Abstract
This paper applies the framework developed by Farrell and Héritier to disputes over ‘legal bases’ (empowering treaty provisions) and legislative procedures in everyday EU decision-making. Using a variety of data, it largely confirms the power of the Farrell–Héritier framework. Legal bases and procedural political disputes respond to incomplete contracting problems, manifested as the jurisdictional ambiguity of specific policy issues. Parties consistently act as competence maximisers, bargaining interstitially in the pursuit of procedural power. Everyday fights over procedures appear to feed back into subsequent formal institutional (treaty) change. The results support claims of endogenous EU institutional change, while highlighting extensive legal-discursive structuring of this process.
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