Conventional forces and arms control: Technology and strategy in a changing world

1. Touring the Western European Defense Horizon.- 2. Western European Defense: The Next Ten Years.- 3. Future Requirements for Theater Weapons in Western Europe.- Appendix: European Security in the Postwar Period: Documents from 1948-1989.- The North Atlantic Treaty Organization.- The North Atlantic Treaty, August 24, 1949.- North Atlantic Council Communique, December 14, 1967.- Speech of M. Laurent Fabius, September 17, 1982.- North Atlantic Council Communique, December 9, 1983.- Lord Carrington, Secretary General, on the Alliance, September 21, 1984.- The Security Policy of the Federal Republic of Germany, 1985.- Maintaining Security in a Changing World [United Kingdom, 1988].- Declaration of the Heads of State and Government, March 2-3, 1988.- Statement on the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, June 9-10, 1988.- European Security Cooperation.- Treaty between Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, March 17, 1948.- Protocols to the 1948 Brussels Treaty, October 23, 1954.- Franco-German Summit Statement, February 27-28, 1986.- Speech by Sir Geoffrey Howe, March 16, 1987.- Arms Control: The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty.- Treaty between the USA and USSR, December 8, 1987.- Address by FRG Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, October 28, 1977.- Communique of a Special NATO Meeting, December 12, 1979.- President Ronald Reagan's Speech to the United Nations General Assembly, September 26, 1983.- NATO Nuclear Planning Group Communique, October 28, 1983.- Speech by FRG Chancellor Helmut Schmidt to the SPD Conference, November 19-20, 1983.- Statement by General Secretary Andropov, November 24, 1983.- Communique of the North Atlantic Council, June 11, 1987.- NATO Nuclear Planning Group Communique, November 1987.- North Atlantic Council Ministerial Communique, December 1987.- Arms Control: Short-Range Nuclear Missiles.- Statement by British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, May 14, 1987.- NATO Nuclear Planning Group Communique, May 15, 1987.- Statement by the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, June 2, 1987.- Arms Control: Conventional Forces.- Document of the Stockholm Conference, September 19, 1986.- Address of the Warsaw Treaty Member States, June 11, 1986.- Press Conference of Francois Mitterrand, April 23, 1987.- Interview with Jacques Chirac, May 16, 1987.- Halifax Statement on Conventional Arms Control, May 30, 1987.- Conventional Arms Control: The Way Ahead, March 2-3, 1988.- Mikhail Gorbachev's Address to the United Nations, December 7, 1988.- Statement Issued by the North Atlantic Council, December 8-9, 1988.- Mandate for Negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, January 10, 1989.- Position Paper, March 6, 1989.- Conceptual Framework of Agreement on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, March 9, 1989.- Speech by Hans-Dietrich Genscher, April 27, 1989.- President George Bush's Statement, May 29, 1989.- About the Authors.

THE CONTROL OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS HAS OFTEN SEEMED THE POOR COUSIN of the global efforts to control weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Since the advent of the atomic era, the focus of arms control and disarmament activity has been overwhelmingly on nuclear weapons and their lesser, if still ugly, stepsisters of biological and chemical weapons. The initial multilateral arms control agreements concerned themselves with limits on the testing of nuclear weapons and, shortly thereafter, with their nonproliferation (e.g., the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty of 1968). Bilateral US-Soviet/Russian arms control arrangements also predominantly dealt with the reduction of strategic nuclear forces and restraints on deployments of defenses against (nuclear-tipped) ballistic missiles. Efforts to reduce major conventional weapon systems were also taken up in the 1980s in the context of negotiations between the opposing alliances of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, eventually culminating in the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty) of 1989. This treaty provided for a massive reduction in the conventional forces that had confronted each other for years in Central Europe and established a new, far more stable security order on the continent. Even the CFE Treaty, however, tended to be overshadowed by other major disarmament agreements concluded in those heady post-Cold War days: the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty (1987), Chemical Weapons Convention (1993), Comprehensive (Nuclear) Test Ban Treaty (1996), and various US-Russian bilateral strategic nuclear arms accords of the 1990s and early 2000s (e.g., the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty and the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty). From one perspective, the focus on WMD and nuclear weapons in particular is understandable. These after all are weapons that have a capacity for apocalyptic destruction. However, given the prevailing taboo on WMD use (not since 1945 for nuclear weapons, and only a handful of incidents involving chemical weapons), the impact on humans is more a grave potential than a painful reality. Conventional arms, including by this term not only the major weapon systems such as tanks, artillery, and armored combat vehicles but also the portable small arms and light weapons (SALW), are the tools of daily destruction around the world. It is this category of armament that, as former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan once described, are the real weapons of mass destruction. (1) These are the weapons that are actually employed in conflicts and that take the greatest toll, not only of combatants, but also of civilians willfully targeted or simply caught in the cross-fire. The year 2013 was marked by two significant achievements in the realm of multilateral conventional arms control. The first was the adoption by the UN General Assembly in April of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), the first legally binding agreement to establish common standards for the international transfer of conventional weapons, including SALW. The second was the unanimous adoption by the UN Security Council of Resolution 2117 at its meeting of 26 September addressing the SALW issue as a threat to international peace and security. This is only the second time that the Council has passed a resolution on this theme. There is reason to celebrate both of these achievements but also to subject them to some critical scrutiny as to what these actions by the General Assembly and the Security Council, respectively, actually mean for dealing with the problems raised by conventional weapons. To better judge the significance of the 2013 developments, it is necessary to place them in their historical context. Past UN Action on Conventional Arms The UN came relatively late to addressing the security and humanitarian challenges posed by conventional arms and, especially, SALW. The UN Register of Conventional Arms was established in 1991 to attempt some transparency over international trade in major weapons systems, but it did not include (and still does not) provision for SALW to be included in the same manner as the seven other categories of weaponry. …

