Conventional Arms Control Agreements in Europe: Conditions of Success and Failure

A qualitative assessment of the conventional military balance between NATO and Russia may form a basis of any potential conventional arms control (CAC) agreement in Europe. Article discusses methods to assess force capability and military balances, and then suggests updates to the methods based on insights from recent conflicts, military capability trends and developments. The article offers a weighted static force analysis model to assess military balances, that can be used for CAC agreements, called the Quantitative Approach to Conventional Arms Control (QuACAC). This approach may help narrow areas of disagreement between negotiating parties, and provide a basis for CAC agreement adaptation.

1. Touring the Western European Defense Horizon.- 2. Western European Defense: The Next Ten Years.- 3. Future Requirements for Theater Weapons in Western Europe.- Appendix: European Security in the Postwar Period: Documents from 1948-1989.- The North Atlantic Treaty Organization.- The North Atlantic Treaty, August 24, 1949.- North Atlantic Council Communique, December 14, 1967.- Speech of M. Laurent Fabius, September 17, 1982.- North Atlantic Council Communique, December 9, 1983.- Lord Carrington, Secretary General, on the Alliance, September 21, 1984.- The Security Policy of the Federal Republic of Germany, 1985.- Maintaining Security in a Changing World [United Kingdom, 1988].- Declaration of the Heads of State and Government, March 2-3, 1988.- Statement on the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, June 9-10, 1988.- European Security Cooperation.- Treaty between Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, March 17, 1948.- Protocols to the 1948 Brussels Treaty, October 23, 1954.- Franco-German Summit Statement, February 27-28, 1986.- Speech by Sir Geoffrey Howe, March 16, 1987.- Arms Control: The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty.- Treaty between the USA and USSR, December 8, 1987.- Address by FRG Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, October 28, 1977.- Communique of a Special NATO Meeting, December 12, 1979.- President Ronald Reagan's Speech to the United Nations General Assembly, September 26, 1983.- NATO Nuclear Planning Group Communique, October 28, 1983.- Speech by FRG Chancellor Helmut Schmidt to the SPD Conference, November 19-20, 1983.- Statement by General Secretary Andropov, November 24, 1983.- Communique of the North Atlantic Council, June 11, 1987.- NATO Nuclear Planning Group Communique, November 1987.- North Atlantic Council Ministerial Communique, December 1987.- Arms Control: Short-Range Nuclear Missiles.- Statement by British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, May 14, 1987.- NATO Nuclear Planning Group Communique, May 15, 1987.- Statement by the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, June 2, 1987.- Arms Control: Conventional Forces.- Document of the Stockholm Conference, September 19, 1986.- Address of the Warsaw Treaty Member States, June 11, 1986.- Press Conference of Francois Mitterrand, April 23, 1987.- Interview with Jacques Chirac, May 16, 1987.- Halifax Statement on Conventional Arms Control, May 30, 1987.- Conventional Arms Control: The Way Ahead, March 2-3, 1988.- Mikhail Gorbachev's Address to the United Nations, December 7, 1988.- Statement Issued by the North Atlantic Council, December 8-9, 1988.- Mandate for Negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, January 10, 1989.- Position Paper, March 6, 1989.- Conceptual Framework of Agreement on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, March 9, 1989.- Speech by Hans-Dietrich Genscher, April 27, 1989.- President George Bush's Statement, May 29, 1989.- About the Authors.

The Great Power Rivalry is a strategic reality with implications at both the international and regional levels. The concept of 'Great Power Competition' (GPC), first formally identified in the 2017 US National Security Strategy, aimed to explain great power behaviors in the post-US hegemony period. While existing literature is rich in historical and global impact studies, research focusing on the conceptual and theoretical aspects of rivalry within the context of security strategies remains scarce. This chapter addresses this gap by offering a comprehensive theoretical and analytical framework for GPC. The central problem investigated is: “How does great power rivalry affect the struggles of small and middle powers, especially in the context of security strategies and doctrines?” The Iran-Israel struggle (2017 to 2023) is presented as a key illustrative case study for future analysis, demonstrating the necessity of the proposed theoretical approach.

