Conspiracism, Politics, and the State in the Twenty-First Century

“We live in an age of conspiracy” says Don DeLillo (1989). In 2014 it seems that conspiracy theories, and speculation concerning the “truth” about major events, has become a popular theme and pastime in contemporary society. From sold out eleven hour David Icke presentations at Wembley Stadium in the UK (as well as his world tours), to the ever expanding radio and television network of Alex Jones in the United States, it is clear that there is more than just a fringe interest in conspiracy theories. In the academic literature dating back to Richard Hofstadter (1964) though, the phenomenon has been cast as a purely pathological or paranoid behaviour. Recent works, such as that of Sunstien and Vermeule (2009), Aaronovitch (2011) and van der Linden (2013) go further in suggesting that engagement with conspiracy theories is not only a pathological behaviour, but a danger both to modern society and one which threatens to bring an end to the “age of reason.” Others however, such as Jane and Fleming (2014) have suggested that conspiracy theories are actually a direct result of Enlightenment thinking, and that they offer a valuable counterweight to modern forms of propaganda. In this thesis I seek to challenge the view that conspiracy theories are a pathological behaviour, and offer instead that in contemporary engagement with conspiracy theories is a form of political resistance that allows the excluded and disaffected a political voice. I also offer that conspiracy theories are best understood as social, cultural and political narratives that are in the words of Michael Barkun (2003) a form of stigmatized knowledge. From this perspective it is possible, I argue, to contextualise conspiracy theories in terms of contemporary political and social issues. Finally, I suggest that conspiracy theories may be a method that is used by those who engage to negotiate social ambivalence as outlined by Bauman (1991). To do this, I interviewed eight Melbournians who were either engaged with conspiracy theories or considered themselves “sceptics.” Each of the participants, shared stories of their everyday experiences with conspiracy theories with me. I have analysed their responses using a thematic narrative analysis and underpinning my research were four research questions: [1] How do people living and working in Melbourne define and use conspiracy theories in their everyday lives?; [2] In my data, are conspiracy theories being discussed (and used) as a form of political action for the alienated and marginalized? [3] Does my data collected conform to the two broad understandings that I have outlined in the literature review (the cultural and psychological approaches)? [4] Following question 3, do my participants engage with conspiracy theories as social, cultural and political narratives that offer a new or alternative means of political resistance?

Although the term conspiracy theory does not appear in my Conspiracy Nar ratives in Roman History, one reviewer remarked, It was hard not to misre member Pagan's title as 'Conspiracy Theories in Ancient Rome.' l Given the preponderance of conspiracies in ancient Rome, conspiracy theory is a reason able expectation; however, so self-evident is the impact of conspiracy on the political life of the Romans that they scarcely engaged in a discourse of con spiracy theory that was not embedded in some response to a specific political crisis. As a modern sociological phenomenon, conspiracy theory was not part of the vocabulary of the ancient Romans; they did not attempt a formal defini tion. Conspiracy demanded action, not theory. Therefore the study of con spiracy theory in ancient Rome demands its own methods?and yields its own results. In this essay I build a model of conspiracy theory based on a wide array of ancient sources and suggest some of the consequences that conspiracy theory had for Roman society. In the absence of a term for conspiracy theory in Latin or Greek, I adopt a sociohistorical approach that moves beyond isolated political events as narrated by individual historians so that I can illustrate how conspiracy forms a substantial part of the Roman mind-set, as evidenced in a variety of

