Correction: An interpretable approach to detect case law on housing and eviction issues within the HUDOC database

Case law plays a critical role in shaping our understanding of human rights, including the right to adequate housing. However, analyzing large legal databases like HUDOC, which contains over 40,000 cases, is a challenging task that requires automated solutions. This study focuses on detecting cases related to housing—a topic encompassing issues such as eviction, access to adequate housing and etc.—from the HUDOC database. For this, we developed classifiers to identify cases related to both housing and eviction issues. We first constructed a dataset using an unsupervised process refined through manual corrections. Then, we trained the Adaptive Chordal Distance-based Subspace Learning Vector Quantization models. These models achieved classification accuracies of 93% for housing-related cases and 91.5% for eviction-specific cases, matching the performance of transformer-based models while requiring fewer computational resources. Furthermore, they provide interpretability by assigning word-level importance scores, helping legal scholars understand and verify the reasoning behind the model’s predictions. The models identified 2,305 potentially housing-related cases. Manual reviews confirmed that 278 of 340 reviewed cases were indeed relevant. By detecting overlooked cases and enriching legal datasets, this study highlights the utility of NLP methods in facilitating the analysis of human rights case law. This approach supports a deeper exploration of housing rights and eviction-related decisions under the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), offering transparency, efficiency, and scalability for legal research.

1. Introduction I. The Problem of Intertemporal Linguistics II. Scope III. Methodological Features IV. Structure PART I THE PROBLEM - DETACHING IT FROM THE DOCTRINES 2. The Rise and Fall of the Principle of Contemporaneity I. Surfacing and Consecration of the Static Approach as the Principle of Contemporaneity II. The Decline and Fall of the Principle of Contemporaneity III. Time to Detach the Principle of Contemporaneity from the Problem 3. The Emergence and Splitting of the Evolutionary Treaty Interpretation Doctrine I. Emergence as an Amalgam of Interpretative and Progressive Approaches II. Splitting of the Doctrine into Distinct Interpretative and Progressive Forms III. Jettisoning a Doctrine No Longer Sufficiently Linked to the Problem 4. Refocusing on and Defining the Static and Dynamic Approaches to the Problem of Intertemporal Linguistics I. The Need for Analytical Definitions of the Problem and the Approaches to it II. Preliminary Refinements of the Nature of the Problem III. Using Linguistics to Refi ne the Key Notion of 'Different Meanings' PART II THE MISCONCEPTIONS - CASTING ASIDE THE CONVENTIONAL WISDOM 5. The VCLT's Interpretative Rules do not Solve the Problem I. The VCLT's Interpretative Provisions are Temporally Neutral II. By Authorising Progressive Adjudication, the VCLT does not Endorse a Dynamic Approach to the Problem III. Only ex ante Guidance Can Solve the Problem, Mere ex post Justification Cannot IV. Conclusions 6. The Post-Namibia International Case Law does not Provide a General Solution to the Problem I. The Conception is Based on the Wrong Set of International Cases II. Seen in their Decisional Contexts, the Authorities for the View do not Adequately Support it III. Conclusions PART III THE SOLUTION - INNOVATING INSIDE INTERNATIONAL LAW 7. The Problem of Intertemporal Linguistics as an Issue of Ambiguity, Not Vagueness I. Interpretation Resolves Either Vagueness or Ambiguity II. The Choice Between an Original and Later-emerging Meaning Calls for the Resolution of Ambiguity, Not Vagueness III. The VCLT Rules are Focused on Resolving Vagueness, but Implicitly Recognise the Ambiguity/Vagueness Distinction IV. Interpreters Disambiguate before they 'De-vaguefy' 8. Disambiguating Original and Later-emerging Senses Using a Temporal Sense-Intention I. Disambiguation is Achieved Through Identifying the Sense-Intention II. The Sense-Intention is Very Different to Other Interpretative Intentions III. The Relevant Sense-Intention in the Intertemporal Linguistics Context is a 'Temporal Sense-Intention' IV. Notions Akin to the Temporal Sense-Intention Emerging from Case Law and Scholarship Relating to the Problem 9. Features of Interpretative Situations that Might Imply a Temporal Sense-Intention I. Sense-Intentions are Usually Inferred from Context II. 'By Definition Evolutionary' and 'Generic' Terms as Indicia of a Mobile Sense-Intention III. Terms that Constitute Legal Concepts as Indicia of a Mobile Sense-Intention IV. Terms in Human Rights Treaties as Inherently Possessing a Mobile Sense-Intention V. Terms in Territorial Treaties as Inherently Possessing a Fixed Sense-Intention VI. Terms in Treaties of Fixed and Continuing Durations as Implying Fixed and Mobile Sense-Intentions Respectively VII. Terms in Constitutive Instruments as Implying a Mobile Sense-Intention VIII. Terms in Clauses Establishing a Situation and Laying Down a Rule Respectively IX. Implications of a Temporal Sense-Intention Arising from the Number of Parties to a Treaty X. Concluding Observations on the Interpretative Features Cited by the Case Law and Scholarship 10. Organising the Features into a Workable Method for Inferring the Temporal Sense-Intention and Solving the Problem I. Context Including Definitions - The Best Evidence of Sense-Intention II. Where Context Runs Out - Using Other Indicia and Presumptions for Inferring the Temporal Sense-Intention III. Presumptions - Strong and Independent Indicators of a Particular Temporal Sense-Intention IV. Mere Indicia - Indicators that Taken Together May Clearly Imply a Fixed or Mobile Sense-Intention V. Twin Presumptions of Last Resort - Using the Number of Treaty Parties VI. Practical Benefits of the Proposed Method for Solving the Problem 11. Conclusion I. Summary II. A Plea for a Less Flexible and More Legally Certain System of Treaty Interpretation

