Correction to "A grain of truth in the grain size effect: Retrieval practice is more effective when interspersed during learning" by Don et al. (2024).

Reports an error in "One thought too few: An adaptive rationale for punishing negligence" by Arunima Sarin and Fiery Cushman (Psychological Review, 2024[Apr], Vol 131[3], 812-824). In the original article, the copyright attribution was incorrectly listed, and the Creative Commons CC BY license disclaimer was incorrectly omitted from the author note. The correct copyright is "© 2024 The Author(s)," and the omitted disclaimer is present as: Open Access funding provided by University College London: This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (CC BY 4.0; http://creativecommons.org/li censes/by/4.0). This license permits copying and redistributing the work in any medium or format, as well as adapting the material for any purpose, even commercially. (The following abstract of the original article appeared in record 2024-74001-001). Why do we punish negligence? Some current accounts raise the possibility that it can be explained by the kinds of processes that lead us to punish ordinary harmful acts, such as outcome bias, character inference, or antecedent deliberative choices. Although they capture many important cases, these explanations fail to account for others. We argue that, in addition to these phenomena, there is something unique to the punishment of negligence itself: People hold others directly responsible for the basic fact of failing to bring to mind information that would help them to avoid important risks. In other words, we propose that at its heart negligence is a failure of thought. Drawing on the current literature in moral psychology, we suggest that people find it natural to punish such failures, even when they do not arise from conscious, volitional choice. This raises a question: Why punish somebody for a mental event they did not exercise deliberative control over? Drawing on the literature on how thoughts come to mind, we argue that punishing a person for such failures will help prevent their future occurrence, even without the involvement of volitional choice. This provides new insight on the structure and function of our tendency to punish negligent actions. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2025 APA, all rights reserved).

The forward testing effect describes the finding that testing of previously studied information potentiates learning and retention of new information. Here we asked whether interim testing boosts self-regulated study time allocation when learning new information and explored its effect on metamemory monitoring. Participants had unlimited time to study five lists of Euskara-English word pairs (Experiment 1) or four lists of face-name pairs (Experiment 2). In a no interim test group, which was only tested on the final list, study time decreased across successive lists. In contrast, in an interim test group, which completed a recall test after each list, no such decrease was observed. Experiments 3 and 4 were designed to investigate the forward testing effect on metamemory monitoring and found that this effect is associated with metacognitive insight. Overall, the current study reveals that interim tests prevent the reduction of study time across lists and that people's metamemory monitoring is sensitive to the forward benefit of interim testing. Moreover, across all 4 experiments, the interim test group was less affected by proactive interference in the final list interim test than the no interim test group. The results suggest that variations in both encoding and retrieval processes contribute to the forward benefit of interim testing. (PsycINFO Database Record

Induction refers to the process in which people generalize their previous experience when making uncertain inferences about the environment that go beyond direct experience. Here we show that interim tests strongly enhance inductive learning. Participants studied the painting styles of eight famous artists across four lists, each comprising paintings by one pair of artists. In an interim test group participants' induction was tested after each list. In two control groups participants solved math problems (interim math group) or studied additional new paintings (interim study group) following each of Lists 1-3 and were asked to classify new paintings on List 4. In the List 4 interim test, the interim test group significantly outperformed the other two groups, indicating that interim testing enhances new inductive learning. In a final cumulative test, accuracy in the interim test group at classifying new paintings by studied artists was nearly double that of the other two groups, indicating the major importance of interim testing in inductive learning. This enhancing effect of interim testing on inductive learning was associated with metacognitive awareness. (PsycINFO Database Record

Reports an error in "Comparing theories with the Ising model of explanatory coherence" by Maximilian Maier, Noah van Dongen and Denny Borsboom (Psychological Methods, Advanced Online Publication, Mar 02, 2023, np). In the article, the copyright attribution was incorrectly listed, and the Creative Commons CC BY 4.0 license disclaimer was incorrectly omitted from the author note. The correct copyright is "© 2023 The Author(s)," and the omitted disclaimer is below: Open Access funding provided by University College London: This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (CC BY 4.0; https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/ 4.0). This license permits copying and redistributing the work in any medium or format, as well as adapting the material for any purpose, even commercially. (The following abstract of the original article appeared in record 2023-50323-001.) Theories are among the most important tools of science. Lewin (1943) already noted "There is nothing as practical as a good theory." Although psychologists discussed problems of theory in their discipline for a long time, weak theories are still widespread in most subfields. One possible reason for this is that psychologists lack the tools to systematically assess the quality of their theories. Thagard (1989) developed a computational model for formal theory evaluation based on the concept of explanatory coherence. However, there are possible improvements to Thagard's (1989) model and it is not available in software that psychologists typically use. Therefore, we developed a new implementation of explanatory coherence based on the Ising model. We demonstrate the capabilities of this new Ising model of Explanatory Coherence (IMEC) on several examples from psychology and other sciences. In addition, we implemented it in the R-package IMEC to assist scientists in evaluating the quality of their theories in practice. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