Learning from Experience?COVID-19 Conspiracy Theories and Their Implications for Democratic Discourse Jennifer Hochschild (bio) and David Beavers (bio) in a survey fielded on march 7, 2020, more than three times as many Democrats as Republicans (61 percent and 20 percent, respectively) agreed that the United States was concealing the true scale of SARS-CoV-2 deaths. Republicans were nearly 20 percentage points more likely than Democrats (57 percent and 38 percent, respectively) to agree that the coronavirus is a man-made epidemic. With fewer than 300 confirmed COVID-19 cases in the United States (CDC 2020), pandemic beliefs with no clear basis in fact were already flourishing and were already colored by Americans' partisan lenses. This case points to large questions. Although research shows that "basically all Americans hold conspiracy beliefs" (Smallpage et al. 2020, 264), we do not know enough about adherence to these beliefs and consequences for American politics. The very concept is contested—one person's plausible hypothesis or praise for imaginative thinking is another's conspiracy theory. But at least for those who see conspiracy theories as a threat to democratic governance, definitions share a few features. Karen Douglas and coauthors define [End Page 859] them as "attempts to explain the ultimate causes of significant social and political events and circumstances with claims of secret plots by two or more powerful actors" (Douglas et al. 2019, 4). Joseph Uscinski and his colleagues, who are among the most influential political scientists writing on this topic, similarly define a conspiracy theory as "a proposed explanation of events that cites as a main causal factor a small group of persons (the conspirators) acting in secret for their own benefit, against the common good" (Uscinski, Klofstad, and Atkinson 2016, 58). Such theories are not new to American politics. Richard Hofstadter set their pejorative framework by "borrowing a clinical term for other purposes" in describing conspiracism as a mental illness ([1964] 2008, 3). Although some argue that conspiracy theories should be analyzed neutrally or even favorably in some circumstances (Butter and Knight 2020a), most analysts of democracy agree with Hofstadter in fearing and condemning them. They worry that conspiracy theories are gaining importance in our era of partisan polarization, hyperpartisan media, disdain for norms of civility and facticity among some political elites, and digital networks' capacity to create "a global network of village idiots" (Lenny Pozner, in Kolbert 2019). Adherence to conspiracy theories might even be deadly. Early in the COVID-19 pandemic, exposure to misinformation was associated with increased cases and deaths, most likely by discouraging individuals from wearing masks, socially distancing, and minimizing travel (Ash et al. 2020; Bursztyn et al. 2020). By March 2022, Americans over age 12 who were not vaccinated, sometimes due to acceptance of theories about vaccines' harms to one's body, were 17 times more likely to die from COVID-19 than were those who had received primary vaccines and a booster dose (CDC 2022). Coronavirus-related conspiracy narratives may also undermine democratic discourse and practice. Furious encounters between people with opposing views on COVID-19 are commonplace on- and offline. Patients and their families who deny the disease's existence have spit on and threatened medical staff, and some public health [End Page 860] experts feel under threat (McKay et al. 2020). Belief in a connection between COVID-19 and 5G telecommunications technology was positively associated with state anger and greater justification for violence now or perhaps in the future (Jolley and Paterson 2020). More generally, as one scholar summarizes, "conspiracy theories … have been linked to climate denial, vaccine refusal, political apathy, apathy in the workplace, prejudice, crime, and violence. … Conspiracy theories about COVID-19 are no exception" (Douglas 2021, 271). Despite the fact that some beliefs arguably endanger public health, democratic polities must be cautious about restraining conspiracy narratives. Commitments to freedom of speech and assembly, along with protections for privacy, civil liberty, and freedom from surveillance, make it difficult to balance the need for effective governance and public safety against the imperative of individual freedom. And disagreement about how to attempt the balance itself adds another layer of challenge to democracy. In the survey that we describe and analyze...

Practical recommendations to communicate with patients about health‐related conspiracy theories