This study analyses the main arguments presented by the Federal Court of Australia in the tax dispute over transfer pricing and royalty taxation in the PepsiCo case. Using a doctrinal research methodology, it examines the legal reasoning behind the Court's decision. The analysis incorporates statutory regulations, case law, and interpretative approaches. Data sources include primary legal materials, such as regulations and court rulings, alongside secondary literature. The research finds that the Court ruled that payments of concentrate do not include royalties, emphasizing the importance of clear contractual documentation. The implications suggest a need for multinational corporations to ensure transparency in their tax-related agreements to avoid disputes over transfer pricing and royalties.

The Doctrine of Strict Compliance of Letters alongside the doctrine of independence of letter of credits is one of the doctrines governing letter of credits as one of the most significant modes of payment in international trade. There are different approaches regarding the concept of the doctrine of strict compliance in case-law of USA, UK, Italy, Germany and China. Two interpretative approaches in this regard are: reflective compliance approach and substantial compliance approach. However, the interpretative criteria of each court differ as to one of these two approaches. Regarding spelling and typographical errors, these two approaches may be expressed in six interpretative aspects. It seems that because of refusing of huge number of letters by the banks, the courts are moving toward substantial compliance approach. This movement is felt in the provisions of UCP 600 in which the prevailing attitude on the provisions is reduction of declaring the conflict of letters. The case law of Iranian judicial law is still doubtful in choosing one of these two approaches.

