Controlling the controller: expressions and limits of the sanctioning power of the public administration in the case of the comptroller general of the republic

Journal Article Recent Case Law of the French Conseil d'Etat Get access Bernard Ducamin Bernard Ducamin 1Bernard Ducamin is Conseiller, Conseil d'Etat. This article is based on a speech given in honor of Prof. F.K. Juenger, 15 October 1984. The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Nancy Jackson, Boalt 1986, for her translation from the French Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The American Journal of Comparative Law, Volume 35, Issue 2, Spring 1987, Pages 341–357, https://doi.org/10.2307/840393 Published: 01 April 1987

THE STORY OF AMERICAN STATE BUILDING is one in which crisis, once episodic, has become a routine feature of American politics. At the heart of this development is the modern executive: emergency powers are presidential powers. The principal objective of this article is to highlight institutional developments since the late 1960s that framed the Donald Trump administration's actions during the COVID-19 pandemic and currently roil the American state: the expansion of administrative power in the White House, which is largely unconstrained by the institutional imperatives of the bureaucracy, Congress, or state governments, and the emergence of the modern executive as the repository of party responsibility, with both Democrats and Republicans dependent on presidents for messaging, fundraising, mobilization, and programmatic action. Together, these developments form a dynamic of executive-centered partisanship—a merging of partisanship and executive prerogative characterized by presidential unilateralism, social activism, and polarizing struggles about national identity that divide the nation by race, ethnicity, and religion. Our account of executive-centered partisanship and how it affected the Trump administration's response to COVID-19 sheds new light on contemporary crisis management and the political nature of administrative power. Other presidents would have responded differently, perhaps with greater success in stemming the spread of the virus; other presidents might have attempted to centralize administrative power more aggressively in fighting the pandemic, rather than deflecting responsibility to states and private entities. Nevertheless, Trump's actions were not irresolute. They were defined by a purposeful pursuit of partisan objectives: a denigration of bureaucratic expertise and an attack on the “deep state”; the politicization and racialization of federal administrative procedures to crack down on legal and undocumented immigration; a campaign of “law and order” to quell civil rights demonstrations; and a punitive form of federalism, defined by partisan retaliation against “blue states.” Contrary to dominant analyses that paint an administration in disarray, we argue that the Trump administration responded to the crisis through a tactical redeployment of national administrative power to fulfill partisan goals, within a party system beholden to executive power.11 Nicholas F. Jacobs, Desmond King, and Sidney M. Milkis, “Building a Conservative State: Partisan Polarization and the Redeployment of Administrative Power,” Perspectives on Politics, 17 (June 2019): 453–469. As such, we conclude that given the current political and institutional context, American presidents are less likely to offer unifying leadership during national crises, or to suffer the political consequences for failing to do so. Instead of subjecting his party to the “blue wave” many Democrats hoped for, Trump's polarizing leadership agitated a highly mobilized and fiercely contested election that sharpened, rather than ameliorated, partisan conflict. Republicans did better than pre-election prognostications implied down ballot, where they gained 11 seats in the House and maintained control of most state legislatures. Moreover, Trump's term in office enabled Republicans to solidify a conservative majority in the courts. As a result, his successor, Joe Biden, came into office having to navigate public health and economic crisis with a bare majority in the Senate, statehouses and governors more deeply divided than Congress, and a judiciary in which 28 percent of all sitting judges were appointed by Trump, including three new justices on the U.S. Supreme Court. Most tellingly, despite his personal defeat, Trump reigned over his party and reveled in the adulation of its base supporters. In short, the American state offers modern presidents not only the opportunity to strengthen their commitment to partisan tactics under the cover of national emergencies, but also the power to do so without the traditional constraints of party, Congress, and the states. That this strategy mobilized the Republican base and did not arouse a national repudiation of the president's leadership is evidence of the power bestowed on the