Abstract
In this chapter, the authors aim to extend virtue (and vice) epistemology into an analysis of the epistemic dispositions possessed by groups. They focus on the epistemic vices that (they claim) contributed to two deadly aircraft crashes. The authors argue that these failings were at least partly epistemic: they included failures to share information with the regulators and arrogance about beliefs held. Epistemically virtuous organizations must have some way of ensuring that “group members exhibit the virtues demanded by their roles within the organization” (emphasis added). This is a claim they repeat several times, in slightly different terms: it must be the case that “the members of that organization have the epistemic virtues required by their roles and responsibilities within the organization”.
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