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In this article, the author presents established models of association of the European Union (EU) with European third countries. She shows their different strategic perspectives, outlines benefits and problems, and examines the potential for developing these relations. Basically, these can go in the direction of expanding or dismantling partial sectoral integration. In addition, new basic forms of EU neighbourhood relations are discussed: the introduction of a new status of partial membership in the EU and - inspired by the European Economic Area - the creation of a European political and economic area.

Until recently, the on-going legal discussions about ‘Brexit’, the United Kingdom’s upcoming withdrawal from the European Union (EU), have predominantly focused on the requirements and consequences of the withdrawal procedure set out in Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU). A hitherto neglected, though arguably no less important question concerns the effect, if any, that a withdrawal from the EU will have on the UK’s membership in the European Economic Area (EEA): Given that the EEA extends many aspects of EU membership beyond the EU’s borders, resulting in a Common Market ‘light’, a future UK membership in the EEA could – at least from a European business law point of view – effectively result in ‘business as usual’, as a significant share of EU law would continue to apply to UK companies, albeit in form of EEA law. Against this background, it is interesting to note that legal analyses of Brexit generally assume that the UK’s EEA membership will be terminated ipso iure, should the UK decide to withdraw from the EU. According to this view, the UK subsequently could (re-)apply for EEA membership should its government so choose, with such an application having to be accepted by all remaining EEA Contracting Parties – an option commonly referred to as the ‘Norway option’ in reference to Norway’s status within the EEA. The present article challenges the underlying (and often merely implicit) assumption that the UK’s withdrawal from the EU will automatically result in its withdrawal from the EEA, given that the EEA Agreement is a separate international treaty subject to separate legal rules governing withdrawals and effects of possible changes in EU membership. It argues that a withdrawal from the EU will in fact not affect the UK’s continuing EEA membership, as long as the UK does not voluntarily choose to also withdraw from the EEA. It then analyses the post-Brexit situation under the EEA Agreement by addressing its practical application to a number of different areas, as inter alia the free movement of UK companies within the EEA, the future of the ‘European passport’ for UK credit institutions and investment firms, as well as the free (but possibly restrictable) movement of workers in the EEA.

The EU, the EEA Agreement and Norwegian Law Norway has stood on the doorsteps of the European Union (then the European Communities (EC)) for more than four decades. In 1960, Norway became one of the seven original members of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), a trade-blocalternative to the European Economic Community (EEC). The Norwegian people voted against EC-membership in 1972 and 1994. In the late 1980's, a plan to create a single market including both EC and EFTA member states was launched. It resulted in the agreement on the European Economic Area (EEA), which extends the single market and the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital to non-EU EEA member states. Since 1995, EEA has only three member states: Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway. The EEA Agreement is limited in scope: It does not include inter alia justice and home affairs. For EU legislation to become EEA law, the EEA Joint Committee must unanimously agree on including it to the EEA agreement. The EEA has its own institutions, including the EFTA Court, which has a similar function as the European Court of Justice. National courts in the EEA states can request advisory opinions on the interpretation of the EEA Agreement. The goal of the EEA is homogeneity and effectiveness, meaning equal and effective application of law in the EEA region. Effective application of substantive law often requires changes in the civil justice system. Despite being outside EU, Norway participates in some aspects of judicial cooperation. It is a party of the Lugano Convention on jurisdiction and recognition and enforcement judgments in civil and commercial matters of 1988, revised in 2007, and the Schengen Agreement. To enlarge judicial cooperation, the Norwegian government seeks to establish a parallel convention to the regulation on service of documents and the regulation on taking of evidence. The Norwegian civil procedure system is consequently far from unaffected by European law. Norway, as a rule, rejects EEA relevance of EU legislation based on article 81 TFEU, judicial cooperation in civil matters. As a principle, Norway also rejects legislation based on article 114 TFEU on approximation of laws to ensure the functioning of the internal market, if the content is primarily procedural.

