Correction for Westwood et al., Current research overstates American support for political violence

In the first prospective study, to our knowledge, of the impact of ongoing terrorism and political violence, we analyzed nationally representative data from 560 Jews and 182 Arabs in Israel over a 6-month period. Based on Conservation of Resources (COR) theory (Hobfoll, 1989, 1998), we predicted that exposure to terrorism and political violence would result in psychosocial and economic resource loss and resource lack, which in turn, would be primary predictors of increases in symptoms of posttraumatic stress (PTS) and depression. We also predicted that trauma exposure and PTS symptoms, in particular, would be related to ethnocentrism and support for political violence. Furthermore, based on theory and prior research, we predicted that posttraumatic growth (PTG) would be related to a worsening of symptoms of distress and that distress would be related to increased ethnocentrism and support for extreme political violence for their “cause.” Women, older individuals, and Arabs (compared with Jews) were more likely to have continued psychological distress over time. In addition, using simultaneous equation modeling, we found good fit for a structural model that partially supported our hypotheses. Psychosocial resource loss, PTG, and social support had direct and indirect effects on psychological distress. Political attitudes tended to harden over time but were not prospectively related to PTS or depressive symptoms.

A nationally representative longitudinal survey in the USA found a decrease in population-level support for political violence from 2022 to 2023. This individual-level analysis of those data examines associations between the occurrence of 18 specified life events and subsequent change in views on political violence. Participants in the Life in America Survey were members of the Ipsos KnowledgePanel. Wave 2 of the survey was fielded online May 18-June 8, 2023; all respondents to 2022's Wave 1 who remained in KnowledgePanel were invited to participate. We calculated individual scores for 2022 and 2023 on 35 political violence measures from the first component of an ordinal principal components analysis and computed the difference in scores for individual respondents from 2022 to 2023 to represent a 1-year change in these measures. Our principal outcomes are adjusted mean differences in change scores from 2022 to 2023 between individuals experiencing and not experiencing the 18 life events. The completion rate was 84.2%; there were 9385 respondents. Support for political violence decreased for 19.9% of respondents, increased for 14.2%, and remained unchanged for 65.9%. When events were considered individually in a model that adjusted for sociodemographic characteristics and other life events, only "things improved for me financially" was associated with decreased support for political violence among respondents as a whole; "I gave up on politics" was associated with an increase. No event was associated with change among both men and women when they were analyzed separately. Among respondents who reported in 2022 that violence was usually or always justified for at least 1 political objective, no events were associated with change in support for political violence. Among those who strongly approved in 2022 of left-wing violent extremist organizations or movements, "my political beliefs changed a lot" was associated with a large decrease. In this cohort, few life events were associated with changes in support for political violence across the entire population, but there were important subset findings. The findings support interventions to improve measures of economic well-being across the population and to encourage belief change among extremists as political violence prevention measures.

Previous research has found that individuals harboring hostile sexist attitudes are more likely to support the use of political violence. In this study, we examine this relationship further. We theorize that the impact of hostile sexism on support for political violence is mediated through two mutually reinforcing factors: social dominance orientation and political illiberalism. We test this argument using an original survey we administered to over 1,400 subjects in the United States. We employ two operationalizations of individuals’ support for political violence: support in the abstract and support for specific acts of political violence. We find that individuals who exhibit hostile sexism are substantially more likely to support political violence, both abstract and specific. Moreover, we find that both social dominance orientation and political illiberalism together mediate 64.9% of the effect of hostile sexism on support for political violence in the abstract and 80.5% of the effect on support for specific acts of political violence. We conclude with a discussion of the implications of these findings.