modern presidency to advance partisan objectives in a deeply divided nation. The article proceeds as follows: First, we argue that while the government's response to COVID-19 is an exceptional case, scholars often learn much about the operating dynamics of the American state by exploring how crises shape and transform certain governing commitments. Students of American politics have long argued that national crises have been central to major political developments. Therefore, the absence of transformative change in the wake of the COVID-19 crisis—the stubborn persistence of the polarizing struggles over American identity that have intensified since the late 1960s—poses hard challenges to this prevailing perspective. Second, we argue that executive-centered partisanship explains the discrepancy between received wisdom and the contemporary battle for the services of the administrative state. We identify three ways in which the Trump administration's actions revealed and reinforced the dysfunctionalism of executive-centered partisanship during COVID-19: the delegitimization of bureaucratic expertise in partisan politics; the decay of constitutional forms that sustain the division and separation of powers; and the politicization of administrative procedures and policy implementation, now central to the partisan struggle to contend with a diversifying and politically fragmented America. Each of these factors, we argue, is symptomatic of the political pathologies that fester under executive-centered partisanship. We conclude with an analysis of Trump's legacy and its effect on the first few months of Biden's presidency. We do not mean to suggest that Biden's leadership is equivalent to Trump's, or that the Democratic and Republican Parties share equal blame for routinizing presidential partisanship. Not only does the base of the Republican Party not apologize for violent insurrection and embrace conspiratorial tales about election fraud, Republican Party leaders in Congress and the states openly question foundational rules and precedent for short-term advantage. Nevertheless, from the early days of his presidency, Biden has struggled to escape from the cultural and institutional forces embedding executive-centered partisanship in American democracy. Despite claims to the contrary, Biden's early performance in office, especially with respect to the COVID-19 crisis, has reinforced the essential features of presidential partisanship.22 Nicholas F. Jacobs and Sidney M. Milkis, “Get Out of the Way: Joe Biden, the U.S. Congress, and Executive-Centered Partisanship during the President's First Year in Office,” The Forum 19, no. 4 (2021): 709–744. Trump's presidency, therefore, has further fused partisanship and executive administration, fanning, rather than dousing, the flames of social discord, all while testing the “resilience” of American democracy.33 Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt, How Democracies Die (New York: Broadway Books, 2019). Emergencies have routinely engaged the potential power of the American state and served as a rallying cry to unify the nation. Yet the public health and economic crises wrought by COVID-19 revealed how the worst emergency since the Great Depression failed to free American politics and government from the conditions that deeply divided the nation. Therefore, there is a need to distinguish COVID-19 from previous crises in American political development, and to reconsider the ways in which earlier emergency responses have affected the development of the American state. To do so, we place the emergence of COVID-19 as a national crisis within a richer historical context, one that accounts for the secular development of a politicized administrative state and the deterioration of partisan organizations. Likewise, although the COVID-19 pandemic has been unique in many ways, it is a telling case for understanding the underlying factors that influence the partisan imperatives to use public crises and the authority they confer for partisan advantage. Indeed, unlike other crises fabricated for partisan objectives—for example, the “war on drugs” that Richard Nixon declared in 1971—COVID-19 posed and proved a dire threat to public health. Paradoxically, the Trump administration sought to exploit the public health emergency, even as it denied its severity. As a result, COVID-19 deepened a political crisis that for decades had politicized the administrative state, subjecting it to a contest between liberals and conservatives for its services. Our analysis takes a broader understanding of the American state. The idea of a “state” cannot be encompassed by Max Weber's definition of “a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory.”44 Max Weber, “Politics as Vocation,” in H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, eds. and trans., From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), 77–128 (originally published 1919). Especially in