Common Law Evidence and the Common Law of Human Rights

Regional human rights courts like the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR), and the African Court of Human and People's Rights (ACtHPR) have become popular sites of mobilization for victims and activists who seek justice when justice fails at home. Besides being platforms for individual remedy, human rights courts increasingly shape social norms and state policy within countries, making them attractive avenues for rights advocates to develop new norms or to push domestic authorities to reform legislation. The judges of these courts can decide, for example, whether same-sex couples have a right to be married, if prisoners have the right to vote or receive HIV/AIDS treatment, or when a state can deport illegal immigrants to a country where they will likely be tortured. As these courts pass their judgments, they often find themselves in conflict with states that are violating human rights of marginalized groups on a large scale and are unwilling to implement international rulings. Although international human rights courts have become increasingly popular venues among victims and activists who seek justice when justice fails at home, we are only beginning to understand how activists play roles in shaping the development of regional human rights courts' case law—the body of judgments that shapes how judges will make their decisions in the future. We now have plenty of international relations and international legal research on the interactions between states and international courts: how judges in these courts wrestle between deferring to the interests of member state governments whose actions are on trial and sticking closely to the conventions' fundamental yet evolving principles (Alter et al., 2019; Helfer & Voeten, 2014). As some states begin to resist international courts' authority, scholars have begun to examine the dynamics of this backlash (Hillebrecht, 2022; Madsen et al., 2018; Sandholtz et al., 2018). Recent studies have also demonstrated that human rights advocates—whether NGOs or individual lawyers—have a significant impact on shaping the jurisprudence of international courts and the impact judgments have in concrete locations (Kahraman, 2018; Sundstrom, 2014; van der Vet, 2012; Kurban, 2020; Conant, 2018; Harms, 2021; Cichowski, 2016; Hodson, 2011; Haddad, 2018). Meanwhile, these advocates themselves have been subject to repression and stigmatization by governments as part of the backlash phenomenon. Without an adequate understanding of the factors shaping activists' engagement with international courts, we risk undervaluing their strategic impact on the expansion of case law, the human rights protection of marginalized groups who cannot find remedies at home, and the domestic implementation of these judgments in an age of state backlash. In this section, we summarize the three papers contained in this symposium and their original contributions to these themes. Over the last decade, dozens of countries have erected legal barriers or started vilifying campaigns to stymie the work of NGOs (Buyse, 2018; Chaudhry, 2022). One tactic in this toolkit is the enactment of burdensome regulation on NGOs that receive funds from foreign donors as they allegedly promote foreign agendas (Christensen & Weinstein, 2013; Dupuy et al., 2021). States that frequently abuse human rights are especially prone to target NGOs that engage in strategic litigation (Hillebrecht, 2019). Most NGOs depend on foreign funding, and NGOs that litigate international cases fall disproportionately in this category, but do funders affect the selection of cases? In “Foreign Agents or Agents of Justice? Private Foundations, NGO Backlash, and International Human Rights Litigation,” Heidi Haddad and Lisa Sundstrom examine the extent to which Western donors, particularly private foundations, have encouraged NGOs in Europe to litigate at the ECtHR as a human rights advocacy strategy. They examine overall patterns of donor funding and NGO litigation records, and look in more detail at the case of Russian NGOs' foreign funding and litigation records. The analysis is extremely timely, as the Russian government's criminalization of independent civil society actors, especially in the human rights field, and their accusation that foreign funding turns NGOs into “foreign agents” have been crucial elements of the Russian regime's autocratization. This claim has also provided fuel for Russia's disenchantment with the ECtHR in recent years, contributing to the assessment of many observers that Russia's full-scale attack on Ukraine was the last straw in an inevitable collision course leading to its exit from the Council of Europe. Haddad and Sundstrom debunk the idea that foreign donors are pushing NGOs toward strategies of human rights litigation. Instead, they argue, there is more evidence that NGOs themselves promoted the mechanism of international litigation as a strategy that donors later adopted. This article is a poignant reminder of the advocacy tools that Russian human rights activists and citizens have lost as a result of their government's departure from the Council of Europe, including ECtHR jurisdiction. Yet it also provides insight into the likely roles of foreign donors in other country cases where NGOs are using international court litigation as a human rights advocacy strategy, which is often a target of the ire of national governments, as explored in the next article in the symposium. When states attack human rights NGOs within their borders and/or international human rights courts themselves, how does this affect the willingness of those NGOs to take cases to international courts, and the ways in which they do so? De Silva and Plagis ask this question in their article about state backlash against NGOs in the case of Tanzania and the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights. A fascinating empirical question they pose is: does state backlash against NGOs increase NGO litigation at international courts (to contest state repression at those courts and use international mechanisms when domestic ones are not available), roughly in line with Keck and Sikkink's famous “boomerang pattern” (Keck & Sikkink, 1998), or decrease it due to heightened fear and restricted NGO capabilities that state repression creates? Employing a process-tracing analysis of NGOs' involvement in three cases before the African Court at different stages of the Tanzanian government's backlash against the Court, De Silva and Plagis find that “two-level backlash” by states can result in both phenomena, either promoting or deterring NGO legal mobilization at international human rights courts, depending on certain conditions. The three selected cases concerning the death penalty, the rights of persons with albinism, and the rights of pregnant schoolgirls and mothers, which took place at different time periods, demonstrate a number of patterns of state backlash interacting with NGO strategies. The authors find that domestic-level state backlash deterred domestic NGOs from partnering with