Little is known about support for and willingness to engage in political violence in the United States. Such violence would likely involve firearms. To evaluate whether firearm owners' and nonowners' support for political violence differs and whether support among owners varies by type of firearms owned, recency of purchase, and frequency of carrying a loaded firearm in public. This cross-sectional nationally representative survey study was conducted from May 13 to June 2, 2022, among US adult members of the Ipsos KnowledgePanel, including an oversample of firearm owners. Firearm ownership vs nonownership. Main outcomes concern (1) support for political violence, in general and to advance specific political objectives; (2) personal willingness to engage in political violence, by severity of violence and target population; and (3) perceived likelihood of firearm use in political violence. Outcomes are expressed as weighted proportions and adjusted prevalence differences, with P values adjusted for the false-discovery rate and reported as q values. The analytic sample comprised 12 851 respondents: 5820 (45.3%) firearm owners, 6132 (47.7%) nonowners without firearms at home, and 899 (7.0%) nonowners with firearms at home. After weighting, 51.0% (95% CI, 49.9%-52.1%) were female, 8.5% (95% CI, 7.5%-9.5%) Hispanic, 9.1% (95% CI, 8.1%-10.2%) non-Hispanic Black, and 62.6% (95% CI, 61.5%-63.8%) non-Hispanic White; the mean (SD) age was 48.5 (18.0) years. Owners were more likely than nonowners without firearms at home to consider violence usually or always justified to advance at least 1 of 17 specific political objectives (owners: 38.8%; 95% CI, 37.3%-40.4%; nonowners: 29.8%; 95% CI, 28.5%-31.2%; adjusted difference, 6.5 percentage points; 95% CI, 4.5-9.3 percentage points; q < .001) but were not more willing to engage in political violence. Recent purchasers, owners who always or nearly always carry loaded firearms in public, and to a lesser extent, owners of assault-type rifles were more supportive of and willing to engage in political violence than other subgroups of firearm owners. In this study of support for political violence in the United States, differences between firearm owners and nonowners without firearms at home were small to moderate when present. Differences were greater among subsets of owners than between owners and nonowners. These findings can guide risk-based prevention efforts.

As populist parties and politicians have grown in prominence in democracies, scholars have turned their attention to the causes, and consequences, of populist attitudes among citizens. Some preliminary research indicates that individuals with populist attitudes are more likely to express support or tolerance for the use of violence to achieve political objectives. In this study, I examine this relationship further by investigating factors that mediate the effect of populism on endorsement of political violence. Using an original survey of more than 1300 subjects in the United States, I evaluate four elements that theoretically mediate the relationship between populism and support for political violence: economic grievances; distrust of political institutions; perception that social and demographic changes in the United States are threatening; and preferences for politically illiberal or nondemocratic rule. I find that the effect of populism on support for political violence is mediated through fear of social/demographic change and preference for illiberal rule but not through economic grievances or distrust of political institutions. Taken together, over 50% of the effect of populism on support for political violence is mediated through heightened anxiety about social and demographic changes in the U.S. and illiberal attitudes.

Research has linked the authoritarian personality with support for political violence, including violence against the government. However, support for political violence is simultaneously a measure of and an outcome of the authoritarian personality, and one key component (submission to authority) is the antithesis of one key measure of political violence (violence against authority). This article makes three contributions. First, we accentuate the importance of using exogenous measures of the authoritarian personality when estimating its effect on support for political violence. Second, leveraging data from an original survey and the American National Election Studies, we find that the relationship between authoritarianism and support for violence is conditional: it can be positive, negative, or null, depending on who is in control of government and the specificity of political-violence measures. Third, we argue that another concept—the securitarian personality—might better predict support for violence. Access to firearms—which we argue is downstream from securitarianism—consistently predicts support for political violence.

Individuals in the United States appear increasingly willing to support and justify political violence. This paper therefore examines whether making partisan identities salient increases support for political violence. We embed priming manipulations in a sample of roughly 850 U.S. adults to investigate whether activating positive partisan identity, negative partisan identity, instrumental partisan identity, and American national identity might lead to differences in reported support for political violence. While we uncover no effects of priming various identities on support for political violence, we replicate and extend previous research on its correlates. Specifically, we demonstrate how various measures of partisan identity strength as well as negative personality traits are correlated with acceptance of political violence.

