Corporate makeover for narcissism: The role of the CEO in asset revaluation and acquisition performance

Using a large sample of about 1,900 M&A deals from 1993 to 2005, and data on more than 3,100 CEOs, we explore merger and acquisition activities from a psychological perspective, and provide another explanation of M&A motives and associated firm stock performance. We empirically test if highly narcissistic CEOs are more likely to conduct mergers than lowly narcissistic CEOs. We also examine the impact of CEO narcissistic personality on market reaction to firm M&A announcements, and also long-term post-M&A stock returns. Three proxies for CEO narcissism are used in this study: Holder 67, a CEO option exercise-based measure, CEO media portrayal, and a third measure based on formal content analysis of actual CEO speech. Our results demonstrate that highly narcissistic CEOs are almost 40% more likely to conduct mergers and acquisitions than lowly narcissistic CEOs. Our results also suggest that the degree of acquiring firm CEO narcissism has a significantly negative impact on both short-run and long-run post-M&A returns. We find that, the market reacts more negatively to M&A deals conducted by highly narcissistic CEOs than lowly narcissistic CEOs in the [-1, 1] three-day event window by between 0.9% and 1.5%. Post-acquisition, we find that deals conducted by highly narcissistic CEOs significantly underperform those by lowly narcissistic CEOs in the [1, 24] month event window by between -1.7% and -2.4%. In addition, our results show that target firm CEO narcissism similarly negatively affects acquiring firm short-term performance. However, we find that effective corporate governance mechanisms ameliorate, to some extent, the adverse impact of high levels of CEO narcissism on firm value in M&A deals.

The financial sector has an essential role in the economy and acts as a catalyst in the transition toward economic sustainability. Consequently, the Financial Services Authority (OJK) periodically requires the banking sector to consistently report its financial performance through Financial Reports and its non-financial performance in Sustainability Reports. In this context, the CEO plays a pivotal role in strategic decision-making related to corporate performance, including financial reporting and sustainability disclosure. CEO narcissism is considered an individual psychological characteristic that significantly impacts organizational functions and corporate strategic decisions. This study investigates the impact of CEO narcissism on Climate-Related Disclosure and Financial Performance. Using a sample of 144 observations of banking and financing companies on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) for 2016–2022. This study uses the Fixed Effect Model as regression estimation model. The results show that CEO narcissism positively affects Climate-Related Disclosure whereas CEO narcissism has no effect on Financial Performance. The upper echelons theory states that CEO psychological characteristics impact organisational functions. This theory supports the relationship between CEO Narcissism and Climate-Related Disclosure that narcissistic CEOs tend to get a good reputation in the public as a leader who is responsive to environmental issues so they encourage the company to provide information related to GHG as a form of corporate responsibility, while in the financial performance, narcissistic CEO decisions are like double-edged sword that might lead either performance increasing or decreasig so the role of Corporate Governance is needed to control CEO decisions which bring beneficial to the company.

Examining the effects of capital intensity, board gender diversity, and CEO narcissism on company tax avoidance with ESG acting as a moderating factor is the aim of this study. Companies that manufacture food and beverages that are listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) for the years 2017–2023 make up the research population. Purposive sampling techniques were used to pick 126 companies for the sample. The research methodology used in this study is quantitative, and linear regression is used to examine the data. The findings show that CEO narcissism has a positive but insignificant effect on corporate tax avoidance, while board gender diversity has a significant positive effect. In contrast, capital intensity does not show a significant effect. However, ESG significantly moderates the relationship between CEO narcissism and board gender diversity with corporate tax avoidance, but not with capital intensity. In conclusion, ESG can reduce the tendency for tax avoidance in companies with more gender-diverse boards and those led by narcissistic CEOs.

