Abstract
Abstract Chapter 11 argues that conscious belief collects (as well as distributes) over conjunction. The chapter then discusses Rosenthal’s principle, according to which if one consciously believes that p, then one believes that p and believes that one oneself believes that p. The principle is strengthened to require conscious belief in the consequent, but then restricted to first- and second-order beliefs to block infinite regress. This explains the epistemic irrationality of fully conscious Moore-paradoxical beliefs. The chapter concludes by discussing cases of Moore-paradoxical beliefs that arise diachronically due to ‘dawning awareness’.
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