Contemporary Science and Technology Evaluation in China: Examining Its Trajectory and the Road Ahead

Research on the Transformation of Contemporary Chinese Science Fiction

The chief goals of language planning in China are given as: (1) to standardize and promote “Mandarin Chinese” (Putonghua) as the common spoken language of the People’s Republic of China (PRC); (2) to develop and promote a “clear speech writing” style (baihuawen) closer to that vernacular spoken language with which to replace the more classical “literary language writing” style (wenyanwen) traditionally used in China; (3) to design and promote a system of phonetic symbols with which to accurately and efficiently express standard modern spoken Chinese; (4) to simplify the forms of Chinese characters; (5) to design and improve writing systems for the languages of China’s many ethnic minorities (Zhou, 2001, p. 9). The tasks of developing and promoting Putonghua as a common spoken language and of designing and improving writing systems for China’s ethnic minorities are explored in depth elsewhere in this volume. Therefore in reviewing the evolution of language planning policy and activities in the PRC, this chapter will focus primarily on the policies and realities of those questions involved in writing modern standard Chinese, that is, on the evolution of policies concerning the simplification of Chinese characters, and the development and status of the official Hanyu Pinyin romanization system now used to express the pronunciation of modern standard Chinese, within the larger context of Chinese language planning in general. As we shall see, beyond the standardization and simplification of the forms of Chinese characters, efforts at standardizing written Chinese have focused mainly on attempts to standardize the use of words and terms, to regularize words written with variant Chinese character combinations (e.g. China, 2001a), as well as to standardize the pronunciation of words and characters. But as noted elsewhere (e.g. Chen, 1999, pp. 111–112) beyond a number of dictionaries incorporating the above standards, there has been no extensive work on standardizing the grammar of written Chinese, or attempts the regulate the baihuawen style(s) in which modern Chinese has been written since the May Movement of 1919.

International Law and the Extraordinary Interaction Between the People's Republic of China and the Republic of China on Taiwan

This paper analyzes Ma Jun-wu's (1881-1940) 1902 translation of Herbert Spencer's ”The Rights of Women.” It demonstrates the importance of the translation of the universalizing discourse of ”The Rights of Women” to early 20(superscript th) century nationalist intellectuals in their discursive construction of a Chinese postcolonial modernity. I investigate the layered postcolonial politics of translation involved as early 20th century intellectuals used the translation of a western, male-authored rights-based feminist discourse to invent a language that could articulate claims to a Chinese modernity. I attempt to delineate those places and moments in the translated texts, where imperial, national and colonial identifications and desires are refracted through already unequal displacements and movements between two languages. I note the interweaving and complex power structurations that transpire between gender and ethnic nationalism, and in particular how a discourse on the rights of women, when travelling between male writing positionalities of differential (national, ethnic) power, will easily transport various problematic gender and colonial identity relations. We can discern this complexity through Ma's translation, for example, of the English words such as ”we,” ”us,” and ”our own,” as appeared in Spencer's original articles, into ”fan-shih jen-lei,” (”all human beings”) or even ”Wuokuo” (”our nation”) in Chinese. Such renderings of English philosophical writings surely arise from a historical moment when imperialism and colonization posed an imminent threat to ”our nation.” The implications of such theory-travel or translations must be re-examined in historical terms. Recent work in postcolonial studies has provided a viable framework for the rethinking of the problem of language and translation. In order to gain an analytic understanding of topics such as the politics of translation and the representation of ”Chinese Feminism,” or the effects of reflection and refraction in the act of reading, we will re-examine the imperial desires in which the project of nation building and the search for (belated) modernization eventually become the ideological consensus in China during the late 19th and early 20th centuries.