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to investigate the role of narcissistic supply for the association between CEO narcissism and corporate risk taking. Design/methodology/design – The authors investigate a sample of 281 non-financial S&P 1500 firms and a corresponding 457 CEOs in the 10-year period 2006-2015. Findings – The association between CEO narcissism and corporate risk taking depends on the admiration, attention, and affirmation of own superiority (“narcissistic supply”) that the CEO receives given her/his current position. Thus, a narcissistic CEO with an insufficient narcissistic supply (small firm / small compensation) will crave for more and take more risks (“rock the boat”) while a narcissistic CEO with a sufficient narcissistic supply (large firm / large compensation) will protect the status quo and be reluctant to take new risks. Specifically, the authors find that a change from a slightly narcissistic CEO to a strongly narcissistic CEO, for positions entailing limited (abundant) narcissistic supply, is associated with an increase (a decrease) in corporate risk of 6%-8% (11%-27%). Originality/value – Previous research indicates a positive association between CEO narcissism and corporate risk taking in specific domains such as M&A and R&D activities. This paper provides a novel contribution to the existing literature by identifying and assessing the important role of narcissistic supply for the association between CEO narcissism and corporate risk taking in general.

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to investigate the role of narcissistic supply for the association between CEO narcissism and corporate risk taking.Design/methodology/approachThe authors investigate a sample of 281 non-financial S&P 1500 firms and a corresponding 457 CEOs in the 10-yr period 2006–2015.FindingsThe association between CEO narcissism and corporate risk taking depends on the admiration, attention, and affirmation of own superiority (“narcissistic supply”) that the CEO receives given her/his current position. Thus, a narcissistic CEO with an insufficient narcissistic supply (small firm/small compensation) will crave for more and take more risks (“rock the boat”) while a narcissistic CEO with a sufficient narcissistic supply (large firm/large compensation) will protect the status quo and be reluctant to take new risks. Specifically, the authors find that a change from a slightly narcissistic CEO to a strongly narcissistic CEO, for positions entailing limited (abundant) narcissistic supply, is associated with an increase (a decrease) in corporate risk of 6%–8% (11%–27%).Originality/valuePrevious research indicates a positive association between CEO narcissism and corporate risk taking in specific domains such as M&A and R&D activities. This paper provides a novel contribution to the existing literature by identifying and assessing the important role of narcissistic supply for the association between CEO narcissism and corporate risk taking in general.

Research Summary : While prior studies have predominantly shown that CEO narcissism and hubris exhibit similar effects on various strategic decisions and outcomes, this study aims to explore the mechanisms underlying how narcissistic versus hubristic CEOs affect their firms differently. Specifically, we investigate how peer influence moderates the CEO narcissism/hubris—corporate social responsibility (CSR). With a sample of S&P 1500 firms for 2003–2010, we find that the positive relationship between CEO narcissism and CSR is strengthened (weakened) when board‐interlocked peer firms invest less (more) intensively in CSR than a CEO's own firm; the negative relationship between CEO hubris and CSR is strengthened when peer firms are engaged in less CSR than a CEO's own firm. Managerial Summary : Some CEOs are more narcissistic while others may be more hubristic, but these two groups of CEOs hold different attitudes toward the extent to which their firms should engage in corporate social responsibility (CSR). Our findings with a large sample of U.S. publically listed firms suggest that narcissistic CEOs care more about CSR, but hubristic CEOs care less. Interestingly, when narcissistic CEOs observe their peer firms engaging in more or less CSR than their own firms, they tend to respond in an opposite manner; in contrast, hubristic CEOs will only engage in even less CSR when their peers also do not emphasize CSR. Our findings point to a fundamental difference between CEO narcissism and hubris in terms of how they affect firms' CSR decisions based on their social comparison with peer firms.