Under what conditions do the more powerful states in an adversarial conventional arms control (CAC) agreement accept a reduction in their relative military power? Scholars have rarely empirically assessed if and how CAC agreements alter the military balance that existed pre-agreement. We developed and tested a theoretical model that predicted the effect of a CAC agreement on the status quo based on the perceptions of geopolitical stability, the military balance, and resource constraints. We hypothesized that resource considerations are a necessary but insufficient condition of military balance status quo agreement outcome. We tested our hypothesis on 29 European CAC agreements. Our findings indicated that in 7 out of 29 cases the status quo was altered, and the actual outcomes matched the expected outcomes in 23 of the 29 cases. These findings offer new theoretical insights into CAC agreement formulation and may also help practitioners establish realistic negotiating approaches.

Conventional arms control and disarmament efforts have historically been framed as a humanitarian cause to limit human suffering. However, activities with an arms control component have only featured to a limited extent within the protection of civilians (POC) mandates of United Nations peace operations. Both issues feature on the agenda of the United Nations Security Council which mandates missions, but the linkages between the two have not been well explored at policy, strategic and operational levels. Produced in conjunction with the International Peace Institute, this brief provides an analysis of the actual, and potential, contribution of conventional arms control and related activities to POC within the context of United Nations peace operations – both peacekeeping operations and special political missions (SPM). There has been limited research conducted on this topic and it has been addressed in only a cursory manner in relevant policies, guidelines, and strategies. This work therefore attempts to demonstrate the existing linkages between these two mandated tasks, as well as to pinpoint some of the barriers and challenges to why conventional arms control has not featured more fully within the POC efforts of missions. It then identifies the relevant entry points based on concrete examples of how arms control-related activities can be better leveraged by United Nations peace operations to ensure a more effective protection of civilians.

Introduction: Great power competition in Africa is a multifaceted phenomenon with significant implications for regional stability, economic development, security, and governance. This study explores the drivers, strategies, and impacts of major global powers in Africa, aiming to deepen our understanding of the complexities of great power rivalry on the continent. Methodology: Employing a qualitative research approach, this study conducts a comprehensive review of existing literature, scholarly research, and expert insights to analyze great power competition in Africa. Data collection involves gathering and synthesizing information from diverse sources, followed by qualitative analysis techniques to interpret key findings and insights. Results/Findings: The study identifies several key findings, including the strategies employed by major global powers, the challenges posed by great power competition, and the role of regional organizations in managing external influence in Africa. Future Directions: Building on these findings, future research directions could explore the long-term implications of great power competition on sustainable development, governance, and regional cooperation in Africa.

Qualitative comparative institutional analysis of environmental governance: Implications from research on payments for ecosystem services

What role did conventional arms control (CAC) agreements failures play in Russia's decision to invade Ukraine? Using a process tracing and counterfactual mixed methodology analyzing Russia's invasion motivations, this article attempts to answer the question by assessing Russian strategic policies, proposals, and arms control agreements. These demonstrate that Russia, seeing its sense of “indivisible security” being violated, sought to adjust or establish new CAC agreements to address a growing conventional military imbalance between NATO and Russia. Having failed to establish a fixed and stable conventional military balance through CAC, and as Ukraine edged closer to NATO membership, Russia resorted to the use of force shortly after their December 2021 proposals were not accepted. The article concludes by suggesting that this case supports arms racing and arms-control related causes of war theories, and that dissonant perceptions of the actual or ideal military balance can lead to conflict.

To address the implications of changes for future roles of conventional forces and to assess the technology implications of future strategies, force requirements, and conventional arms control agreements, the Center for National Security Studies in cooperation with the Defense Research and Applications Directorate of the Los Alamos National Laboratory held a conference on Conventional Forces and Arms Control: Technology and Strategy in a Changing World'' at Los Alamos from September 25--27, 1989. The distinguished participants from government, industry, and academia in the United States and Western Europe addressed such issues as: What are the implications of geopolitical and technological trends for international security and stability How will these global changes affect US and allied strategies and force structure, especially the requirements for conventional, nonnuclear forces What will be the role of and rationale for conventional forces in the context of current and prospective allied security requirements How can the West assure it will have the forces necessary for its security How will technological developments influence the structure of tomorrow's conventional forces What impacts will arms reductions have on future systems and force structures What are the prospects for the development and deployment in weapon systems of future conventional military technologies, in light of existing and potential political, economic, bureaucratic, and other impediments

The current and future successes and failures of this era’s great powers—the United States, the People’s Republic of China, and Russia—can be traced back to the domestic political economy of each contender. The three great powers all rely on capitalist economic arrangements operating within a global market economy. But capitalism comes in a variety of forms ranging from the Anglo-American neoliberal model to state or even “party” capitalism as practiced in Russia and China. Each great power thus relies on different domestic political and economic institutions as well as legitimating ideologies to generate usable power within the global system. To illustrate the impact of distinct varieties of capitalism on great power competition, this chapter analyzes how each great power meets the most salient contemporary strategic challenge: military modernization.

