Conceptualizing Compartmentalization in International Relations: The Case Of Turkish Foreign Policy

The Turks in the Land of Afghans:History, Politics, and Relationships Mohammed Alrmizan (bio) Introduction Turkish foreign policy in Afghanistan dates to the changing dynamics in the Ottoman Empire's foreign policy, particularly following the Russian Empire's wars and the support of the British Empire during the middle of the nineteenth century.1 The Ottoman Empire then began communicating with the Durrani and Barakzai dynasties in Afghanistan through different missions from Istanbul and Mumbai to Kabul. Ottoman foreign policy did not establish diplomatic relations, although it had previously had some positive communication with the rulers of Afghanistan. Due to increasing weaknesses in its colonies during the Great War and the rise of the İttihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti (Committee of Union and Progress, CUP), the Ottoman Empire ended in collapse. Then, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk rose to power and declared the Republic of Turkey in 1923.2 Turkish foreign policy toward Afghanistan developed through different periods: first, in the Kingdom of Afghanistan until the 1950s, then in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan in the first two decades of the twenty-first century (2004-2021), [End Page 41] and currently in the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan beginning from August 2021 when Taliban forces took over Kabul.3 In parallel, Turkish foreign policy toward Afghanistan, although starting with Atatürk, could not escape the impacts of the country's domestic politics and challenges in previous decades, for instance, the successful coups in 1960, 1971, 1980, and 1997. Furthermore, relations were affected by Turkey's socioeconomic and political developments from the 1960s until the 1990s, including anti-Communism and the rise of Islamism. Such political instabilities, which were either caused by changes in power or by the rise of and conflict between different ideologies, significantly impacted the aims and priorities behind Turkey's foreign policy. Turkish foreign policy in Afghanistan has seen critical developments following the so-called war on terror, including the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001 and later that of NATO in 2003, and in Turkish politics the rise of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his party, Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party, AKP).4 The Erdoğan era has seen proactive, far-reaching, and noticeable developments in Turkey's domestic politics and foreign policy in particular. Turkish foreign policy has taken a different path from that followed from the time of Atatürk's predecessors until Turgut Özal. The rise of Erdoğan and his party has undeniably impacted Turkish foreign policy, especially Turkish-Afghan relations. In his era, Turkey has participated in NATO missions in Afghanistan and has initiated different strategies cementing Turkish-Afghan relations with the various regimes in Afghanistan, which dramatically increased Turkey's role in the country. This came to include overseeing hundreds of humanitarian and developmental assistance projects in Kabul, Mazar-i Sharif, Herat, and other cities, which made Turkey one of the most active foreign powers in Afghanistan.5 This becomes even more interesting when considering the end of the U.S. and NATO military missions and the subsequent departure of foreign forces in late 2021, which allowed the Taliban to take power. This once again made Afghanistan an essential topic in international relations and foreign policymaking in many countries, including Turkey. This article, based mainly on secondary resources and qualitative analysis, [End Page 42] aims to explore Turkish foreign policy in Afghanistan historically, politically, and operationally and is divided into four sections. The first provides a brief account of the history of Afghanistan. The second sheds light on the earlier developments of Turkish foreign policy in Afghanistan, first through the Ottoman Empire and later in the Republic of Turkey through Atatürk and subsequent eras, focusing on the Erdoğan era. Third, the article then investigates the Turkish state and the Taliban from historical, political, and intellectual perspectives, showing the potential similarities and differences between the two entities, and the Turkish foreign policy with a specific focus on the era of Erdoğan in Turkey and the Taliban in Afghanistan. The fourth and final section examines the motivations behind Turkish foreign policy in Afghanistan. A Short History of Afghanistan What is known today as the Islamic...

