Congress at the Bicentennial: A Comment

Abstract

Each of the papers presented in this issue concerns, either explicitly or implicitly, the interaction between individual behavior and institutional development. Their subjects range from the Continental Congress and Confederation Congress to the modern House of Representatives. Three of the papers concern the development (or lack of development) of specific features in national legislatures in the United States. Wilson and Jillson address the lack of institutional support for leadership in the preconstitutional congresses, Gamm and Shepsle consider the growth of standing committees in the House and Senate, and Cooper and Young focus on the evolution of procedures for introducing bills to the House of Representatives. The fourth paper examines institutional change in a broader context: Collie considers the relationship between the rise of individualism in the electoral arena and the rise of individualism in the House. The purpose of my comments are twofold. First, I provide some comments specific to each article. Second, I suggest some generic problems in studies of this type and, perhaps, ways to avoid those problems. For example, the articles by Gamm and Shepsle and by Cooper and Young both confront the problem of explaining institutional change through either a macro or a micro approach. I argue that these approaches need not be contradictory and, indeed, are complementary. This comment first discusses the article by Wilson and Jillson and then discusses the articles by Gamm and Shepsle and by Cooper and Young in tandem. These are considered together because of their similarities: both examine the development of specific practices in the House of Representatives and both contrast macro and micro approaches to the study of institutions. Finally, the Collie essay is considered.