Abstract

Market penetration by the hegemonic core state's agricultural biotechnology firms has been preceded and accompanied by a vigorous anti-genetically modified seeds (anti-GM) movement in semi-peripheral India. To understand the extent of anti-imperialism and anti-capitalism exhibited by the Indian state, it is useful to investigate the character of democratizing forces-such as the anti-GM movement-which interact with and shape the state. I use primary and secondary data sources to analyze the anti-GM movement in India and argue that the movement is anti-corporate without being anti-capitalist. Further, it is counter-hegemonic but not anti-systemic. These four traits reflect the strengths and weaknesses of exemplary coalition-building between right-wing nationalists, centrists, and left activists. The Indian anti-GM movement suffered an early failure when the Indian state commercialized Bt cotton seeds in 2002, following the entry of unauthorized Bt cotton seeds and lobbying by farmers' groups for legalization of Bt cotton seeds. However, an effective coalition between the right-wing, centrist, and left elements was built by about 2006. This was followed by a most significant victory for the anti-GM movement in February 2010, when the Indian state placed an indefinite moratorium on the commercialization of Bt brinjal seeds. A second, more qualified, victory was achieved by the anti-GM movement when the Indian state placed a hold on field trials of GM crops in July 2014. The anti-GM coalition has been successful in pressing ideologically different political parties to take steps against the multinational seed firms based in core states. Further, it has enabled the Indian state to move from a sub-imperialist to an anti-imperialist role regarding GM seeds. But until the anti-GM coalition in India resolves its inner contradictions and becomes resolutely anti-capitalist and anti-systemic, it will not be able to effectively challenge the anti-imperialist Indian state's pro-capitalist stance regarding GM seeds and industrial agriculture.

Highlights

  • Market penetration by the hegemonic core state's agricultural biotechnology firms has been preceded and accompanied by a vigorous anti-genetically modified seeds movement in semi-peripheral identified organic farmers in Gujarat (India)

  • The anti-genetically modified seeds (anti-GM) movement has enabled the Indian state to move from a sub-imperialist to an anti-imperialist role when it comes to GM seeds

  • During the course of my research, I found that many Indian farmers had joined anti-GM activists-right-wing nationalists, centrists, and leftists-in protesting against transgenic seeds and Monsanto's dominance in the Indian market

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Summary

Setting the Context

To better understand the Indian anti-GM movement, it is useful to briefly analyze how its main interlocutor, the Indian state, operates. The three largest seed firms- Monsanto, DuPont, Syngenta-accounted for 53 percent of the proprietary seed market globally in 2009, and the same three corporations accounted for nearly three quarters of all U.S patents issued for crop cultivars between 1982 and 2007 (Shand 2012). The domestic seed market in India is one of the largest in the world It is worth about U.S $1.3 billion, and has been growing at a compounded annual growth rate of about 15 percent, according to a report in a major Indian financial daily, The Economic Times (2012). According to Shand (2012), the world's six largest seed/agro-chemical/biotechnology firms, which are BASF, Bayer, Dow Agrosciences, DuPont, Monsanto, and Syngenta have a 'dangerous chokehold' on the global agricultural research agenda. In the perception of many activists with whom I have spoken, these 'Big Six' corporations constitute what may be termed the 'GM cartel.' Whether or not the 'GM cartel' has been intentionally formed by the six corporations, the evidence is that the Big Six corporations have agreed to cross-license proprietary germplasm and technologies, consolidate R&D efforts, and terminate costly patent litigation battles

Theoretical Background
Data and Methods
Findings
Concluding Reflections
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