<p>This thesis is an in-depth study into the New Zealand-Australian relationship and the two nations' divergence in International Relations, with particular reference to the disparate foreign and security policies implemented under the Howard and Clark Governments from 1996/1999 respectively until the present time in 2007. The purpose of this study is to provide an accurate and up-to-date overview of the New Zealand-Australian relationship as it stands today, and to define the main areas of difference between the two countries which are driving trans-Tasman divergence in the international sphere. In pursuit of this goal, the subject-area is explored in the following ways. Chapter One provides a general overview of the trans-Tasman relationship, reflecting specifically on three abiding dynamics which together have contributed to the 'strangeness' of the trans-Tasman rapport from the mid-1800s until today. Chapter Two, defines in fuller detail the greatest areas of divergence between the two countries in their foreign and security policies, and then additionally outlines three important issues in the international sphere on which the Tasman pair have diverged most strikingly in recent years. Chapters Three to Five explore three areas of fundamental difference between the Tasman pair in their International Relations, considered here to be driving factors behind the trans-Tasman divide - namely, different beliefs and approaches towards multilateralism, the use of force and relations with the United States. Finally, Chapters Six and Seven explore three contemporary theories attempting to explain New Zealand and Australia's divergence in International Relations today. There are three main arguments throughout this thesis: first, that New Zealand and Australia are becoming increasingly divergent in their foreign affairs; second, that this divergence is primarily due to the fact that the two countries are fundamentally different in their views and approaches towards three crucial areas within international politics - multilateralism, the use of force and relations with the United States; and thirdly, that these differences in view and approach, and the divergent policies they produce, in turn arise chiefly from completely disparate senses of national identity in the two Tasman countries, which motivate differing - and sometimes conflicting - foreign policy behaviour. These three arguments are explored and expounded in the following ways. With regard to the first argument, Chapter Two provides an in-depth overview of the most important areas of divergence between New Zealand and Australia since 1999. As to the second argument, Chapters Three to Five employ a case study based on discourse analysis into New Zealand and Australian governmental speeches on the 2002-2003 Iraq Crisis - an issue that inherently involved these three fundamental areas of difference - in order to specify how precisely New Zealand and Australia diverge in their view and approach to these three matters based on the two Governments' own self-proffered statements and explanations. These disparate beliefs are then shown to translate into divergent actions and foreign policy behaviour on the world stage, by substantiating such rhetorical statements with evidence taken from the Howard and Clark Governments' foreign policy record, as documented in governmental documents as well as in political and academic literature. Finally, with regard to third argument, Chapters Six and Seven involve a discussion and critique of two rather convincing orthodox explanations for trans-Tasman divergence, Hugh White's 'Strategic Perception' and David McCraw's 'Divergent Political Ideologies', as well as a summary and broad application of one new theoretical explanation called 'Identity Theory' to New Zealand and Australia's foreign policy record, in order to show that it is indeed identity-based explanations, when combined with other strategic and political factors, that in fact provide the most accurate, comprehensive and insightful explanation for New Zealand and Australia's divergent behaviour in the international sphere from the time of Federation in 1901 until today in 2007. This thesis makes the following conclusions: first, that it is fundamentally different beliefs in regard to multilateralism, the use of force and relations with the United States which are driving the 'continental drift' between New Zealand and Australia, through motivating disparate policies and conflicting behaviour by the Tasman pair in their international affairs, as shown during the 2003 Iraq Crisis; secondly, that these dissimilar beliefs regarding the three matters stem in turn from deeply-rooted foreign policy traditions within New Zealand and Australia's own core national identity, namely traditions of independence, idealism and multilateralism in New Zealand, and independence, realism and alliances in Australia; and thirdly, that it is in fact national identity - encompassing national beliefs, traditions and ideas of what the nation stands for and is destined to become - that can best explain nation-state behaviour and action on the world stage today. In my own view, I believe that it is identity theory, when combined with aspects of disparate strategic perception and predominant governmental political ideology advocated by White and McCraw, which together present the best and most wide-ranging means of understanding the complex realities of International Relations today. It is hoped that the research undertaken in this thesis will not only contribute to the new wave of academic literature attempting to describe and explain the differences between New Zealand and Australia in our foreign affairs today in 2007, but also add to the growing consensus in the constructvist academic world that identity-based explanations are crucial for understanding foreign affairs.</p>

Turkey's proactive foreign policy directed at assuming a regional or even global “soft power” role has created heated debate. This development may be explained as the result of the Europeanisation of Turkish political culture and its impact on foreign policy behaviour, as a globalisation trend, as a bargaining card towards the West or even as an alternative foreign policy option. Arguably, the ideas of Ahmet Davutoglu, Turkey's new foreign minister, have contributed at the level of rhetoric; meanwhile, the emphasis of the country's foreign policy on its eastern neighbourhood seems to have less to do with the ruling party's religious premises, than with a rational choice towards the development of an independent foreign policy agenda. It remains to be seen whether this change in rhetoric in Turkish foreign policy will develop into a substantial shift in practice.