When narcissistic CEOs meet power: Effects of CEO narcissism and power on the likelihood of product recalls in consumer-packaged goods

SYNOPSIS Prior research on CEO narcissism has focused on outcomes related to the CEO's firm. We extend this literature by examining how an important counterparty—the firm's external auditor—responds to a client having a more narcissistic CEO. Compared to other firms, firms with narcissistic CEOs are more likely to exhibit greater inherent risk and control risk. To maintain an acceptable level of audit risk when faced with the heightened risk of CEO narcissism, auditors must do additional work. Consistent with this notion, we find that CEO narcissism has an economically and statistically significant positive effect on external audit fees, indicating that auditors work more, charge a risk premium, or both when auditing a client with a more narcissistic CEO. We also find that firms with narcissistic CEOs are more likely to have internal control weaknesses, which suggests a possible mechanism for why auditors might need to perform more work. This is the first study to provide large-sample real-world evidence on how auditors respond to CEO narcissism and demonstrates the significant effect that executive personality characteristics can have in an audit setting.

Having an inflated sense of self and wanting to have that self-view continually reinforced, narcissistic CEOs are interesting characters and can be formidable rivals in interfirm competitions. Extending prior research on CEO narcissism, we investigate how firms with narcissistic CEOs engage in competitive actions. Using videometric survey methodology on 185 Fortune 500 CEOs from the years 2000—2017, we find that narcissistic CEOs tend to take on industry leaders by entering into the leaders’ markets and competing more aggressively with higher volume of actions than the leaders. We also investigate how managerial discretion may moderate the effect of CEO narcissism on aggressive competitive actions toward industry leaders and find that narcissistic CEOs’ aggressive competitive actions are not constrained by certain factors that are expected to reduce managerial discretion. Our findings contribute to CEO narcissism, upper echelon, and competitive dynamics research.

Financial performance reflects a company’s operational condition in both favorable and unfavorable periods. Narcissistic CEOs often drive short-term financial gains through risky strategies, but these can result in long-term issues, such as rising debt and declining performance. This study examines the impact of CEO narcissism on financial performance, using Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) as a mediator. The population consists of state-owned firms in Indonesia, with purposive sampling applied. Data analysis uses the path analysis method. The study finds that CEO narcissism negatively affects both financial performance and CSR. Narcissistic traits, measured through factors like photos and education, harm CSR efforts, though CSR does not mediate the relationship between CEO narcissism and financial performance. The findings suggest that companies should carefully assess narcissistic traits in CEO candidates, as these can harm long-term financial stability and social reputation. Investors are also advised to consider CEO personality traits when making investment decisions.

Background: Behavioural personal characteristics are proven to have an impact on corporate decisions. There have been many behavioural biases and fallacies identified so far. One of the important behavioral traits is narcissism. Managerial narcissism and the belief in their own grandiosity affect their corporate behaviour. Previous research finds that narcissistic leaders have higher compensation. However, previous research takes into account only job-related compensation and ignores the common fact that the CEO is often the owner of the company. The aim of our research is to explore the impact of a narcissistic CEO who has a financial stake in the equity on their total income. Our research refers to the situation when narcissistic CEOs’ labour and capital are involved in the same company, which is quite common in a business environment. Thus, the compensation consists of two parts: job-related (salary) and capital-related (dividend). Methods: We have conducted our research on a sample of 160 companies from the Warsaw Stock Exchange over six years (2017-2022). We have performed statistical analysis of data with descriptive statistics, correlation matrix, and regression analysis. Results: We have found that a narcissistic CEO with a stake in the company negatively affects both job and total compensation. Conclusions: We believe that the lower compensation of narcissistic CEOs is the price they pay in return for both their prestige and the sound financial standing of the company. The financial soundness of the company allows them to stay in power (by meeting owners’ expectations), and remain in the centre of attention.Structure of the paper: The paper starts with a literature review on the issues included in the research, especially: CEO compensation, CEO ownership, and CEO narcissism. Then, we present our research plan and the methodology. Later, we report our findings and discuss our findings with previous ones. Finally, we present the conclusions.