From COVID-19 Treatment to Miracle Cure

This article focuses on the fear discourse prevalent in the Estonian media and investigates how critical positioning toward so-called quackery and conspiracy theories is constructed within this context, with particular attention to meaning-making processes. Drawing on the framework of fear semiotics and Arlie Hochschild’s concepts of feeling rules and deep stories, we explore the cultural mechanisms underpinning (alleged) fear and suggest ways of engaging with fear discourses without inadvertently reinforcing them. As fear discourse is not only characteristic of media critiques but also central to contemporary conspiracy theories, we begin by examining the fears they articulate and depict. To this end, we draw on our own and our colleagues’ recent research, focusing in particular on examples from the Great Reset super-conspiracy theory, which gained traction during the pandemic years. In our analysis of the fear discourse critiquing conspiracy theories, we identified two interrelated deep stories. The primary deep story underlying the anti-quackery fear discourse rests on the assumption of the human subject as a rational agent. This was particularly prominent in texts warning of the dangers of conspiracy theories – such as the erosion of social cohesion or the rise of polarization – where individuals were portrayed as surrendering reason to unchecked emotion. Similar portrayals emerged in depictions of conspiracy adherents and, at times, their disseminators as manipulated or “brainwashed”. Furthermore, the narrative extended into expressions of phobophobia – the fear of fear itself – underscoring concerns that persistent exposure to fear fosters frustration and hostility. This rationalist deep story also manifested in frequent appeals to scientific authority, where opposing views were discredited through reference to expert consensus and empirical knowledge. Evidence-based medicine was often positioned in stark contrast to pseudo- or fringe therapies associated with quackery, with media texts featuring vivid descriptions of illness and recovery, replete with biomedical terminology. Notably, the figure of the rational subject surfaced not only in discourses opposing conspiracy theories, but also within conspiracy narratives themselves. The second deep story revolved around the so-called power of the word and was predicated on belief in the profound emotional and cognitive influence exerted by conspiracy theories and fear-driven rhetoric. This narrative, too, characterized both conspiratorial and anti-conspiratorial discourses. Across both camps, the media were portrayed as potent tools of manipulation – either in the hands of nefarious conspiracy peddlers, intent on stoking fear, or wielded by their critics. In both frames, emotional responses – particularly fear and anxiety – were seen as easily triggered within the opposing interpretive community. As such, the manipulators were constructed as highly strategic and powerful agents, while those being manipulated appeared devoid of agency. Within this understanding of manipulability, texts critical of conspiracy theories articulated clear affective norms – emotional exploitation and covert persuasion were deemed morally reprehensible. Highly charged expressions such as “quackery believers”, “misinformation bullies”, “quackery kills”, “gullibles”, and “brainwashed” were frequently used to label both the perpetrators and their presumed victims. In discourses expressing phobophobia, it was not fear itself that was condemned, but rather the deliberate cultivation and instrumentalization of fear. In sum, phobophobic rhetoric allowed both members of conspiracy-oriented interpretive communities and their critics to position themselves as rational and morally upright. In-group members were typically portrayed as perceptive and critically minded, while out-group members were depicted as emotionally unstable, manipulable, and trapped in compulsive affective loops.

Conspiracy theories are widespread and have a profound impact on society. The present contribution proposes that conspiracy theories are explanatory narratives that necessarily contain justice judgments, as they include attributions of blame and accusations of unethical or criminal conduct. Conspiratorial narratives also are mental simulations, however, and may elicit genuine feelings of injustice also without evidence of actual malpractice. Indeed, conspiracy theories sometimes describe unfair events that are unlikely to have occurred, unethical authorities that might not actually exist, and so on. Here I propose two complementary processes that stimulate belief in evidence-free conspiracy theories: (1) Existential threats instigate biased mental processing and motivated reasoning, that jointly promote an alternative perception of reality; and (2) group allegiances shape how people perceive, interpret, and remember facts to highlight the immoral qualities of competing outgroups. Due to these processes, conspiracy theories elicit a set of distinct reactions such as poor health choices and rejection of science. Moreover, evidence-free conspiracy theories require interventions beyond traditional approaches to install justice principles, such as debunking falsehoods and reducing polarized intergroup distinctions. I conclude that the scientific study of conspiracy theories is part of, and has a unique place in, social justice research.