本論文考察民國以來，面對國體與政局更替動亂、國際勢力與世界大戰進逼、西學與現代資本主義衝擊之下，中國境內具備人類學教養的知識份子圍繞民族認同、現代新禮俗和鄉村建設的中國現代方案及其敘事話語。 論文處理的時間跨度，始於象徵開啟中國民俗學運動的北京大學徵集近世歌謠事件的1918年，結束於中華人民共和國成立的1949年。論述脈絡依循以時間順序為本質的歷史、作為歷史化空間的民間民俗和體現現實時空特徵的實際社會調查，以追尋本真性作為結構論文的主軸，輔以共同體敘事的觀點，分別以民初神話研究、江紹原禮俗迷信研究、梁漱溟和費孝通的鄉村敘事為個案展開。 古史辨、人類學派和民族誌神話研究三個案，分別面向歷史、現代性與民族，藉此闡釋中國現代民族國家建構的話語，為民族認同話語的機制、型態及變化張本，而三者亦回應了神話研究作為一種民族歷史的建構和效果，導引出民族、歷史和現代性相互補充的敘事學。在江紹原禮俗迷信研究中，分析江氏有關迷信和民俗的表述及其意涵，試圖描繪江紹原論述中的「民間」及其折射出的現代性問題，該個案意義在於顯現科學話語主導的共同體敘事，展現文明進程與民族世界主義的心態。在梁漱溟和費孝通的鄉村建設敘事個案中，意欲聯繫梁氏和費氏兩人的鄉村建設計畫以考察一段鄉土精神史，討論「鄉土」如何成為本真性領域，即如何敘述「鄉土」，透過什麼方式生產何種精神性價值，其中將涉及它與誰對抗、解決何種問題的問題。 論文總結在以民族、民俗、鄉土的角度詮釋「中國」共同體的現代境遇，係近現代中國關於「民」的集體敘事，為大量發明傳統的年代。其中展現了中國現代認同的多層次性，以及以內在視野看待，以想像的同一性、延續性和本真性構築的共同體的意識形態和話語。

The civil war of China ended in 1949 with the People's Republic of China (PRC) founded in Beijing and the Republic of China (ROC) retreated to Taiwan. The confrontation of these two regimes resulted in a divided China. While the PRC claimed herself as the legitimate government succeeding the ROC and enjoyed effective control of the Mainland, the ROC still regarded herself as the legal government after the downfall of Qing Dynasty and her legitimacy did not end with the retreat to Taiwan. Hence, both regimes were fiercely engaged in diplomatic struggles for the ”sole legitimate” status. The fight for representation in the International Olympic Committee (IOC) in 1952 was the first cross-Strait diplomatic warfare. With the withdrawal of the PRC from the IOC around 1960, the international legal status of the ROC was more or less secured. However, with no effective control over the field of sports, the IOC considered neither regime representative of each other. Hence, the IOC adopted the principle of ”de facto controlled athletic area” in its Charter to regulate the membership of the PRC and ROC in the IOC. IOC asserted that ”since Taiwanese did not administer sport in China, the Republic of China was to taken off the IOC membership list. However, if it chose to reapply for admission under another name the application would be considered.” This provoked severe protest from Taiwan. Although the ROC was forced to reapply for membership under ”Republic of China Olympic Committee”, Taiwan still claimed to be the sole legitimate representative of China. This triggered the name ROC rectification campaign in the IOC. As demanded by IOC, Taipei had to give up her original membership title of ”Chinese Olympic Committee”, and to recognize her control over the field of sports only in Taiwan. Faced with such change in status, the ROC on the one hand reapply for admission to the IOC as ”Republic of China Olympic Committee, ROCOC”, and on the other hand, campaigned for effective control over the field of sports in the PRC. While the application for membership succeeded, the title was refused by the IOC. The bone contention remained the inclusion of 'China' in the title. The IOC was suspicious of Taiwan's intention to extend the ”de facto controlled athletic area” to Mainland China. To continue the fight, The ROC government through the Central Committee of KMT formed the Name Rectification Committee with the Sports Federation of the Republic of China as the convener and with members including the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Lobbying thus began through the support of overseas consulates and targeted at not only the IOC president and committee members, but also the participants of annual IOC executive committee meetings held in Baden-Baden, Innsbruck and Tokyo. Two achievements were eventually made. First, it was resolved at the Baden-Baden meeting that that ”ROC” could be embroidered on athletes' sportswear; and second, it was agreed at the Tokyo meeting that ”Republic of China” in Chinese characters could be added under the word ”TAIWAN” in English on the nameplate of the ROC delegation. Hence, the humble wish of the ROC was granted. Nevertheless, besides athletes from countries in East Asia using Chinese characters, most of the foreign athletes from western countries would hardly see the difference, nor understand its meaning or significance. 1960 to 1964 saw persistent efforts of the ROC in name rectification in the IOC but with little success. The same plight was suffered in her other battles in the international arena. The culture and value of status and rank provided the impetus to ROC's name-rectification campaign.

