Constructive Empiricism and Logical Positivism: The Return of the Prodigal Son

Bas van Fraassen’s ‘Constructive Empiricism’, first presented in The Scientific Image, has rightly stimulated widespread, searching discussion and rejoinder. Yet something very fundamental remains to be appreciated about his Constructive Empiricism and how he advocates it. I say ‘advocates’ advisedly, not only because van Fraassen’s view is voluntarist, in exactly the voluntarist strain of fideism tracing back to Augustine, but because his core strategy is quasi-pyrrhonist. To exhibit how so, and why it matters philosophically, I first briefly review some main Pyrrhonian tropes, the Dilemma of the Criterion and Pyrrhonism’s key basis step (§2).² I then summarise my reasons for suggesting that van Fraassen constructs his ‘new’ empiricism with quasi-Pyrrhonist equipollence strategies (§3). To substantiate my suggestion, I recount van Fraassen’s empiricist stance (§4), his own sceptical tropes (§5), and the key basis step of his Constructive Empiricism (§6). I conclude by reflecting philosophically upon method, scepticism, and the philosophical importance of philosophical history (§7). Despite the ‘retreat’ from The Scientific Image announced in an appendix to Scientific Representation: Paradoxes of Perspective,³ the same basic Pyrrhonist tendencies persist throughout van Fraassen’s empiricist stance. Van Fraassen, of course, calls his view ‘the empirical stance’, yet he is chronically cavalier or mistaken about so many central empirical matters that his stance is not empirical, but throughout is merely an empiricist stance redux.

Konstruktyvusis empirizmas (KE), plačiai nagrinėta ir nagrinėjama Baso van Fraasseno antirealistinė mokslo koncepcija, siūlo filosofinę mokslo praktikos interpretaciją. KE filosofijoje mokslo praktikos subjektas yra, kaip nurodo pats van Fraassenas, vadinamoji episteminė bendruomenė. Tačiau Williamas Seageris prieštarauja, kad jeigu KE šalininkai remiasi episteminės bendruomenės sąvoka, tai KE filosofija neišvengiamai numato, jog mokslininkai tiki nestebimaisiais esiniais. Maža to, Simone Bahrenberg ir kt. teigia, kad nuo to, iš ko sudaryta episteminė bendruomenė, priklauso, kurie esiniai yra stebimieji, todėl stebimumas negali būti objektyvi savybė, o KE laikosi nuostatos, kad stebimumas yra objektyvi savybė. Straipsnyje, remiantis keturiais mintiniais eksperimentais, aptariamas atskiras hipotetinis episteminės bendruomenės, kurioje tėra vienas asmuo, atvejis ir teigiama, kad šiuo hipotetiniu atveju Seagerio bei Bahrenberg ir kt. kontrargumentai nepagrįsti: Seagerio reikalavimas kitų episteminės bendruomenės narių liudijimus laikyti episteminius įsitikinimus grindžiančiais duomenimis tiesiog neveikia; o, contra Bahrenberg ir kt., tai, kas stebima vienam asmeniui, KE filosofijoje yra neproblemiškai objektyvu. Remiantis šia įžvalga teigiama, kad konstruktyvusis empirizmas būtų stipresnė filosofinė pozicija, jeigu performuluotų savo tezę taip, lyg ši aprašytų vieną pažįstantįjį subjektą (asmenį, mokslininką), nes i) taip ne tik kartą ir visiems laikams atremtų visus episteminės bendruomenės sąvoka besikliaujančius prieštaravimus, bet ir ii) šiuo pakeitimu tiesiogiai atsižvelgtų į kai kuriuos mokslo praktikos atvejus, į kuriuos nemodifikuota KE tezė taip akivaizdžiai atsižvelgti negali. Siūlomas KE nuostatos pakeitimas iii) išlaiko pagrindinius KE pozicijos aspektus, − skirtį tarp stebimųjų ir nestebimųjų esinių, skirtį tarp priėmimo ir įsitikinimo, episteminės ekonomijos principą ir mokslo racionalumo principą, − bent tiek pat pagrįstus, kiek ir naudojant originaliąją van Fraasseno tezę.

André Kukla has argued that both Bas van Fraassen’s constructive empiricism and Bruno Latour’s constructivism should be regarded as anti-realist approaches. In order to support his own claim, Kukla brought forward three parallels between them, namely: i) the observable/unobservable distinction in Bas van Fraassen’s constructive empiricism may be found in Bruno Latour’s constructivism, too; ii) the constructivist’s emphasis over the social construction of facts could be (although it was not) acknowledged by van Fraassen; iii) both constructive empiricism and constructivism are approaches about scientific practice. The aims of this paper are, firstly, to introduce and criticize the support gave by Kukla regarding his own conception and, secondly, to argue for that there is, instead, a stronger relationship between constructivism and realism than constructive empiricism and constructivism.

