Conventional arms control and military confidence building

: Disarmament, Conventional Arms Control, Negotiations on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), Confidence- and Security-Building Measures (CSBM), Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), Armored Combat Vehicles, tanks, artillery, combat aviation, personnel ceilings, sub-zones, NATO, Warsaw pact, Neutral and nonaligned. In this textbook the authors address significant conventional arms control history; development of U.S. and NATO objectives for the talks; pertinent issues which had to be resolved; the role of partial disarmament in National Security Strategy; and conclude with a full discussion of CFE and CSBM proposals, data, and the military implications of a successful agreement. The authors provide answers to the important questions: How close are we to an agreement? Can conventional arms reductions be verified? What does the post arms reduction world look like? What is the future of the alliances in Europe? Will we have to change national security strategy? Is arms control still relevant, considering the changes in Eastern Europe? How can we agree on answers before events change them? This book is somewhat unique since it incorporates the work of practitioners, academics, and actual members of our U.S. conventional arms control negotiating teams. (EG)

What role can conventional arms control (CAC) and confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) play in crises and conflicts? By examining the use of CAC and CSBMs during the Russian-Georgian war in 2008 and during Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the war in eastern Ukraine in 2014, the present article argue that CAC and CSBMs are unable to prevent intentional conflict. Their more realistic value in crises is to function as early warning mechanisms that raise the bar for and increase the costs of conflict as well as serving as instruments to monitor conflicts. To increase their effectiveness, the links between early warning and early action need strengthening and several ambiguities need to be removed, particularly form the Vienna Document, in order to improve indicators, increase warning times and raise the political costs of non-compliance. Nonetheless, when one or two sides seek a conflict, CAC and CSBMs do not provide a remedy for conflict prevention.

1. Touring the Western European Defense Horizon.- 2. Western European Defense: The Next Ten Years.- 3. Future Requirements for Theater Weapons in Western Europe.- Appendix: European Security in the Postwar Period: Documents from 1948-1989.- The North Atlantic Treaty Organization.- The North Atlantic Treaty, August 24, 1949.- North Atlantic Council Communique, December 14, 1967.- Speech of M. Laurent Fabius, September 17, 1982.- North Atlantic Council Communique, December 9, 1983.- Lord Carrington, Secretary General, on the Alliance, September 21, 1984.- The Security Policy of the Federal Republic of Germany, 1985.- Maintaining Security in a Changing World [United Kingdom, 1988].- Declaration of the Heads of State and Government, March 2-3, 1988.- Statement on the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, June 9-10, 1988.- European Security Cooperation.- Treaty between Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, March 17, 1948.- Protocols to the 1948 Brussels Treaty, October 23, 1954.- Franco-German Summit Statement, February 27-28, 1986.- Speech by Sir Geoffrey Howe, March 16, 1987.- Arms Control: The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty.- Treaty between the USA and USSR, December 8, 1987.- Address by FRG Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, October 28, 1977.- Communique of a Special NATO Meeting, December 12, 1979.- President Ronald Reagan's Speech to the United Nations General Assembly, September 26, 1983.- NATO Nuclear Planning Group Communique, October 28, 1983.- Speech by FRG Chancellor Helmut Schmidt to the SPD Conference, November 19-20, 1983.- Statement by General Secretary Andropov, November 24, 1983.- Communique of the North Atlantic Council, June 11, 1987.- NATO Nuclear Planning Group Communique, November 1987.- North Atlantic Council Ministerial Communique, December 1987.- Arms Control: Short-Range Nuclear Missiles.- Statement by British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, May 14, 1987.- NATO Nuclear Planning Group Communique, May 15, 1987.- Statement by the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, June 2, 1987.- Arms Control: Conventional Forces.- Document of the Stockholm Conference, September 19, 1986.- Address of the Warsaw Treaty Member States, June 11, 1986.- Press Conference of Francois Mitterrand, April 23, 1987.- Interview with Jacques Chirac, May 16, 1987.- Halifax Statement on Conventional Arms Control, May 30, 1987.- Conventional Arms Control: The Way Ahead, March 2-3, 1988.- Mikhail Gorbachev's Address to the United Nations, December 7, 1988.- Statement Issued by the North Atlantic Council, December 8-9, 1988.- Mandate for Negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, January 10, 1989.- Position Paper, March 6, 1989.- Conceptual Framework of Agreement on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, March 9, 1989.- Speech by Hans-Dietrich Genscher, April 27, 1989.- President George Bush's Statement, May 29, 1989.- About the Authors.