Problem setting. One of the distinguishing features of the modern era is the marginal and dubious nature of explanations of complex social realities. Cognitive and symbolic specifics of conspiratorial thinking, marked by a sense of predictability, regularity and explicit simplicity, contribute to the development and dissemination of political mythology.
 Recent research and publications analysis. In recent decades, concepts have been actively used in the body of social science works: paranoid style, conspiratorial narrative, power discourse, unstable ontologies, crisis of production of meanings, conspiratorial worldview. The latest scientific search takes place in the context of abandoning the strict framing of conspiracy theories in favor of a pluralistic approach that combines epistemic, existential and social dimensions of the subject.
 Paper objective. The aim of the article is to try to identify the features of conspiracy in the latest conditions of cultural development.
 Paper main body. The article shows the features of modern conspiracy theories in terms of its paradoxical stability, information and cognitive attractiveness. It is emphasized that the conspiracy discourse determines the peculiarities of the conspiratorial mentality, influencing, in particular, the existential aspects of human life. The consequences of the influence of conspiracy theories can be not only feelings of alienation from politics or radicalization of society, but also the blurring of semantic boundaries between conspiracy theories and more respectable forms of socio-political criticism. Such features make it possible to distinguish positive and critical understandings of conspiracy theory, as well as to outline the main vectors in further theoretical studies of conspiracy theories. Among the distinctive features of conspiratorial meaning formation are the cultural-temporal universality, the paradoxical combination of irrational and rationalist ways of perception, and others. The peculiarities of conspiratorial thinking in comparison with the radical-constructivist specifics of the explanation of the world, as well as in the communicative-narrative logic are analyzed. The difference between conspiratorial meaning formation and the picture of the world in unstable ontologies is shown. Differentiated conspiracy narrative and political imagination. Particular attention is paid to the phenomenon of agency in the context of a multi-vector model of social organization.
 Conclusions of the research. The dynamics of the multifaceted study of conspiracy correlates with the growing awareness that conspiratorial narrative tends to grow significantly and affect society and culture. The stability and success of the conspiracy narrative is ensured by the realization of the claim to "correct" understanding, which makes it quite convincing, and therefore in demand. Conspiracy theories, manifested in various ways of agent communication, range from simple conspiracy through complicity to structural prejudices and ideologies.

Since the breakout of COVID-19 in late 2019, various conspiracy theories have spread widely on social media and other channels, fueling misinformation about the origins of COVID-19 and the motives of those working to combat it. This study analyzes tweets (N = 313,088) collected over a 9-month period in 2020, which mention a set of well-known conspiracy theories about the role of Bill Gates during the pandemic. Using a topic modeling technique (i.e., Biterm Topic Model), this study identified ten salient topics surrounding Bill Gates on Twitter, and we further investigated the interactions between different topics using Granger causality tests. The results demonstrate that emotionally charged conspiratorial narratives are more likely to breed other conspiratorial narratives in the following days. The findings show that each conspiracy theory is not isolated by itself. Instead, they are highly dynamic and interwoven. This study presents new empirical insights into how conspiracy theories spread and interact during crises. Practical and theoretical implications are also discussed.

Recent studies on conspiracy theories employ standardized questionnaires, thus neglecting their narrative qualities by reducing them to mere statements. Recipients are considered as consumers only. Two empirical studies—a conventional survey (n = 63) and a study using the method of narrative construction (n = 30)—which were recently conducted by the authors of this paper—suggest that the truth about conspiracy theories is more complex. Given a set of statements about a dramatic historic event (in our case 9/11) that includes official testimonies, allegations to a conspiracy and extremely conspiratorial statements, the majority of participants created a narrative of 9/11 they deemed plausible that might be considered a conspiracy theory. The resulting 30 idiosyncratic stories imply that no clear distinction between official story and conspiratorial narrative is possible any more when the common approach of questionnaires is abandoned. Based on these findings, we present a new theoretical and methodological approach which acknowledges conspiracy theories as a means of constructing and communicating a set of personal values. While broadening the view upon such theories, we stay compatible with other approaches that have focused on extreme theory types. In our view, accepting conspiracy theories as a common, regulative and possibly benign phenomenon, we will be better able to understand why some people cling to immunized, racist and off-wall stories—and others do not.