Championed on the Supreme Court by Justices Scalia and Thomas and championed in academia most prominently by Professor Akhil Amar, textualism has in the past twenty years emerged as a leading school of constitutional interpretation. Textualists argue that the Constitution should be interpreted in accordance with its original public meaning and, in seeking that meaning, they closely parse the Constitution's words and grammar and the placement of clauses in the document. They have assumed that this close parsing recaptures original meaning, but, perhaps because it seems obviously correct, that assumption has neither been defended nor challenged. This article uses Professor Amar's book, The Bill of Rights, the widely acclaimed masterpiece of the textualist movement, as a case study to test the validity of that assumption. Amar's work has profoundly influenced subsequent scholarship and case law with its argument that the Bill of Rights primarily reflected republican rights of the people, rather than individual rights. This article shows that Amar's republican reading is incorrect and that his textualist interpretive approach repeatedly leads him astray. Amar incorrectly assumes that words have the same meaning throughout the document, assigns a significance to the placement of clauses that is belied by the drafting history, and incorrectly posits that the Bill of Rights reflects a unitary ideological vision. The textualist search for original public meaning cannot be squared with an interpretive approach that assumes that all word choices were made with a high degree of care, that the significance of location can be assessed simply by examining the four corners of the document, and that the Constitution must be understood holistically. Analysis of Professor Amar's The Bill of Rights indicates that, paradoxically, close reading is a poor guide to original meaning.

Potrzeba znalezienia środków z podatków na finansowanie funkcjonowania państw oraz coraz większa nieufność polityków i opinii publicznej wobec schematów optymalizacji podatkowej przedsiębiorstw wielonarodowych (multinational enterprises, MNE) i najbardziej majętnych osób fizycznych (high-net worth individuals, HNWI) wywołały bezprecedensowy entuzjazm polityczny dotyczący przeciwdziałania międzynarodowemu unikaniu opodatkowania. Ten entuzjazm przerodził się w mandat polityczny udzielony OECD przez G20 w 2012 r. Wśród mnogości propozycji środków prawnych przeciwdziałających unikaniu opodatkowania opracowanych przez OECD w ramach projektu BEPS, za kluczowe należy uznać: test jednego z głównych celów (principal purposes test, PPT) z MLI i ogólną klauzulę przeciwdziałania unikaniu opodatkowania (general anti-avoidance rule, GAAR) z unijnej dyrektywy przeciwdziałającej praktykom unikania opodatkowania (anti-tax avoidance directive, ATAD). Celem niniejszego artykułu jest znalezienie odpowiedzi na główne (tytułowe) pytanie badawcze: Czy GAAR (ATAD) i PPT (MLI) powinny być stosowane w podobny sposób? Hipotezą pozytywnie zweryfikowaną w ramach niniejszego opracowania jest to, że: im bardziej zbiegające się (koherentne) będzie stosowanie GAAR i PPT, tym mniej praktyk unikania opodatkowania i sporów wynikających z tego zjawiska będzie występować między podatnikami i organami podatkowymi. Istnieje jednak poważne zastrzeżenie: GAAR i PPT powinny być stosowane zgodnie z ogólną zasadą przeciwdziałania nadużyciom (general anti-abuse principle, GAAP) wynikającą z orzecznictwa Trybunału Sprawiedliwości Unii Europejskiej (TSUE), a nie zgodnie z PPT zaprojektowanym przez OECD. Tylko takie podejście do stosowania GAAR i PPT może zapewnić właściwą równowagę między interesami fiskalnymi różnych państw a swobodami gospodarczymi podatników. Konstatacja ta wynika z analizy treści i struktury GAAR i PPT, celów polityki podatkowej wyrażonych w preambułach do MLI i ATAD, orzecznictwa Trybunału Sprawiedliwości Unii Europejskiej (TSUE), Komentarza OECD do Modelu Konwencji OECD oraz literatury.

The author explores whether legal pragmatism may function as a useful and adequate explanatory model for the case law on tax avoidance unfolding in the Danish Supreme Court. In doing so, the underlying ideas of philosophical and legal pragmatism are initially re-visited while the general interpretational approach of the Danish judiciary is briefly outlined. Subsequently, the general approach to interpretation of Danish tax law is presented and the prevailing opinions on tax avoidance in the Danish doctrine are touched upon. This provide the necessary foundation for the following legal analysis of the Danish Supreme Courts’ case law on tax avoidance. Based on this analysis, it is concluded that legal pragmatism may actually function as a useful and adequate explanatory model for the Danish Supreme Court's case law on tax avoidance. Awareness of this pragmatic inclination may facilitate a better understanding of the Danish Supreme Court's approach in difficult cases on tax avoidance and enhance the possibilities of predicting the outcome of such cases.

