Constructing Digital Sovereignty in Russian and Chinese Media: Big Data Analysis

The term “Cyber Sovereignty” has been tossed around panels (See for example the International Cybersecurity Conference 2016 in Munich, Panel: Digital Sovereignty – the Right Concept for Securing Europe’s Industry?), newspaper articles, and blogs for quite some time. However, a practical solution to reach a state of sovereignty in the field of implementing fitting and trustworthy cyber tools and products in one’s company is still missing. We have come to the conclusion that the idea of cyber sovereignty – undoubtedly charming and worthwhile – cannot be pursued with the usual military and national approach but must be addressed using a community of users and experts. Combining the concepts of digital user communities and cyber sovereignty led several German DAX companies to found the Deutsche Cyber Sicherheitsorganisation (German Cyber Security Organization) – DCSO in 2015 where the authors implemented the idea of a “Product Evaluation and Integration” Service (PEI). This PEI Service enables the founding members and DCSO customers to execute cyber sovereignty through testing, evaluating, and prototyping state of the art and future cyber security products, services, and vendors.

The purpose of this study is to determine the role and legal status of the Federal Service for Supervision of Communications, Information Technology and Mass Media (Roskomnadzor) among federal executive bodies in the system of state regulation of the "digital sovereignty" in Russia. Research Methodology: The study utilized general scientific methods - analysis, synthesis, and generalization - to detail Roskomnadzor's powers related to regulating the "digital sovereignty" in Russia. A comparative legal analysis was used to examine international practice. A formal legal approach was used in this study to examine current Russian legislation in this area. Conclusions: The study identified the key characteristics of the concept of "digital sovereignty" identified the government bodies involved in shaping Russia's digital sovereignty, analyzed the powers of these bodies, and defined the role of the Federal Service for Supervision of Communications, Information Technology and Mass Media (Roskomnadzor) as one of the most important government bodies in the mechanism for creating digital sovereignty.

Today, a number of high-profile initiatives across the globe are concrete implementations of the ‘digital sovereignty’ principle: i.e., the idea that states should ‘reaffirm’ their authority over the Internet and the broader digital ecosystem, to protect their citizens, institutions, and businesses from the multiple challenges to their nation’s self-determination in the digital sphere. According to this principle, sovereignty depends on more than supra-national alliances or international legal instruments, military might or trade: it depends on locally owned, controlled and operated innovation ecosystems, able to increase states’ technical and economic independence and autonomy. Presently, digital sovereignty is understood primarily as a legal concept and a set of political discourses. As a consequence, it is predominantly analyzed by political science, international relations and international law. However, the study of digital sovereignty as a set of infrastructures and socio-material practices has been comparatively neglected. This article explores how the concept of digital sovereignty can be studied via the infrastructure-embedded ‘situated practices’ of various political and economic projects which aim to establish autonomous digital infrastructures in a hyperconnected world. Although the article focuses primarily on outlining the agenda for a wider and comparative research program, I will place a specific focus on Russia, subject of an ongoing research project, as a pilot case.

The development of digital technologies and international relations in this area has led to the emergence of such a phenomenon as digital sovereignty. In this regard, the authors ask about the essence of digital sovereignty. Having studied a number of opinions of scientists, the authors identified common features in the understanding of digital sovereignty and gave the most general definition of it. The authors also raise the issue of distinguishing digital sovereignty from state sovereignty, as a result of which they come to the conclusion that digital sovereignty is inseparable from state sovereignty, but, due to its specificity, it is an independent component of it. The issue of measures to ensure digital sovereignty was also studied, the most important of which is legal regulation. At the international level, the regulation of digital sovereignty is poorly developed, while domestic legislation is actively building up the base of regulatory legal acts in this area. Specific measures were considered to ensure digital sovereignty and to develop its technological foundations in the Russian Federation. In this context, the PRC's experience in establishing and ensuring its digital sovereignty was studied. Summing up the results of the study, the authors came to the conclusion that it is necessary to develop independent digital technologies of the state, the legal framework for regulating the digital space, as well as providing large-scale state support to domestic IT manufacturers and their projects. In addition, an option was proposed to consolidate the definition of "digital sovereignty" in Russian legislation to ensure the protection of domestic Internet borders.

