Continuity versus changes in Soviet policy in Asia

Abstract

In general, looking at the whole Far East panorama, one is left with an impression that Soviet policy in Asia is still largely dominated by the rigidities imposed by both Soviet accumulated gains and Soviet vulnerabilities, but that some limited movement has begun. The Soviet political position throughout the Far East is still generally weak, in sharp contrast to the growing strength of the Soviet military position. the Soviet political position in South Asia is only moderately better. The basic Soviet instinct in this situation appears to be to hold on at all costs to the strong points of the Soviet position: to continue the military buildup, to intensify the war in Afghanistan and the pressure on Pakistan, to try to defend and bolster the arms-supply relationship with India, to persevere in support of Vietnam’s attempt to dominate Indochina, to continue to expand the Soviet naval and air presence at Cam Ranh Bay, and to continue to hold and to fortify Japan’s northern territories. Where, however, a changing situation has presented a chance to advance by modifying soviet policy (as has been the case with the Soviet attitude toward North Korea), the Gorbachev leadership was shown willingness to do so. In places where possible future new opportunities are still maturing (as may be the case in the Philippines) the Soviets may eventually respond, but only slowly and cautiously.