international NGOs in litigation, but that such backlash, when it repressed domestic political and legal mobilization opportunities, actually encouraged both Tanzanian and international NGOs to turn to the African Court more frequently to seek remedies. International-level backlash in turn only deterred NGOs from international litigation when such backlash consisted of state efforts to restrict NGOs' ability to engage in litigation, and not when the international backlash was in the form of routine noncompliance with African Court rulings. Importantly, the authors find that NGO responses to state backlash were significantly shaped by their degree of legal consciousness and expertise with the rules, proceedings, and workings of the African Court. Those NGOs with less knowledge and experience were more likely to back away from engaging with the Court under the pressure of state backlash. De Silva and Plagis conclude that “NGOs' persistent human rights advocacy in the face of state backlash is a double-edged sword,” in the sense that they may not be deterred by state backlash initially, but there is a danger that their continued determination to engage in international litigation could prompt governments to engage in even more severe forms of backlash, with critical impacts on international courts and already vulnerable human rights defenders. Rights advocates have a growing menu of institutions and courts available to them. How do activists choose at which institution to lodge their cases in a world where legal remedies have diversified, or as some have argued, fragmented (Koskenniemi & Leino, 2002)? In “What Makes an International Institution Work for Labor Activists? Shaping International Law through Strategic Litigation,” Filiz Kahraman goes beyond the tendency of legal mobilization studies to only examine how activists interact with a single court or institution. Instead, Kahraman opens up how rights advocates imagine which institution is most receptive to their claims. Drawing on a comparative interview study of British and Turkish trade union activists and their legal mobilization campaigns at international courts and quasi-judicial institutions like the International Labor Organization (ILO), Kahraman examines how activists first probe and then strategically identify which court or international institution is most susceptible to their primary goals of influencing structural reforms and setting new norms. Through this probing process—or dynamic signaling game between courts and litigants—activists push a court's jurisprudence and case law into new issue areas. For instance, at the ECtHR, Turkish trade unionists challenged domestic courts' ruling that public sector workers did not have the right to establish unions, even though the ECtHR had no established case law on labor rights in 1990s. They won the case, with the ECtHR finding that Turkey violated the right of public sector workers to unionize. These cases not only had an impact within Turkey, but over the next decades, similar cases brought by British unionists would spin off the early precedent set by the Turkish legal mobilization efforts. Kahraman argues that they ultimately pushed the ECtHR to recognize the basic trade union rights as fundamental human rights. Kahraman sheds light on the often hidden strategies behind international litigation. Activists litigate not just for the immediate impact on the current case they work on, but how they envision that all the cases they work on may shape norms and domestic structural reforms further in the future. Whether an institution is perceptive of claims lies in the eye of the beholder. Kahraman finds that besides targeting institutions with high compliance rates, they also take cases to institutions with low rates of compliance, especially “if these institutions have extensive judicial authority to create new international norms.” So, it is not the de jure protection set by an international courts, but rather how activists perceive the juridical responsiveness and judicial authority of courts—or, how judges adopt either an activist approach or restraint in response to incoming cases and how willing states are to implement cases of a court, respectively—that determines why activists select certain courts or quasi-judicial institutions (like the ILO). Kahraman gives us new tools to interpret how activists perceive authority and receptiveness and respond to opportunities. Rather than static external legal remedies, courts and quasi-judicial institutions are opportunity structures that are malleable to the strategic vision of the activist or litigant. The articles in this symposium together reveal a number of key overlapping insights. At the broadest level, they demonstrate that activists' behaviors and strategies influence international courts' jurisprudence, politics within states, and the human rights outcomes of everyday citizens—and these influences have often been hidden in our existing canon of research on international courts. In addition, all of these articles show that, while activists may face challenges in their efforts, often including significant backlash from their home state governments, they also continue to retain significant agency through their creative efforts to develop legal strategies and circumvent state repression. Activists perennially innovate: sparking the ideas that inspire donors who fund them; calculating how to continue their litigation work when government actors threaten them; and taking risks in litigation to push courts to expand how they define human rights. However, along with these uplifting conclusions, there are worrying patterns that demand future research. States are increasingly pushing back against the powers of international courts to bind them to costly measures, and as this symposium has shown, national governments often point to activists as contributors to this “problem” of invasive international human rights standards. A growing body of research has tracked how human rights defenders of all kinds globally are under threat from actors like governments and corporations who disagree with their contentious actions. We need more studies that gather comprehensive data and systematically track these threats, specifically with regard to activists who engage in international human rights litigation. We suspect that such activists are likely disproportionately targeted due to the international visibility of their complaints. We also desperately need research into possible innovative responses to these threats to activists—responses from activists, funders, governments of countries that support human rights, and international courts themselves. Freek van der Vet is a University Researcher at the Erik Castrén Institute of International Law and Human Rights, Faculty of Law, University of Helsinki and the principal investigator of the Toxic Crimes Project. Lisa McIntosh Sundstrom is Professor of Political Science at the University of British Columbia. She is the director of the ActinCourts network at UBC and conducts research on legal mobilization by Russian activists.