Growing studies are focusing on middle powers’ security policies, examining their impact and consequence in the system. Among the states, Türkiye has been through major domestic and foreign changes that have increased its middlepowerness. With this regard, Türkiye’s attitude towards the European Union (EU) seems to evidence patterns that go beyond the common multilateralism shared by other middle powers. Its recent security policies in the Eastern Mediterranean evidence how the Turkish Foreign Policy (TFP) pursues an entrepreneurial strategy that seeks authority and leadership, but the definition of such behaviour still has not been explored entirely. In the light of the recent regional crises in the broad Eastern Mediterranean, this paper analyses transactionalism as the behaviour adopted by Türkiye in the recent years. Empirically, this article progresses the debate about middle powers’ foreign policy behaviour, by investigating Turkish security policies in four different environments: Syria, Libya, Cyprus and Israel/Palestine. Firstly, the article theorises the concept of middle power in the international relations, following the theoretical explanation of transactionalism as an assertive form of behaviour followed by middle powers that seek a higher status. In the empirical part, it then proceeds to explain how geopolitical elements of Turkish security policies can be the primary sources to evidence whether Türkiye has a transactionalist behaviour. The article claims that Türkiye limits multilateralism when it cooperates with EU to gain short-term gain in the geopolitical environment, for then expanding its regional authority by implementing transactionalism in security policies.

The expansion and the new directions of Turkish foreign policy over the last decade have generated a lively debate in domestic and foreign policy circles, among diplomats, analysts, academics, journalists, and businesspeople, and in civil society. The debate revolves around the transformation of Turkey's foreign policy agenda against the backdrop of major shifts in regional and global power structures. Various questions, some well informed and others rather rhetorical, are posed to assess Turkey's standing in global politics.Are Turkey's recent engagements in multiple regions a new phenomenon generated and sustained by the ruling Justice and Development party's (AKP's) domestic agenda? Is Turkey's newfound interest in the Middle East and the larger Muslim world a result of the Islamization of Turkey, as some critics claim? Has Turkey given up on the European Union and thus its traditional alliance with the west? Also, has Turkey found a balance between actor and structure, i.e., does the current foreign policy amount to more than the individual, self-proclaimed initiatives of successive AKP governments? Finally, is Turkey a model for the Arab world? These questions require a proper analysis of the major changes that have taken place in Turkey's own domestic scene, its surrounding regions, and the global order in the first decade of the 2ist century. In an age of increasing interdependence, local and global dynamics affect each other and bring about new synergies. Turkey's adjustment to the post-Cold War world and the challenges of globalization has taken various forms, ranging from a heightened sense of insecurity and new types of nationalism to embracing globalization and exploring new diplomatic and economic tools. While Europe and the US generally treated Turkey as a military ally under NATO during much of the Cold War, the new realities of volatile globalization and multiple modernities have both enabled and forced Turkey to reinvent itself as a new political, economic, and diplomatic power.1 In addition to pursuing EU membership as a strategic goal, even though not much progress has been made since 2005, Turkey has been diversifying its foreign policy agenda in the Middle East, Africa, Asia, and Latin America, and engaging in multiple regional issues. Turkey is also rising as a soft power with a strong economy, a young population, and new cultural ties with the peoples of the Middle East and the Balkans.2To understand why and how Turkish foreign policy is transforming, I shall examine three interrelated issues. The first is the reasons behind the new dynamism in Turkey's foreign policy thinking and action. The elements that drive Turkey's new strategic thinking and modes of action need to be explained within the larger context of the new geostrategic environment in which Turkey has found itself in the 2ist century. The second is the overarching goals and principles of the new mindset that has propelled Turkey into new areas of expansion, engagement, risk-taking, and influence. These goals and principles display both change and continuity and shape Turkey's new ventures on a number of regional and global issues. The third is the instruments and mechanisms that Turkey employs in realizing its foreign policy goals. The successive AKP governments since 2002 have implemented a number of policies, including developing stronger bilateral relations, lifting visa requirements, establishing high strategic councils, and increasing Turkey's mediation efforts.My main argument is that while adjusting itself to the ever-changing dynamics of 21st-century globalization, Turkey operates from a broad foreign policy perspective that combines elements of constructivist and realist approaches to global politics and international relations. Turkey projects its sense of identity and history into its regional and global engagements, seeks to pursue a value-based and principled foreign policy, and responds to the hard realities of power struggles and national interest. …