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to examine how chief executive officers’ (CEOs) narcissism impacts firm performance and how this, in turn, affects a CEO’s positive rhetorical tone.Design/methodology/approachThe narcissism score is measured by using an analytical composite score for each CEO based on eight factors. The paper uses textual analysis on a sample of 848 CEO letters of US firms over the period 2010–2019. WarpPLS software, version 7.0 was used to conduct structural equation modeling through the partial least squares because a non-linear algorithm exists between CEO narcissism, firm performance and positive tone, and the values of path coefficients moved from non-significant to significant.FindingsThe results suggest that performance partially mediates the relationship between CEO narcissism and positive tone. This indicates that not all the positivity expressed by narcissistic CEOs is opportunism; some of it is indeed driven by better performance. The reported findings indicate that firm performance explains one-quarter of a CEO’s positive words, whereas some three-quarters of the positivity is driven by a narcissistic CEO (i.e. opportunism). A comparison of letters signed by highly narcissistic and less narcissistic leaders reveals that among those letters signed by highly narcissistic leaders, firm performance plays a significant mediating role between narcissistic tendencies and positive tone. However, among those with less narcissistic score, there is no evidence that performance mediates the tone and narcissism. Interestingly, both highly narcissistic and less narcissistic CEOs use positive words and optimistic expressions even when their firms perform poorly or negatively.Research limitations/implicationsThe results help shareholders be aware that CEOs may opportunistically use their personal characteristics and language to manipulate them. Data limitations about women CEOs were one of the reasons behind the small proportion of women CEOs in this study, making it low in generalizability.Originality valueA comprehensive review showed that none of previous studies examined the more ambiguous relationship between a CEO’s narcissist tendency, the firm’s performance, and CEO rhetorical tone. As one set of studies focused on Narcissism → Performance, and the other one on Performance → Tone, this current study completes the picture with Narcissism → Performance → Tone.

We investigate whether CEO narcissism affects a firm’s credit risk from bondholders' perspective. We find that CEO narcissism is significantly and positively related to corporate bond yield spread (namely credit risk), indicating that bondholders care more about the increase on asset value volatility and financial constraint than the increase on asset value due to the risk-taking behaviors conducted by a narcissistic CEO. The implications are empirically supported by the path analyses. In addition, better corporate governance quality (especially internal governance), higher management team background homogeneity, and lower likelihood of future growth weaken the positive effect of CEO narcissism on bond yield spread while higher management team shared working experience, cash conversion cycle, and R&D intensity all enhance the CEO narcissism effect. Moreover, we also find that bondholders have less concern about a narcissistic CEO when the CEO simultaneously has the personality traits of conscientiousness and openness. Finally, our findings are robust when considering endogeneity issues and controlling for several well-known CEO-, firm-, and bond-level characteristics.

We investigate the relationship between CEO narcissism and corporate social responsibility (CSR). We suggest an alternative to the current assumption of a linear relationship between CEO narcissism and CSR. Instead, we propose an inverted U relationship between the two. Although narcissistic CEOs may engage in CSR, we argue that highly narcissistic CEOs may be drawn to actions that would garner greater attention and they may be less inclined to engage in CSR. Based on a sample of Fortune 500 firms during the period 2006–2013, we find support for an inverted U relationship and support for our arguments that CEO power moderates the relationship between CEO narcissism and CSR.

CEOs in corporations may not always employ logical reasoning when making decisions and may be swayed by personal characteristics such as overconfidence and narcissism. The decisions made by CEOs ultimately affect the company's performance. This study examines how CEO overconfidence and narcissism affect firm performance in the presence of capital structure variables. The study surveyed 39 infrastructure companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange between 2017 and 2021, totaling 175 observations. The data were analyzed using Stata 16 to test the direct effect, and indirect effects were tested using the Sobel test. Results indicate that neither CEO overconfidence nor narcissism has a significant impact on a firm's performance, as measured by ROA or ROE. Furthermore, CEO narcissism has no impact on firm performance mediated by capital structure, while capital structure can mediate the effect of CEO overconfidence on ROA but not on ROE