Contrasting eras in integration: Venezuela’s foreign policy towards Latin America and the Caribbean under Hugo Chávez and Nicolás Maduro

Issues in Australian Foreign Policy January to June 2022

«М’ЯКА СИЛА» ЯК ХАРАКТЕРНА ОЗНАКА ПОЛІТИЧНОГО ВПЛИВУ ВЕЛИКОЇ ДЕРЖАВИ ЗАУМОВ БАГАТОПОЛЯРНОГО СВІТУ В ЛАТИНОАМЕРИКАНСЬКОМУ РЕГІОНІ

The Trump presidency was an unwavering source of controversy and attention for four years; it can now be evaluated for its legacy. This article assesses the Trumpian contribution to US foreign policy, turning to the case study of US policy toward Argentina. Situating it in the wider historical context of traditional US “dollar diplomacy,” it argues that, despite warnings from the US foreign policy elite, Trump has not weakened US hegemony in Latin America, but conversely, has acted as an indicator of its strength. We contextualize Trump's influence on US hegemony by suggesting that the occupant of the White House had less of an effect on transforming the broader contours of US foreign policy than the deep‐rooted structural factors shaping it. By viewing US hegemony as a complex adaptive system, able to absorb changes such as the shift from Obama to Trump, it is possible to reconceptualize the way foreign policy is understood and evaluated in both the Latin American and the global context.

All heads of state of independent Nigeria have left their mark on the formation of national foreign policy, including the policy for Africa, and brought their vision to the development of this sphere, although the greatest contribution to the formation of relations of the Giant of Africa with other states of the continent was made during the years of the Fourth Republic (1999 – present), when, after a long period of military rule, civilian politicians came to power in the country. Throughout the entire period of independent development, the main principles of Nigeria’s formation of contacts with other countries were respect for equality and territorial integrity of sovereign states; non-interference in their internal affairs; active membership in international organizations; non-alignment with military-political blocs, etc. However, the main priority of Nigeria’s foreign policy in the post-colonial period was the development of relations with African countries – a phenomenon that has come to be known as Afrocentrism. In accordance with the principles declared in all Constitutions of the country (1960, 1979, 1993, and 1999), Nigeria made a great contribution to the struggle for the true political and economic independence of African countries, for the liberation of the continent from the remnants of colonialism and apartheid. Since the 1970s, when the country became one of the world’s largest oil producers and exporters and began to provide financial and logistical assistance to African countries in need, a new objective has appeared in its foreign policy – gaining the status of “the leader of the continent”. This desire has been fueled by the fact that Nigeria is the most populous state on the continent and has one of the largest and fastest growing economies in Africa. Not all Nigerian leaders were able to correctly identify political priorities and to a certain extent demonstrated naiveté, limiting their foreign policy primarily to the African direction. While in the first years of independence this was legitimate and justified, with the advent of globalization, the development of a multipolar world, and the transformation of the world political and economic order, it became necessary to ensure that Nigeria’s foreign policy was adapted to modern realities. Meanwhile, thanks to its economic potential, huge reserves of hydrocarbons, which all countries in the region need, and military-political power, Nigeria quite rightly claims a central role in coordinating joint efforts to achieve true economic and political independence by West African states, although one of the obstacles to the transformation Nigeria into a real “hegemon” both in West Africa and throughout the continent remains political instability in the country.

The likely foreign policy imperatives of President Donald Trump's second term are interpreted through a world‐systems interpretation of cycles of hegemony and the related geography of seapower. A realist transactional approach is the likely framework for Trump's foreign policy imperatives. United States foreign policy is understood through a political economy lens that identifies national economic competition, especially over new innovations, as the foundation for global geopolitical competition. The temporal context of declining US hegemony explains the resort to transactionalism and the retreat from liberal internationalism. The geographical focus of United States foreign policy will be Asia, primarily an attempt to challenge the rise of China. Established European alliances may be of lesser value in a transactionalist approach. The geopolitical calculations of Trump's foreign policy are explained by the geography of seapower, the US global presence in far waters, and the resulting friction in China's near waters, the western Pacific and South China Sea. National economic competition has global implications, especially the growing influence of China in Africa and Latin America, and decreased US influence. The US transactional approach is ill‐suited to global and multi‐lateral issues, such as nuclear weapons proliferation. The national economic concerns of President Trump are contextually relevant but are unlikely to be successfully ameliorated by the likely foreign policy initiatives.