Behavioral trends in Turkish foreign policy during the rule of the Justice and Development Party Turkey’s foreign policy behavior in a given period can be understood by examining the ruling party and domestic relations, the interests and composition of the governing coalition and prevalent international dynamics. The aim of the article is to show, that paradigmatic shifts in foreign policy and the drivers of Turkey’s quest for autonomous policy space can be understood as an outcome of interrelated transformations at global, regional and domestic levels. After 2010, Turkish foreign policy was marked by a period of „autonomization”, in which the ruling party decided to fill the geopolitical vacuum created in the region after the failure of negotiations with the European Union in the gradual withdrawal of the United States from the local diplomatic chessboard.

47 *Kilic Bugra Kanat is a an assistant professor of Political Science at Penn State University, Erie and a non-Resident Fellow at SETA Foundation. He received his PhD degree in Political Science from Syracuse University (Syracuse, NY). He received his MA in International Affairs from Marquette University (Milwaukee, WI) and his undergraduate education in the International Relations and Sociology from the Middle East Technical University (Ankara, Turkey). 1 Charles F. Hermann, “Changing Course: When Governments Choose to Redirect Foreign Policy,” International Studies Quarterly 34 (1990): 3-21; Jerel A. Rosati, Martin W. Sampson III, and Joe D. Hagan, “The Study of Change in Foreign Policy,” in Foreign Policy Restructuring: How Governments Respond to Global Change, ed. Jerel A. Rosati, Joe D. Hagan, and Martin W. Sampson, (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1994); Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Jakob Gustavsson, The Politics of Foreign Policy Change: Explaining the Swedish Reorientation on EC Membership, (Lund: Lund University Press, 1998); Jakob Gustavsson, “How Should We Study Foreign Policy Change?” Cooperation and Conflict 34 (1999): 73-95.K. J. Holsti, Why Nations Realign: Foreign Policy Restructuring in the Postwar World, (London: Allen and Unwin, 1982), 2. Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies Vol. XXXVI, No.2, Winter 2012 Evolution of Turkish-Israeli Relations 1992-2008: Causes, Actors and Reactions Kılıç Buğra Kanat* Introduction Although “the change in foreign policy” of a country is one of the most frequently used phrases in the field of foreign policy, the issue has remained one of the most understudied topics in academia. Despite developments in other fields, including foreign policy analysis, foreign policy decision-making, and comparative foreign policy, foreign policy change has not generated enough scholarship to be considered a separate field of study. In different instances, several scholars raised red flags about the lack of systematic scholarship on this topic in foreign policy literature and asserted the necessity to form a systemic research program to deal with the issue of foreign policy change.1 Although these calls resulted in the 48 formation of certain theoretical models to understand foreign policy change, these models have not been implemented sufficiently through case studies, and thus their efficacy and empirical relevance have still not been researched or discussed properly. Moreover, different studies in this field rarely engage in a dialogue and there is a significant lack of integrative studies in the field, which would bring together the salient aspects of different studies to create a more comprehensive approach toward foreign policy change. As a result, there is deep disagreement among scholars about the definition, causes, process and outcome of foreign policy change in countries. In this study, I aim to contribute to the literature of foreign policy change scholarship by integrating the findings of different foreign policy change studies with empirical findings on Turkish-Israeli relations. The study will take foreign policy change as a process instead of a single breaking point. It will be argued that, other than in the case of major crises and revolutionary changes, the foreign policy transformation of countries takes place in a gradual fashion as a result of the cumulative effect of domestic, regional and international factors. Monocausal explanations will fail to provide an accurate portrait of the changes in foreign policy and will lead to reductionism in this field. Although some of these factors may play a more prominent role in the path to the policy change, at the end of the day there are only a number of major transformations in foreign policy which took place as a result of only a single factor. In addition, in most instances of foreign policy transformation, change necessitates either a consensus among different actors within an authoritative foreign policy decision unit or an effective and strong leadership. The changes in Turkish foreign policy towards Israel throughout a twenty year period will be used to demonstrate this form of multicausal and gradual evolution in foreign policy. In addition to showing the causes and process of foreign policy changes, the study will also take into account the outcome of those changes. Changes in a country’s foreign policy elicit varied reactions from...

