Converting the "union curious"? Rights-based, pro-worker arguments and Republican support for expanding collective bargaining: The case of the Illinois Workers' Rights Amendment.

Scholars and practitioners have advocated for freedom of association and collective bargaining (FOA/CB) rights as a key mechanism to improve labor compliance in global supply chains. Drawing on a longitudinal data set comprising 6,500 Better Work factory assessments across seven countries from 2015 to 2021, the authors compare violations of various FOA/CB elements to provide a general picture of the progress and problems of FOA/CB in supplier workplaces. They argue that suppliers are likely to selectively comply with FOA/CB elements that afford them some legitimacy but will violate the elements that impose significant costs on them. Specifically, the authors find fewer violations of union formation rights, in contrast to higher violations of union operation rights and of collective bargaining rights. Yet, when these latter rights are respected, they are associated with better compliance with other employment standards, with effective collective bargaining having the strongest effect.

Collective Bargaining and Police Misconduct: Evidence from Florida

As of 2018, thirty-one states granted collective bargaining rights to police officers that require local government management to recognize and collectively bargain in good faith with police unions. Although scholars have identified factors related to police fatalities, the influence of police unions has gone understudied. Research in other occupational areas shows that union strength is associated with fewer workplace injuries and fatalities. This research analyzes the influence of union strength and collective bargaining rights on police fatalities. Using state-level data from 1990 to 2018, a rare-event analysis of police fatalities indicates that states with strong public employee unions experience fewer accidental line-of-duty deaths of police officers. Further, this analysis shows that states which grant collective bargaining rights to police officers have fewer felonious line-of-duty deaths of police officers compared with those that do not grant police collective bargaining rights. This article concludes with a discussion of the policy implications and the role of collective bargaining in police safety.

We provide quasi-experimental evidence on the effects of law enforcement collective bargaining rights on violent incidents of misconduct. Our empirical strategy exploits a 2003 Florida Supreme Court decision (Williams) conferring collective bargaining rights on sheriffs’ deputies. Using a state administrative database of “moral character” violations over 1996–2015, we implement a difference-in-difference approach in which police departments (PDs; which were unaffected by Williams) serve as a control group for sheriffs’ offices (SOs). Our estimates imply that collective bargaining rights led to a substantial increase in violent incidents of misconduct among SOs relative to PDs. This result is robust to including only violent incidents involving officers hired before Williams, suggesting that it is due to a deterrence mechanism rather than compositional effects. In a separate event-study analysis, unionization is associated with higher levels of violent misconduct, and so appears to be a channel for the effect. (JEL K42, J50, J45).

The drama unfolding in various state legislatures since early 2011 has reopened debates about the status of public sector collective bargaining rights in the United States. This article critically examines the rhetorical strategies used by opponents of public sector collective bargaining rights. There are two types of political claims justifying these limitations: instrumental and normative. The instrumental argument claims that collective bargaining must be curtailed because of the necessity of economic crisis. The normative argument claims that collective bargaining for public servants is not a right, but rather a “privilege.” I argue that the politics surrounding the passage of the Ohio and Wisconsin laws, including the strategies of proponents and public’s response, reaffirms the residual legitimacy of collective bargaining as a right. However, it is important to note that this conception of right is limited and differs in various US communities. While human rights scholars have theoretically and strategically argued that the indivisible body of human rights represents a broad and overlapping “consensus,” the recent fights inWisconsin and Ohio demonstrate how internationally recognized human rights remain deeply contested in the domestic sphere. Yet there is evidence that collective bargaining maintains significant legitimacy as a human right. This paper argues that the controversy of the 2011 legal changes suggests that collective bargaining rights are still considered human rights by many communities in the US.

British Columbia’s Residential Tenancy Act is premised on an understanding of residential tenancies as individual contractual relationships. Tenants cannot engage in collective action against their landlords for fear of breaching their contractual obligations. However, there was a time when associations of tenants nearly secured collective bargaining rights and the recognition of tenants as a class with significant influence in the municipal regulation of residential tenancies. This paper explores the history of the tenants’ movement, 1968–75, that struggled and failed to obtain collective bargaining rights for tenants. It follows the growth of the tenants’ movement from collectives of tenants in individual apartment complexes to a provincial coalition of tenants’ associations that achieved significant protections for tenants in municipal by-laws and provincial legislation. It then chronicles how the New Democratic Party government of 1972–75 was elected on a promise to grant collective bargaining rights to tenants but instead denied class rights in favour of establishing a provincially-regulated administrative body to mediate individual disputes. The basic shape and structure of today’s Residential Tenancy Act can be traced to the reforms of this period.