In the digital sovereignty debate, countries and blocks seek to build technological and regulatory capacity to ascertain technological autonomy—definitions notwithstanding. Meanwhile, these actors seek to position themselves discursively, differentiating their own understanding of digital sovereignty from that of competing powers. In this context, the European Union (EU) elaborated the concept of digital sovereignty as something obtainable on an individual level, where regulations are put in place for users to be able to choose what personal data (not) to share. Meanwhile in China the government launched a number of artificial intelligence (AI) and data protection regulations along with an antitrust crackdown on numerous platform companies. This aimed at bringing technological giants (namely platforms), capable of handling massive amounts of data and influencing people's everyday lives, under stricter government rule. While the Chinese government has only partially framed these actions within frameworks akin to ‘digital sovereignty’, the purported aim was accruing individual autonomy vis‐à‐vis big techs, arguably falling close to the EU's ‘digital sovereignty’ discursive framework. By comparing EU and Chinese AI and data governance regulations, this article unpacks the EU discourse on the individual element of digital sovereignty and finds the EU regulatory effort insufficient to achieve its declared objective.

Subject/Topic. The article is devoted to the study of the concept, parameters, barriers and scenarios for ensuring the digital sovereignty of the Russian Federation in the era of Industry 4.0. Methodology. To study the concept of digital sovereignty as a scientific shortage, the authors used general scientific methods (observation, comparison, measurement, analysis and synthesis, the method of logical reasoning), when conducting an analytical study of indicators of the digital maturity of the national economy of the Russian Federation, the dynamics of high-tech challenges and threats specific scientific methods were used (static analysis, expert assessments, graphical method), to form scenarios of the future trajectory of the development of digital sovereignty, methods of strategic management – SWOT analysis, PEST analysis, Foresight tools. The validity and reliability of the results of scientific research is ensured by the correctness and rigor of the construction of the logic and research scheme. Scientific and applied research of Russian and foreign scientists in the field of innovative development, digital economy and public administration was used as a methodological and fundamental basis for the study. The initial statistical data for the analysis were taken from open sources of thematic reviews and analytical reports of the consulting agencies VC.RU, the Ministry of Economic Development of the Russian Federation, the Skolkovo Research Center, Digital IQ, PWC, statistical collections of the Higher School of Economics and Rosstat. Results. Currently, digital sovereignty is considered from a political, economic and technological point of view, which determines the presence of a pluralism of points of view on its meaningful definition in the scientific literature. The authors propose to understand by digital sovereignty the criterion of sustainability of the architecture of a socio-economic business model in front of external and internal digital challenges and threats of various origins, as well as its ability to adapt and proactively protect its own interests in the digital sphere. The development of the digital sovereignty of the Russian Federation is presented according to four scenarios: 1st – the Russian Federation is unable to build an effective national infrastructure and is dependent on these groups, digital sovereignty has become an object and means of influence of world leaders on the behavior of entire states and allied formations, an emphasis on military the political role of digital sovereignty; 2nd – the Russian Federation joins the digital infrastructure to the Asian group, and the Chinese conglomerate pursues a policy of soft absorption with the gradual assimilation of the cultural and value paradigms of the population into non-Chinese paradigms; 3rd – the collapse of the oligo-polistic power, the FAMGA group (USA) and the BAT group (China), the entire world economy is being reshaped into autonomous digital ecosystems that build relationships among themselves on the principles of win-win partnership; 4th – the USA, EU, Russia is actively developing digital infrastructure in Asia, Africa, South America to form a new colonial system built on the basis of digital technologies. Conclusions/Relevance. As part of the scientific study, it was found that the digital sovereignty of the state directly depends on the level of digital maturity of the national economy and the digital responsibility of society's behavior. Taking into account the passage of the global economic system to the point of no return – the onset of the era of Industry 4.0 - the issue of ensuring the digital sovereignty of the state is becoming a new priority in the agenda for future development. Application. The results obtained in the process of scientific research can be used by the authorities and management as a theoretical and practical basis for making appropriate decisions in the field of improving the processes of digital transformation of various levels of society, and by business representatives – for adjusting business development strategies based on taking into account relevant digital challenges and threats.