This book addresses some of the key conceptual issues related to the NATO-Warsaw Pact Vienna talks on Conventional forces in Europe (CFE). The chapters presented include: Constraints in Europe, Nuclear weapons and conventional arms control, and Approaches to conventional arms reductions.

In July 2001, member states will gather in New York for the UN Conference on the Illicit Trade in Arms in All its Aspects. It represents part of the effort to establish controls on small arms and light weapons. This article argues that it is possible that nuclear and conventional arms control represent two ends of a continuum, with common goals and a common set of mechanisms and processes at work. A decade after the end of the Cold War, it is not surprising that the international community is working on mechanisms to deal with conventional arms. The existence of a continuum and connections between conventional and nuclear arms control is less evident. The two arms control communities appear to function in isolation of each other. The return to the debate on small arms and light weapons echoes post-World War I and II periods. The fact that small arms control is back on the agenda within the context of the UN may signify recognition that any kind of arms control serves the same purpose—preventing and mitigating the effects and duration of, and bringing an end to conflict.

More than two decades have passed since flexible response and non-nuclear war fighting options were formally accepted as the core of NATO strategy. Raising the nuclear threshold through credible conventional defenses for Europe has been central to that strategy. The Soviet buildup in strategic nuclear weapons in the early 1970s, followed by equally dramatic theater nuclear force modernization programs, resulted in an overly narrow, nuclear focus on NATO strategy in Europe. Soviet acceptance of the American proposal to eliminate intermediate-range nuclear missiles and progress in conventional arms control have refocused Western attention on NATO’s conventional forces. NATO strategy will undergo dramatic changes if conventional forces are reduced in accordance with the ambitious proposals coming out of both Washington and Moscow. As the difficult details of a conventional arms treaty emerge, it is important to remember how and why NATO’s 1990 force levels and military strategy evolved in the first place.

: Disarmament, Conventional Arms Control, Negotiations on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), Confidence- and Security-Building Measures (CSBM), Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), Armored Combat Vehicles, tanks, artillery, combat aviation, personnel ceilings, sub-zones, NATO, Warsaw pact, Neutral and nonaligned. In this textbook the authors address significant conventional arms control history; development of U.S. and NATO objectives for the talks; pertinent issues which had to be resolved; the role of partial disarmament in National Security Strategy; and conclude with a full discussion of CFE and CSBM proposals, data, and the military implications of a successful agreement. The authors provide answers to the important questions: How close are we to an agreement? Can conventional arms reductions be verified? What does the post arms reduction world look like? What is the future of the alliances in Europe? Will we have to change national security strategy? Is arms control still relevant, considering the changes in Eastern Europe? How can we agree on answers before events change them? This book is somewhat unique since it incorporates the work of practitioners, academics, and actual members of our U.S. conventional arms control negotiating teams. (EG)

In 2010 improved relations between Russia and the United States, the signing of the New START treaty and efforts to surmount obstacles on the European security agenda ‘reset’ conventional arms control and confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs). Proposals made in 2010 on the two tracks of European arms control dialogue, the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe regime and the Vienna Document on CSBMs, will inform future work. Arms control in Europe depends on the strategic interests of its main actors. Elsewhere, the relevance of the Treaty on Open Skies was reaffirmed at its second review conference.

ABSTRACTAmid tensions with the West over Ukraine, Russia pulled out of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe in March 2015. The Russian case is another example of a country disengaging from conventional arms control when relations with other member states deteriorate. This raises an important question: can arms control regimes aimed at preventing conflict survive periods of tension and preserve peace? This article argues no. It demonstrates that the prospect and stability of conventional arms control regimes depend on healthy international relations. In times of tension, governments rely on military institutions for advice and absorb military biases incompatible with arms control. Therefore, these regimes fail when most needed and are impotent as instruments of peace. Beyond conventional arms control, the article hints at the fragility of nuclear agreements such as the 2015 Iran deal and the 2010 New START between the United States and Russia.