This introduction addresses a number of approaches to the emerging field of the study of conspiracy theories and new and alternative religions. Scholars can examine how certain religious groups have been the subject of conspiracy narratives created by the wider culture, and how conspiracy narratives are mobilized within religious groups such as Aum Shinrikyo, Scientology or others. Moreover, we can fruitfully examine secular conspiracy theories through ideas typically applied to religions, such as theodicy, millenarianism, and esoteric claims to higher knowledge. Most studies assume that conspiracy theories indicate pathology—paranoia or simply stupidity. Increasingly however, scholars have begun to interpret the term “conspiracy theory” as operating polemically to stigmatize certain beliefs and ideas. The field therefore offers a microcosm of broader trends in the interplay of knowledge and power. The study of both new and emergent religions and conspiracy theories comes of age only when we cease to think of them as necessarily deviant and irrational.

The paper claims that conspiracy theories in Bulgaria are organized as a milieu rather than as a genre, and that, depending on their intensity, conspiracy theories can perform heterogeneous functions, which range from justification of political claims and popular mobilization to entertainment. Building on that conceptual framework, the paper illustrates the most prominent functional types of Bulgarian conspiracy theories. The higher-intensity theories are exemplified by the narratives of corruption and of the afterlife of the former communist secret services. The lower-intensity theories are illustrated by the fortunately short-lived question if the president of the United States has been abducted by aliens. The impact of the Bulgarian conspiratorial milieu on global theories is represented by the example of the Bulgarian modifications of the traveling narrative of the conspiracy of Jewish bankers. The emancipatory potential of the conspiracy theories is demonstrated by the example of the 2011 anti-GMO protests, motivated by narratives of conspiracy between the government and transnational corporations, which derived their energy from the associated milieu of ecological concerns.

Does belief in climate change conspiracy theories predict everyday life pro-environmental behaviors? Testing the longitudinal relationship in China and the U.S.

Recent research explores the high proliferation of conspiracy theories about COVID-19 vaccination, and their potential effects within digital media environments. By means of a 2 × 2 experimental design (N = 945) conducted in Romania, we explore whether exposure to media messages promoting conspiracy theories about vaccination versus media messages debunking such conspiracy narratives could influence people’s intention to either support or argue against vaccination in front of their friends and family (interpersonal influence). We also analyze the moderation effects of education and critical thinking. Main results show that both conspiracy and counter-conspiracy media content about vaccination negatively affect people’s willingness to discuss the topic with others, which offers support for a silencing effect. Education and critical thinking moderate the main effects, but only to some extent and in certain experimental conditions.

Conspiracy theories are attracting increasing attention from political scientists, much of it negative. Three recent books, from the disciplines of political science, cultural history and social theory, provide a valuable critical corrective. Uscinski and Parent argue that conspiracy theories are connected to partisan distrust and are largely stable across the twentieth century. Michael Butter uses detailed historical cases from the Puritan witch trials to the Red Scare of the 1950s to show the central and influential role that conspiratorial beliefs have played in American history. Luc Boltanski focuses on conspiracy narratives in early detective and spy novels, but situates them in a broader account of the relation between the state, the social and political sciences, and popular representations of political power. Taken together, these books place the problem of conspiracy theory firmly in the context of democratic politics, opening important empirical and conceptual questions about partisanship, populism, publicity and secrecy. Boltanski, L. (2014) Mysteries and Conspiracies: Detective Stories, Spy Novels and the Making of Modern Societies. Translated by Catherine Porter. Cambridge: Polity Press. Butter, M. (2014) Plots, Designs and Schemes: American Conspiracy Theories from the Puritans to the Present. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter. Uscinski, J. E. and Parent, J. M. (2014) American Conspiracy Theories. Oxford: Oxford University Press.