The paper analyses the phenomenon of populism and its impact on Turkish foreign policy in three dimensions: institutional, instrumental and ideological. The research scrutinizes a wide selection of party manifestos and public speeches of Turkish politicians with primarily focus on Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s statements during his incumbency as the prime-minister and the president. The embeddedness of populism in political culture of Turkey provided it with ideological flexibility and made populism almost a universal instrument for engaging with electorate. Starting from Turkey’s transition to multiparty system the majority of political actors have resorted to populism in one or another way. Erdoğan has not only continued this tendency but mastered the populist rhetoric. The character and content of Erdoğan’s populism fluctuated following the changing domestic and international environment. In the 2000s it was hinged on the loose concept of conservative democracy. At the turn of the 2000s and 2010s the dreams for the EU membership gave way to ideas of ‘civilizational expansionism’ which had the concept of Islamic/Ottoman civilization as its core. From the mid-2010s ultra nationalism has come to the forefront of the populist rhetoric. Eventually, the populist binary opposition of ‘us’ and ‘they’ took a definite shape of global confrontation between Turkey as a defender of Islam and the ‘adverse’ West. Populist rhetoric helped Erdoğan to justify his almost two-decades-long incumbency and evade direct responsibility for economic hardships of the 2010s. Populism has become an effective instrument to monopolize the foreign policy in the hands of Erdoğan. Utilizing negative rhetoric against Turkish professional diplomats within the last decade Erdoğan has managed to cement his clout over the foreign-policy making. Institutionally the expansion of populism in the sphere of foreign policy led to its ‘domestication’ and ‘nationalization’ while its impact on the foreign policy discourse manifested itself in the spread of civilizationism. Making both domestic and foreign policy process more personalized Erdoğan has reinforced ‘personal authoritarianism’ at the expense of the state institutions. Thus their decline led to the ‘Erdoğanization of the Turkish politics’. The declarative pursuit of Turkey to get more independent and autonomous position in the international system resulted in the strategy of development with primarily focus on the bilateral relations with different states. Consequently Turkey, previously known as a consistent advocate of regional cooperation and integration, in many respects has become a regionally isolated state.

This thesis employs the norm entrepreneurship approach to explore Ghana’s foreign policy during the post-independence era, with a particular focus on the country’s first President Kwame Nkrumah’s policy of Pan-Africanism. Pan-Africanism may be defined as the idea of protecting Africa’s selfdetermination, and promoting a sense of consciousness and group solidarity amongst people of African origin. This thesis critically examines Nkrumah’s leadership in the post-independence period, and the way in which his Pan-African ideal and legacy has continued to influence Ghana’s foreign policy engagement in the African region. In tracing the evolution of Ghana’s foreign policy under Nkrumah, two main cases are examined — Ghana’s peacekeeping engagement in the 1960–1964 Congo mission and the creation of a continental bloc, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in 1963. Norm entrepreneurship theory provides new insight into Nkrumah’s attempts to reinforce, articulate, and communicate his vision of Pan-Africanism. Buoyed by his success post-Ghana’s independence, Nkrumah continued to present himself as a crucial vehicle for protecting Africa’s political and economic independence. The concept of Pan-Africanism was vital in assisting Nkrumah articulate and champion Ghana’s path to achieve independence. It served to establish his leadership and his political networks. However, his devotion to the promotion of the Pan-African norm during his Presidency compromised his foreign policy choices and decisions; it was also paradoxical in view of the increasingly authoritarian leadership style he adopted in Ghana. This thesis presents the complexity of post-independence foreign policy decision making and the influence of the post-colonial narrative. Leaders such as Nkrumah considered themselves as the redeemers of Africa’s political and economic vulnerability from its colonial experiences. This thesis finds that, in contrast to the positive experience associated with his independence movement for Ghana, Nkrumah could not build the same kind of vision, engagement, and networks necessary for successful promotion of a Pan-African region. Despite Nkrumah’s own foreign policy failures in the Congo and OAU’s formation, as well as his sudden departure after a military coup, Nkrumah’s Pan-African vision is still promoted as an important foreign policy legacy by Ghana’s politicians, public servants, military, and academics. I argue that this legacy endures because the independent, post-colonial narrative matters as much as the promotion of geopolitical and material interests. The struggle for independence and the right to independent self-determination was not just a geopolitical fight; it was a deeply personal one in the case of Nkrumah and the Ghanaian population.