In recent years, various claims of cyberspace sovereignty, including 'data sovereignty', 'digital sovereignty' and 'technological sovereignty', have attracted widespread attention. In this research, we examine the various academic positions and governments’ policies on different "sovereignty" concepts in cyberspace, and to explore the controversies, evolution and future development of these concepts. Research questions are: 1) what are the definitions of the academic community on these concepts including ‘cyber’, 'digital', 'data' and 'technology’ sovereignty ; 2) what are the positions and claims of major governments on these sovereignties; and 3) what are the overlaps, differences and conflicts between those positions and the underlying reasons? Methodologically, this paper will use a historical documentary analysis approach. The types of documents used include two categories: (1) Primary sources: Initiatives, laws, regulations, drafts, ordinances and strategic proposals issued by governments on sovereignty in cyberspace; 2) secondary source: academic literatures related to various concepts of sovereignty in cyberspace, including journal papers, academic conference reports and books. In this paper, government policy documents from China, the EU and the US for the period 2010-2021 will be chosen as the main subjects of study. There has been a major conceptual and position differences among these countries/region on the "sovereignty " in cyberspace, they represent the focus of the debates.

ABSTRACTDigital sovereignty and its cognate concepts have become staples of the digital governance debate; however, in the search for a shared understanding of the concept, the proliferation of claims to digital sovereignty by multiple different actors remains a contested issue. This study provides a review of 240 works, coded according to disciplinary area, actors mentioned in relation to digital sovereignty, and the types of relations explicitly or implicitly conceptualised within each work. I argue that the abundance of actors to which digital sovereignty is ascribed is not an issue per se; rather, the issue is that significant portions of the literature cluster around a digital sovereign ‘of choice’ and limit conversation with other strands. Those works that acknowledge the possibility of multiple coexisting digital sovereigns, or that see digital sovereignty as something that arises from the interactions among multiple actors, neither stretch the concept of sovereignty nor turn digital sovereignty into something different from sovereignty tout court: instead, they explore ways to innovate the concept of sovereignty as a whole and problematise our long‐held assumptions about it.

In the early months of the COVID-19 pandemic, European countries implemented several non-pharmaceutical interventions with country-specific policies and reduced coordination. Digital Contact Tracing (DCT) was one of the few interventions on which European countries had a common approach oriented toward DCT apps’ interoperability. As most EU countries implemented interoperable apps relying on an Apple and Google’s framework, France developed the app autonomously. Recent literature argues that France’s choice was mainly due to its strong stance in defense of national digital sovereignty. However, current contributions do not largely cover the issue empirically. Therefore, we aim to better explore the role played by digital sovereignty in the political debate related the development of DCT apps. To do so, we conducted a thematic analysis of 16 documents from France’s political bodies, selected from a larger corpus of 438 documents dealing with DCT. Three main relevant dimensions related to digital sovereignty emerge. First, the initially sponsored EU interoperability progressively faded in the French political debate. Then, Apple and Google’s involvement in the healthcare domain was perceived as highly problematic. Finally, having national players developing the DCT app was largely preferred. Based on our empirical findings, we further engaged with the concept of digital sovereignty, pointing out its difference from digital sovereignism by highlighting the ontological distinction between practices and ideas. Building on these reflections, we argue that France’s stance towards DCT and the related digital sovereignty practices subtended digital sovereignism positions.