The article deals with the recent case law of the Italian Supreme Court in respect of the application of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive. In the timeframe between 2017 and 2019 the Supreme Court issued four judgments which denied the application of the dividend withholding tax exemption regime based on a restrictive and highly disputable interpretation of the ‘subject to tax’ requirement laid down under Article 2(a) (iii) of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive. The article analyses this interpretative approach and highlights the reasons of its non compliance with the principles underlying the Parent-Subsidiary Directive. Then the article analyses a further and more recent judgment of the Italian Supreme Court in which the Court seems to change its approach, clarifying that the dividend withholding tax exemption regime applies even in cases in which the parent company is merely liable to tax in its State of residence, being not required that the dividends received by the parent company are subject to tax in that State. In the conclusions the author expresses his view on possible amendments to the Parent-Subsidiary Directive which could contribute to a more straightforward application of the regimes provided by the Directive in the different EU Member States. Parent-Subsidiary Directive, dividend, withholding tax, subject to tax requirement, liable to tax, Italian Supreme Court, case law, juridical double taxation, economic double taxation.

The framework for this article is the relationship between a national and a supra-national protection of human rights: the Norwegian Constitution of 1814 (NC) and the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). These legal instruments share two constitutional elements: they place content-based limits on legitimately enacted or enforced laws, and they are adjudicated by courts. The article presents a case study analyzing how one right protected both by the NC and the ECHR – that of free speech – has been treated in Norwegian Supreme Court (NSCt) case law. This particular variant of dual rights protection is interesting from the perspective of international law influence onnational law. The NC § 100 was revised in 2004, i.a. with the aim of making it a modern and practicable national alternative to the ECHR art. 10, which had until then been the central source of free speech protection. However, as shown, the NSCt rarely uses the “new” NC § 100 as legal authority where relevant free speech case law from the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) exists.When NC § 100 is used, legal arguments are not derived from its text, but from assumptions about its legislative intent as extracted from statements in its preparatory works. Reliance on preparatory works is a historically central method of adjudication in Scandinavian and Norwegian law. This method does not, however, lead to significantly different outcomes than would result from assessing the same cases under ECtHR art. 10 case law. Through a peculiarly domestic interpretative approach, then, the NSCt does in fact protect the right of free speech in consistence with international standards. Consciously or not, it seems to use a traditional mode of legal justification as one vehicle for effectively implementing the ECHR in to Norwegian law. The article calls attention to the methodological questions raised by dual rights protection. These questions gain relevance following a January 2012 proposal to amend the NC with a human rights catalogue for its 200 year anniversary in 2014.

As forums for the resolution of international disputes expand and international case law continues to pile up, the likelihood that a State may advance contradictory approaches to treaty interpretation increases. Since there is a uniform set of international norms on the matter – for the most part established in Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties – such inconsistencies might be problematic when measured against the principle of good faith in treaty interpretation. This article explores the role that good faith may play in this context, suggesting that the interpretative approaches that a State has embraced in the past may have some bearing on the way future disputes in which it is involved are resolved, although (as with much in international law) important caveats apply.

This chapter considers the various interpretative approaches to the European Convention on Human Rights that have been adopted in case law. It first explains the rules of treaty interpretation applied by international courts and tribunals that were codified in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. It then discusses the respect for precedent; the Court's insistence that ‘the Convention must be read as a whole, and interpreted in such a way as to promote internal consistency and harmony between its various provisions’; the dynamic and evolutive interpretation; and the need to construe the provisions of the Convention in the light of their object and purpose and also in accordance with the principle of effectiveness.