The forward testing effect (FTE) refers to the finding that retrieval practice of previously studied material can facilitate recall of newly studied (critical) material. Such interim retrieval practice can also lead to a differential FTE, i.e., a more pronounced FTE for items at early than later serial positions in the critical material. The present study examined whether this differential FTE also holds with interim semantic generation of extra-list items, and whether it is influenced by study material. Consistent with prior work, the results of two experiments showed that both interim retrieval practice and interim semantic generation induce the general (list-level) FTE when unrelated study lists are applied, whereas retrieval practice only creates the effect with categorised study lists. Critically, however, the differential FTE was present in response to retrieval practice but absent in response to semantic generation. This pattern held regardless of which material was studied, thus experimentally dissociating the general (list-level) from the differential (item-level) FTE. The findings may suggest that retrieval practice, but not semantic generation, induces a reset of the encoding process which promotes attentional encoding such that a more pronounced FTE arises for early than middle and late serial positions in the critical list.

The forward testing effect (FTE) refers to the finding that retrieval practice of previously studied material can facilitate retention of newly studied material more than does restudy of the material. The goal of the present study was to examine how such retrieval practice affects initially studied, unpracticed material. To this end, we used two commonly applied versions of the FTE task, consisting of either three (Experiment 1) or five (Experiment 2) study lists. While study of list 1 was always followed by an unrelated distractor activity, study of list 2 (3-list version) or lists 2, 3, and 4 (5-list version) was followed by either interim restudy or retrieval practice of the immediately preceding list. After studying all lists, participants were either asked to recall the first or last study list. Results showed that, for both the three-list and five-list versions, interim retrieval practice led to a typical FTE, irrespective of whether unrelated or categorized study lists were used. Going beyond the prior work, interim retrieval practice was found to have no effect on initially studied, unpracticed material, regardless of the type of study material. The findings suggest that using interim retrieval practice as a study method can improve recall of the last studied list without incurring a cost for the initially studied material. Our results are difficult to align with the view that retrieval practice induces context change, but are consistent with the idea that retrieval practice can lead participants to employ superior encoding strategies.

Scientific Online Letters on the Atmosphere (SOLA) is going to implement new policy changes starting from 2018 in order to comply with a fully Open Access policy under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0) License. This license permits users to adapt, distribute, and reproduce the articles of SOLA in any medium, even commercially, provided that the users give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the original source, provide a link to the license, and indicate if changes were made, without obtaining permission from the Meteorological Society of Japan (MSJ). The copyright of articles will be retained by the authors. Authors will be required to sign a License to Publish form in order to give the MSJ permission to reproduce the article in SOLA under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0) license. Another change is to employ Article Processing Charge (APC) in order to cover the publication cost such as copy editing, typesetting, and online procedures under the Open Access policy with the CC BY license, shifting from the current page charge. Author(s) or their institution(s) are requested to pay an APC to the MSJ with the amount of 80,000 Japanese Yen for members of the MSJ and 100,000 Japanese Yen for non-members of the MSJ (both with consumption tax if applicable). There will be a transition period for the articles that have been submitted in 2017 and will appear in early 2018; either the current page charge or the APC, a lower amount, will be asked to pay. I believe that this policy change would further enhance the status of SOLA in the international community.

ObjectivesAcademical and not-for-profit research funders are increasingly requiring that the research they fund must be published open access, with some insisting on publishing with a Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY)...

When retrieval practice promotes new learning – The critical role of study material

Retrieval Practice and Spacing Effects in Naming Rehabilitation: A Theory of Learning

It has long been known that one of the most effective study techniques is to be tested on the to-be-remembered material, a phenomenon known as the testing effect. Recent research has also shown that testing of previous materials promotes the learning of new materials, a phenomenon known as the forward testing effect. In this paper, as of yet unexplored aspects of the forward testing effect related to face-name learning are examined; continuous and initial testing are compared to restudying, the effects of an initial test on subsequent learning, and whether an initial change of domain (change from one topic to another) regarding study material affects the robustness of the effect. An experiment (N = 94) was performed according to a 2 (Material: word pairs/face-name pairs in Block 1) × 3 (Test occasions: Blocks 1–4/Blocks 1 and 4/Block 4) complex between-groups design. The results showed that no difference between testing and repetition could be observed regarding the recall of faces and names. The restudy groups incorrectly recalled more names from previous lists in the last interim test compared to the tested groups, which supports the theory that interim tests reduce proactive interference. The results also suggest that the number of test occasions correlates with the number of incorrect recalls from previous lists. These results, in contrast to previous studies, highlight a potential uncertainty about the forward testing effect linked to the robustness of the phenomenon, the specificity in execution, and generalizability.