Alan Musgrave, Michael Friedman, Jeffrey Foss, and Richard Creath raised different objections against the Distinction between observables and unobservables when drawn within the confines of Bas C. van Fraassen's Constructive Empiricism (CE), to the effect that the Distinction cannot be drawn there coherently. Van Fraassen has only responded to Musgrave but Musgrave claimed not to understand van Fraassen's succinct response. I argue that van Fraassen's response is not enough. What remains in the end is an unsolved problem which CE cannot afford to leave unsolved, or so I argue; I then strengthen Musgrave's criticism and indicate that an extension of the epistemic policy of CE is mandatory to solve the problem. I also argue that Friedman's and Foss' objection against the Distinction in CE misses the mark on closer inspection. An objection due to Creath does hit the mark but can be taken care of without too much ado. All these objections seem alive and kicking until the present day; I try (and hope) to put them all to rest.

What can Bas believe? Musgrave and van Fraassen on observability

Kokia nūdienio mokslo prigimtis, koks jo pažintinis statusas? Ir dar plačiau: ar ir kaip įmanomas racionalus žinojimas? Šie klausimai nūdienos mokslo filosofijoje sprendžiami visų pirma empirizmo ir mokslinio realizmo ginčuose. Bene ryškiausia šiuolaikinio britų empirizmo forma – Baso van Fraasseno konstruktyvusis empirizmas, arba tiksliau konstruktyvusis empiricizmas (KE). Straipsnyje, remiantis ir ginčijant visų pirma van Fraasseno, Gideono Roseno ir Marco Alspector-Kelly argumentaciją, pateikiama revizionistinio KE normatyvumo samprata. Tvirtinama, kad KE epistemologijoje implicitiškai slypintis normatyvumas yra (a) neišvengiamas ir (b) euristiškai naudingas. Neišvengiamas, nes pati deskripcijos ir normos dichotomija nėra absoliuti. Būtent tai visų pirma atskleidžia van Fraasseno ir Roseno diskusijos analizė KE daugiaprasmiškumo bei jo diktuojamų metodologinių nuostatų terminais. Euristiškai naudingas, nes lankstusis KE normatyvumas, lyginant jį su rigidiškais mokslinio realizmo ontologiniais postulatais, siūlo epistemologiškai nuosaikesnę ir empiriškai adekvatesnę mokslo sampratą, apimančią nuolat kintančių episteminių, normatyvinių ir aksiologinių praktikų įvairovės visumą. Šio euristinio KE potencialo sąlyga galų gale yra KE vykdoma nuosaikioji agneologinio moderniojo mokslinio žinojimo revizija lygiai tiek, kiek jis yra moderniosios filosofijos atmaina.

In this journal [2000], I argued that Bas van Fraassen's constructive empiricism was undermined in various ways by his antirealism about modality. Here I offer some comments and responses to the reply to my arguments by Bradley Monton and van Fraassen [2003]. In particular, after making some minor points, I argue that Monton and van Fraassen have not done enough to show that the context dependence of counterfactuals renders their truth conditions non-objective, and I also argue that adopting modal realism does after all undermine the motivation for constructive empiricism. 1. Introduction2. Underdetermination and epistemic modesty3. Counterfactual observations4. Modal realism and constructive empiricism

Van Fraassen does not argue that everyone should be a constructive empiricist. He claims only that constructive empiricism (CE) is a coherent post-positivist alternative to realism, notwithstanding the realist's charge that CE is arbitrary and irrational. He does argue, however, that the empiricist is obliged to limit belief as CE prescribes. Criticism of CE has been largely directed at van Fraassen's claim that CE is a coherent option. Far less attention has been directed at his claim that empiricists should be constructive empiricists. I consider his various attempts to support this claim, conclude that they are unsuccessful, and suggest that the empiricist who repudiates CE does not thereby abandon contemporary empiricism itself.

Empiricism has a long and venerable history. Aristotle, the Epicureans, Sextus Empiricus, Bacon, Locke, Hume, Mill, Mach and the Logical Empiricists, among others, represent a long line of historically influential empiricists who, one way or another, placed an emphasis on knowledge gained through the senses. In recent times the most highly articulated and influential edition of empiricism is undoubtedly Bas van Fraassen’s constructive empiricism. Science, according to this view, aims at empirically adequate theories, i.e. theories that save all and only the observable phenomena. Roughly put, something is observable in van Fraassen’s view if members of the human epistemic community can detect it with their unaided senses. Critics have contested this notion, citing, among other reasons, that much of what counts as knowledge for scientists, especially in the natural sciences, concerns things that are detectable only with instruments, i.e. things that are unobservable and hence unknowable by van Fraassen’s lights. The current paper seeks to overcome this objection by putting forth and defending a liberalised conception of observability and an associated, and accordingly liberalised, conception of empiricism. ‘Grounded observability’ and ‘grounded empiricism’, as we call them, unchain themselves from the burdens of traditional conceptions of experience, while at the same time tethering themselves to the source of epistemic credibility in the senses, and, hence to the true spirit of empiricism.