A retrospective analysis of applicants to Specialist Registrar training posts in anaesthesia in the Wessex Region of the UK was undertaken. Applicants whose primary medical qualification was obtained in the European Economic Area were compared to applicants whose primary medical qualification was obtained outside it. The time since qualification, the time spent in anaesthesia, the time spent in other specialities, the post currently held and the success of the application were recorded. For doctors with a primary medical qualification from outside the European Economic Area, the median time since obtaining that qualification was 12.0 yr compared with 6.0 yr for doctors qualifying within it (P = 0.0001, U-test). Thirteen out of 89 (15%) doctors whose primary medical qualification was from outside the European Economic Area and 39 out of 61 (64%) doctors whose primary medical qualification was from within it were shortlisted for interview (P = 0.0001, chi2-test). Six out of 13 (46%) shortlisted doctors from outside the European Economic Area were appointed at interview compared with 24 out of 39 (62%) shortlisted doctors who qualified within it (P = 0.33, chi2-test). In the Wessex Region of the UK, applicants whose primary medical qualification is obtained within the European Economic Area are approximately four times as likely to be shortlisted than doctors qualifying outside it. However, after shortlisting, both categories are equally likely to be successful at interview.

Background and objective: A retrospective analysis of applicants to Specialist Registrar training posts in anaesthesia in the Wessex Region of the UK was undertaken. Methods: Applicants whose primary medical qualification was obtained in the European Economic Area were compared to applicants whose primary medical qualification was obtained outside it. The time since qualification, the time spent in anaesthesia, the time spent in other specialities, the post currently held and the success of the application were recorded. Results: For doctors with a primary medical qualification from outside the European Economic Area, the median time since obtaining that qualification was 12.0 yr compared with 6.0 yr for doctors qualifying within it (P = 0.0001, U-test). Thirteen out of 89 (15%) doctors whose primary medical qualification was from outside the European Economic Area and 39 out of 61 (64%) doctors whose primary medical qualification was from within it were shortlisted for interview (P = 0.0001, χ2-test). Six out of 13 (46%) shortlisted doctors from outside the European Economic Area were appointed at interview compared with 24 out of 39 (62%) shortlisted doctors who qualified within it (P = 0.33, χ2-test). Conclusions: In the Wessex Region of the UK, applicants whose primary medical qualification is obtained within the European Economic Area are approximately four times as likely to be shortlisted than doctors qualifying outside it. However, after shortlisting, both categories are equally likely to be successful at interview.

68 Though Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein are not EU countries, they also seek to share the responsibility of reducing socioeconomic disparities on European territory, especially in Eastern and Central Europe. In connection with the EU and EEA enlargement in 2004, Iceland, Norway and Liechtenstein introduced the “Europe Economic Area (EEA)” and “Norway” grant mechanisms [3] aimed at solving the above mentioned problems. The Agreement of the European Economic Area establishes the legislative framework for the single internal market of 27 EU members and three EEA EFTA countries. The agreement guarantees “four freedoms” — the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital — for 30 EEA member states. In addition, the agreement covers co-operation in other important areas such as research and development, education, social policy, environment protection, consumer protection, tourism and culture [1]. The agreement guarantees equal rights and obligations within the internal market for citizens and economic operators in the EEA. The agreement establishes two types of financial mechanisms: multilateral financial mechanism (Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein) and bilateral financial mechanism in Norway. In 2004—2009, 600 million euros were allocated in the framework of the multilateral financial mechanism, and 567 million euros in the framework of the bilateral mechanism; these funds can be assigned only to the states that acceded to the EU not earlier than 2004. The agreements with beneficiary states give priority to the following areas: environment protection, sustainable development, cultural heritage, human resources, healthcare, social protection of children, provided by the requirements of the Schengen acquis, regional policy and cross border cooperation, academic research, technical assistance, in order to meet the EU accession requirements (the Acquis Communautaire). Gender equality, ‘good governance’ and sustainable development are the core criteria for all projects [4]. Eduardas Spiriajevas