174 SAISREVIEW continuous American support for German unification and German insistence on remaining a member of NATO indicate the continued validity of this observation. Despite its underlying strength, this relationship is experiencing increasing difficulties. Smyser attributes these difficulties to "the growth of German power, the relative decline ofAmerican power, and the emergence ofthe new Europe and the new world." The present and future of German-American relations are best understood by "an appreciation of the exploding breadth of the relationship." From global economics to reconstructing the East, to non-regional issues, a constantly widening agenda offers the possibility both for greater cooperation and for greater conflict. During the Cold War, the commitments and dependencies arising out of the nuclear relationship between the two countries exacerbated the potential for conflict. An "extraordinary degree of mutual trust" was required, which prompted "ceaseless mutual scrutiny" in the search for reassurance. Smyser does not reflect on whether Europe's impending demilitarization will relax this strain. Concluding his study, Smyser recommends that balanced communication and understanding between the United States and Germany be facilitated through the institutionalization of increased high-level contact. Further, he asserts that principles necessary to guide the relationship should be the focus of such contact. Directing high-level attention towards the relationship is logical given the added weight that a newly-unified Germany will cany in world affairs. Yet the potential threat that such a policy will eclipse other European powers poses a dilemma. As the Germans increasingly infuse their foreign and domestic policies with a European component, it will be appropriate for the United States to structure its relations with Germany in the context of other European institutions as well. American National Interest: Virtue and Power in Foreign Policy. By Karl Von Vorys. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1990. 276pp. $39.95/Hardback. Reviewed by Mark S. Mahaney (SAIS M.A., 1990), Presidential Management Intern with the Department of State. What to make of a book that casually roams from the conceptual underpinnings of strategic deterrence, to the trials and tribulations of historical European security structures, to the social, economic, and political obstacles facing development planners in the Third World? And what to make of an author who can concisely outline the reasons why U.S. military intervention is unlikely to succeed in Latin America, explain how U.S. policy lost contact with domestic political reality during the Vietnam War, and then conclude that the nation needs a small, highly trained, and highly mobile Rapid Deployment Force? Von Vorys declares at the outset that the purpose of his book is "to develop national interest as a pre-policy standard, a standard that by consensus sets the parameters for official policy...[a standard] by which foreign policy can be evaluated." Sound familiar? It should. American foreign policy thinkers from Charles Beard to Walter Lippmann to Hans Morgenthau (to name only a few) BOOK REVIEWS 175 established their reputations through their efforts to wed U.S. foreign policy to a "correct" interpretation of American national interests. How does Von Vorys fare in such exalted company? Answer: the odds were against Von Vorys from the start, but his attempt is interesting and quirkily provocative. What might help explain the quirks of this book—its drift into and out of topics as diverse as SDI, the fundamental tenets of Islam, and foreign aid—is the rather unusual perspective the author brings to the main subject. Von Vorys' previous books focused on communalism in Malaysia and political development in Pakistan. All the more impressive, therefore, is his sharp analysis of the foreign policy challenges confronting U.S. national interests. According to Von Vorys, those challenges come in the following order of importance: those to our vital interests (our national existence); those to our special interests (our friends and allies); and those to our general interests (international order). By carefully setting up this hierarchy, Von Vorys has half the battle behind him. After all, one of the greatest challenges facing our country has always been our unwillingness or our inability to discriminate between those national interests that are truly vital and those that are not. The former sometimes obligate the expenditure of our most precious resources—our...

