Communicating Commander's Intent in a Chain of Command With Multi‐Criteria Decision Analysis—An Experiment in Air Combat

: Effective operational level implementation of the concept of commander's intent has great potential for projecting the CINC's leadership. This potential is not realized today for many reasons: service and joint definitions and descriptions of the concept differ, the concept is not fully embraced by the Air Force and the Navy, and commanders have difficulty expressing their intent. The potential benefits in the military planning process and implementation of plans are not appreciated and current statements lack meaning because the concept is misunderstood. Implementation at the operational level can be particularly influential for naval and air forces with the capability to exert force over a large portion of the theater. To fully realize the potential, several things must happen: all services must use the same joint planning process, the definition and discussion of commander's intent in joint publications must be strengthened, commander's intent must be emphasized by the Air Force and the Navy, and commander's intent should be reinforced during exercises.

About the Authors

This article explains the importance of mission command to joint operational effectiveness through the experiences of the Australian and American armies.Guidance is also given regarding the caveats of subordinate competencies and experiences, which affect the appropriate application of the leadership practice.M ilitary operations-whether combat, peacekeeping, or humanitarian, whether single-country or multinational-are complex and unpredictable.Intelligence, understanding one's own capabilities and limitations, and carefully crafted command guidance at best lend limited insight into how to confront what lies ahead.Adversaries seek to deceive and surprise.Environmental conditions change.Leaders' understanding of circumstances at the sharp end increasingly dims the further up the chain of command one goes, even in an era of communications capabilities undreamed of a generation ago.The sergeant leading his squad sees what his platoon leader cannot.Those at battalion, brigade, and higher know little of what confronts their trusts below.The wise military leader recognizes unforeseeable events always lie ahead.Those commanders, therefore, require subordinates be ready to adapt to the unexpected.Mission command-the practice of assigning a subordinate commander a mission without specifying how the mission is to be achieved-provides a means of addressing this challenge. 1 The United States is not the only country committed to practicing mission command.Armies in Australia, Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Singapore, and the United Kingdom have adopted the familiar approach.Centuries old in concept and decades aged in military doctrines, effective implementation has nonetheless proven elusive.The following paragraphs focus on the Australian approach to mission command.Australia and the United States have a long historical partnership.The two countries' soldiers served side by side in East Timor, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Vietnam; on World War II battlefi elds; and elsewhere.There is great value in learning from such allies and colleagues akin to but different from ourselves.This article presents mission command practices during recent operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, major predecessor confl icts from World War I on, and in today's Australian Army brigade.The events

: Commander's Intent is a command technique that supplies subordinate commanders their superior commander's vision of a mission's end goals and purpose as a method of focusing the subordinates' decisions and initiative. This paper contrasts the US Army's and Marine Corps' heavy emphasis on this command tool in their basic doctrine for all levels of command, with the minimal Air Force use of the concept. The paper describes why this concept is not an obvious aerospace tool by comparing the significant differences between land force and air force combat command and control. The paper then offers potential benefits in wider Air Force use of commander's intent and describes methods of incorporating the technique into the Air Force command and control system. (AN)

The centralized control and decentralized execution is one of the basic tenets of air power command and control, a tenet that has proven its importance and usefulness throughout history. The development of electronic and cyber warfare capabilities, space, surface-to-air missile systems and A2/AD (anti-access/area interdiction) strategies create contested operational environments that limit traditional concepts of command and control (C2) in the effective employment of air forces. The new US Air Force Doctrine, “Air Force Doctrine Publication 1 – The Air Force”, formally establishes mission command as the philosophy for command and control (C2) airpower and centralized command, distributed control, and decentralized execution the way to be implemented. Conducting air operations in a contested operational environment requires an approach to command-and-control principles that responds to threats to communications and attacks on air operations centres. Distributed control exploits the flexibility and versatility of air power to ensure that it remains responsive, survivable, and sustainable, especially in a contested environment. The benefits associated with distributed control (as well as decentralized execution) are maximized when the commander's intent is clearly communicated and guides subordinate actions, in order to allow continuity of operations. Commanders will continue to face the challenge of harmonising centralization, distribution and decentralization, a struggle that will be situation dependent and that requires an approach within the guidance of the higher echelon.

About the Authors

: The crowd roars with laughter. The quick, clever banter invented by the two actors on stage seems planned, but it is not. The actors are performing a Harold, where each player invents a role for himself and a story unfolds before the audience. Underneath the apparent chaos, though, is a very simple concept that fosters spontaneity: the concept of acceptance. Notice that in the above example, taken from Malcom Gladwell's book, Blink, neither actor tries to pull the scene in a certain direction. Actor A initiates the situation and even points actor B in a certain direction (being a doctor); actor B decides that his counterpart's leg is made of wood, and so on. The concept of acceptance means that no initiative is wrong in improvisation; it must be adjusted to and incorporated into the scene. It is the singular unifying force that gives direction to the actors and allows comedy to evolve in the midst of apparent chaos. More importantly, it fosters unspoken, instantaneous understanding and interaction: the art of implicit communication. To any military unit dealing with the complexities of today's battlefield, implicit communication, like that used by the comedy troupe, is a powerful tool. It is the very antithesis of micromanagement. Subordinate units, even individuals, are more able to take initiative within the commander's intent, and information flow is expedited up and down the chain of command, often without words. Unfortunately, due to the nature of the current conflict and accepted personnel staffing practices, many deploying units are unable to truly grow implicit communication. The cost is heavy; it directly correlates to the unit's ability to perform its mission and can be measured in loss of equipment and personnel. Despite the difficulties of the current wartime requirements, the Marine Corps could better prepare its deploying units by taking simple measures to facilitate the use of implicit communication.