Three Essays on the Political Economy of Corporate Bailouts

The European Economic Area (EEA) was created by the Agreement on the European Economic Area, signed at Oporto, Portugal, on 2 May 1992 (‘the EEA Agreement’), which entered into force on 1 January 1994. The EEA was originally intended to create an economic association between two economic blocs in Europe: the European Economic Community (now more often known as the European Union or EU) and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA). In the event, one of the members of EFTA, the Swiss Confederation, declined to ratify the EEA Agreement. Accordingly, the EEA Agreement came into effect as between the EU, and its Member States, and the remaining member states of EFTA (the Republic of Iceland, the Principality of Liechtenstein and the Kingdom of Norway). The EEA therefore comprises all the current Member States of the EU (numbering, at the time of writing, 27) plus Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway. EFTA remains in existence. Those member states of EFTA that are also members of the EEA are often referred to as ‘the EEA EFTA States’ but, in the EEA Agreement itself, and in similar texts, the phrase ‘EFTA States’ is used. In order to avoid confusion, the phrase ‘EEA EFTA States’ will be used in this chapter to describe those EFTA States that are signatories to the EEA agreement. Relevant legislation and statutory standards Article 57 of the EEA Agreement provides that concentrations which create or strengthen a dominant position, as a result of which effective competition would be significantly impeded within the territory covered by the EEA Agreement or a substantial part of it, are incompatible with the Agreement. For the purposes of applying Article 57, use is made of the criteria and concepts to be found in EC Regulation No. 139/2004. That Regulation and the provisions that implement Article 57 of the EEA Agreement also contemplate that, in certain circumstances, a concentration may be referred to a Member State of the EU or an EEA EFTA State to be dealt with under the legislation of that State.

This chapter briefly introduces the European Economic Area (EEA) Agreement and the EEA/European Free Trade Association (EFTA) institutional structures, resulting from that Agreement. It describes the EEA State aid rules and the ESA State aid decision practice. The chapter also analyses the State aid judgments of EFTA Court, rendered in 2012. The EEA Agreement promotes a continuous and balanced strengthening of trade and economic relations between the EEA Contracting Parties with equal conditions of competition and the respect of same rules with a view to creating a homogeneous EEA. A brief study shows that both the ESA and the EFTA Court do apply and interpret the EEA relevant State aid rules with quite some precision, preserving the homogeneous application and interpretation of common rules, both referring to EU practice and case law, as the European Commission and the EU Courts make reference to ESA decisions and EFTA Court judgments. Keywords: EFTA Surveillance Authority (ESA); European Economic Area (EEA); European Free Trade Association (EFTA) institutional structure; European Union (EU) court; state aid rules

This working paper analyses the institutional challenges related to external differentiated integration in the European Economic Area (EEA). It focuses mainly on the formulation of EEA-relevant EU legislation and its incorporation into the EEA Agreement. The paper shows that over the past 25 years various institutional arrangements have been added to the initial institutional framework of the EEA in order to increase and maintain substantive integration. However, the European Union (EU) has been consistent in protecting the autonomy of its decision making which is why the EEA EFTA States have far-reaching access to EU policy making but never the right to vote. The EEA EFTA States therefore insist on separate EEA decision making whenever possible. This has given them a surprisingly large amount of room for manoeuvre for instance, by deliberately delaying the incorporation of politically sensitive acts, and by making EEA-specific adaptations to EU acts. On the other hand, they were also forced to introduce simplified procedures for EEA decision making in order to cope better with the high legislative dynamics of the EU. These procedures give priority to the efficacy of the EEA over the decision-making autonomy of the EEA EFTA States by establishing a more or less automatic rule transfer from the EU to the EEA. Thanks to its far-reaching functional and institutional integration the EEA provides a good example for the analysis of the legal and political feasibility of external differentiated integration. Above all, the results of the empirical analysis demonstrate how difficult it is to reconcile the integration reservations of non-Member States with the principles of the EU in an institutional framework designed to ensure the long-term good functioning of their relations.

The aims of this study were to establish how many dental hygienists were licensed to practice in Canada, Japan, USA and the 18 member states of the European Economic Area (EEA) and to compare these with the populations and numbers of dentists practising in the countries concerned. Data for the overall populations, numbers of 'active' dentists, of dental hygienists and of employed dental hygienists in the member states of the EEA in 1998 were taken from the responses to a Council of European Chief Dental Officers survey carried out in 2000/2001. Data for these variables for Canada, Japan and the USA in 1998 were accessed from published reports. The ratios of population: active dentist; population: dental hygienist; and active dentist: dental hygienist were calculated and compared. The overall populations and total number of active dentists in the 18 EEA member states and Canada plus Japan plus the USA were broadly similar in 1998 (EEA overall population 381 million with 245169 active dentists: Canada/Japan/USA overall population 421 million with 253825 active dentists). However, there were only 13295 dental hygienists in the EEA as opposed to a total of 215435 in Canada, Japan and the USA. In terms of population:dental hygienist and active dentist: dental hygienist ratios the UK was found to have proportionally far fewer dental hygienists than Canada, Japan, USA or the four Nordic members of the EEA. The survey revealed that relative to overall populations and numbers of dentists, there are far fewer dental hygienists in the EEA than in Canada, Japan and the USA and that scope for the UK to import dental hygienists from other EEA member states is probably very limited.