Testing of previously studied information potentiates subsequent learning of new information, a phenomenon referred to as the forward testing effect (FTE). The current study aimed to investigate the developmental trajectory of the FTE and whether the reset-of-encoding process contributes to the FTE. Younger children, older children, and adults were instructed to study four lists of unrelated words, then either restudied or were tested following studying each of Lists 1–3, and took an interim test on List 4. Results demonstrated that interim testing on Lists 1–3 enhanced learning of List 4 for younger children, older children, and adults. Importantly, this enhancement varies with items’ serial list position in both younger children and older children. Early List 4 items at list primacy positions benefited more from interim testing than later ones at non-primacy positions. Overall, this is the first study demonstrating that (1) the FTE generalizes to younger children, older children, and adults, suggesting the FTE emerges quite early in human life; (2) the reset-of-encoding process contributes to the FTE in both younger and older children.

Reports an error in "Does a lack of perceptual expertise prevent participants from forming reliable first impressions of "other-race" faces" by Maria Tsantani, Harriet Over and Richard Cook (Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, Advanced Online Publication, Nov 07, 2022, np). The original article is being made available open access under the CC-BY license following the University of Nottingham opt-in to the Jisc/APA Read and Publish agreement. The correct copyright is "© 2022 The Author(s)" and the CC-BY license disclaimer is below. All versions of this article have been corrected. "Open Access funding provided by Birkbeck, University of London: This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (CC-BY). This license permits copying and redistributing the work in any medium or format, as well as adapting the material for any purpose, even commercially." (The following abstract of the original article appeared in record 2023-15561-001). Many studies investigating first impressions from faces employ stimulus sets that comprise only White faces. It is argued that participants lack the necessary perceptual expertise to provide reliable trait evaluations when viewing faces from ethnicities that differ from their own. In combination with a reliance on White and WEIRD participants, this concern has contributed to the widespread use of White face stimuli in this literature. The present study sought to determine whether concerns about the use of so-called other-race faces are justified by assessing the test-retest reliability of trait judgments made about same- and other-race faces. In two experiments conducted on 400 British participants, we find that White British participants made reliable trait judgments about Black faces, and Black British participants made reliable trait judgments about White faces. It is important that future work be conducted to determine how widely these results generalize. Considering our findings, however, we suggest (a) that the default assumption in future first impressions research should be that participants-particularly those recruited from diverse communities-are able to form reliable first impressions of other-race faces and (b) that faces of color be included in stimulus sets whenever possible. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

Many studies investigating first impressions from faces employ stimulus sets that comprise only White faces. It is argued that participants lack the necessary perceptual expertise to provide reliable trait evaluations when viewing faces from ethnicities that differ from their own. In combination with a reliance on White and WEIRD participants, this concern has contributed to the widespread use of White face stimuli in this literature. The present study sought to determine whether concerns about the use of so-called other-race faces are justified by assessing the test-retest reliability of trait judgments made about same- and other-race faces. In two experiments conducted on 400 British participants, we find that White British participants made reliable trait judgments about Black faces, and Black British participants made reliable trait judgments about White faces. It is important that future work be conducted to determine how widely these results generalize. Considering our findings, however, we suggest (a) that the default assumption in future first impressions research should be that participants-particularly those recruited from diverse communities-are able to form reliable first impressions of other-race faces and (b) that faces of color be included in stimulus sets whenever possible. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

The Plan S Rights Retention Strategy (RRS) requires authors who are submitting to subscription journals to inform publishers that the author accepted manuscript (AAM) will be made available under a Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) licence. The laudable stated aim of the RRS is to achieve immediate open access to research outputs, while preserving journal choice for authors. However, proponents of the RRS overlook the significant administrative and legal burdens that the RRS places on authors and readers. Even though compliance with existing green open access (self-archiving) policies is poor at best, the RRS is likely to rely on authors to successfully execute the CC licensing of their work in the face of publisher resistance. The complexity of copyright law and CC licensing gives many reasons to doubt the legal validity of an RRS licence grant, which creates legal risk for authors and their institutions. The complexity of RRS CC BY licensing also creates legal risk for readers, who may not be able to fully rely on the reuse rights of a CC BY licence on the AAM. However, cOAlition S has released no legal advice that explains why the RRS is valid and legally binding. Publishers of legacy subscription journals have already begun implementing strategies that ensure they can protect their revenue streams. These actions may leave authors having to choose between paying publication fees and complying with their funding agreements. The result is that the RRS increases the complexity of the copyright and licensing landscape in academic publishing, creates legal risk and may not avoid author fees. Unless increased complexity and conflict between authors and publishers drives open access, the RRS is not fit for its stated purpose as an open access strategy.