The Saudi Arabia’s “Fundamentalists” the position runs counter in the basic religious doctrine with, and People's Republic of China ’s “Communist” and “Socialism” the idea, also can affect the Saudi Arabian imperial family’s benefit and the stability. However the Saudi Arabia actually purchases the missile to the People’s Republic of China, and established diplomatic relations in 1990 . The Transformation in Diplomatic Relations between Saudi-Arabia and China was really worth studying and the discussion truly. Because in 1973 the petroleum crisis took Saudi Arabia the huge economic interest, enable Saudi Arabia’s government to have the abundant financial resource to foster the talent, but caused in this border to have the social structure change, because the group accepted the higher education or overseas abroad study return to homeland, dominated the political power to Saudi Arabian’s Government and the traditional royal court to be discontented, finally urged Saudi Arabian’s King to implement the reform as well as the cabinet carries on the reorganization, in addition, also enabled the sand country tradition political power abandonment passing the country to have to “the communism” first impressions ares most lasting the hostility, and after suffered US ‘s Parliament to go back a promise to sell the Saudi Arabian F-15 fighter plane, originated the policy using the disperser arms sale to purchase missiles form People’s Republic of China. In the international environment aspect, the Saudi Arabia after the excavating petroleum, is admires the US military force to protect its petroleum benefit, but because US's Israel's policy, causes the Saudi Arabia to the American confidence vacillation, however, this time People’s Republic of China actually unceasingly (the People’s Republic of China using the United Nations Security Council), the economy (purchases petrified industry and wheat), the military (sells the missiles), the psychology (using religious relations), at that time Saudi Arabia is in order to maintain the Saudi Arabian leader regime stably, strengthens own national defense military force, by the consolidated this country in under the Islam world leading positions consideration, urges Saudi Arabia choose People’s Republic of China to purchases missiles, and establishes both sides official foreign relations.

This essay introduces the concept of colonial temporality to make sense of Chinese modernization discourses. Although institutional discourses on modernization and development in China are largely nationalist and tightly entangled with state authority, they nevertheless draw from conceptions of temporality that are colonial in character. However new the technologies of subjectivity are, they are embedded in a discourse transmitted from a colonial discourse that is not new, not entirely controlled by the Chinese state and not entirely favorable to the Chinese government. I will introduce three features of this temporality that make it colonial and highly ambivalent for the Chinese state: Firstly, it was created by colonial encounters in history and in an entanglement of Western, Japanese and Chinese discourses. Secondly, it provides China with a “story” of future progress by placing it in the middle of history. And thirdly, it revolves around discourses of deficiency that compels Chinese institutional discourses to constantly compare themselves to the West. In consequence, the “quest” for a Chinese modernity also contains a search for narratives of a better future that allow imagining improvement but are not based on colonial temporality. Paying more attention to this problem would allow scholars to better understand the position of the Chinese state and of Chinese intellectuals within modernization discourses, and to better conceptualize the historic and transnational Character of these discourses.

The Republic of China and Japan signed the ”Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty” in April 28, 1952. When this treaty became effective in August 5, 1952, both sides also ended the state of war. According to this treaty, the Republic of China (ROC) and Japan should negotiate quickly agreements on matters such as commercial affairs, navigation and aviation. Because the issue of the fishery right was a controversial problem between the ROC and Japan, both sides hoped to solve this controversial issue by the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty. Thus, the article 9 indicated ”The Republic of China and Japan will endeavor to conclude, as soon as possible, an agreement providing for the regulation or limitation of fishing and the conservation and development of fisheries on the high seas.” Both sides wanted to sign the agreement of fishery based on the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty.After signing the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty, the ROC and Japan were expected to consume and preserve the sea resource together in accordance with the agreement of fishery, thus solving the Sino-Japanese dispute over fishery since 1920s. The ROC and Japan attempted to negotiate the issue of fishery between August 1 and 8 in 1952, but there was a wide gap between their standpoints. All the ROC hoped was to sign the agreement of fishery with Japan and to take advantage of this occasion to learn Japanese fishery technology. The Japanese government, however, intended to legitimate the use of the fishing ground around the Chinese coast lest the Japanese fishing boats were seized by the ROC, the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the USSR anymore. There was a small scale cooperation of mackerel pole and line between the ROC and Japan, but both sides stood on the different standpoints, causing the agreement of fishery between the ROC and Japan breakdown. Japan then contacted the PRC.Because Yoshida Shigeru held the diplomatic principle that-politics and economics should be separated and the PRC hoped to extend her foreign relation, Japan and the PRC signed the agreement of fishery in 1955. By this agreement, Japan obtained the right of fishing around Chinese coast, and the PRC also extended her foreign relations, they could say each shining more brilliantly in the other's company. Because of the accident concerning the PRC national flag in Japan in 1958, Japan and the PRC fall foul of each other. Meanwhile, the ROC began the negotiations with Japan once again, but their differing standpoints made the negotiation break down again. In 1963, under Ikeda Hayato's economic diplomacy the relation between Japan and the PRC improved. Both sides signed the second agreement of fishery at the end of the year, this agreement was valid until Japan and PRC established the diplomatic relation in 1972. Even when the ROC and Japan still had diplomatic relation, they failed to reach an agreement on the fishery right, which symbolized their sovereign rights to them, not to mention after Japan and the PRC established the diplomatic relations in 1972. Given that Japan no longer recognized the ROC, the negotiations on the agreement of fishery between the two countries finally closed its door.