the United States, with its fragmentation of power, the state should be understood as “negotiated arrangements between the central government and powerful subnational units, patterns of competition and contestation among political parties, and relations among ‘public’ and ‘private’ providers of social welfare.”55 Desmond King and Robert C. Lieberman, “Review: Ironies of State Building: A Comparative Perspective on the American State,” World Politics 61 (July 2009): 547–588, at 549. The American state is not easily characterized as weak or strong—its power derives from a centralizing ambition amid a complex system of institutions that seeks to cultivate or impose a specific type of American community. This American state is a legacy of unintended consequences, historical contingency, and the unique position of the presidency in the constitutional order. In particular, the rise of the modern state, especially in a political culture that presumes to proscribe centralized power, is inextricably connected to American wars and domestic emergencies, which are frequently characterized as the moral equivalent of wars. Unlike some other republican charters, the U.S. Constitution does not have formal provisions that establish prerogative executive power in times of emergency.66 For example, Article 16 of the French Constitution explicitly allows the president to take exceptional measures “where the institutions of the Republic, the independence of the Nation, the integrity of its territory or the fulfillment of its international commitments are under serious and immediate threat” (see https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/France_2008). This provision was an important template of the Fifth Republic, formed in 1958, which transformed a parliamentary into a presidential system. However, crises have created opportunities for presidents to cut through the normal working arrangements of American politics. The central role of the presidency as a vanguard of institutional change has long been understood by scholars; furthermore, territorial expansion, globalization, and the nationalization of American political culture have encouraged the consolidation of an executive-centered state. The imperative to act—especially when confronted with the existential possibility of the state's destruction—leads to creative extensions of existing administrative power and social policy.77 Suzanne Mettler, Soldiers to Citizen: The G.I. Bill and the Making of the Greatest Generation (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005); William J. Barber, Designs within Disorder: Franklin D. Roosevelt, the Economists, and the Shaping of American Economic Policy, 1933–1945 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Karen Orren and Stephen Skowronek, “Regimes and Regime Building in American Government: A Review of Literature on the 1940s,” Political Science Quarterly 113 (Winter, 1998): 689–702; and Sheldon D. Pollack, War, Revenue, and State Building; Financing the Development of the American State (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2009). Emergencies are not only instrumental in episodic bouts of executive aggrandizement; crises and presidential emergency powers have also entrenched the American state's more permanent features.88 Robert P. Saldin, War, the American State, and Politics since 1898 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010). Especially during major episodes of bellicosity, the terms of political conflict are redefined, and wartime presidents are central actors in defining these terms. Indeed, David Mayhew has written that wars “seem to be capable of generating whole new political universes.”99 David R. Mayhew, “Wars and American Politics,” Perspectives on Politics 3 (September 2005): 473–493, at 473. All-consuming emergencies open up space for presidents to act unilaterally, permitting political outcomes in both foreign and domestic policy that are largely inconceivable absent the nationalizing and centralizing tendencies of national crises.1010 William G. Howell, Saul P. Jackman, and Jon C. Rogowski, The Wartime President: Executive Influence and the Nationalizing Politics of Threat (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013). As John Lapinski demonstrates, “crises often delegitimize existing government policies that are directly and, in some cases, indirectly linked to the event.”1111 John S. Lapinski, “Policy Substance and Performance in American Lawmaking, 1877–1994,” American Journal of Political Science 52 (April 2008): 235–251, at 238. Although Congress and the courts do not vanish during protracted states of crisis or war, “modern presidents are undoubtedly the preeminent actors.”1212 Douglas L. Kriner, After the Rubicon: Congress, Presidents, and the Politics of Waging War (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010). “Reconstructive presidents,” Stephen Skowronek argues, can bring about new political orders, but they typically do so only when the prevailing regime is in disarray—after the extant regime's internal weaknesses are exposed, often because it cannot contend with governing exigencies.1313 Stephen Skowronek, The Politics Presidents Make: Leadership from John Adams to Bill Clinton, revised ed. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997). Therefore, for liberals and conservatives alike, the grandeur of an energetic executive has been forged during the country's most perilous, unpredictable moments in history. More often than not, war and crisis are understood to be central to the development of foreign policy institutions within the presidency, such as the National Security Council.1414 Bryan Mabee, “Historical Institutionalism and Foreign Policy Analysis: The Origins of the National Security Council Revisited,” Foreign Policy Analysis 7 (January 2011): 27–44. However, the fact that foreign crises are so central to redefining domestic priorities for presidential administrations suggests that emergency powers cut more deeply into the fabric of the modern political system. Presidential state building is nurtured by large-scale, national crises, but the modern executive, dependent on loyal partisans, is not an institution that works on behalf of the “whole people” or rallies the country to tackle national crises through enduring reforms. Even in the work of administering less politically charged programs, such as disaster funding or decisions to close military bases, the modern presidency is electorally motivated and often acts to serve its core constituency.1515 Douglas L. Kriner and Andrew Reeves, The Particularistic President: Executive Branch Politics and Political Inequality (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015). During emergencies, well-organized and highly motivated factions within a single party can leverage the institution to enact unpopular and divisive schemes.1616 Daniel DiSalvo, Engines of Change: Party Factions in American Politics, 1868–2010 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012). Moreover, the reliance on unilateral administrative measures to advance party objectives—disingenuously justified in the name of the “national interest”—further enfeebles legislative institutions during moments of crisis.1717 Neomi Rao, “Administrative Collusion: How Delegation Diminishes the Collective Congress,” New York University Law Review 90 (November 2015): 1463–1526. With the country sharply divided by deep cultural rifts, such presidential unilateralism arouses fundamental struggles over inclusion. For a time, the executive-centered administrative state was sustained by a fragile consensus that obscured partisan conflict over national administrative power. The extraordinary crises of the Great Depression and World War II led to institutional changes and policies that subordinated partisanship to administration, consolidating a New Deal state committed to a “coalition” between partisans of executive power and the proponents of expertise, or “neutral competence.”1818 Herbert Kaufman identifies the “quest for neutral competence” and the “quest for executive leadership” as core commitments in the development of the administrative state. See Kaufman, “Emerging Conflicts in the Doctrines of Public Administration,” American Political Science Review 50 (December 1956): 1057–1073. Politics was then a search for pragmatic solutions to the challenging responsibilities that America had to assume, at home and abroad, to secure economic and national security. However, public support for the New Deal state fractured in the wake of the cultural and political upheavals of the 1960s.1919 Hugh Heclo, “Sixties Civics,” in Sidney M. Milkis and Jerome Mileur, eds., The Great Society and the High Tide of Liberalism (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2005), 53–82. The attempt to realize the Great Society exposed the liberal state's central fault lines (notably racial inequalities), and with violent upheaval in Vietnam and in the nation's urban core, the pragmatic center that buttressed the New Deal disintegrated. Once contested by conservative Democrats and Republicans as a threat to constitutional government, national administrative power gained acceptance on the right as liberalism expanded throughout the 1960s. In the wake of the cultural revolution of that decade, Republicans built a conservative base whose foot soldiers, most notably the Christian Right, rallied around the belief that liberalism had so corrupted the country that the national government had a responsibility to aggressively protect “traditional values” and uphold “law and order.”2020 Nicholas F. Jacobs and Sidney M. Milkis, What Happened to the Vital Center? Presidentialism, Populist Revolt and the Fracturing of America (New York: Oxford University Press, 2020), chaps. 