In the European Union and European Economic Area (EU/EEA) three member states have no recognised dental specialties and twelve have four or more. Orthodontics is recognised in most countries and oral surgery in over 60 %. Other common specialties are periodontics and paedodontics. Variation in the numbers of specialties and specialists between individual countries is great and can partly be explained by oral health care systems and traditions to study abroad in some countries. Most existing specialties seem to have emerged from professional interests. Only two, orthodontics and oral surgery, are formally recognised by the European Commission (EC). The new Directive on recognition of professional qualifications has left the recognition of additional dental specialties to be negotiated between individual Member States. This calls for better Pan-European co-operation in dental matters in the future.

The European Economic Area (EEA) Agreement signed in May 1992 between the European Free Trade Area (EFTA) States, the European Community (EC) and the EC member States' seeks to establish “a dynamic and homogeneous” area by extending provisions which apply within the European Community to the EEA.2 The first decision of the EFTA Court,3 interpreting the EEA Agreement to determine its application within the legal orders of the EFTA States, concerned the Finnish alcohol monopoly. The Restamark decision was awaited with great interest to know to what extent the EFTA Court would follow the European Court of Justice's interpretation of the EC Treaty in order to achieve the aims of the EEA Agreement.

Objective The aims of this study were to establish how many dental hygienists were licensed to practice in Canada, Japan, USA and the 18 member states of the European Economic Area (EEA) and to compare these with the populations and numbers of dentists practising in the countries concerned. Method Data for the overall populations, numbers of 'active' dentists, of dental hygienists and of employed dental hygienists in the member states of the EEA in 1998 were taken from the responses to a Council of European Chief Dental Officers survey carried out in 2000/2001. Data for these variables for Canada, Japan and the USA in 1998 were accessed from published reports. The ratios of population: active dentist; population: dental hygienist; and active dentist: dental hygienist were calculated and compared. Results The overall populations and total number of active dentists in the 18 EEA member states and Canada plus Japan plus the USA were broadly similar in 1998 (EEA overall population 381 million with 245,169 active dentists: Canada/Japan/USA overall population 421 million with 253,825 active dentists). However, there were only 13,295 dental hygienists in the EEA as opposed to a total of 215,435 in Canada, Japan and the USA. In terms of population:dental hygienist and active dentist: dental hygienist ratios the UK was found to have proportionally far fewer dental hygienists than Canada, Japan, USA or the four Nordic members of the EEA. Conclusion The survey revealed that relative to overall populations and numbers of dentists, there are far fewer dental hygienists in the EEA than in Canada, Japan and the USA and that scope for the UK to import dental hygienists from other EEA member states is probably very limited.

This thesis first examines the situation of the EFTA after the financial crisis of 2007/2008, including Iceland’s position within Europe. In the following, several possible scenarios for EFTA are being defined and analysed with respect to their likelihood of being implemented. A special focus is set on Switzerland’s position within EFTA and also within Europe, and scenarios are analysed for Switzerland’s future irrespective of EFTA.In order to be able to fully assess EFTA’s future, this paper also touches upon the future of the European Economic Area (EEA). EFTA and the EEA are inevitably linked, as all members of the EEA, apart from the EU, are also EFTA member states. Therefore it follows that EFTA’s future will directly affect the EFTA/EEA institutions, equally EEA’s future as a result also influences EFTA’s future. Furthermore it is essential to additionally contemplate the view of the EU towards the developments within EFTA and the EEA, as the EU is the crucial counterparty in the EEA agreement, able to influence the EEA’s, as well as EFTA’s future to a considerable extent.