Are partisans more likely to endorse political violence when politicians accuse their rivals of election improprieties? I theorize that for Republican partisans in the United States, the answer to this question is yes. Republican partisans are primed to believe allegations of cheating by Democrats and view election improprieties through the lens of racial and xenophobic resentments. Allegations of Democratic election fraud prompt them to eschew nonviolent norms of political behavior and endorse political violence. I test these propositions using an original, online survey experiment involving 140 self-identified Republican subjects. I find that exposure to allegations by politicians that Democrats engage in election fraud prompts Republican partisans to increase their support for political violence. Furthermore, using mediation tests, I find that exposing Republicans to allegations of electoral fraud by Democrats reduces their trust of people of different races and religions which, in turn, increases their support for political violence.

Concerns about political violence have intensified across the United States. We conducted two pre-registered studies (N=408 and N=906) examining how Americans perceive support for political violence within their own and opposing political parties. In Study 1, Democrats estimated that 29.60% of Republicans report supporting political violence, but only 1.83% of Republicans actually report support, representing a 1,517% overestimation. In contrast, Republicans estimated that 19.48% of Democrats report supporting political violence, but only 3.54 % of Democrats actually did—a 450% overestimation. Thus, while both groups overestimated the prevalence of outparty members’ political violence support, we find that Democrats are significantly more pessimistic. In Study 2, we replicated this finding with a larger, nationally representative sample. We also explored the limits of this asymmetry and found no evidence of asymmetric perceptions for non-political crime support or ingroup members’ political violence support, suggesting a unique asymmetry in perceived outgroup political violence support.

Is approval of Donald J. Trump associated with support for political violence? If so, what explains the link between Trump approval and political violence? Using an original, nationally representative survey of over 1,500 adults in the United States we produce two findings. First, individuals who express approval for Trump are also significantly more likely to endorse positive descriptors for the January 6, 2021 attack on the U.S. Capitol and are more likely express support for the use of political violence more broadly. Second, the effects of Trump approval on support for the use of political violence are mediated through racist and xenophobic attitudes. Trump supporters in the study disproportionately exhibit racist and xenophobic/anti-foreigner attitudes, and these attitudes are associated with a positive endorsement of both January 6 and the use of political violence.

BackgroundCurrent conditions in the USA suggest an increasing risk for political violence. Little is known about the prevalence of beliefs that might lead to political violence, about support for and personal willingness to engage in political violence, and about how those measures vary with individual characteristics, lethality of violence, political objectives that violence might advance, or specific populations as targets.MethodsThis cross-sectional US nationally representative survey was conducted on May 13 to June 2, 2022, of adult members of the Ipsos KnowledgePanel. Outcomes are weighted, population-representative proportions of respondents endorsing selected beliefs about American democracy and society and violence to advance political objectives.ResultsThe analytic sample included 8620 respondents; 50.5% (95% confidence interval (CI) 49.3%, 51.7%) were female; and weighted mean (± standard deviation) age was 48.4 (± 18.0) years. Nearly 1 in 5 (18.9%, 95% CI 18.0%, 19.9%) agreed strongly or very strongly that “having a strong leader for America is more important than having a democracy”; 16.2% (95% CI 15.3%, 17.1%) agreed strongly or very strongly that “in America, native-born white people are being replaced by immigrants,” and 13.7% (95% CI 12.9%, 14.6%) agreed strongly or very strongly that “in the next few years, there will be civil war in the United States.” One-third of respondents (32.8%, 95% CI 31.7%, 33.9%) considered violence to be usually or always justified to advance at least 1 of 17 specific political objectives. Among all respondents, 7.7% (95% CI 7.0%, 8.4%) thought it very or extremely likely that within the next few years, in a situation where they believe political violence is justified, “I will be armed with a gun”; 1.1% (95% CI 0.9%, 1.4%) thought it very or extremely likely that “I will shoot someone with a gun.” Support for political violence and for the use of firearms in such violence frequently declined with increasing age, education, and income.ConclusionsSmall but concerning proportions of the population consider violence, including lethal violence, to be usually or always justified to advance political objectives. Prevention efforts should proceed urgently based on the best evidence available.