On 19 October, 1955, the Academy of Traditional Chinese Medicine affiliated with the Ministry of Health of the People's Republic of China was established formally. On 8 October, 1985, its name was changed to "China Academy of Traditional Chinese Medicine", which was renamed as "China Academy of Chinese Medical Sciences (CACMS)" on 15 November, 2005. During its six decades of history, the construction of the institutions in the CACMS were improved constantly. Nowadays, there are altogether 17 academic institutions, 6 clinical institutions, 1 educational institution and 6 industrial institutions in the CACMS, which has become a comprehensive research institution of traditional Chinese medicine (TCM), embodying scientific research, clinical service, education and industry as a whole, under the direct control of the State Administration of Traditional Chinese Medicine of the People's Republic of China.

This dissertation offers new perspectives on China's transition to socialism by investigating a fundamental question--how did the state build capacity to know the nation through numbers? With the establishment of the People's Republic in 1949, jubilant Chinese revolutionaries were confronted by the dual challenge of a nearly nonexistent statistical infrastructure and the pressing need to escape the universalist claims of capitalist statistics. At stake for revolutionary statisticians and economists was a fundamental difficulty: how to accurately ascertain social scientific fact. Resolving this difficulty involved not just epistemological and theoretical debates on the unity or disunity of statistical science but also practical considerations surrounding state-capacity building. The resultant shift toward a socialist definition of statistics, achieved by explicitly following the Soviet Union's example, was instrumental in shaping new bureaus, designing statistical work, and training personnel. New classificatory schemes and methods of data collection also raised issues of authority and policy, ultimately not just remolding state-society relations but also informing new conceptions of everyday life and work. By the mid-1950s, however, growing disaffection with the efficacy of Soviet methods led the Chinese, in a surprising turn of events, to seek out Indian statisticians in an unprecedented instance of Chinese participation in South-South scientific exchange. At the heart of these exchanges was the desire to learn more about large-scale random sampling, an emergent statistical technology, which, while technically complex, held great practical salience for large countries like China and India. "Making it Count" engages with and contributes to scholarship on the history of modern China and on the global and Cold War histories of science and social science. While the historiography on statistics and quantification has focused primarily on the early-modern and nineteenth century world, the dissertation brings this history into the twentieth century, when states, multi-national institutions, and private actors, regardless of their ideological hue, mobilized statistics on behalf of positivist social science and statecraft. By examining the collection and deployment of data, a process critical to the ambitions of the revolutionary PRC state but one that has largely been overlooked in the historical literature, the dissertation also provides an alternative account for a decade often portrayed as lurching from one mass campaign to another. Finally, the examination of the Sino-Indian statistical links reveals that pioneering innovation took place in many contexts after 1945 and challenges Cold War paradigms that are predisposed to assume the United States or the Soviet Union as the primary nodes from which scientific and other forms of modern knowledge emanated.