4 and 5. As presidents have the of partisan leadership and as partisans their political to the president's personal it has become more to national from the president's In the institutional of the presidency with the of the American emergencies offer even greater opportunity for presidents to they act on behalf of their partisan As a partisanship in the United is a struggle over the of the state. has become an executive-centered struggle for the services of national administrative power. The of executive has been deepened by partisan in which Democrats and Republicans not only on of and policy but also their as existential to the American of J. H. C. David G. J. J. S. and in Science no. of this party conflict it First, since the struggles over and have partisan fundamental about it to be an have been further by the expansion of presidential power, executive to partisan conflict. As party wars have Congress, the legislative have become more dependent on presidents to cut through the and advance through executive action. During the and both Democrats and Republicans dependent on presidents to their and advance partisan through unilateral Sidney M. Milkis, H. and J. Happened to and the New American Party Perspectives on Politics Indeed, Republican presidents have the development of executive-centered partisanship. to the of social in the Richard Nixon was the first conservative president to the of national emergency with a partisan of American With a rallying cry of and Nixon new in the urban core, and abroad, in the of an presidential administration and a conservative modern Richard P. The Administrative (New York: As of the National at the time, conservatives only the work of the New Deal and Great Society the of a powerful president is to to war within his executive in to his Conservative National in in The New Republic, that the politicization of emergency powers did not at the the unilateralism in foreign had been a since the of the threat of an was to its partisan Andrew The New Presidential University of Press, the one foreign the funding of the in is an of that is in the of the American The President: (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, the other the administration's and use of presidential power a deeply partisan commitment to the and to the Republican Party with a of American power A the War on in an by modern embrace of a state. Not only did legal a of legal support for the constitutional independence under the of the in by Donald Trump's Supreme M. of during the and Law Review the White House also to centralize the Republican to transform the and into on the president's leadership in the War against Sidney M. Milkis and H. the Republican and the American Party Perspectives on Politics (September Democratic presidents have also the that crises in to their partisan dynamics are not dependent on the of the White they are to executive-centered partisanship. was on the of the economic that the country had in a presidency, it would be by the of the country of an economic despite and from partisans, the administration its partisan to health the most divisive and partisan policy with perhaps the of The consequences are Democrats in Congress from an with the legislative of his the and of crisis the president's governing strategy long the worst of the Great had As the president in the to the and Sidney Milkis, Partisan Polarization and the Administrative The Forum no. built the centralizing of his conservative and liberal to advance through executive the of a powerful but of the the and especially The 17 at 16 The of and of the to control the federal bureaucracy, and the of Richard its into the administrative presidential powers over and to management strategy directly to his for example, J. and L. and the Administration,” The Journal of 2011): and R. The of in Press, In political crises often leadership and we the for to around the political upheavals also in the community and should in the current of American presidents are to power for partisan are that presidents the were Donald Trump's of the worst national crisis since the Great Depression should have to the of “a late regime Herbert or in a political repudiation of a conservative political and the rise of a new Richard about Trump's and Biden's The Nation, at 16 The Trump presidency at of the At the Trump's about the spread of the his that the president has to battle the pandemic, Trump responsibility to state and governments, and, when for racial and in the of of for the and sought to the of public and for as the president's public amid the of the and did his months a of these only how the Trump administration failed to the threat that COVID-19 posed to public health and the D. and David Trump's The to Leadership on the New York at 16 and C. and Trump from the Trump the of partisan than attempt to the modern executive as the of the public as many and public had been to during a national crisis of the Trump further fused executive prerogative and partisanship. This was not a of Trump's many was to executive

