Competition in recycling and sales market between retailer and third party under cap and trade

ABSTRACTGovernments and enterprises are paying more and more attention to carbon emissions. Considering the dynamic of carbon emissions reduction (CER) and the government intervention, this study discusses the optimal CER effort level, price, and government intervention intensity in a two‐echelon supply chain consisting of a government and two manufacturers. The two manufacturers have two competitive behaviors: Cournot and Stackelberg. Two differential game models are constructed for the two different behaviors, and the optimal decisions under the two models are obtained. The comparisons of these optimal solutions are analyzed, and the influence of some parameters on the optimal solution in the two models is investigated under two scenarios. Furthermore, the optimal government intervention intensity is obtained with the goal of maximizing government utility. The results show that the Stackelberg game allows manufacturers to achieve higher profits and CER but is disadvantageous to consumers, and the manufacturer as the leader has a first‐mover advantage. Fierce market competition leads to greater CER and profits, but higher prices reduce consumer surplus. Larger penalties can promote enterprises to reduce carbon emissions when carbon emissions are large. Compared with the Cournot behavior game, the Stackelberg allows manufacturers to obtain higher profits and CER, but the prices are higher that are detrimental for consumers. The fierce market competition is good for manufacturers, the environment, and the society, but it reduces the consumer surplus. The low CER efficiency causes high costs and reduces the manufacturer's motivation to CER, which harm the environment and reduce profits. The government intervention is negatively correlated with the intensity of market competition and the sensitivity of manufacturers to policies.

Carbon trading volume and price forecasting in China using multiple machine learning models

Faced with increasingly strict carbon emission control, high-emission enterprises need scientific and rational management systems and methods to strengthen carbon emission reduction management. Among the many management systems and methods, the carbon budget has become an effective emission reduction management tool, allowing the planning of carbon emissions and emission reduction activities and rational arrangement of economic inputs. However, judging from the research status and business practices in China and abroad, there is no general carbon budget system to guide the development of carbon emission and emission reduction activities. Based on this background, this paper first attempts to construct an enterprise carbon budget system comprising four sub-budgets: carbon emission, carbon emission reduction and cost, carbon emission rights trading, and carbon emission reduction net profit/loss. It draws on the idea of interactive control to consider the impact of changes in carbon prices, energy prices, and policy guidelines on carbon emission reductions and losses. A carbon budget management system based on interactive control is then constructed and applied to China National Aviation Holding Air China Group (AC Aviation). The research results show that the carbon budget system based on interactive control can dynamically adjust carbon emission reduction behavior based on changes in carbon and energy prices to make carbon budgeting a more viable carbon reduction tool and institutional arrangement.

Carbon emission reduction analysis for cloud computing industry: Can carbon emissions trading and technology innovation help?

<p style='text-indent:20px;'>Motivated by the remanufacturing practice of construction machinery, this paper examines the impacts of different cooperation financing and carbon emission reduction (CER) strategies on the operational decisions in a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) where the original equipment manufacturer (OEM) produces only new products and the capital-constraint retailer produces remanufactured products and sells both new and remanufactured products to consumers. Based on the cooperation level between the OEM and the retailer, four different financing strategies, including the non-cooperation financing (NCF), the supply chain carbon financing (SCCF), the partial cooperation with delay-in-payment financing (PCD), and the full-cooperation financing (FC), are explored. Meanwhile, we extend the proposed models by considering the CER strategy implemented by the OEM, and then investigate its impact on the optimal operational and financing decisions of the retailer. The results show that: i) Under different financing strategies, the CER strategy has no impact on the retail price of remanufactured products, but can help increase the market share of new products and strengthen the market value effect for the OEM. ii) Compared with the scenario without CER, the SCCF strategy can not only ease funding pressure than the NCF strategy for the retailer but also increase the CLSC profit under the CER strategy. iii) No matter which financing strategy is adopted, the CER strategy always has a squeezing effect on the market size of remanufactured products, i.e., the cannibalization effect. iv) The CER strategy is not conducive to the development of the remanufacturing industry, but can improve the environmental performance in terms of reducing emissions and increasing the market sales for new products.</p>