Every region has to elaborate its own confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) culture, while not abandoning the basic Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) accords in this field. CSBMs cannot be seen as an aim in themselves. They have to be incorporated in the broader, emerging security regime. If our security is threatened, both internally and externally (from territories far away from Europe), our counteraction must correspond to the new nature of these threats. Although played down, the concept of CSBMs is not a thing of the past and may be a useful instrument in addressing various kinds of security issues, including those on the Korean peninsula. There is an urgent need to start a serious discussion on the overall concept of arms control and CSBMs and its place in the security-building processes. The main forum for European CSBMs remains the OSCE, although arms control efforts are also being developed outside its remit. The promotion of endeavors in this field would be much enhanced by having the European Union and NATO engaged more deeply in it. The question of CSBM implementation in the contiguous areas of the states which share frontiers with non-European, non-OSCE states remains outstanding. The current circumstances on Europe's perimeter bear evidence that the OSCE community cannot defer the issue interminably. The OSCE Partners for Cooperation need to be further encouraged to follow and get involved in the CSBM/arms control processes.

ABSTRACTAmid tensions with the West over Ukraine, Russia pulled out of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe in March 2015. The Russian case is another example of a country disengaging from conventional arms control when relations with other member states deteriorate. This raises an important question: can arms control regimes aimed at preventing conflict survive periods of tension and preserve peace? This article argues no. It demonstrates that the prospect and stability of conventional arms control regimes depend on healthy international relations. In times of tension, governments rely on military institutions for advice and absorb military biases incompatible with arms control. Therefore, these regimes fail when most needed and are impotent as instruments of peace. Beyond conventional arms control, the article hints at the fragility of nuclear agreements such as the 2015 Iran deal and the 2010 New START between the United States and Russia.

To address the implications of changes for future roles of conventional forces and to assess the technology implications of future strategies, force requirements, and conventional arms control agreements, the Center for National Security Studies in cooperation with the Defense Research and Applications Directorate of the Los Alamos National Laboratory held a conference on Conventional Forces and Arms Control: Technology and Strategy in a Changing World'' at Los Alamos from September 25--27, 1989. The distinguished participants from government, industry, and academia in the United States and Western Europe addressed such issues as: What are the implications of geopolitical and technological trends for international security and stability How will these global changes affect US and allied strategies and force structure, especially the requirements for conventional, nonnuclear forces What will be the role of and rationale for conventional forces in the context of current and prospective allied security requirements How can the West assure it will have the forces necessary for its security How will technological developments influence the structure of tomorrow's conventional forces What impacts will arms reductions have on future systems and force structures What are the prospects for the development and deployment in weapon systems of future conventional military technologies, in light of existing and potential political, economic, bureaucratic, and other impediments

The chapter gives a comprehensive review of Russia’s policy toward conventional arms control in Europe. In particular, the Conventional Forces in Europe treaty (CFE Treaty), Open Skies Treaty (OST), and succession of Vienna Documents on confidence and security building measures (Vienna Document) are the focus of research.

In July 2001, member states will gather in New York for the UN Conference on the Illicit Trade in Arms in All its Aspects. It represents part of the effort to establish controls on small arms and light weapons. This article argues that it is possible that nuclear and conventional arms control represent two ends of a continuum, with common goals and a common set of mechanisms and processes at work. A decade after the end of the Cold War, it is not surprising that the international community is working on mechanisms to deal with conventional arms. The existence of a continuum and connections between conventional and nuclear arms control is less evident. The two arms control communities appear to function in isolation of each other. The return to the debate on small arms and light weapons echoes post-World War I and II periods. The fact that small arms control is back on the agenda within the context of the UN may signify recognition that any kind of arms control serves the same purpose—preventing and mitigating the effects and duration of, and bringing an end to conflict.

Conventional arms control and disarmament efforts have historically been framed as a humanitarian cause to limit human suffering. However, activities with an arms control component have only featured to a limited extent within the protection of civilians (POC) mandates of United Nations peace operations. Both issues feature on the agenda of the United Nations Security Council which mandates missions, but the linkages between the two have not been well explored at policy, strategic and operational levels. Produced in conjunction with the International Peace Institute, this brief provides an analysis of the actual, and potential, contribution of conventional arms control and related activities to POC within the context of United Nations peace operations – both peacekeeping operations and special political missions (SPM). There has been limited research conducted on this topic and it has been addressed in only a cursory manner in relevant policies, guidelines, and strategies. This work therefore attempts to demonstrate the existing linkages between these two mandated tasks, as well as to pinpoint some of the barriers and challenges to why conventional arms control has not featured more fully within the POC efforts of missions. It then identifies the relevant entry points based on concrete examples of how arms control-related activities can be better leveraged by United Nations peace operations to ensure a more effective protection of civilians.