The Political Economy of the Budget-Making Process in Jamaica, 1991 - 2010

Part 1 Comparative and development administration: comparative and development administration as fields of study - history, methods, concepts, problems and issues historical bases of public administration and bureaucracy public administration inmore developed nations - the United States, Western Europe, Australia and Japan public administration in more developed nations -Russia and Eastern and Southern Europe public administration in less developed nations - Asia and Africa publicadministration in less developed nations - the Near and Middle East, Latin America and the Caribbean public administration and development, dependency and independence - theoretical and empirical aspects comparative public administration and publicpolicy -administrative reform, change and development some central issues/problems in comparative and development administration. Part 2 Comparative public bureaucracies - administrative performance and political responsibility: contemporary bureaucraticpolitics and administrative theory bureaucratic power - administrative performance and regime maintenance bureaucratic power - administrative performance and political responsibility in Europe bureaucratic politics and public administration in lessdeveloped nations - Asia and Africa bureacratic politics and public administration in less developed nations - the Near/Middle East and Central/Latin America bureaucracy, change and revolution.

This article analyses the emergence of administrative science in France in the wake of the Second World War. The birth of this discipline is examined through the history of its founders, a group of comparatist aiming at developing universal administrative principles. The post-war context prompted the creation of checks and balances against administrative power (through oversight of the legality of administrative action) and against the powers of nation states (through human rights and international organizations). Administrative science and comparative law were meant to rebuild international relations. The history of this discipline highlights a legal project to redefine the role and limits of executive power at the dawn of the construction of a new world order. Points for practitioners Looking at long-term developments in the science of administration helps to inform administrative practice by providing a historical and reflective perspective. This article shows how a new understanding of the administrative reality emerged after the fall of the totalitarian regimes of the first half of the 20th century. It highlights the different ways in which administrative power was controlled after the Second World War through greater oversight over administrative legality, the establishment of universal administrative principles and the proclamation of human rights. Questions of administrative legitimacy and the limitation of administrative power are still very much part of the daily practice of executive power, and represent a central aspect of administrative thinking.

There is an increasing interest in the category of “public administration” in Russian administrative law. The article argues for the development of this category’s comprehensive concept that would meet the needs of the Russian legal system’s modern advancement. The article considers the theoretical grounds for this concept in pre-Soviet administrative law, and diring the Soviet period. The authors reveal the category’s essential features, after analyzing contemporary Russian researchers’ ideas regarding its role and significance in dynamic Russian administrative law. Approaches to conceptualizing public administration in Russian and foreign administrative law are considered in the article and the authors contemplate the necessity and possibility of providing an integrative definition of this category as the basic concept of administrative law. Public administration is mapped within such concepts as executive and administrative power, government, state and municipal administration, public administration and governance. Public administration and governance are rationalized as paired categories within Russian administrative law theory. Within the framework of comparative law, the approaches to classifying the forms of public administration activities related to the implementation of administrative functions are analyzed. On the basis of the analysis, it is proposed to identify such forms of activities as intervening and facilitating public administration as well as public administration through services provision. The paper further considers specific features of public administration’s organizational structure and its types in the modern state. The authors conclude on the feasibility of developing and adopting a law on the federal public administration, and, on the basis of this law, to pass the regional legislative acts on the public administration entities of the Russian Federation.

The analysis of the problem field is a serious problem from the methodological and methodical point of view. The solution of this problem becomes particularly difficult in cases when the object under study is characterized by a high level of structural and process diversity, has a dynamic character, i. e. it is constantly evolving, and exists in many variants with the presence of the invariant enshrined in international acts and legislation of most states. The end of the last century was a period of rethinking of many concepts that define the complex processes of political and social interaction of various levels and elements of the system of power and public administration in Russia. The adoption of the Constitution of the Russian Federation in 1993 put forward fundamental problems that needed to be solved to move the country along the path of democratization, build a market economy and form an effective governing system. Article 12 of the first chapter establishes the autonomy of local self-government as an institution, guarantees its protection from excessive state influence. This provision reflects the global trend of consolidating the right to local self-government in democratic states. However, the European Charter of Local Self-Government includes a provision on the independence of local self-government in resolving issues of local significance only within the framework of state legislation, i. e. it establishes its subordinate nature. The latter provision automatically makes local self-government part of the unified system of public power and public administration, which is reflected in the corresponding amendment to Ch. 8 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation “Local self-government” in 2020. This makes t relevant he problem of the local authorities ‘ own powers, the division of functions between them and state authorities to achieve the fundamental goal of the modern state — to ensure an optimal uniform quality of life throughout the territory. The purpose of the article is to characterize the problem field in which the concepts of “public power” and “public administration” are defined and analysed in the context of considering local self-government as a key actor of both systems. The objectives of the research are to determine the boundaries of this problem field, its structure, as well as the difference in approaches to this problem in the works of Russian and foreign authors, including scientists from Central Asian countries.

