, despite the fact that Dewey himself seemed, at best, uninterested in rhetoric. Two recent works—Robert Danisch's Pragmatism, Democracy, and the Necessity of Rhetoric and Nathan Crick's Democracy and Rhetoric: John Dewey on the Arts of Becoming—have already fruitfully mined Dewey's writings for insights on how pragmatist philosophy intersects with the rhetorical tradition. Now comes Scott Stroud's John Dewey and the Artful Life. Like Danisch and Crick, Stroud explores the nexus of American pragmatism, human communication, and civic life. Also like Danisch and Crick, he focuses much-needed attention on how Dewey's understanding of art—or, better, the artful life—connects to his understanding of language, symbols, deliberation, and discourse. Taken together, these books provide a strong foundation for those interested in continuing the conversation about rhetoric and pragmatism.Yet it would be a mistake to suggest that Stroud's book is merely an extension of the work begun by Danisch and Crick, for Stroud approaches Dewey's thought from a distinct perspective. Whereas Danisch and Crick utilize Dewey's insights for decidedly rhetorical projects, Stroud begins from philosophical ground and builds toward communication and the artful life. Both approaches are valuable in their own ways, but it is important to note that Stroud's primary interest concerns aesthetic experience, which then leads to a consideration of communicative practices. It is also important to note that whereas Danisch and Crick foreground the rhetorical tradition, Stroud is content—and understandably so—to leave rhetoric lurking around the periphery. Scholars interested in pragmatism, aesthetics, ethics, and communication will find in John Dewey and the Artful Life a compelling treatment of the artistry of experience from a Deweyan perspective. Scholars will also find a clear, engaging, well-developed discussion of how Dewey's work informs aesthetics and moral philosophy. At the same time, however, Stroud's book raises significant questions about the place and character of rhetoric in a Deweyan view of the world.Stroud begins with the relationship between art and morality—or, in Deweyan terms, aesthetic experience and moral cultivation. In response to scholars who implicitly or explicitly erect barriers between art, morality, and life, Stroud persuasively argues that aesthetic experience can lead to moral growth. He turns to Dewey's work because Dewey locates “the moral value of aesthetic experience in the experience” itself (6). Whether through an immediate encounter with an “art object” or through subsequent reflection on the encounter, the individual's experience with art can, does, and should lead to “a progressive adjustment or growth … in light of some concrete situation” (6). For both Stroud and Dewey, aesthetic experience can be morally cultivating because it involves absorbed attentiveness to particular situations as well as “the constant and ongoing adjustment of individual to environment” (8).Central to the “ongoing adjustment of individual to environment” are the pragmatist notions of habit and attitude—notions that William James and John Dewey, among others, spent considerable time explicating. In Stroud's treatment, moral cultivation hinges on the habit and attitude of “orientational meliorism,” which concerns the way individuals attend to and adjust their “deep-seated orientations toward self, others, and the value of an activity” (9). Put somewhat differently, orientational meliorism is a mental, attitudinal adjustment to the rich particulars of experience. For example, instead of viewing an activity as simply the means for attaining a long-term goal, one should, Stroud argues, pay attention to “the material of the present situation, while maintaining a flexibility to new ways of reacting to such material and to the myriad meanings resident in such a situation” (157). By attending to the rich particulars of the situation at hand, one can make one's experience aesthetically and morally meaningful. Moreover, because orientational meliorism is tied to one's attitude and habits, it can be employed in almost any situation, which means that almost any experience can become aesthetically and morally meaningful. Art, Stroud insists, does not lie in a particular object; rather, it emerges from the way we approach and tend to the qualities of experience.Stroud explores aesthetic experience, moral cultivation, and orientational meliorism across six substantive chapters in addition to an introduction and conclusion. The early chapters explore such topics as the meaning and dimensions of aesthetic experience, Dewey's thoughts on the connection between experience and value, and the ways aesthetic experience can function as moral cultivation. Among readers of Philosophy and Rhetoric, however, the later chapters will likely attract the most attention. In chapter 5, “Reflection and Moral Value in Aesthetic Experience,” Stroud explores how art works communicatively—that is, how it can be “used by an artist or by an auditor to force consideration of values, beliefs, and action strategies” (95). In this conceptualization, art exists in the relational space between speaker and audience, writer and reader, producer and consumer, rhetor and auditor. To illustrate the point, Stroud