Common pool water resources management considering a regulator interference: A game theory approach to derive managerial policies for Urmia lake, Iran

Abstract

AbstractAn increased need for water, combined with a scarcity of water resources, has resulted in serious challenges regarding water resource management. Those issues have always been a major concern of most research regarding the management and operation of water resources. Various qualitative and quantitative methods, Game Theory (GT) being an example, have been proposed for managing common pool water resources. This study adopts GT to address a case of common pool water resource management, including consideration of the interference of a regulator. Urmia lake in north‐western Iran was chosen as an illustration of a common source of water shared between two provinces acting as littoral stakeholders to the lake. Due to a non‐cooperative behaviour of the stakeholders, the lake is most likely to dry up. To change the game situation, a regulator was inserted into the game as a third player. The game among players is investigated in terms of two static and dynamic game methods. Two strategies are defined for each player. The equilibrium point will be achieved according to the strategies adopted by the players. For static games, a low‐level equilibrium under non‐cooperation conditions is obtained. Dynamic games among players are more likely to occur, rather than static games. The equilibrium of high‐level productivity will be obtained under cooperative conditions among the players.