The main idea of this article is to describe the process of Turkish foreign policy evolvement during the rule of Justice and Development party (JDP). From weak economy and unstable political situation in 2001, JDP quickly formulated a new strategy of foreign policy and stabilized economy. In the article the Turkish foreign policy in the 21st century is divided into several stages which respond to different international threats and circumstances. The first stage was a peacekeeping stage when Turkey tried to stabilize the situation near its borders and implement peace initiatives for the purpose to find new markets and allies. As a result, Turkey formulated a new strategy of foreign policy, called "Zero Problems Policy" which aimed to create a ring of friendly countries on the borders. On the second stage, Turkish foreign policy was more active -Turkey tried to balance among regional power centers and confront with one of the most powerful actors -Israel. Confrontation with Tel Aviv was a preface to the third stage, and today under the influence of "Arab Spring" and desire to change its role in international relations, Turkey refused "Zero Problems Policy" strategy and turned to a new aggressive and revanchist idea -neo-Ottomanism. Ankara tries to build a new regional set of rules where Turkey will play a leading role.

Turkish foreign policy has been at the forefront of diplomatic and geopolitical alterations as Ankara has established itself as a regional power over the past decades. Perhaps changes within the foreign policy behavior and output of Ankara have deeply affected its geopolitical neighbors Starting from its isolationism in the Ataturk and Inonu eras to the liberalization of its diplomacy during the Menderes era, followed by military rule and the rise of Islamism, Ankara has faced complicated challenges and difficulties in maneuvering these changes. The Caucasus represents an important geopolitical arena for the Turkish Republic. Regardless of the pragmatic gains, Ankara also has historical, especially Ottoman ties to the region, specifically with Armenia, which used to be part of the Empire and its people called the Armenian Millet. Azerbaijanis are ethnically tied to Turks, as represented by the contemporary political conception tying Turkey with Azerbaijan as “One Nation, Two States” The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict takes center stage in the foreign policies of Armenia and Azerbaijan vis-à-vis each other. Turkey, as a regional power, has taken various stances in approaching this matter, perhaps trying to appear as a neutral mediator. This study employs the Neo-classical Realist Model to comparatively study how Ankara has conducted its foreign policy with Armenia and Azerbaijan, tackling the changes and historical nostalgias involved in the behavior and nature of these foreign policy maneuverings.

The Turkish Republic ended the twentieth century without any significant role in the Middle East. From the end of World War One until the end of the 20th century, Turkey adopted a foreign policy based on isolation from its Arab region and a role that does not exceed its Western allies in international affairs. The Turkish foreign policy could be described as a policy aimed at achieving the security of great powers in the region. However, when the Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power in Turkey in 2002, and its attempts to redefine Turkey's role in the area and to formulate a new foreign policy towards its Arab region and to adopt what was known as the "Zero Problems" policy. But Turkey could not abandon the political constraints imposed by its commitments Especially towards the United States of America. The article (From Border Security to National Security: Change in Turkish Foreign Policy towards the Middle East after 2016 - Realistic Perspective-) adopted the Realistic Theory of International Relations as a basis for analyzing the change in Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East issues after 2016. The article based on the assumption that the failed coup attempt against Turkey on 25 July 2016 has become a pivotal turning point in the political history of the Turkish Republic in general, and especially in Turkey's foreign policy. For the first time in nearly a century Turkey Foreign policy aimed at achieving its national security beyond its geographical borders.

