Commentary: Interests and Equal Moral Status

Abstract

Professor DeGrazia argues that (1) we may give the interests of humans and animals equal considemtion, (2) that this considemtion does not entail that humans and animals have equal moml status, and (3) that humans do have higher moral status than animals. He concludes that the use of nonhuman animals in research is ethically justified. His position does not differ significantly from that of Frey. Both avoid the appearance of speciesism by providing a supposed objective criterion of moral worth. Both appeal to intuition to support such a criterion. I find DeGrazia's position implausible for three reasons: fIrst, it cannot be put into practice; second, intuitions differ and cannot be used as a ground for assuming that humans are more worthy than animals; and third, the plausibility of his view depends on accepting a fmrnework that is generally destructive oClife. My comments will be restricted to two of his contentions; frrst, that differences in moml status appear with regard to the interest of freedom and second, that differences in moral status appear most vividly with respect to life. As he points out, this position is not uncommon. Singer claims that the rejection of speciesism does not imply that all lives are of equal worth. Most philosophers contend that human life is more valuable than animal life, and that some animal lives are more valuable than other animal lives. DeGrazia contends that captivity would generally do