In The Scientific Image [1980], Bas van Fraassen argues against a particular form of scientific realism and for a view of his own which he dubs constructive empiricism. The version of realism he intends to refute is the view that the aim of science is to construct theories that are literally true, and that to accept a scientific theory is to believe that it is literally true (or at least approximately true). In contrast, according to van Fraassen's constructive empiricism, science aims only at theories that are empirically adequate, that is, at theories that accord with all observable events, and to accept a scientific theory is only to believe that it is empirically adequate. To accept a scientific theory it is not necessary, according to constructive empiricism, to believe what it says about unobservable entities, such as electrons. It is quite clear that van Fraassen is not merely advancing a thesis about actual scientific practice. He is not saying merely that science, as we know it, does not aim to discover true theories about unobservable events and processes, but rather that the discovery of such theories can never be the object of any reasonable human endeavour. The problem is not simply that we know, from the historical frequency with which theories are refuted, that the achievement of this aim is a practical impossibility. After all, if the frequency of empirical refutation counts against the aim of arriving at true theories, then it also counts against the aim of obtaining theories that are empirically adequate! Consequently, van Fraassen's objection is quite different from that of Laudan [1981], which is based on the historical frequency of theoretical errors.1 Instead, van Fraassen is claiming that it is not even possible to approach

Bas van Fraassen claims that constructive empiricism strikes a balance between the empiricist’s commitments to epistemic modesty – that one’s opinion should extend no further beyond the deliverances of experience than is necessary – and to the rationality of science. In “Should the Empiricist be a Constructive Empiricist?” I argued that if the constructive empiricist follows through on her commitment to epistemic modesty she will find herself adopting a much more extreme position than van Fraassen suggests. Van Fraassen and Bradley Monton have recently responded. My purpose here is to contest their response. The goal is not merely the rebuttal of a rebuttal; there is a lesson to learn concerning the realist/anti-realist dialectic generated by van Fraassen’s view.

Psillos has recently argued that van Fraassen’s arguments against abduction fail. Moreover, he claimed that, if successful, these arguments would equally undermine van Fraassen’s own constructive empiricism, for, Psillos thinks, it is only by appeal to abduction that constructive empiricism can be saved from issuing in a bald scepticism. We show that Psillos’ criticisms are misguided, and that they are mostly based on misinterpretations of van Fraassen’s arguments. Furthermore, we argue that Psillos’ arguments for his claim that constructive empiricism itself needs abduction point up to his failure to recognize the importance of van Fraassen’s broader epistemology for constructive empiricism. Towards the end of our paper we discuss the suspected relationship between constructive empiricism and scepticism in the light of this broader epistemology, and from a somewhat more general perspective.

Constructive empiricism is supposed to offer a positive alternative to scientific realism that dispenses with the need for metaphysics. I first review the terms of the debate before arguing that the standard objections to constructive empiricism are not decisive. I then explain van Fraassen's views on modality and counterfactuals, and argue that, because constructive empiricism recommends on epistemological grounds belief in the empirical adequacy rather than the truth of theories, it requires that there be an objective modal distinction between the observable and the unobservable. This conclusion is incompatible with van Fraassen's empiricism. Finally I explain some further problems for constructive empiricism that arise when we consider modal matters.

This chapter shows that the sceptical empiricist argument, and by extension any argument like it, fails. It considers the concept of evidence, endorsing Williamson's view that all and only knowledge is evidence, (E=K). In particular, it considers the alternative view that only observational knowledge is evidence. Bas van Fraassen's constructive empiricism is then studied. Some commentators employ a caricature of constructive empiricism that takes the same argument. In fact, van Fraassen is careful to distance himself from scepticism about theories and to take constructive empiricism to be a view about the aim of science. It is argued that van Fraassen ought to be committed to the sceptical conclusion, and that constructive empiricism is implicitly committed to the above argument.

Discussions of causal inquiry in International Relations are increasingly framed in terms of a contrast between rival philosophical positions, each with a putative methodological corollary — empiricism is associated with a search for patterns of covariation, while scientific realism is associated with a search for causal mechanisms. Scientific realism is, on this basis, claimed to open up avenues of causal inquiry that are unavailable to empiricists. This is misleading. Empiricism appears inferior only if its reformulation by contemporary philosophers of science, such as Bas van Fraassen, is ignored. I therefore develop a fuller account than has previously been provided in International Relations of Van Fraassen’s ‘constructive empiricism’ and how it differs from scientific realism. In light of that, I consider what is at stake in calls for the reconstitution of causal inquiry along scientific realist, rather than empiricist, lines. I argue that scientific realists have failed to make a compelling case that what matters is whether researchers are realists. Constructive empiricism and scientific realism differ only on narrow epistemological and metaphysical grounds that carry no clear implications for the conduct of causal inquiry. Yet, insofar as Van Fraassen has reformed empiricism to meet the scientific realist challenge, this has created a striking disjunction between mainstream practices of causal inquiry in International Relations and the vision of scientific practice that scientific realists and contemporary empiricists share, especially regarding the significance of regularities observed in everyday world politics. Although scientific realist calls for a philosophical revolution in International Relations are overstated, this disjunction demands further consideration.