Constitutional Review and the Economic Crisis: In the Courts We Trust?

Abstract

A reflection on the constitutional effects of the economic crisis is now both possible and useful. The paper assesses the judicial reaction to the national and EU measures introduced for containing the economic crisis. The focal point of analysis is the intensity of review and the judicial justifications given during that period. The working hypothesis is that the jurisprudence is characterized by the utilization of the ‘crisis vocabulary’, by the application of a low intensity review yardstick, by the application of a narrower in scope version of the principle of proportionality and by the wide margin of discretion recognized for the decision-maker. The analysis concludes that the jurisprudence was not uniform; significant differentiations exist both in approach and in the impact of the relevant case law on the respective legal order. The courts are divided between those of Member States and supranational courts (CJEU and ECtHR). The CJEU approached the matter in jurisdictional terms and formalistically, thus placing the burden on the national constitutions. The Strasbourg court applied the margin of appreciation doctrine, thus limiting review to cases where the impact of the legislative measures resulted in danger to survival. On the other hand, the national courts are classified as either ‘lenders’ (Germany) or ‘borrowers’ (Greece, Portugal and Cyprus). Constitutional review in fuller effect can be found in the German example, while in the case of ‘borrowers’ the national courts faced a moral and existential dilemma. The result was that crisis laws were approached as requiring light review, thus transforming national legal orders and unsettling the equilibrium of constitutional coexistence. National constitutional orders were transformed and the courts were placed in the impossible position of adjusting constitutional review to the economic needs. During the crisis, pragmatism became the new norm.