This chapter aims to study the military dynamics, conventional arms control, and regional security in the Western Balkans since the end of the Yugoslav wars. The first section deals with the region’s transformation from a conflict zone to a security regime during the stabilisation phase (1995–2001). A critical aspect of this was creating the sub-regional conventional arms control (CAC) regime modelled after the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE). The chapter then analyses the consolidation phase (2002–13), when the region embarked on security community-building, while the CAC regime was fully implemented and transferred to regional ownership. The third section zooms in on the ongoing backsliding phase (2014–), when the region experienced a relapse of tensions and securitisations which halted security community-building. After briefly presenting how the war in Ukraine triggered this phase, the following sections unpack the evolving military dynamics and the heated rhetoric of the arms race and rising military budgets. The chapter concludes that these worrying trends and the ongoing military modernisation have not yet undermined the regional balance of power and the CAC regime.

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Conventional arms control and disarmament efforts have historically been framed as a humanitarian cause to limit human suffering. However, activities with an arms control component have only featured to a limited extent within the protection of civilians (POC) mandates of United Nations peace operations. Both issues feature on the agenda of the United Nations Security Council which mandates missions, but the linkages between the two have not been well explored at policy, strategic and operational levels. Produced in conjunction with the International Peace Institute, this brief provides an analysis of the actual, and potential, contribution of conventional arms control and related activities to POC within the context of United Nations peace operations – both peacekeeping operations and special political missions (SPM). There has been limited research conducted on this topic and it has been addressed in only a cursory manner in relevant policies, guidelines, and strategies. This work therefore attempts to demonstrate the existing linkages between these two mandated tasks, as well as to pinpoint some of the barriers and challenges to why conventional arms control has not featured more fully within the POC efforts of missions. It then identifies the relevant entry points based on concrete examples of how arms control-related activities can be better leveraged by United Nations peace operations to ensure a more effective protection of civilians.

The chapter gives a comprehensive review of Russia’s policy toward conventional arms control in Europe. In particular, the Conventional Forces in Europe treaty (CFE Treaty), Open Skies Treaty (OST), and succession of Vienna Documents on confidence and security building measures (Vienna Document) are the focus of research.

: The Middle East has experienced numerous wars and other conflicts over the past 50 years that have been caused by religious, geopolitical, social, and economic factors. Strategically located, it has served as an important trade route linking mankind's earliest civilizations. This region, also known as the Holy Land, was the birthplace for three of the world's major religions-Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. In turn Persia, Egypt, Rome, Byzantium, the Arabs, the Ottoman Empire, and the British Empire ruled the area for its strategic location and religious significance. By the Twentieth Century vast oil reserves discovered in the Middle East made this an economically important region for the industrialized world. The United States, Europe, and the Former Soviet Union all have attempted to influence this region to enhance security and gain economic benefits. Conventional arms transfers and conventional arms control are two ways that have been used to achieve these goals. This paper examines the relationship between arms control and arms transfers and evaluates their impact on security in the Middle East. It also examines economic benefits of arms transfers for supplier nations that include preserving the defense industrial base; reducing research, development, and production costs for weapon systems; and easing trade imbalances caused by oil purchases. Finally, some recommendations for the future of arms transfer and arms control are proposed.

This chapter explores the opportunities, challenges and risks of using artificial intelligence (AI) technologies in the context of conventional arms control and military confidence-building. First, it briefly reflects upon different theoretical approaches and perspectives on arms control and military confidence-building. Second, it provides a brief overview of existing treaties, regimes and measures in Europe. Finally, the chapter concludes with a few reflections and food for thought on the opportunities, challenges and risks inherent in AI technologies for: (1) the balance of power; (2) analysis, planning, coordination, and evaluation; (3) verification and (4) trust-building in conventional arms control and military confidence-building measures in Europe. In sum, the chapter argues that the best prospects for AI technologies in conventional arms control and military confidence-building are in the augmentation of human intelligence, while the biggest risks lie in a lack of human oversight and an uncritical reliance on AI systems, as well as in the reduction of the trust-building effects of direct military-to-military contacts.KeywordsConventional arms controlTrustVerificationEarly-warningAugmented intelligenceMilitary-to-military contactsHuman oversight

The intensely adversarial relationship between India and Pakistan is marked by military rivalry, mutual distrust, and suspicion. The most dividing disagreement has been over the Kashmir region. An inability to discuss the Kashmir issue has prevented discussion on other important issues. Since there is little prospect of detente, at least in the near-term, the question is whether this rivalry can be contained by other means, such as arms control approaches. Conventional arms control has been applied flexibly and successfully in some regions to reduce threat-perceptions and achieve reassuring military stability. Some lessons from other international models might be applied to the India/Pakistan context. This paper discusses the status of conventional arms control in South Asia, the dominant Indian and Pakistani perceptions about arms control, the benefits that could be derived from arms control, as well as the problems and prospects of arms control. It also discusses existing conventional arms control agreements at the regional and global levels as well as the potential role of cooperative monitoring technology.