draws on three disparate but compelling examples—the film Saving Private Ryan, the sculpture Tilted Arc by Richard Serra, and the haiku poetry of Bashō. These art objects are purposively evocative of experience itself, making audiences aware of the aesthetic encounter taking place and eliciting from them reflective judgment. The result is a bond between artist and audience, a shared way of attending to the moral meanings of the situation.In chapter 6, Stroud explores the concept of orientational meliorism at length, showing the problems associated with “nonpresent goals” and how Dewey's philosophy can properly attune individuals to the depths of everyday experience. One way Stroud illustrates orientational meliorism is through common attitudes toward work, labor, and one's occupation. One could, and many do, view work as drudgery, as simply a means to a paycheck. Conversely, Stroud argues, one could view it “as something that is suffused with the value of a larger goal. One could consciously tie one's activity to the goal of the organization in which one is located” (160). Similarly, one could focus on the personal relationships associated with one's occupation (161). The key is how the individual orients himself or herself to the present situation. Orientational meliorism thus allows individuals to make meaning out of the particulars they encounter—whether those particulars be in traditional art objects or in the more mundane aspects of everyday life.Chapter 7 ties together Stroud's themes of aesthetic experience, moral cultivation, and orientation meliorism in communicative encounters. And here Stroud, as many before him have done, underscores the importance of Dewey's philosophy for the study and practice of communication. According to Stroud, the key to artful communication, whereby ordinary symbolic exchanges become aesthetic, is “the orientation of the individual communicator”; it is the “attitude the subject brings into the communicative experience that will render it aesthetic” (171). By attending to “means and ends as integrally connected” and by valuing “means and ends in a connected fashion,” one is able to see and develop the aesthetic threads of almost any form of communication. Stroud provides three specific guidelines for making communicative activities more aesthetic. “First, a communicator is well served to avoid focusing on a remote goal” (186). Seeing one's interlocutors as intrinsically valuable, for example, can keep one grounded in the exchange itself. Second, “one ought to consciously cultivate habits of attending to the demands of the present communication situation” (186). This means, on Stroud's account, not only considering one's personal needs and interests but the needs and interests of others (family, friends, coworkers, etc.). Without considering these wider interests, one can quickly cut oneself off from the possibilities at hand. Third, “one should avoid the pitfall … of focusing too much attention on the idea of a reified, separate self” (187). Stroud's caution here is important for his project and for pragmatist philosophy more generally. While Stroud, like Dewey and other pragmatists, focuses extensively on individuals and subjective dispositions, he is careful to note that selves are integrally linked to communities and wider relational networks. Individuals are inseparable from the communities through which they exist, and properly attending to the specifics of a situation can coordinate meanings across individuals.All of this suggests that John Dewey and the Artful Life is as much about ethical life as it is about aesthetic experience and moral cultivation. These concepts are integrally linked, especially in the ways we communicate. Indeed, human communication is, or can be, one of the most fully developed expressions of an aesthetic, moral, ethical life. Perhaps the best way to think about John Dewey and the Artful Life, then, is as a guidebook for infusing everyday life with new meaning. By seizing on the particulars of experience—of almost any experience—one can make the world richer and more meaningful, so long as one adopts the proper orientation. Orientational meliorism is an attitude anyone can adopt, even in the most horrific circumstances (see the example Stroud develops on 163–67), which means that aesthetic experience is close at hand. In the end, Stroud merges communication studies and philosophy into a provocative pragmatist whole—and he does so in a way that Dewey himself would likely applaud.Yet in accord with Dewey's own philosophy, John Dewey and the Artful Life centers on communicative practices writ large, leaving the art of rhetoric, more narrowly conceived, at the periphery. In fact, readers of Philosophy and Rhetoric may come away from Stroud's book asking the question long asked about Dewey's work: “Whither rhetoric?” If we follow Stroud's lead in theorizing about aesthetic experience, moral cultivation, and orientational meliorism, rhetoric's role is ambiguous at best. At worst the art of rhetoric may impede the aesthetic, moral, ethical life.To be clear, Stroud never claims that his book will address the connection between Dewey's work and the art of rhetoric. Indeed, his treatment of John Dewey and the Artful Life stands admirably on its own terms, offering a compelling