This study uses Stackelberg game theory, considering different combinations of carbon emission reduction policies and that high-carbon-emission enterprises may face various carbon emission reduction regulations, to explore the production inventory problems in a multinational supply chain system. The purpose is to determine the manufacturer’s optimal production, shipping, carbon reduction investment, and the retailer’s replenishment under the equilibrium for different carbon emission policy combinations. To develop the production inventory models, this study first develops the total profit and carbon emission functions of the supply chain members, respectively, and then obtains the optimal solutions and total profits of the manufacturer and the retailer under different carbon emission policy combinations through the mathematical analysis method. Further, this study used several numerical examples to solve and compare the proposed models. The results of numerical analysis show that regardless of the increase in carbon price or carbon tax, the manufacturer and retailer will adjust their decisions to reduce carbon emissions. Specifically, an increase in the carbon price contributes to an increase in the total profit of manufacturers, while an increase in the carbon tax reduces the total profit of manufacturers. This study also explores a sensitivity analysis on the main parameters and has yielded meaningful management insights. For instance, in cases where low-carbonization strategies are required, the manufacturer or retailer can effectively reduce the carbon emissions resulting from production or purchasing activities, thereby significantly reducing overall carbon emissions. It is believed that the results of this study can provide enterprises/supply chains with reference to their respective production, transportation, carbon reduction investment, and inventory decisions under carbon emission policies, as well as information on partner selection and how to adjust decisions under environmental changes.

Role and issues of CCS in long-term sustainable emission reductions and toward sustainable development

Impacts of carbon emissions allowance limitations on carbon price with power generation rights trading in China

Low-carbon planning and optimization of the integrated energy system considering lifetime carbon emissions

Carbon tax for energy-intensive enterprises: A study on carbon emission reduction strategies

With the increasingly serious problem of environmental pollution, reducing carbon emissions has become an urgent task for all countries. The cap-and-trade (C&T) policy has gained international recognition and has been adopted by several countries. In this paper, considering the uncertainty of market demand, we discuss the carbon emission reduction and price policies of two risk-averse competitive manufacturers under the C&T policy. The two manufacturers have two competitive behaviors: simultaneous decision making and sequential decision making. Two models were constructed for these behaviors. The optimal decisions, carbon emission reduction rate, and price were obtained from these two models. Furthermore, in this paper the effects of some key parameters on the optimal decision are discussed, and some managerial insights are obtained. The results show that the lower the manufacturers’ risk aversion level is, the higher their carbon emission reduction rate and utilities. As the carbon quota increases, the manufacturers’ optimal carbon reduction rate and utilities increase. Considering consumers’ environmental awareness, it is more beneficial for the government to reduce the carbon quota and motivate manufacturers’ internal enthusiasm for emission reduction. The government can, through macro control of the market, make carbon trading prices increase appropriately and encourage manufacturers to reduce carbon emissions.

Carbon emissions abatement: Emissions trading vs consumer awareness

Evaluating the effects of green development policies on energy security and carbon emissions reduction.

Carbon emission scenarios of China's power sector: Impact of controlling measures and carbon pricing mechanism

This study aims to effectively reduce carbon emissions by selecting the low-carbon technology service emission reduction modes. This paper constructs a revenue-sharing contract model based on game theory. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the choice of carbon emission reduction strategies for carbon emission-dependent manufacturers and low-carbon technology service providers with advance funding risk aversion. This study analyzes the effects on the optimal decision-making and profits of both parties of the degree of risk aversion and the investment cost coefficient of carbon emissions reduction for service providers, and initial carbon emissions of manufacturers. The optimal carbon emissions reduction strategy of manufacturers and service providers with numerical analysis is obtained, and the revenue-sharing contract coordination is realized. Finally, the validity of the contract is verified by simulation analysis. The results show that manufacturers and service providers can only achieve optimal cooperation for emission reduction within a certain range of parameters. With different investment cost coefficients of carbon emissions reduction and with different initial carbon emissions, manufacturers will adjust the fixed emissions reduction fee and the revenue-sharing coefficient to encourage service providers to offer the optimal carbon emissions reduction rate. This study enriches theoretical research on low-carbon service chains. It also provides important practical evidence to help manufacturers and service providers choose optimal strategies for coordinating revenue-sharing contracts.