Contributors

Multiple Criteria Decision Analysis for Health Technology Assessment

Software tools are now available to assist the Air and Space Operations Center (AOC) with effects based Course of Action (COA) development, analysis, comparison and selection.In 2001, the Information Directorate of the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) initiated an advanced technology demonstration program in the area of effects based operations.The program set out to develop new concepts and a software toolset to meet the AOC requirement for effects based targeting and campaign assessment.At the core of the toolset are the Strategy Development Tool (SDT) and Causal Analysis Tool (CAT).The Strategy Development Tool guides the user through the development of effects based COAs.During the initial planning phase, the Causal Analysis Tool predicts the probability of achieving commander's intent for the effects based COAs.During execution, the Causal Analysis Tool acts as a campaign assessment tool by incorporating accrued evidence provided by a multi-intelligence fusion component.An attrition-based campaign level wargaming tool was also developed to supplement COA analysis The goal is to transition the software tools to AOC strategists to help them achieve an effects based approach to the COA development process described in Joint Publication 3-30, "Command and Control for Joint Air Operations."Though focused on air operations, the tools can be used at the Joint Force Command level as well.

Sexual Assault in the Military: A Discussion of the Current Status and Future Prevention

"Over the time, spreading the commander’s vision at the execution level has required a format as well as a language that could ensure the fluidity of information and their understanding, above all. This has taken shape in the concept that has been coined the “commander’s intent”, acknowledged as the key element in providing the necessary framework for expressing the freedom of action, playing the important role of strengthening and encouraging the initiative of subordinate commanders during mission accomplishment."

: The Expeditionary Aerospace Force (EAF) concept and the concurrent revolution in military affairs has introduced to the warfighter a multitude of means to better enable them to accomplish their mission. The Air Expeditionary Wing (AEW), as a part of the Air Expeditionary Force, will become the United States Air Force's quick reacting, on-call fighting force. It is essential that the Air Force leverage capabilities stemming from the revolution in military affairs and its accompanying revolution in military technology to improve the Air Expeditionary Wing's ability to not only react, but also to act. As the United States Air Force continues to develop the Expeditionary Aerospace Force concept, within the broad guidance of Joint Vision 2010 and Global Engagement, changes to three primary areas will need to take place. The technology, organizational structures and doctrine that the Air Expeditionary Wing incorporates needs to be adapted in light of this Revolution in Military Affairs. The Air Expeditionary Wing concept will present challenges to orthodox Air Force way of thought. New technologies, combined with new organizational structures demonstrated during recent deployments and Air Force experiments, and the introduction of commander's intent with mission-type orders can revolutionize the On-call AEW. To embrace innovation, one must accept change.

Purpose – The purpose of this research is to develop a theoretical understanding of indirect leadership in a severely stressful peacekeeping context, focusing on the perspective of subordinates. Peacekeeping missions in recent decades have led to increased exposure to acute danger.Design/methodology/approach – Retrospective in-depth interviews were carried out with 17 Norwegian officers and soldiers, who were involved in the handling of a violent riot in Kosovo during a peacekeeping mission. The interviews were analyzed using a grounded theory approach.Findings – A model emerged with three categories: Situational Characteristics, Organizational Characteristics, and the Commander's Intent. A related core category was labelled Subordinates' Appraisal or Sensemaking. During the climax of the riot, a strict following of the ordinary chain of command was impractical. Local initiatives at lower organizational levels were needed, but these, in turn, required competence and a trustful organizational environment.Research limitations/implications – Not representative of the entire population. Given the male-dominated military context under consideration, there could be no meaningful analysis of possible gender-related differences. The results related to a general model of indirect leadership and specific stress. Organizational theory-related additions and limitations are suggested.Practical implications – The proposed model may be a practical tool for management education.Originality/value – The study's identification of key aspects of indirect leadership in severely stressful contexts is a useful addition to the literature.

: The United States Air Force's Officer's Career Path Guide cites 47 different careers paths that an officer can pursue covering a vast array of specialty occupations required to support the ultimate mission of the Air Force. As officers progress up the chain of command, the demands placed on them change and their knowledge base is required to expand beyond that of their native specialty. However, the Air Force born from technology and dedicated to the pursuit and exploitation of it has evolved an officer development process that puts greater emphasis on individual specialization skills and expertise than on the future broad development of our senior leaders. The effect of this long-term policy is the creation of senior officers with highly specialized skills in a specific occupation yet lacking the true knowledge and skills in our real profession, the Profession of Arms. The contracting career field is a prlme example of what many refer to as a stove-piped specialty in which officers enter as lieutenants and stay until completion of their Air Force career, many never venturing far away from their home career field.