In 2010 improved relations between Russia and the United States, the signing of the New START treaty and efforts to surmount obstacles on the European security agenda ‘reset’ conventional arms control and confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs). Proposals made in 2010 on the two tracks of European arms control dialogue, the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe regime and the Vienna Document on CSBMs, will inform future work. Arms control in Europe depends on the strategic interests of its main actors. Elsewhere, the relevance of the Treaty on Open Skies was reaffirmed at its second review conference.

The intensely adversarial relationship between India and Pakistan is marked by military rivalry, mutual distrust, and suspicion. The most dividing disagreement has been over the Kashmir region. An inability to discuss the Kashmir issue has prevented discussion on other important issues. Since there is little prospect of detente, at least in the near-term, the question is whether this rivalry can be contained by other means, such as arms control approaches. Conventional arms control has been applied flexibly and successfully in some regions to reduce threat-perceptions and achieve reassuring military stability. Some lessons from other international models might be applied to the India/Pakistan context. This paper discusses the status of conventional arms control in South Asia, the dominant Indian and Pakistani perceptions about arms control, the benefits that could be derived from arms control, as well as the problems and prospects of arms control. It also discusses existing conventional arms control agreements at the regional and global levels as well as the potential role of cooperative monitoring technology.

This chapter explores the opportunities, challenges and risks of using artificial intelligence (AI) technologies in the context of conventional arms control and military confidence-building. First, it briefly reflects upon different theoretical approaches and perspectives on arms control and military confidence-building. Second, it provides a brief overview of existing treaties, regimes and measures in Europe. Finally, the chapter concludes with a few reflections and food for thought on the opportunities, challenges and risks inherent in AI technologies for: (1) the balance of power; (2) analysis, planning, coordination, and evaluation; (3) verification and (4) trust-building in conventional arms control and military confidence-building measures in Europe. In sum, the chapter argues that the best prospects for AI technologies in conventional arms control and military confidence-building are in the augmentation of human intelligence, while the biggest risks lie in a lack of human oversight and an uncritical reliance on AI systems, as well as in the reduction of the trust-building effects of direct military-to-military contacts.KeywordsConventional arms controlTrustVerificationEarly-warningAugmented intelligenceMilitary-to-military contactsHuman oversight

: Disarmament, Conventional Arms Control, Negotiations on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), Confidence- and Security-Building Measures (CSBM), Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), Armored Combat Vehicles, tanks, artillery, combat aviation, personnel ceilings, sub-zones, NATO, Warsaw pact, Neutral and nonaligned. In this textbook the authors address significant conventional arms control history; development of U.S. and NATO objectives for the talks; pertinent issues which had to be resolved; the role of partial disarmament in National Security Strategy; and conclude with a full discussion of CFE and CSBM proposals, data, and the military implications of a successful agreement. The authors provide answers to the important questions: How close are we to an agreement? Can conventional arms reductions be verified? What does the post arms reduction world look like? What is the future of the alliances in Europe? Will we have to change national security strategy? Is arms control still relevant, considering the changes in Eastern Europe? How can we agree on answers before events change them? This book is somewhat unique since it incorporates the work of practitioners, academics, and actual members of our U.S. conventional arms control negotiating teams. (EG)

ABSTRACTAmid tensions with the West over Ukraine, Russia pulled out of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe in March 2015. The Russian case is another example of a country disengaging from conventional arms control when relations with other member states deteriorate. This raises an important question: can arms control regimes aimed at preventing conflict survive periods of tension and preserve peace? This article argues no. It demonstrates that the prospect and stability of conventional arms control regimes depend on healthy international relations. In times of tension, governments rely on military institutions for advice and absorb military biases incompatible with arms control. Therefore, these regimes fail when most needed and are impotent as instruments of peace. Beyond conventional arms control, the article hints at the fragility of nuclear agreements such as the 2015 Iran deal and the 2010 New START between the United States and Russia.