As is well known, different countries may have a different attitude toward the formal rank of international human rights law in domestic legal order. In those countries that qualify the ratified international human rights law merely as statute, the formal rank of international human rights law is often used as an argument against the binding force of international human rights law on domestic constitutional law. Through a comparative analysis between Germany and Taiwan, though, this paper shows that, despite similar determinations on the formal rank of international (human rights) law, the German and the Taiwanese Constitutional Courts have developed quite different views on the normative significance of international human rights law to their domestic constitutional orders. The different constitutional practices in Germany and Taiwan thus not only reflect Taiwan’s unique international status, but also indicate that the formal rank of international human rights law does not have much to do with its normative binding force on domestic constitutional law. Those who use formal rank as an argument against the binding force of international human rights law on constitutional law presuppose the absolute dichotomy of international and domestic law and thereby overlook the potential compatibility between international human rights law and constitutional law. From a human rights perspective, I argue that international human rights law should not be regarded as an “external” law, but rather as a framework order which delegates domestic constitutional orders to concretize international human rights law according to their own needs or interests so as to fulfill their international task of human rights protection on national level. Viewed this way, the determination on the formal rank of international human rights law in domestic legal order matters only because it has to do with the determination of a certain constitutional order on the way in which it concretizes international human rights law.

The British House of Lords recently considered whether Augusto Pinochet was entitled to immunity from arrest and possible extradition to Spain for human rights abuses allegedly committed during his reign as Chile?s head of state. In its second decision in the case (after the first one was vacated due to a conflict of interest), the House of Lords concluded that Pinochet was not entitled to immunity for acts of torture and related conduct committed after Britain?s 1988 ratification of an international convention against torture. In addressing this immunity issue, the parties and judges in the Pinochet case looked closely at the large and growing body of U.S. case law involving civil suits against foreign officials for alleged human rights abuses committed in foreign countries. In this article, we in effect do the opposite: we assess how the Pinochet decision might be relevant to international human rights litigation in U.S. courts. The article focuses on three issues in particular. It first considers whether developments in international human rights law limit the scope of the domestic immunity available to foreign governments and officials. The House of Lords held that these developments did limit the scope of Pinochet?s immunity from criminal process in Great Britain. In the United States, however, the political branches and the federal courts have, with narrow and specific exceptions, declined to permit developments in international human rights law to limit the scope of foreign sovereign immunity from civil process. As we explain, the adverse political consequences that might flow from otherwise-unfettered private lawsuits against foreign officials for human rights abuses justify the broader immunities available in U.S. domestic courts. The second issue is the legitimacy of a U.S. counterpart to the British rule, invoked by some of the Law Lords in Pinochet, that customary international law ("CIL") is part of the British common law. In the United States, plaintiffs and scholars have argued for a similar rule of incorporation to justify the domestic application of substantive international human rights law. As we explain, however, the constitutional implications of an automatically-incorporated CIL are substantially different for the United States than they are for Great Britain. And, when faced with claims of international immunity, such as the claim of head-of-state immunity that was at issue in Pinochet, U.S. courts do not apply the CIL governing this immunity directly. Instead, they seek and follow political branch authorization. The failure by courts to apply CIL as automatically-incorporated common law in this context, involving traditional rules of CIL that are a central component of international relations, casts substantial doubt on the conventional wisdom that international human rights law should be applied as self-executing federal