Digital sovereignty is a term increasingly used by academics and policymakers to describe efforts by states, private companies, and citizen groups to assert control over digital technologies. This descriptive conception of digital sovereignty is normatively deficient as it centres discussion on how power is being asserted rather than evaluating whether actions are legitimate. In this article, I argue that digital sovereignty should be understood as a normative concept that centres on authority (i.e., legitimate control). A normative approach to digital sovereignty is beneficial as it supports critical discourse about the desirability of actors’ assertions of control. It is also more closely aligned with traditional definitions of sovereignty that are grounded in ideas of sovereign authority. To operationalise this normative approach to digital sovereignty and demonstrate the deficiencies of a descriptive approach, the role that “Big Tech” companies are playing in controlling artificial intelligence is considered from both perspectives. Through this case study, it is highlighted that Big Tech companies assert a high degree of control (i.e., descriptive digital sovereignty), but that they lack strong input legitimacy and have a questionable amount of output legitimacy. For this reason, it is argued that Big Tech companies should only be considered quasi-sovereigns over AI.

This article studies the role that ‘digital sovereignty’ performs in the EU's digital policy discourse comparing speeches by high‐level European Commission officials and Members of the European Parliament (MEPs). It indicates that the concept of digital sovereignty is not mentioned very frequently, neither in the European Parliament (EP) nor in the public statements of top EU officials. It is furthermore not closely linked to specific policy ideas, not even to the idea of promoting European values in the world as a way of openly projecting digital sovereignty outward. EP actors mainly refer to policy‐related aspects of digital sovereignty, and these show systematic affinities to parties' ideologies – primarily along an axis of economic development versus protecting personal rights – and to EP committees. Hence, digital sovereignty does not seem to mainly serve as normative idea directed at the public sphere but emerges as a common denominator to which different relevant actors within the EU decision‐making system can equally relate.

This study explores the institutional tensions between Russia’s policies for developing its creative industries and its push for digital sovereignty. On one hand, the Russian government aims to promote creative industries as a key sector for economic diversification and soft power expansion. On the other hand, it enforces strict digital sovereignty measures designed to control digital infrastructure, data flows, and online content. These two policy directions are fundamentally at odds and risk creating institutional collision. Creative industries thrive on openness, freedom of expression, and the exchange of diverse ideas. However, Russia’s digital sovereignty strategy—centered on information control, protection of domestic platforms, and data localization—imposes structural barriers to content creation and distribution. Censorship, the promotion of state-sanctioned “traditional values,” and restrictions on foreign platforms have significantly curtailed creative freedom and limited access to global markets for Russian creators. Domestic platforms, many of which are state-controlled, further restrict content through algorithmic filtering, reinforcing a closed and tightly controlled digital environment. Beyond stifling the growth of its own creative industries, Russia’s digital sovereignty policies also act as major obstacles to its participation in international digital trade. Requirements like mandatory data localization, bans on foreign software, and strict content regulations serve as non-tariff barriers in the global digital economy. These policies may hinder Russia’s engagement in WTO e-commerce negotiations and complicate bilateral digital trade agreements, further isolating the country technologically and culturally. The study concludes that without addressing the fundamental conflict between state control and industry openness, Russia’s creative industries are likely to face prolonged stagnation and a decline in global competitiveness.