This work desribe Chavismo as a populist movement and in making Venezuelan foreign policy directed towards the United States in the six years from 2013-2019. By using the Foreign Policy Theory which explains the function and purpose of foreign policy, it is found that Chavismo does not have much influence in making foreign policy towards the United States. The death of Hugo Chávez plus the poor economic conditions in the Maduro era, inevitably the problem of existence now plagues Chavismo. Chavismo under the government of Nicholás Maduro is in an alarming position. Where the position of this socialist movement no longer occupies a significant number as when Chávez, was still alive. The study of Chavismo in foreign policy is still possible given that Nicholás Maduro is a Chavista. Nicholás Maduro also carries out foreign policy with Chávez,s foreign policy. Sticking to the existing foreign policy, there is not much Maduro can do to maintain his power and the Bolivarian Revolution in Venezuela

John Quincy Adams: Policymaker for the Union. By James E. Lewis Jr. (Wilmington: Scholarly Resources, 2001. Pp. xxv, 164. Cloth, $50.00; paper, $17.95.) Although John Quincy Adams's achievements in foreign policy as secretary of state from 1817 to 1825 have long overshadowed his presidency (1825-- 1829) and his later career in the House of Representatives (1831-1848), James E. Lewis Jr. successfully demonstrates that Adams's foreign policy objectives were inextricably bound to his overall political philosophy and to his approach to domestic policy. While John Quincy Adams: Policymaker for the Union is part of the Biographies in American Foreign Policy series, Lewis takes a far broader and much-needed approach to his subject, producing a fascinating study that examines the length and breadth of John Quincy Adams's long political career and assesses his contributions to the policy debates that shaped the early republic. Throughout the book, Lewis emphasizes that John Quincy Adams reflected the political outlook and objectives of the Founding Fathers more than those of his own generation. Adams had been trained for a political career by his parents, who instilled in him the Puritan values of a strong work ethic and dedication to promoting the commonwealth, the Enlightenment's emphasis upon reason and republican ideology, and the manner and refinement of a proper gentlemen. These were traits that he would display throughout his career. More important, however, Lewis stresses that the young John Quincy Adams grew to reflect the views of the Founding Fathers, who saw union of the states and neutrality from European conflicts as the two keys to maintaining the central objectives of the American Revolution: securing independence and preserving republican government. Adams's commitment to these principles had a profound impact not only upon his as a statesman but also upon his actions as a politician. Much to the chagrin of his family and his colleagues, Adams sought to maintain his political independence, to remain above factional or party struggles, and to pursue what he regarded as the best national interests. Thus, he split with the Federalists over their opposition to the Louisiana Purchase and the Embargo Act, sacrificing his seat in the U. S. Senate in the process. Although some have compared Adams to Austrian Foreign Minister Klemens von Metternich, Lewis stresses that Adams faced a far more daunting challenge as secretary of state because of the inherent weakness of America's federal union. Adams recognized the limitations of exercising foreign policy in a federal republic and often used this weakness to his own advantage in negotiating with European powers because it allowed him to deflect European criticism and anger over the actions of states and