study in how everyday experience can be infused with meaning and possibility. So my question about the place of rhetoric is not a criticism of Stroud's book. But it is a question with which Stroud's book leaves us—a question that follows directly from Dewey's philosophy. It is also a question that readers of Philosophy and Rhetoric ought to consider, especially given the ongoing conversation about pragmatism and rhetoric. Does the art of rhetoric become less artful when considered in the context of Dewey's conception of the artful life? Is there a place for rhetoric in Deweyan aesthetic experience? More precisely, is there a place for certain kinds of rhetorical practice in the melioristic-communicative schema Stroud explicates?Scholars of Dewey's work will well remember the idealistic, romantic quality of his thoughts on communication. When Dewey insists that communication can liberate us “from the otherwise overwhelming pressure of events,” can enable us “to live in a world of things that have meaning,” and can allow us to share “in the objects and arts precious to a community,” all of which result in a profound “sense of communion” with those around us, he links the artistry of communication to moments of cooperative, level-headed, face-to-face exchange (1988, 159). Aesthetic communicative experiences thus hinge on individuals working deliberatively together for the common good. In this view of communication Stroud seems to concur, insisting that the key to aesthetically rich discourse is the proper orientation of communicants. Artistry depends, writes Stroud, “on orientations in the artist and the audience. Of particular interest to my argument is the orientation that the audience must take. This receiver orientation is crucial, as art's reception as valuable in the public sphere depends on the precondition that the audience attends to it in such a fashion that its uniquely communicative power is available” (102).Such a characterization nicely captures the artistry of many communicative exchanges, but it simultaneously pushes certain rhetorical encounters outside the boundaries of art. Indeed, rhetoric often operates in those moments when audiences lack the proper orientation. In many rhetorical encounters, speakers and audiences are misaligned, even hostile and antagonistic. And one could argue that rhetoric is most artful when it wrenches individuals away from their initial orientations, setting them aright about the basic goods of life. In Stroud's schema, however, the proper orientation is necessary for an aesthetic experience, which means that this framework may be unable to accommodate those profound moments when rhetoric is needed to wrench people away from what they think they know.Put somewhat differently, does the artful life include those times in a democracy when individuals do not collaborate and deliberate together but yell, decry, defame, lambaste, and try to start fights with words? Several scholars have already critiqued a Deweyan view of communication for failing to account for truly democratic rhetoric—namely, moments of protest, denunciation, and vituperation (e.g., Schudson 1997 and Roberts-Miller 2005). In such moments, does rhetoric fall outside the boundaries of art? What are we to do with rhetors like William Lloyd Garrison, whose powerful, profound, prophetic, vicious denunciations of slavery basically told the American people they were going to hell? Surely Garrison's audiences were thoroughly misaligned with his words. Surely they lacked the proper orientation. Does Garrison's rhetoric thus become inartistic? I hope not, considering that Garrison's pages overflow with eloquence, with wisdom speaking artistically. William Lloyd Garrison ought to have a place in Dewey's Great Community. His unflinching invectives against slavery ought to be affirmed as part of the nation's collective aesthetic experience. Artful living ought to incorporate those who yell at others, who condemn their foes, who disregard the orientations of the status quo and denounce evil.Stroud and Dewey would likely have a reasonable response to these concerns. Stroud himself begins to offer one when he notes that aesthetic experience accommodates those moments when artists “force consideration of values, beliefs, and action strategies” (95). Forcing consideration of values is one way of characterizing Garrison's project. But insisting that “it is the attitude the subject brings into the communicative experience that will render it aesthetic” (171) seems to leave little room for forcing people into a position where they must reconsider their beliefs. Orientational meliorism may mean that many rhetorical encounters fall beyond the pale of the aesthetic.Or maybe not. Stroud never claims that his view of aesthetic experience is all-encompassing, nor does he claim that he is interested in using Dewey's philosophy to account for rhetoric. So once again, my critique is not of Stroud's book. It is rather a prompt for scholars who wish to continue to pursue pragmatism and rhetoric. John Dewey and the Artful Life gives us a detailed, clear, and insightful account of how Dewey's work intersects with art, experience, and communication. At the same time, it encourages us to think further about Dewey's place in and around the rhetorical tradition.