What explains popular support for political violence in the contemporary United States, particularly the anti-institutional mob that attacked the U.S. Capitol in January 2021? Recent scholarship gives reason to suspect that a constellation of beliefs known as “Christian nationalism” may be associated with support for such violence. We build on this work, arguing that religious ideologies like Christian nationalism should be associated with support for violence, conditional on several individual characteristics that can be inflamed by elite cues. We turn to three such factors long-studied by scholars of political violence: perceived victimhood, reinforcing racial and religious identities, and support for conspiratorial information sources. Each can be exacerbated by elite cues, thus translating individual beliefs in Christian nationalism into support for political violence. We test this approach with original survey data collected in the wake of the Capitol attacks. We find that all the identified factors are positively related to each other and support for the Capitol riot; moreover, the relationship between Christian nationalism and support for political violence is sharply conditioned by white identity, perceived victimhood, and support for the QAnon movement. These results suggest that religion’s role in contemporary right-wing violence is embedded with non-religious factors that deserve further scholarly attention in making sense of support for political violence.Supplementary InformationThe online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s11109-021-09758-y.

Droughts, state-citizen relations and support for political violence in Sub-Saharan Africa: A micro-level analysis

Scholars have found that Americans subscribing to Christian nationalist beliefs are more likely to endorse political violence. In this study I examine the role that apocalypticism – the belief that the United States is doomed to imminent collapse due to political, economic, socio-cultural, demographic, environmental, or religious causes – plays in explaining the link between Christian nationalism and support for political violence. Specifically, I theorize that Christian nationalists are more likely to hold apocalyptic outlooks and that these, in turn, produce feelings of threat that reinforce negative attitudes toward social outgroups. Hatred of outgroups prompts Christian nationalists to normalize political violence. I employ a serial mediation analysis on an original survey of 1300 white American subjects and find that close to 70% of the effects of Christian nationalist beliefs on support for political violence are mediated through apocalypticism and its effects on attitudes toward outgroups.

BackgroundIn recent years, the United States (US) has witnessed a rise in political violence. Prior research has found that an individual’s social network is associated with their likelihood of engaging in various forms of violence, but research on social networks and political violence in the US context is limited. This study examined associations between social network size and endorsement of political violence in a recent nationally representative survey and explored how the relationship varied by use of social media as a major news source, perceptions of the government as an enemy, and membership in a marginalized or privileged racial or ethnic group.MethodsThis was a nationally representative cross-sectional survey study of adults aged 18 and older in the US, administered from May 13-June 2, 2022. The exposure was social network size, defined by the number of strong social connections. We examined three violence-related outcomes: support for non-political violence, support for political violence, and personal willingness to engage in political violence. We estimated prevalence ratios for associations using survey-weighted Poisson regression with robust standard errors, adjusting for hypothesized confounders and including interaction terms to examine effect measure modification.ResultsThe sample included 8,620 respondents. Median age was 48.4 years (95% CI = 47.9–48.8), 51.5% were female (95% CI = 50.4–52.7%), and 62.7% self-identified as non-Hispanic White (95% CI = 61.4–65.9%). In adjusted models, those with zero strong connections were more likely than those with 1–4 strong social connections to consider political violence usually/always justified in general (PR = 2.43, 95% CI = 1.47–4.01). Those with 50 + strong connections were more likely than those with 1–4 strong social connections to consider political violence usually/always justified in at least one situation (PR = 1.19, 95% CI = 1.03–1.37) and were more likely to report being willing to personally use political violence (PR = 1.52, 95% CI = 1.13–2.04). Associations varied somewhat by social media use, perceptions of the government as an enemy, and racialized identity.ConclusionsIndividuals who reported very few and very many strong social connections were more likely than others to support political violence or be personally willing to engage in it in one form or another. Findings point toward potential intervention and prevention opportunities.