citizens. Adams's experiences as a diplomat and a member of the Senate prepared him well for the role of secretary of state. The War of 1812, in particular, had demonstrated to Adams the profound weakness of the union and convinced him that the federal government must pursue that would strengthen the union and secure its independence. As secretary of state, therefore, Adams not only pursued a foreign policy devoted to maintaining American neutrality in European conflict and establishing peaceful relations with the European powers but also promoted domestic designed to tie the interests of the sections to the union: He never doubted that these two 'systems'-avoiding European disputes and cementing American union-depended upon each other, demanding a single approach to policy making rather than separate foreign and domestic policies (39). Lewis emphasizes that many of Adams's successes as secretary of state-the Convention of 1818 with Great Britain, the Transcontinental Treaty with Spain, and the Monroe Doctrine-occurred not because of careful planning but because of unexpected events. In particular, Lewis stresses Adams's toward Spain. …

Venezuela, 1998’de Hugo Chávez’in iktidara gelişi ile birlikte köklü bir dönüşüm geçirmeye başlamıştır. Chávez tarafından Bolivarcı Devrim olarak adlandırılan bu köklü dönüşüm ülkede siyasal, ekonomik ve sosyal açıdan pek çok değişimin yaşanmasına neden olmuştur. Bu durumun, Venezuela’nın dış politikasına da yansımaları olmuştur. Chávez döneminde uygulanmaya başlanan çok taraflı dış politika vizyonu, anti-emperyalist/anti ABD duruşu ve neoliberal politikalara karşı yapılan hamleler Maduro döneminde de uygulanmaya ve sürdürülmeye çalışılmaktadır. Bu gelişmeler sonrasında Venezuela’da yaşanan değişim sonucunda ortaya çıkan durum ABD’yi pek çok alanda olumsuz olarak etkilemektedir. Bu nedenle ABD, Venezuela’daki ekonomik çıkarlarını korumak, bölgede ABD karşıtı bir eğilimin yaygınlık kazanmasını önlemek ve Latin Amerika’daki hegemonyasını koruyabilmek için birtakım politikalar geliştirme ihtiyacı duymuş ve uygulamaya koymuştur. Böylece ABD ve Venezuela arasındaki ilişkiler zaman içerisinde oldukça gerginleşmiştir. Venezuela dış politikada müttefiklik ilişkileri, ülke içinde uygulanan siyasal, sosyal ve ekonomik program ve politikalarla ABD açısından olumsuz olarak değerlendirilecek eylem ve uygulamalar gerçekleştirmiştir. Buna karşın ABD ise çeşitli müdahale araçlarını kullanarak Venezuela’ya müdahale etmiş ve etmeye devam etmektedir. Bu açıdan müdahale ve dış müdahale olguları bu iki ülkenin ilişkileri açısından gündeme gelmeye başlamıştır. Bu nedenle Venezuela ve ABD arasında yaşanan gelişmeler çalışmada dış müdahale olgusu kapsamında değerlendirilmiştir.

This chapter offers an evidence-based analysis that demystifies the contemporary misconception according to which Venezuela's international assertiveness originated with the advent of Hugo Chávez's Bolivarian Revolution. It explains that this feature is a proper feature of the peculiar Latin American petro-state. Thus, the chapter addresses the foreign policy of Venezuela during the second half of the 20th century from a historical perspective. It starts from the specificity of Venezuela as a Latin American petro-state that reached development and sustained a regionally prominent democratic regime for 40 years. This chapter shows that the Venezuelan international assertiveness is due in large part to a combination of autonomist aspirations of Latin American origin, and the availability of financial resources derived from an abundant oil income. This mixture created the conditions for a Venezuelan enduring pattern in which presidents experiment with foreign policy decisions and actions that, at least at first glance, would not correspond to a secondary regional power.

