CONCEPTUALIZING STRATEGIC RISK-TAKING BY SMALL STATES UNDER GAME THEORY (A CONSTRUCTIVIST ANALYSIS)

Abstract

This paper undertakes a constructivist analysis of Game Theory approach and presents the co conceptualization of different players in a system i.e. small states, hegemonic and counter-hegemonic states on the basis of role conceptualization , perceptions, ideals and beliefs regarding “self” and “others”. The paper then presents the dilemma faced by a small state in a system while dealing with the hegemon and counter-hegemon and introduces the concept of strategic risk-taking to encapsulate that any action (or inaction) by the small state in a system, even if it be seemingly docile in character aimed at ensuring state sovereignty, is contingent upon the perceptions, beliefs and ideals of the hegemon and counter-hegemon. The paper further argues that any action or inaction by the small state even for securing its sovereignty is deemed a risk-taking action or inaction by the greater power, mostly hegemon. The paper while presenting the case studies from South Asia explores as to how the strategic risk-taking by small states, as perceived by the hegemon or counter-hegemon leads to a lose-lose situation through creation of security dilemmatic situation as a final outcome of the gaming approaches.