One of the interesting developments that follows from the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) is that “operational arms control” or confidence and security-building measures (CSBMs) will probably increase in importance. This essay traces some of the major accomplishments of the CSBM negotiations throughout its history. Particular emphasis is given to the Vienna Document concluded in November 1990 which marked a reconceptualization of the role of CSBMs in a post Cold War era. The essay also advances some proposals for future consideration at the CSCE review conference in Helsinki in March 1992. While most of the CSBMs discussed below were conceived before the disintegration of the Soviet Union in December 1991 — what is important is that many of the same principles might be applied between newly independent states inside the territory of the former Soviet Union.

This chapter explores the opportunities, challenges and risks of using artificial intelligence (AI) technologies in the context of conventional arms control and military confidence-building. First, it briefly reflects upon different theoretical approaches and perspectives on arms control and military confidence-building. Second, it provides a brief overview of existing treaties, regimes and measures in Europe. Finally, the chapter concludes with a few reflections and food for thought on the opportunities, challenges and risks inherent in AI technologies for: (1) the balance of power; (2) analysis, planning, coordination, and evaluation; (3) verification and (4) trust-building in conventional arms control and military confidence-building measures in Europe. In sum, the chapter argues that the best prospects for AI technologies in conventional arms control and military confidence-building are in the augmentation of human intelligence, while the biggest risks lie in a lack of human oversight and an uncritical reliance on AI systems, as well as in the reduction of the trust-building effects of direct military-to-military contacts.KeywordsConventional arms controlTrustVerificationEarly-warningAugmented intelligenceMilitary-to-military contactsHuman oversight

: The Middle East has experienced numerous wars and other conflicts over the past 50 years that have been caused by religious, geopolitical, social, and economic factors. Strategically located, it has served as an important trade route linking mankind's earliest civilizations. This region, also known as the Holy Land, was the birthplace for three of the world's major religions-Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. In turn Persia, Egypt, Rome, Byzantium, the Arabs, the Ottoman Empire, and the British Empire ruled the area for its strategic location and religious significance. By the Twentieth Century vast oil reserves discovered in the Middle East made this an economically important region for the industrialized world. The United States, Europe, and the Former Soviet Union all have attempted to influence this region to enhance security and gain economic benefits. Conventional arms transfers and conventional arms control are two ways that have been used to achieve these goals. This paper examines the relationship between arms control and arms transfers and evaluates their impact on security in the Middle East. It also examines economic benefits of arms transfers for supplier nations that include preserving the defense industrial base; reducing research, development, and production costs for weapon systems; and easing trade imbalances caused by oil purchases. Finally, some recommendations for the future of arms transfer and arms control are proposed.

Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs), to use the Stockholm Conference terminology, are instruments which aim at reducing the possibilities of armed conflicts resulting from accident, misunderstanding, miscalculation or failure of communication as well as at strengthening confidence among states. In other words, they constitute means to change the perception and nature of the threat and to lessen tensions. An agreement on a set of mutually complementary CSBMs which would alter the threat significantly within the forseeable future, if enforced, could certainly help modify the nuclear dilemma as it now stands.KeywordsForeign PolicyArmed ConflictNorth Atlantic Treaty OrganisationEuropean SecurityInternational CrisisThese keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

The Russo-Ukraine War has capped the decay of conventional arms control (CAC) agreements and security institutions designed and evolved in large part to prevent this type of conflict. At its root is the rivalry between Russia and NATO, and Russian concerns over the military balance. The Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty was the cornerstone agreement to stabilize the military balance, but the treaty and other security institutions such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) failed to adapt to NATO expansion. This article explores the role of various organizations in Europe in CAC and proposes a unique approach to future CAC agreements, dynamic CAC, implemented by a dedicated organization called the European Military Balance Organization (EMBO) which would continuously assess the military balance between NATO and Russia.

The fundamental political changes of the last decade have unquestionably led to the emergence of a new Europe, a continent if not yet free of military tensions then at least one in which the major powers have negotiated their way toward relative stability. The seeds of this change were sown in the years preceding the collapse of Soviet-dominated communism in east-central Europe (ECE). Mikhail Gorbachev’s leadership inspired new Soviet approaches to international security issues and offered concessions in arms control to further these approaches. The most visible result of these policies was the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty signed in 1987, a historic agreement which effectively eliminated an entire category of weapons from Europe. The late 1980s also saw the beginning of negotiations leading to agreements which were to have a substantial impact upon the size, structure and operational aims of military forces in Europe and which established a considerable degree of openness and transparency in military relations between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and its former adversaries in the Warsaw Pact. The 1990 Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), the Concluding Act of the Negotiation on Personnel Strength of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (the 1992 CFE-1A agreement), the 1992 Vienna Document on Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs) and the 1992 Treaty on Open Skies together represented a package of measures designed ‘to replace military confrontation with a new pattern of security relations’ in Europe, thereby helping to overcome the division of the continent.1KeywordsNorth Atlantic Treaty OrganizationEuropean SecurityWarsaw PactConventional ForceFlank ZoneThese keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.