Much praise and calumny has been heaped on the new Turkish Foreign Policy (TFP) for its peculiar record in the last decade. In particular, probing into whether Turkey drifts from the West have recently become something of a cottage industry. Systematic studies analyzing complexities and nuances of the new TFP are scarce. Instead, both the champions and critics of the new TFP often cloak normative and empirical debate in hastily designed conceptual edifice, which not only tend to simplify and misconstrue the whole debate on what is at stake in Turkey's changing identity and foreign policy but also expose deep misperceptions and confusions rather than scholarly communication. This article seeks to offer an analysis of Turkey's new foreign policy orientations in relation to its identity-changes affect policies and positions of Turkey in world politics. It first provides a general overview of the approach developed by the founding figure of the new TFP, Ahmet Davutoglu. Secondly, it identifies theoretical underpinnings of the new TFP with a view to evaluating the role of its religious and cultural identity. Then, a selection of discussions both from the advocates and critics with regard to empirical cases including Iraq and Israeli conundrums are put under scrutiny. Thirdly, the much-hyped debate as to whether the new TFP drifts from the west and its ideals are put into context order to provide a more balanced view of what is at issue in Turkey's changing foreign policy orientations.

Ideational change in the self-characterization of a state is bound to have repercussions on its domestic and foreign policy behavior. Consequently, the gradual but radical change that has been ongoing in Turkey in the past two decades has had a wide-ranging impact on the way Turkish foreign policy has been conducted. Whereas survival and protection of territorial integrity as well as a Western orientation were traditionally the main concerns of Turkish policy-makers, under the rule of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) (since 2002), there has been a partial Islamization of Turkish foreign policy especially with regard to liaisons with Israel and Palestine. This shift can be explained by the replacement of the Western Turkish state identity with an Islamic conservative outlook.

Turkish foreign policy has shifted over the past two decades from a ‘value-rational’ foreign policy to a more ‘purpose-rational’ foreign policy. This shift is driven by changes in three key pillars: civilianization of decision-making processes, defense industry advancement, and changes in the government system. This article begins by framing and contextualizing the two abovementioned foreign-policy concepts. Then, under each pillar, I explore how Turkish foreign policy initially followed a value-rational paradigm and later transitioned to a purpose-rational foreign policy post-2000. I conclude by analyzing the sustainability of this shift and considering its potential long-term consequences for Turkish foreign policy.

Contents: Introduction: is it possible to speak of a process of Europeanisation in Turkish foreign policy? Why is Europeanisation a useful concept for analysing the transformation of Turkish foreign policy? Part I Europeanisation of Political Actors: The difficult process of Europeanisation of Turkish political parties and their foreign policy positions Europeanisation of Turkish governments since 1999 The transformation of security policy and the influence of the military on foreign policy The empowerment of civil society organisations in Turkish foreign policy. Part II Europeanisation of Foreign Policy Practice: EU candidacy and Turkey's historically troubled relationship with two neighbours: Greece and Armenia Cyprus problem: a major case of Europeanisation in Turkish foreign policy Relations with Southern neighbours: Europeanisation or Middle Easternisation? The future of Turkish foreign policy in between the US and the EU Conclusion: permanent Europeanisation or probable shift of axis in Turkish foreign policy Bibliography Index.

Evaluation of Turkish foreign policy events suggests that both external and domestic factors have affected its determination. While a consistent pattern in foreign policy has been observed since Ottoman times, the 20th century has led to substantial challenges. Long-established Turkish foreign policy, based exclusively on external factors, was reshaped to include domestic factors as well. With the new Republic in 1923, the process of reshaping foreign policy, based on Western values, has started. The end of the Cold War started a new era in which domestic factors gained predominance. The aim of this study is to evaluate the factors that have driven Turkish foreign policy and the changes thereto in three different time periods. The most important change is primarily the shift from external factors to domestic factors, especially after the Cold War. However, the period before the end of Cold War is further subdivided into two distinct periods—before and after the Second World War. Balanced neutrality in the pre-World War II period shaped Turkish foreign policy. After the war, with the change in the balance of power in the international system, the U.S.S.R. appeared as a serious threat. The Western Alliance was in the center of Turkish foreign policy. Domestic factors became evident with the 1960 coup d’état, which led to a new constitution to allow different political groups to become active. It was the end of the Cold War which put domestic factors in a predominant position. Ethnic and religious politics posed the biggest challenge for Turkey. Based on the recent events in the international system, Turkish foreign policy is again at a turning point in which domestic factors are not only predominant, but may in fact be the driving force behind foreign policy making.