This article focuses on the development of the crime of incitement to genocide and the prohibition of hate propaganda. It first examines the conflict which exists between these and the right to freedom of speech and concludes that a limitation of this right through prohibition of hate propaganda and criminalization of incitement to genocide is justifiable. The article then analyses how the crime of incitement to genocide and the prohibition of hate propaganda first developed historically, focusing on judgments by the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg and the Genocide Convention, on the one hand, and on international conventions and case law by the Human Rights Committee and the European Court of Human Rights, on the other. Next, recent ICTR decisions are examined, in which the ICTR has considerably clarified and extended the concept of incitement to genocide. The tribunal has brought it closer to encompassing vicious hate propaganda by acknowledging that in order to incite individuals to commit genocide, incitement in the sense of instigation is insufficient; it requires the prior creation of a certain climate in which the commission of such crimes is possible. Hate propaganda leads to the creation of such a climate. It is argued that, for several reasons, virulent hate propaganda must be accorded the status of an international crime. Genocide could be prevented more effectively if such speech were criminalized. Several efforts to outlaw hate propaganda internationally in the past are examined. The article concludes that it can be regarded as a crime punishable under the Genocide Convention if a purposive interpretative approach is used, and that hate propagandists should be prosecuted for direct and public incitement to genocide if their hate speech is engaged in with the specific intent to commit genocide, and creates a substantial danger of genocide.

Human rights violations occurring as a consequence of drug control and enforcement are a growing concern, and raise questions of treaty interpretation and of the appropriate balancing of concomitant obligations within the drug control and human rights treaty regimes. Tracing the evolution of international drug control law since 1909, this book explores the tensions between the regime's self-described humanitarian aspirations and its suppression of a common human behaviour as a form of 'evil'. Drawing on domestic, regional and international examples and case law, it posits the development of a dynamic, human rights-based interpretative approach to resolve tensions and conflicts between the regimes in a manner that safeguards human rights. Highlighting an important and emerging area of human rights inquiry from an international legal perspective, this book is a key resource for those working and studying in this field.

Summary Most western contemporary legal systems are grounded in natural law principles established by modern humanism even though various alternatives, post-humanism being among the most influential, start influencing their understanding. In addition, the effect of the rapid pace of technological development on humanity has made the inherent limitations of its rules and other social arrangements manifest, as the use of technology is growingly used for human enhancement. The advocacy seeking to expand the catalogue of human rights and to cover transhumanism has started to bear fruit, but more conceptual developments are needed to lay the foundations for a more systemic regulatory development. This reflection paper focuses on the use of microchip implants, from among the augmentation practices that have recently flown under the radar of legal scientific research. These electronic devices re-shape the experience of being human and their various applications suggest that the penetration levels of capacity enhancing technologies will continue to be on the rise. It will discuss and clarify whether and to which extent transhumanism, personal rights and private autonomy are connected, and the former sufficiently covered by the right to bodily integrity (RBI). The reflection will rely on a comparative and interpretative approach based on the extant literature, national and European Union (EU) regulatory initiatives, and recent doctrinal developments found in case law.

In this chapter, I discuss the manner in which the Appellate Body (AB) has been completing the WTO contract through its case law. To do that, I first briefly examine the mandate given to the AB. Having established that, I move to discuss the manner in which the AB has handled its mandate. The AB is called to settle disputes among WTO members by following a certain methodology for interpreting the WTO contract. The main conclusions that I draw are that the AB has not, as a general remark, overstepped its authority and that it has, with few outliers, traditionally followed an (overly) textualist interpretative approach. This attitude is probably consistent with the incentive structure of a risk averse agent who can always turn back and request from its principals to write a more complete contract next time. It has led, nonetheless, to some unfortunate results. Assuming that the current WTO agreement and the interpretative tools are not negotiable (although a re-weighing of the various factors included in the latter is both feasible and warranted), it is the institutional design of the AB and its supporting Secretariat that should probably be re-thought.