Although populism does not dictate a coherent ideological or programmatic agenda, some of its elements still leave distinct marks on the formulation and implementation of foreign policy. This paper argues for the study of populism in its tangible policy impacts and scrutinizes the nexus of populism and foreign policy in contemporary Turkey under President Erdoğan’s rule. Despite the abundant references to the ‘people’ in the populist rhetoric, it identifies personalization in foreign policy decision-making, nationalization in foreign policy implementation, and civilizationalization in the foreign policy discourse. Having established the patterns of populist foreign policy from a wider reading, this study then examines, generally, how populism has informed Turkish foreign policy and, specifically, Turkey’s approach to the recent border disputes over the gas fields in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Notes 1. Linda Robinson, “Terror Close to Home” U.S. News, September 28, 2003, http://www.usnews.com/usnews/news/articles/031006/6venezuela.htm; Dan Burton, “Opening Statement: Hearing on Venezuela,” testimony before the Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, July 17, 2008, http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/110/43520.pdf; Fred Burton, “Venezuela: Documenting the Threat,” STRATFOR, December 13, 2006; Nima Gerami and Sharon Squassoni, “Venezuela: A Nuclear Profile,” Proliferation Analysis, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Web site, December 18, 2008, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=22568&prog=zgp&proj=znpp&zoom_highlight=Venezuela+A+Nuclear+Profile; Chris Kraul and Sebastian Rotella, “Hezbollah Presence in Venezuela Feared,” Los Angeles Times, August 27, 2008, http://articles.latimes.com/2008/aug/27/world/fg-venezterror27. 2. Joseph S. Nye, “Soft Power and American Foreign Policy,” Political Science Quarterly 119, no. 2 (Summer 2004): 255–270. 3. Robert A. Pape, “Soft Balancing Against the United States,” International Security 30, no. 1 (Summer 2005): 7–45; T.V. Paul, “Soft Balancing in the Age of U.S. Primacy,” International Security 30, no. 1 (Summer 2005): 46–71; Andrew Hurrell, “Hegemony, Liberalism, and Global Order: What Space for Would-Be Great Powers?” International Affairs 82, no. 1 (January 2006): 1–19. 4. Stephen Walt, “Can the United States be Balanced? If So, How?” (remarks, Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, Illinois, September 2–5, 2004) (hereinafter Walt remarks). 5. Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, “Hard Times for Soft Balancing,” International Security 30, no. 1 (Summer 2005): 72–108; Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, “International Relations Theory and the Case Against Unilateralism,” Perspectives on Politics 3, no. 3 (Summer 2005): 509–524; Keir A. Lieber and Gerard Alexander, “Waiting for Balancing: Why the World Is Not Pushing Back,” International Security 30, no. 1(Summer 2005): 109–139; Robert Kagan, “The September 12 Paradigm,” Foreign Affairs 87, no. 5 (September/October 2008): 25–39. 6. Mark Eric Williams, “The New Balancing Act: International Relations Theory and Venezuela's ‘Soft Balancing’ Foreign Policy,” in The Revolution in Venezuela, eds. Jonathan Eastwood and Thomas Ponniah (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, forthcoming 2009); Gregory Wilpert, Changing Venezuela: The History and Policies of the Chavez Government (London: Verso, 2007). 7. Wilpert, Changing Venezuela . 8. “Country Fact Sheet: Venezuela,” UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), World Investment Report 2007, http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite_dir/docs/wir07_fs_ve_en.pdf (hereinafter UNCTAD World Investment Report 2007). 9. This includes petrostates for which there is data: Algeria, Angola, Republic of Congo (Brazzaville), Egypt, Gabon, Iran, Libya, Nigeria, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen. Kuwait was excluded from this list because with 47 percent of outward foreign direct investment it is a prominent outlier. See UNCTAD World Investment Report 2007. 10. See UNCTAD World Investment Report 2007; Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Foreign Investment in Latin America and the Caribbean 2007 ( Santiago, Chile: ECLAC, 2008), http://www.eclac.org/publicaciones/xml/1/32931/lcg2360i.pdf. 11. Maruja Tarre Briceño, “Abandonados en grandes ligas: Chávez Quiere ahora codearse con los grandes de la política mundial,” El Universal, August 24, 2008. 