Abstract
This paper examines whether corporate governance mechanisms affect earnings and earnings management at the largest publicly traded bank holding companies in the United States. We first find that performance, earnings management, and corporate governance are endogenously determined. Thus, OLS estimation can lead to biased coefficients and a simultaneous equations approach is used. We find that CEO pay-for-performance sensitivity (PPS), board independence, and capital are positively related to earnings and that earnings, board independence, and capital are negatively related to earnings management. We also find that PPS is positively related to earnings management. Finally, PPS and board independence are positively related and the relationship is bidirectional. While both PPS and board independence are associated with higher earnings, our results indicate that more independent boards appear to constrain the earnings management that greater PPS compels.
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