common law. Finally, the article defends the United States? general resistance to the domestic application of international human rights law. This resistance has two dimensions. First, the United States does not apply international human rights law to domestic officials. This approach is justified by the profound uncertainty regarding the source and content of international law, and the general adequacy of U.S. domestic human rights protections. Second, the United States permits the domestic application of international human rights law against foreign governmental officials, but only in very narrow contexts. This limited embrace of international human rights law reflects a legitimate concern with giving private citizens, and unelected judges, too much influence over U.S. foreign relations. As we explain, both of these justifications for resistance to the domestic application of international human rights law ? the vagueness of international norms and the danger that private lawsuits will interfere with foreign relations ? find support in the House of Lords? decision in Pinochet.

The nature of the relationship between international humanitarian law and international human rights law remains a vexed one. In recent years, human rights lawyers and activists have sought to apply human rights norms to military conduct in international and internal conflicts, and during belligerent occupations. With varying degrees of success, complainants have brought their cases before international tribunals, and to national courts able to apply international human rights standards. This development has occurred largely because forums exist to hear human rights claims, whereas they do not for persons claiming individual redress for violations of international humanitarian law. However, human rights norms have also been seen as more restrictive: as placing greater constraints on States' freedom to conduct hostilities, preventively detain, and administer occupied territories. It is for this reason that some States have resisted attempts to extend the reach of international human rights law into areas traditionally seen as governed by international humanitarian law. This chapter argues that principles have now developed to govern the relationship between the two bodies of law. However, their application to different situations remains a work-in-progress and controversies remain. In particular, despite valient efforts, it remains unclear what what happens in situations where the two bodies of law cannot be read together? There are only few rules of norm-conflict resolution in international law, all of which have limited application in the context of the relationship between international humanitarian law and human rights law. Most inconsistencies between the rules of the two bodies of law are not true conflicts at all, as they do not require States to conduct themselves in different ways. It is simply that international humanitarian law is the more permissive system. In such situations, to argue that the two bodies of law are ‘complementary and mutually reinforcing’ is to do little more than issue a policy prescription. In reality, in such cases States have to make a choice as regards which rules they wish to comply (a choice which is likely to be a political one) and take the consequences. There are fundamental incompatibilities between international humanitarian law and human rights law, not only as regards discrete rules but in their theoretical bases. Attempts can be made to reconcile them, to avoid conflicts, but they can only be provisional and on a case-by-case basis. The legal tools available cannot always provide an answer. Absent legislation, conflicts will remain. And in a world of States with differing interests and values, the adoption of new rules governing armed conflict and belligerent occupation will be difficult, if not impossible. One difference between the two bodies of rules, in particular, remains fundamental. Despite developments over past decades which are said to indicate a ‘humanization of humanitarian law’, international humanitarian law, in contrast to human rights law, is not based on an individual rights paradigm. It is this difference, even excluding the differences in the substantive protections accorded individuals under the two bodies of law, which will ensure that individuals continue to bring complaints regarding their treatment in situations of armed conflict before human rights bodies. And even if human rights bodies take the view that States’ human rights obligations in situations of armed conflict are to be interpreted using the yardstick of international humanitarian law, their interpretations of humanitarian law are likely to differ from lawyers advising States’ defence ministries and armed forces, who are likely to continue to be unhappy with such trespasses into what they see as their chasse gardee.