12. Gustavo Coronel, “Pedigüeños de todo el mundo: absteneosi¡” Las Armas de Coronel Blog, August 4, 2007, http://lasarmasdecoronel.blogspot.com/2007/08/pedigueos-de-todo-el-mundo-absteneos-ya.html 13. See “US Accuses Venezuelan Diplomat of Working for Hizbullah,” Jerusalem Post, June 19, 2008, http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull&cid=1213794272800. 14. Natalie Obiko Pearson and Ian James, “Venezuela Offers Billions to Countries in Latin America,” VenezuelaAnalysis.com, August 28, 2007, http://www.venezuelanalysis.com/news/2571. 15. Andrés Oppenheimer, “Alan García, Chávez y las Casas del ALBA,” El Nuevo Herald, March 16, 2008. 16. Sean W. Burges, “Building a Global Southern Coalition: The Competing Approaches of Brazil's Lula and Venezuela's Chávez,” Third World Quarterly 28, no. 7 (October 2007): 1343–1358. 17. Richard Feinberg, “Chávez Conditionality,” Latin Business Chronicle, June 4, 2007, http://www.latinbusinesschronicle.com/app/article.aspx?id=1296. 18. “Food Aid Arrives in Haiti Amid Protests, Political Unrest,” FoxNews.com, April 19, 2008, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,351830,00.html. 19. Jorge I. Domínguez, To Make a World Safe For Revolution: Cuba's Foreign Policy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989). 20. Ernesto “Che” Guevara, “Vietnam and the World Struggle for Freedom (Message to the Tricontentinental, published in 1967),” in Che Guevara and the Cuban Revolution: Writings and Speeches of Ernesto Che Guevara, ed. David Deutschmann (Sydney: Pathfinder Press, 1987). 21. International Monetary Fund, “Honduras: Request for Stand—By Arrangement-Staff Report,” IMF Country Report, no. 08/241 (Washington, D.C.: IMF, July 2008), http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2008/cr08241.pdf. 22. “Petrocaribe heredó deudas y compromisos; Zelaya cerró las puertas a los organismos de financiamiento internacional para Abrazar los proyectos chavistas y embarcar al país en una dependencia financiera de largo plazo,” El Heraldo, August 3, 2009. 23. Julia Buxton, “European Views of the Bolivarian Progressive Social Image: Have the Revelations of Deeper Relations with the FARC Changed Anything? Does it Matter?” (paper, Miami, Florida, 2008) (presented at the Florida International University Summit of the Americas Center conference “Ten Years of Venezuelan Foreign Policy: Impacts in the Hemisphere and the World”). 24. Jack Levy and L.Vakili. “Diversionary Action by Authoritarian Regimes: Argentina in the Falklands/Malvinas Case,” in The Internationalization of Communal Strife, ed. Manus I. Midlarsky (New York: Routledge, 1992), pp. 118–146; Graeme A.M. Davies, “Domestic Strife and the Initiation of International Conflicts: A Directed Dyad Analysis, 1950–1982,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 46, no. 5 (October 2002): 672–692. 25. See Demetrio Boersner, “Dimensión internacional de la crisis venezolana,” in Venezuela en retrospectiva: Los pasos Hacia el régimen chavista, ed. Günther Maihold (Madrid and Frankfurt: Iberoamericana and Vervuert, 2007) (in Spanish). 26. Janet Kelly and Carlos A. Romero, The United States and Venezuela (New York: Routledge, 2002). 27. Javier Corrales and Michael Penfold, “Venezuela: Crowding Out the Opposition,” Journal of Democracy 18, no. 2 (April 2007): 99–113; Francisco Monaldi, Rosa Amelia González, Richard Obuchi, and Michael Penfold, “Political Institutions and Policymaking in Venezuela: The Rise and Collapse of Political Cooperation,” in Policymaking in Latin America: How Politics Shapes Policies, eds. Ernesto Stein, Mariano Tommasi, Pablo T. Spiller, and Carlos Scartascini (Washington, D.C. and Cambridge, MA: Inter-American Development Bank and Harvard University David Rockefeller Center for Latin American Studies, 2008), pp. 371–417; David J. Myers, “Venezuela: Delegative Democracy or Electoral Autocracy?” in Constructing Democratic Governance, 3rd edition, eds. Jorge I. Domínguez and Michael Shifter (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008), pp. 285–320. 28. Vitaly Kozyrev, “China's Continental Energy Strategy: Russia and Central Asia,” in China's Energy Strategy: The Impact on Beijing's Maritime Policies, eds. Gabriel B. Collins, Lyle J. Goldstein, and Andrew S. Erickson (Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute, 2007), pp. 202–251. 