This article aims to analyze the so-called “starting point” when modern scientific and technological successes in China were in their infancy, and to provide the reader with insight on how various challenges were overcome in their development. The period under review is 1949–1955. The information about this period was obtained from Soviet archives and special literature. The first part of the article describes the state of affairs in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in the early years of its formation, focusing on education, science, industry (including military), communications, and rail transport. The second part turns to the Soviet specialists working in the PRC during these years, focusing on their profession, number, cities of residence and living conditions. Issues regarding Chinese specialists’ internship in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) are also touched upon. The article selects several lesser-known areas in which professional competencies were established in this very weak post-war country to discover the origins of the most important science and technology in the contemporary PRC, thereby contributing to readers’ understanding of the initial conditions for the development of science and technology in China.

Quality vs. quantity of publications in nanotechnology field from the People’s Republic of China

This article examines the substance and modification of the “One-China” principle, which the government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) pursued in the mid 1960s. Under this principle, a country wishing to establish diplomatic relations with the PRC was required first to break off such relations with the Republic of China (ROC). In 1964 the PRC established diplomatic relations with France. This was its first ambassadorial exchange with a Western government. The PRC, in the negotiations over the establishment of diplomatic relations, attempted to achieve some consensus with France on the matter of “One-China”. The PRC, nevertheless, had to abandon these attempts, even though it demanded fewer conditions of France than of the United States (USA), Japan and other Western countries in the 1970s. The PRC had demanded adherence to the “One-China” principle since 1949. France, however, refused to accept this condition. Nevertheless, the PRC established diplomatic relations with France before the latter broke off relations with the ROC. Subsequently, the PRC abandoned the same condition in negotiations with the African governments of the Republic of Congo, Central Africa, Dahomey and Mauritania. After the negotiations with France, the PRC began to insist that the joint communiqué on the establishment of diplomatic relations should clearly state that “the Government of the People’s Republic of China is the sole legal government of China”. However, France refused to insert these words into the communiqué. Afterwards, the PRC nevertheless insisted on putting such a statement into the joint communiqués or exchanges of notes on the establishment of diplomatic relations with the African countries mentioned above. This was done in order to set precedents for making countries accede to the “One-China” principle. The “One-China” principle was, thus, gradually formed in the process of the negotiation and bargaining between the PRC and other governments.

Aim. The work aimed to substantiate national approaches to ensuring technological sovereignty and economic security using the examples of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the United States of America (USA) in the context of digital economy development. Objectives. The work seeks to examine issues of ensuring technological sovereignty and economic security in the context of digital economy development; to analyze and systematize the factors, characteristics, and challenges of digital economy development using the examples of the PRC and the USA; to develop a framework for defining national approaches to ensuring technological sovereignty and economic security; and to substantiate national approaches to ensuring technological sovereignty and economic security using the examples of the PRC and the USA. Methods. The study was based on theoretical research in the field of economic digitalization, economic security, and innovative and technological development in individual countries, as well as empirical studies in the fields of digitalization, scientific, industrial, and technological development using the examples of the PRC and the USA, within the context of their international political and economic ties. The authors employed general scientific methods of systemic, comparative, functional, statistical, and causal analysis, as well as systematization, abstraction, and generalization. Results. The PRC and the USA are identified as global leaders in technological and digital development, while their influence extends beyond national borders. China’s national approach to ensuring technological sovereignty and economic security in the context of developing a digital economy is characterized by an industrial model of integration into international scientific and industrial chains, determined by external constraints, the implementation of a predominantly planned principle of state presence in the digital economy, and the international transmission of a horizontal architecture of international relations based on national digital sovereignty. The USA approach is distinguished by its integration into international cooperation, combining elements of protective, industrial, and open models. It implements a predominantly market-based approach to state presence in the digital economy, and promotes internationally a vertical architecture of international relations based on digital solidarity with partner countries and the accountability of states that violate the established rules. Conclusions. The study confirms the assertion that the national approaches to ensuring technological sovereignty and economic security in the context of digitalization in the PRC and the USA differ significantly in terms of government regulation of the digital economy, the quality of participation in international high-tech cooperation, and their concept of the architecture of international relations. These differences are mainly determined by asymmetric development factors and the internal specifics of the digital economies of the countries studied. Numerous restrictions aimed at restraining scientific, technological, and industrial development of Russia hinder the country’s technological sovereignty and economic security, which encourages long-term partnerships with friendly states, particularly China. Despite the differences in economic scale and socio-cultural differences, Russia and China can successfully complement each other, including in scientific, industrial, and technological partnerships.