Employing an institutional logics framework and critical discourse analysis, this study examines the discourse of participants in a stakeholder-feedback meeting about a proposal by the Denver Public School board to extend collective bargaining rights to teachers in the district's innovation schools. The findings provide insight into the logics that control how teacher unions and collective bargaining agreements are understood by proponents of autonomous schools and portrayed to the general public through media. The analysis explores how connections to power and status allowed some stakeholder groups to influence the board to revise the policy to one more favorable toward market-oriented school reform. In this case, the dominant narrative that emerged from the stakeholder feedback cycle was one in which the collective bargaining rights of teachers were positioned as a threat to autonomous schools’ ability to provide “what's best for kids” in their classrooms.

Why did public sector unionization rise so dramatically and then plateau at the same time as private sector unionization underwent a precipitous decline? The exclusion of public sector employees from the centerpiece of private sector labor law—the 1935 Wagner Act—divided U.S. labor law and relegated public sector demand-making to the states. Consequently, public sector employees' collective bargaining rights were slow to develop and remain geographically concentrated, unequal and vulnerable. Further, divided labor law put the two movements out of alignment; private sector union density peaked nearly a decade before the first major statutes granting public sector collective bargaining rights passed. As a result of this incongruent timing and sequencing, the United States has never had a strong union movement comprised of both sectors at the height of their membership and influence.

State Budget Cuts Will Affect Members, Services

The chapter provides a critical survey of theoretical and empirical literature on the two-way relationship between freedom of association and collective bargaining (FACB) rights and globalization, specifically international trade and foreign direct investment (FDI). The debates on globalization and labour standards are contentious and venerable yet remain as timely as ever with the growth of labour provisions in international trade agreements. Nonetheless, there are strikingly few empirical studies addressing the relationship between FACB rights and globalization in either direction of causality, which the chapter attributes to the scarcity of credible indicators of FACB rights. Moreover, these empirical studies come to wildly contrary findings, even when using the same indicators of FACB rights. The chapter attempts to shed light on these debates by assessing the different limitations of these empirical studies while advocating further studies more full addressing sectoral breakdowns in FDI and trade and using improved indicators of FACB rights.

This paper examines the positive obligations of States Parties to the European Social Charter (ESC) to secure migrant workers’ collective bargaining rights and analyses their interaction with European Union (EU) law. It sets out the Charter framework, notably Article 5 on the right to organise and Article 6 on collective bargaining, read together with Article 19§4(b) on equal treatment in trade union membership and in the enjoyment of the benefits of collective bargaining, and analyses its interpretation in the supervisory practice of the European Committee of Social Rights (ECSR). The paper addresses both formal legal conformity and effective implementation in practice, with particular attention to discriminatory effects and structural impediments that may undermine the practical and effective exercise of these rights. It then examines the interaction between ESC obligations and EU internal market freedoms, as illustrated by the Viking and Laval judgments, and considers whether subsequent EU instruments, including Directive (EU) 2022/2041 on adequate minimum wages, reinforce collective bargaining as a policy objective. It concludes that, notwithstanding areas of convergence, ESC standards retain autonomous normative force and require practical and effective protection of migrant workers’ collective bargaining rights.

Divided Unions: The Wagner Act, Federalism, and Organized Labor

Public‐sector unions are generally thought to increase the size of government through collective bargaining. This article challenges this idea for the case of teacher unions in the United States and argues that while collective bargaining institutions sometimes lead to increased education spending, this is not the norm. Using a new longitudinal data set spanning all states before and after they granted collective bargaining rights to teachers, the article shows that although states that mandate districts to bargain with teachers have higher education expenditures than states that do not, the differences precede collective bargaining. Difference‐in‐differences analyses find no evidence that introducing collective bargaining rights led to average increases in the level of resources devoted to education. Although existing theories cannot explain these null findings, the article shows one reason behind them is that most laws granting collective bargaining rights to teachers were not unambiguously prolabor, but included both pro‐ and anti‐union provisions.