29. Because supertankers are not capable of passing through the Panama Canal, oil shipments from Venezuela to China would need to go first south to the Strait of Magellan and then northwest across the Pacific or else entirely east through Cape Horn and then the Strait of Malacca. Either route would be one of the lengthiest in the world. 30. Farideh Farhi, “Iran in Latin America: Threat or Axis of Annoyance” (paper, Washington, D.C., July 10, 2008) ( presented at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars conference “ Iran in Latin America: Threat or Axis of Annoyance”), http://www.wilsoncenter.org/events/docs/Farhi.pdf. 31. Henri J. Barkey, “Saudi Arabia, the U.S. and Energy Security” (paper, Washington, D.C., May 28–June 3, 2007) (presented at the Aspen Institute's sixth conference on political Islam “Political Islam: Challenges for U.S. Policy”). 32. Elodie Brun, La Place de l'Iran dans la politique étrangère du Venezuela (paper, Washington, D.C., July 10, 2008) (presented at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars conference “Iran in Latin America: Threat or Axis of Annoyance”), http://www.wilsoncenter.org/events/docs/Brun1.pdf. 33. Michael Klare, Rising Powers, Shrinking Planet: The New Geopolitics of Energy (New York: Metropolitan Press, 2008). 34. Burton, “Venezuela: Documenting the Threat.” 35. Veneconomía Opina, “¡Ni espejo de China es!,” Veneconomía, October 18, 2008. 36. Most Latin Americans doubt the leadership of Chávez. See “Global Unease With Major World Powers; Rising Environmental Concern in 47-Nation Survey,” Pew Global Attitudes Project (Washington, D.C.: Pew Research Center, June 27, 2007), http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?ReportID=256 (hereinafter Pew Global Attitudes Project 2007). 37. Michael Shifter, “A New Path for Latin America,” Current History 107, no. 706 (February 2008): 90–92. 38. Pew Global Attitudes Project 2007. 39. Peter Hakim, “The Next President's Agenda for the Americas” (paper, Washington, D.C., November 27–December 2, 2007) (presented at the Aspen Institute conference “U.S. Policy in Latin America”), http://www.aspeninstitute.org/sites/default/files/content/docs/congressional%20program/Hakim_Paper.pdf; Abraham F. Lowenthal, “The Obama Administration and the Americas: A Promising Start,” The Washington Quarterly 32, no. 3 (July 2009): 119–136, http://twq.com/09july/docs/09jul_Lowenthal.pdf. 40. María Teresa Romero, “Expansión sin plata,” El Universal, January 7, 2009. 41. John Kiriakou, “Iran's Latin America Push,” Los Angeles Times, November 8, 2008, http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/la-oe-kiriakou8-2008nov08,0,878526.story. Additional informationNotes on contributorsJavier CorralesJavier Corrales is an associate professor of political science at Amherst College

In an era of ongoing strategic confrontation between the world's major powers, the security and foreign policy of the United States, the still dominant global superpower, is also undergoing constant and turbulent changes personified particularly by the arrival of new presidential administrations. In this regard, the ascension of the administration of current President Joe Biden in January 2021 is another milestone for the analysis of U.S. security policy. The presented article thus analyses the foreign and security policy of the United States of America in the January 2021-January 2023 period, that is, in the first half of the Joe Biden administration's term. The authors use the foreign policy analysis method to critically analyse Biden's foreign and security policy in three distinctive geopolitical regions: the Indo-Pacific, Europe, and the Middle East. The authors utilise Biden's policy in these regions as a case study to test Pavel Hlaváček's theory from 2018, according to which the national mood of the U.S. foreign currently finds itself in an introverted phase. The authors conclude that the theory remains valid by analysing Biden's foreign and security policy. Based on the 2022 midterm elections result, they also support Hlaváček's assumption that another alteration in the national mood in the U.S. foreign policy should not be expected sooner than in the mid-2030s. Nonetheless, the validity of the applied theory and the conclusions we have drawn from it will be conclusively tested by all upcoming presidential or midterm elections, with the nearest ones as early as November 2024.