В настоящее время концепция цифрового суверенитета прочно укоренилась в политико-правовой дискуссии об общеевропейском будущем. Ее появление и укрепление связано с фактически сложившейся в Европе зависимостью от зарубежных технологий, товаров и услуг в цифровой сфере, что ставит под угрозу как собственное экономическое развитие Европейского союза, так и защиту основных прав и свобод европейских граждан в соответствии с его принципами. Настоящая статья посвящена изучению особенностей развития концепции цифрового суверенитета Европейского союза. В работе рассматривается содержание термина «цифровой суверенитет» в практике его использования в европейском политико-правовом дискурсе, выявляются основные характеристики двух измерений цифрового суверенитета ЕС (во-первых, способности регулировать технологический сектор и поведение в киберпространстве и, во-вторых, стратегической автономии в цифровой сфере и европейской конкурентоспособности в сфере технологий). Кроме того, в статье обращается внимание на основные теоретические и практические проблемы содержания и развития данной концепции. Такими проблемами являются, во-первых, выбор надлежащего носителя цифрового суверенитета и определение параметров соотношения общеевропейского наднационального цифрового суверенитета с суверенитетом государств — членов ЕС, включая его цифровое измерение; во-вторых, оценка справедливости выбора модели цифрового суверенитета Европейского союза, которая нередко критикуется как чрезмерно «корыстная» и как недостаточно конкурентоспособная. В статье утверждается, что, несмотря на отдельные аргументы о несостоятельности рассматриваемой модели, есть основания считать, что ЕС уже достиг положительных результатов на пути формирования своего цифрового суверенитета. Currently, the concept of digital sovereignty is firmly rooted in the political and legal debate about the pan-European future. Its emergence and strengthening is associated with the actual dependence in Europe on foreign technologies, goods and services in the digital sphere, which jeopardizes both the European Union’s own economic development and the protection of the fundamental rights and freedoms of European citizens in accordance with its principles. This article is devoted to the study of the peculiarities of the development of the concept of digital sovereignty of the European Union. The paper examines the content of the term “digital sovereignty” in the practice of its use in European political and legal discourse, identifies the main characteristics of two dimensions of digital sovereignty of the EU (first, the ability to regulate the technological sector and behavior in cyberspace, and secondly, strategic autonomy in digital area and European technology competitiveness). In addition, the article draws attention to the main theoretical and practical problems of the content and development of this concept. Such problems are, firstly, the choice of an appropriate bearer of digital sovereignty and the determination of the parameters of the relationship of the pan-European supranational digital sovereignty with the sovereignty of the EU member states, including its digital dimension; secondly, the assessment of the fairness of the choice of the model of digital sovereignty of the European Union, which is often criticized as overly “selfish” and as insufficiently competitive. The article states that, despite some arguments about the insolvency of the model under consideration, there is reason to believe that the EU has already achieved positive results on the path to forming its digital sovereignty.

In the states of the European Union (EU), the question currently raised is to what extent dependence on technologies from the USA and China will have a lasting impact on state sovereignty. The concept of digital sovereignty represents the EU's efforts to compensate for the deficits of the past decades caused by an inadequate positioning of Europe as a location for software and hardware development. Autocratic states use the path of digital autarky, the USA a path of liberalisation and high degrees of openness. In the EU, on the other hand, regulation, data protection and liberal values developed over centuries play a major role in the less pronounced IT development. The path of European states to more digital sovereignty has been addressed politically as an “action plan”, but there is still no common understanding or definition of what digital sovereignty exactly means, where the EU and thus also an individual European state stands. There is a lack of a target and a measurable index as well as evaluated measures derived from it. The present article articulates the basis, namely the common understanding and the definition of digital sovereignty. It places the concepts of digitalisation and state sovereignty in a historical framework and locates them in the current literature, then analyses digital sovereignty as a composite term and places it in the context of current research. Finally, a definition is proposed that can serve as the basis for further research to identify an index of digital sovereignty. This definition can also become the basis for EU legislation to implement the “action plan”.

This introductory chapter examines the efforts that governments across the world are seeking to rein in the internet, bringing digital leviathans under control. Recent enforcement actions dispel the notion that the internet is beyond the reach of governments; the state is back. The chapter delves into the concepts of data sovereignty and digital sovereignty, discussing their relationship with traditional notions of territorial sovereignty. It examines the rise of digital sovereignty, distinguishing the various approaches in the United States, the European Union, China, Russia, and the Global South. It highlights how digital sovereignty proves different than traditional territorial sovereignty in practice: digital sovereignty is always global, generally involves corporations, intensifies state surveillance, and remains susceptible to protectionist tendencies. The chapter concludes with a case study of the fight over digital sovereignty that accompanied Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.