This review article discusses the conception of collective rights necessary to ground contemporary entrenchments of minority educational rights, Indigenous rights, and collective bargaining rights, as discussed in Miodrag Jovanovic’s book, Collective Rights: A Legal Theory. Jovanovic argues for a role for value collectivism in elucidating a rationale for the entrenchment of rights held by what he conceives of as pre-legally existing groups with interests not reducible to those of their individual members. This approach can offer an explanation for the entrenchment of minority educational rights and Indigenous rights. The article extols Jovanovic’s attempt to grapple with an explanation for rights not explained within standard liberal theory, even in Will Kymlicka’s attempt to justify minority rights within liberalism. The review also critiques the argument offered by Jovanovic. First, the review argues that a full-fledged adoption of value collectivism is not necessary to provide a justification for irreducibly collective rights and that the unnecessary adoption of such a theoretical construct may, in practical terms, work counter to the ongoing entrenchment of the rights it seeks to justify, thus becoming what it will categorize as a ‘self-threatening theory.’ Second, the review argues that Jovanovic’s stark division of rights held by pre-legally existing groups and legally constituted collective entities undermines his account’s ability to explain collective bargaining rights of trade unions that are entrenched in some jurisdictions.

10 | International Union Rights | 23/3 FOCUS | TURKEY Legal Barriers to Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining Turkey’s current legal protection of trade union rights remains a long way from compliance with international norms. Labourers are divided into ‘workers’ and ‘public officers’. The Law on Trade Unions and Collective Bargaining (Law 6356) regulates the trade union rights and freedoms of workers. The Law on Trade Unions and Collective Bargaining of Public Officers (Law 4688) regulates the trade union rights and freedoms of the public officers but provides public officers very limited rights of association, collective bargaining and strike. Besides, the parties to the collective bargaining under Law 4688 do not have to reach an agreement and the final decision is given by the Government. If the parties disagree, the public officers have no right to strike. This legal rule - enacted in 2012 - provides no rights to association, collective bargaining or strike for public officers to protect their interests. Therefore, the following analysis of these rights will focus on the Law on Trade Unions and Collective Bargaining (Law 6356). Freedom of Association: only sector-based unions can be formed The right to form a trade union and freedom of association are assured in Article 51 of the Turkish Constitution. However, Law 6356 was enacted with a limited scope in contrast with international norms. Article 3 says that a ‘trade union is formed to operate in a certain sector’. This regulation contradicts Article 2 of Convention 87 of the ILO Convention 87 which accepts the ‘liberty’ principle on the matter of the freedom of association. Additionally, the ILO Committee on Freedom of Association (CFA) assessed Article 2 of Convention 87 and stated that workers can form a trade union with reference to the sector, profession or regional and other criteria. Moreover, Law 6356 Article 2 does not allow trade unions to organise themselves under umbrella organisations like federations or others, other than confederations. This is also in contradiction with the liberty principle in Article 7 of Convention 87. Collective Bargaining Rights The most important discrepancy in Law 6356 is that while it only permits the formation of trade unions in the sectors, the collective bargaining system is organised on the basis of the workplace or business. Apart from the workplace and business in the collective bargaining, it was not defined on the scale of country, industry and sector (Articles 33-4). This certainly violates ILO norms (Convention 98, Article 4). One of the most important obstacles in Turkey for trade union association and collective bargaining is the legal restrictions and thresholds to have authority for collective bargaining. There are two major problems in Turkey in the system of authorisation. The first obstacle is having the majority in the country and then in the workplace and business, as the law requires. The prerequisite for collective bargaining rights is union membership of 1 percent of workers in respective sector in the country. After the trade union achieves this condition, if more than half of the workers working in the same workplace become members of this trade union, collective bargaining can be signed for the workers in this workplace. If the company has more than one workplace or branches, the union must also organise 40 percent of all the workers in all these workplaces. If a trade union cannot ensure these conditions, it has no authority for collective bargaining. For instance, according to the data from July 2016, there are almost 3,079,761 workers work in Sector 10 (Education and Commerce Offices). A trade union in this sector has to have at least 30,790 members working in this sector for a collective bargaining in any workplace. Otherwise, even if all 20,000 workers from a single workplace of 20,000 workers are in membership this trade union still has no legal power for collective bargaining. The second is that collective bargaining power is given by the Ministry of Labour and Social Security – a political institution. The processes determining if a trade union meets those thresholds are controversial. These are implemented by the Ministry. If an employer or another trade union in the same sector objects to the processes to be performed by...