Today, a state intervenes in various areas of society. Accordingly, the tasks that a state must be responsible for are increasing, and in line with this, the scope of policies and administration that a state must carry out also is expanding. Meanwhile, as the specialty and complexity of a society itself regulated by a state are increasing, the expertise and complexity of the policies or public administration that a state is responsible for must also improve in line with this. To this end, the involvement of academics, including science, in national policies and administration is also increasing. As the Korean case of Covid-19 shows, this can achieve significant results. However, this sometimes fails. This article defines the failures caused by scientific advisory as scientific advisory corruption. At the same time, this article deals with the topics of how to prevent such scientific advisory corruption, and what kind of relationship should be formed between policy, administration, and science to achieve this. This article emphasizes the following: The responsibility for the results produced by the public administration must be took by the administration itself, even in the case of scientific advisory. The public administration must avoid passing its responsibilities onto the scientific system. Conversely, the scientific system must resist the temptation to engage in administrative power through scientific advisory. There is a need to prevent the scientific system from falling into the problem of trying to exceed the functional role assigned to itself, that is, functional corruption. In this process, law will play an important role.

Every discipline periodically goes through a period of sometimes wrenching reassessment. For public administration, this reassessment has been nearly constant. Americans have always been distrustful of governmental power and, especially, administrative power. They have long believed that public administration is more inefficient and corrupt than private administration. Woodrow Wilson's memorable call to study the importance of running a constitution shows how, even in its earliest days, the modem study of American public administration has struggled for acceptance.

This study aims to examine the application of Deliberative Democracy, outlined by Jurgen Habermas, within the sphere of the Public Administration, in order to extend the concept of democracy, including the population as a key element in the political debate. For this, it is important the establishment of adequate spaces for deliberations and formulations of built consensus in the public sphere, as well as the normative Proceduralism able to guide the fundamental premises of the debatein order to that dialogue tract follow rules and reach for the understanding. In this regard, propaedeutic considerations will be addressed on the Discourse Theory, such as communicative action, the public sphere and self-legislation, as the understanding of these expressions allows formulate a procedimentalizado mechanism of action of the citizen in the Administrative Power. At the prospect, the study of social participation in Brazil will be conducted building on deliberative approachwhile still considering the pertinent criticisms. Another aspect to be considered is the question of the administrator link to what was agreed in the public sphere by procedural rules such link that will be addressed considering the similarities and differences between the "Theory Sluice" by Habermas and the Primary Assemblies of Condorcet, with in order to find the limit of deliberative participation in the conduct of public choices.

This study critically examines the manifestation of government oppression through tax increase policies in Pati Regency within the framework of critical public administration analysis. The research explores how state power is exercised by employing fiscal instruments to control and marginalize citizens, particularly those belonging to vulnerable social groups. A critical ethnographic methodology was applied, combining in-depth interviews with 25 affected citizens, government officials, civil society activists, and public administration scholars. These interviews were further supported by policy discourse analysis and participatory observation to capture multiple perspectives on the policy process. The findings reveal that tax increase policies in Pati demonstrate systematic patterns of government oppression. Four major characteristics were identified: (1) authoritarian policy formulation implemented without meaningful public consultation, (2) a regressive fiscal burden that disproportionately affects the poor and working-class communities, (3) administrative power used as a tool to silence public dissent and criticism, and (4) the use of taxation mechanisms as instruments of social control. Taken together, these dynamics show that fiscal policies are employed not as instruments of public service but as tools of domination. The study thus provides empirical evidence of how taxation in post-authoritarian Indonesia operates to reproduce structural inequalities and weaken democratic practices.