The Nuremberg tribunal was the expression and the beginning of states' recognition of their duty to prosecute genocide and other gross human rights violations. It was a first step towards fulfillin...

Since the World War, international cooperation has been made to preserve the peace and interests of the human community, and representative results include the creation of international organizations and the establishment of international human rights treaties and norms(conventions). In particular, as the issue of human rights protection is recognized as a significant governmental matter, each country is striving to find a means to secure the legal effectiveness of international human rights norms within the country. However, given that the contents of international human rights norms are generally similar to the contents of the constitutional basic rights of the countries that accepted them, it has been discussed that it is necessary to incorporate international human rights norms into the Constitution and recognize the same effect as the Constitution (or constitutional basic rights). However, there is a counterargument that the constitutionalization of international human rights norms cannot be evaluated as desirable because it could undermine the foundation of the national legal system and people’s sovereignty. In addition, it may be questioned whether the constitutionalization of international human rights norms must be premised in securing the legal effectiveness of international human rights norms and their usefulness in constitutional adjudication. This article, focusing on the actual cases of the Constitutional Court of Korea, reviewed what legal and systematic status the Constitutional Court has recognized in international human rights norms and how they have been used in actual adjudication. According to this review, it seems the Constitutional Court sometimes directly used international human rights norms as constitutional norms(standard of review), but a close analysis of related decisions shows that the Court does not use international human rights norms as a direct criterion for constitutional adjudication and uses them as supplementary material for interpreting constitutional basic rights and principles. In particular, the Constitutional Court shows a pragmatical attitude of using it as a supplementary material for constitutional interpretation without judging the legal status of international human rights norms. The Constitutional Court's strategy of using international human rights norms as significant material for constitutional adjudication without shaking the legal system is a dynamic constitutional interpretation process that can localize the universal content of international human rights norms while maintaining the public autonomy of members of the legal community. Through this, international human rights norms will be able to secure a balance of universality and locality, legitimacy and effectiveness, abstraction and specificity, moral legitimacy and democratic-political legitimacy. However, the Constitutional Court is generally considered passive in using international human rights norms in constitutional interpretation, and, in reality, only a few international human rights norms are used, and furthermore, there is no in-depth argument for justification of use of international human rights norms in cases, so it is confirmed that international human rights norms are used superficially and decoratively. In order to improve this, it is necessary to consider preparing a system or practice that actively refers to and properly considers international human rights norms in constitutional adjudication. Above all, it is necessary to fully review related international human rights norms and discussions in the process of constitutional interpretation and establish a faithful method of argumentation of connection and integration that ultimately converts discussions of international human rights norms into constitutional discourse.

Central Asian States’ Compliance with International Refugee and Human Rights Law Both China and Central Asian states are parties to the major international human rights instruments that demand protection of the human rights of ethnic and religious minorities as well as protection of refugees from persecution based on their ethnicity and religious and political views. This chapter explores how Central Asian states have been balancing their international human rights obligations towards Chinese Uyghur asylum seekers and their regional obligations under the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) to fight against terrorism, extremism and separatism. The author finds that Central Asian states have continuously treated Chinese asylum seekers as a political matter and have given preference to their regional commitments towards China over their international human rights obligations, which has resulted in the absence of any real protection for Chinese asylum seekers in the region. This chapter argues that while Central Asian states may see compliance with human rights obligations to be politically inconvenient, only due compliance with international refugee and human rights law in good faith will benefit these states in the long run. In particular, a strictly legal approach to Chinese asylum seekers will help Central Asian states assert their sovereign equality and independence within the SCO and balance out China’s growing influence on their domestic policy.