ABSTRACTFoundational work in public administration has considered the relationship between administrative power, accountability, and performance in public organizations. Even with the vast literature addressing power, accountability, and performance, scholars are still theorizing on how they influence one another. This study proposes and empirically tests a theoretical model of the relationships between each of these three constructs. Data are analyzed from an original survey of a national sample of US local government public administrators—city managers. Using structural equation modeling, results show that there are positive relationships between power and accountability, power and performance, and accountability and performance. The article discusses theoretical and practical implications of these findings.

This article explores Johann Gottfried Herder’s ideas on cultural pluralism and the state and what they suggest for American and comparative public administration. Herder’s ideas provide a powerful reminder of the dangers of centralized political and administrative power both to individuals and to diverse cultures and the need to place limits on such power. Furthermore, Herder’s ideas on the incompatibility and incommensurability of cultural values call into question the idea of any universal model of public administration and suggest that, in thinking about administrative changes, we should examine more closely our own political and social culture as well as those of other countries.

The solution of new tasks facing the leaders of public administration at the present stage of development of the Ukrainian state requires an increase in the efficiency of public administration and public administration as one of the priorities based on the principles of democracy, nation and human-centrism. The relevance of the topic of updating the principles of leadership development in public administration is closely related to updating management mechanisms in the information society, changing the traditional paradigm of management, characterized by stability, control, competition, homogeneity, egocentrism and heroism to a new one, which is characterized by fluidity, delegation of power, cooperation, heterogeneity, social relevance and modesty. The new management paradigm, which is partially being introduced into public administration and public administration, increasingly requires the introduction of modern leadership principles, which are manifested through the assertion of moral values in the personality of a leader, his behavior models and reforming organizational structures. According to the author, such signs of leadership as delegation of power and cooperation in public administration determine the development of leadership through its consideration in conjunction with the principle of command.
 The purpose of the article is to reveal the essence of the priority principles of leadership in public management activities, revealing the state of the study of this issue in domestic and foreign literature. The author of the article focuses on the definition – principle, which is analyzed as the basis for any theory or teaching, explanations or guidelines for action, a person’s inner conviction; basic rule of conduct; features in the creation of something, etc. The article reveals the priority principles of leadership as a prerequisite for the formation of a successful personality, successful leadership qualities.
 The system of principles of leadership development in public administration activities consists of an innovative principle of leadership development; the principle of independence for the development of new rules and regulations; the principle of subsidiarity to ensure the implementation of powers to the bodies of representative power; the principle of socially responsible leadership to ensure ethical relations between subordinates and the leader; the principle of justice, which is a special value measure for maintaining a balance between legal and moral values; the principle of professional and psychological readiness for public administration activities; methodological principle of information and analytical support.

In the article it is investigated how the formation of civil society in the country is taken place, what scientific rethinking is needed to determine the place of power in public administration. The way of formation of public administration, political system, state institutions from the period of the Old Russian state to the present is traced.The originations of problems of theory and practice of social management and policy of the Ancient world in the formation of states in the world are analyzed. The value of the state as a philosophical and legal theory and practice of organization of political power and management of society is pointed out. It is elucidated the advocating of ideasof the rule of law, the requirements to observe legal justice, the contractual concepts of the state. The essence of management in which the primary component is the person, its conscious activity is exposed. Two approaches to understanding of the content of public administration are highlighted: "American" and "European". Different viewsof scientists on the definition of "public administration" are analyzed. The stages of evolution of the managerial (managerial) school are considered and the term "social management" is noted. Different approaches to this "mechanism of influence" on society are highlighted. It is defined two approaches to management: "managerialism"and the theory of "scientific management of society". The meaning of the term "administration" is exposed and its interpretation from different points of view. It is pointed out the consideration of this concept in foreign practice, and, accordingly, in Ukraine. The concept of "public administration" is highlighted, and the "mechanism" of its action is indicated. It is determined the subjects of public administration such as: executive authorities, their staff, officials and office workers; executive bodies and officials of local self-government, officials and officials of executive bodies of local self-government. The characteristic features of the post-Soviet public administration transformation into public administration are highlighted