Human rights queryfalse are typically presented in terms of entitlements, correlative duties, claims, “trumps,” and remedies. 1 These framings, which draw principally on law and philosophy, emphasi...

Global inequities persist despite the achievements of the human rights project so far, as Kofi Annan highlighted in 2005. Caribbean calls for reparations for chattel slavery are a manifestation of and a response to global inequities that affect the Global South in particular. However, when endeavouring to find a footing in international law, and specifically in international human rights law, reparations calls have been contested and challenged. This article proposes a reimagining of the international human rights system to offer a legitimate place for reparations for chattel slavery and thus enable an effective challenge to pressing injustices such as racial discrimination and its ramifications. Despite being a region that has been birthed from such profound historical injustices that still affect the full realisation of human rights today, the Caribbean and its human rights challenges and calls for justice have been relegated to and maintained at the periphery of international human rights law. For that reason, this article focuses on reparations for slavery emanating from the Caribbean. Drawing on Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL), it argues that the inability of international legal systems to respond to historical injustices indicates that the colonial imagination, constructed on the compass of exclusion, is still the foundation of international human rights law and of modern, postcolonial societies. The article thus advocates for decolonising international human rights law to accommodate a more inclusive future for human rights.

The current study analyses the behaviours of US state actors in engaging in international human social rights practices. In particular, through citation count analysis, we examine the citation patterns of US federal and state courts in utilising international human rights instruments, such as international human social rights treaties, in facilitating human rights-based education rights. The empirical findings indicate that US federal and state courts are not engaging the global judicial human rights networks in promoting human rights-based education rights as a type of universal human social right. Theoretical and empirical implications are presented in the concluding section.

Reviewed by: Mobilizing for Human Rights: International Law in Domestic Politics David Cingranelli (bio) Beth Simmons, Mobilizing for Human Rights: International Law in Domestic Politics (Cambridge Univ. Press 2009) 451 pages, ISBN 9780521885102. This is one of the most important books in decades on the effectiveness of international law in affecting human rights practices. It is an outstanding example of testing theory using a combination of qualitative and quantitative analyses. For students and scholars who want to understand how and when international human rights law works this book is a must-read. Simmons argues that international human rights law has made a positive contribution to the realization of human rights in much of the world. In support of this argument, she shows that governments that ratify human rights treaties improve their treaty-relevant human rights practices more than governments that do not. Although governments sometimes ratify human rights treaties insincerely, gambling that they will experience little pressure to comply with them, Simmons contends that this is not typically the case. Focusing on rights stakeholders within ratifying countries rather than external pressure from the United Nations or other states, she demonstrates that the ratification of treaties leads to better rights practices on average. By several measures, civil and political rights, women’s rights, a right not to be tortured in government detention, and children’s rights improve, especially in the very large heterogeneous set of countries that are neither stable autocracies nor stable democracies. Simmons argues that the international community should give more practical and rhetorical support to international human rights law as a supplement to broader efforts to address conflict, development, and democratization. She devotes about 40 percent of the book to developing theoretical arguments about why governments commit themselves to be bound by international law and then subjecting those arguments to empirical tests. The author uses most of the rest of the book to develop arguments about why states comply with their treaty commitments and subjecting those arguments to empirical tests. Her main argument about compliance is that treaties alter politics and human rights practices in certain settings by providing opportunities for social mobilization. There are four findings chapters—each focused on estimating the effects of joining a different human rights treaty. The last chapter is a well written summary of her findings, how they relate to her theories of commitment and compliance, and the implications of her findings for policy and practice. The two appendices to the book will be especially useful to those who wish to replicate her study or conduct similar studies. Appendix one provides a detailed account of the measures used in the quantitative analyses. Appendix two shows the countries included in her study broken down by the degree of the rule of law and by regime type—two of the most important characteristics explaining treaty commitment and compliance. [End Page 761] Simmons acknowledges that her arguments about the effectiveness of human rights treaty commitments run counter to most previous research. She notes that most previous relevant research in the fields of international law and human rights has relied on evidence from intensive case studies about treaty participation effects in individual countries. Her research, in contrast, looks for evidence of relationships between commitments to human rights treaties and human rights performance over a broad span of time and space. The data shows patterns that were not easily demonstrated in the previous quantitative or case study work conducted by other scholars. Simmons complements her quantitative evidence with detailed discussions of how treaties have influenced politics and practices in particular countries. The qualitative work in the book is useful in exploring the causal mechanisms by which government commitments to treaties are translated into subsequent better human rights practices. Her argument is that commitments to human rights treaties do not affect human rights practices by all the governments that make such commitments. They matter most where they have “domestic political and legal traction.”1 Her book is focused on identifying the conditions under which such traction is possible. Thus, even her quantitative research is more nuanced than most previous quantitative studies on this topic, which have generally reached more pessimistic conclusions about the effectiveness of international human rights...

It is a joy and a privilege for me to be here with you allfriends and colleagues of very long standing and new (dare I say "younger"?)colleagues with whom I look forward to forming lifelong friendships.**[Much of the depressing material that we have been discussing has to do not with substance, but with procedurewho can gain access to the courts or legislatures, what statutory or regulatory language will be held to be enforceable at the instance of private plaintiffs, etc.***Although this is not what I am going to discuss, I do want to underscore that access to the courts and legislatures is crucial.I never understand why so-called conservatives want to keep people out of these institutions, for when aggrieved people do not have such access, they are more likely to express their grievances in other ways, often including violence.

The treaty basis of most international human rights, combined with the dualism of common law legal systems, means that international human rights are often thought of as one of the most entrenched holdouts of the traditional model. In many common law jurisdictions, the least controversial cases of tunorthodoxt domestic recourse to international human rights are found in constitutional adjudication. The most explicit example of this distinctive relationship between international human rights norms and post-war constitutions is found in the South African Constitution. The most explicit example of this distinctive relationship between international human rights norms and post-war constitutions is found in the South African Constitution. International human rights as expressed in various treaties may, through the act of ratification, come to exert a mandatory domestic effect. However, courts sometimes also insist on the salience of international human rights norms for another reason. Keywords: constitutional adjudication; international human; ratification; unorthodox

Economic Sanctions Against Human Rights Violations

Over the last decade, many scholars have argued for the enforcement of international human rights norms by the domestic courts. Those claims are largely normative and there are hardly any empirical arguments advanced in support of the normative arguments. This paper presents an empirical study which examines the enforcement of international human rights norms by the Indian Supreme Court between 1997 and 2008; based on the content analysis of its judicial decisions. With specific focus on the Indian Supreme Court, it examines the reasons, justifications and means for referral to international human rights norms between 1997 and 2008. Firstly, it examines the human rights cases in which the Supreme Court refers to international human rights norms. Then, human rights cases are divided into three categories; those involving: 1. Civil and political rights, 2. Economic, social and cultural Rights and 3. Both. Secondly, techniques developed by the Supreme Court of India for the enforcement of international human rights norms in these three categories of cases are explained. The methodology deployed codes the variables aimed at ascertaining the frequency of the enforcement of international human rights norms by the Supreme Court of India, using different techniques between 1997 and 2008. The study finds that the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence during the years 1997-2008 can be defined as a transitional period, at least when it comes to the enforcement of international human rights norms. The Court has used international human rights norms largely as an interpretative tool, where international human rights norms were taken as a ‘given’ under the international human rights instruments. There are only a few instances where the Court has ‘defined’ what constitute international human rights norms by reading them into customary international law.This paper concludes by suggesting that the Supreme Court of India should take an ‘active,’ informed approach, while referring to international human rights norms, and should enforce international human rights norms by reading them into customary international law where needed; rather than its ‘passive’ approach of referring to international human rights norms for statutory interpretations. The Supreme Court should look at the relationship between international and domestic legal norms as a “co-constitutive, or synergistic,” and should utilize these norms actively as a participant in the dynamic process of developing international law. The Supreme Court must be able to apply customary law on human rights exhaustively and in a fully independent way, in particular, it must be able to verify that the violations of human rights recognized by customary international law are not committed by the executive. While the Supreme Court has been known for its judicial activism, it is time that it is also known for its informed approach and respect towards international human rights norms.