COMBATING CRYPTOCURRENCY LAUNDERING BY ORGANISED CRIME GROUPS THROUGH AN EFFECTIVE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK

The international law of money laundering is found in several United Nations (UN) crime suppression treaties, United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions, and a body of soft law, some of which arguably has crystallized as customary norms. Beginning with the 1988 UN Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (Vienna Convention), states agreed to establish anti-money laundering (AML) measures in their domestic law for drug-related offenses. This was followed by AML measures against organized crime and corruption, respectively, in the 2000 UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (Palermo Convention), including its protocols and the 2003 UN Convention against Corruption (Merida Convention). The AML measures include the criminalization of money laundering, powers to freeze and confiscate the proceeds of crime, duties of the private sector to generate financial intelligence, the establishment of financial intelligence units (FIUs), and formal legal cooperation arrangements between states, necessary given the transnational dimension of money laundering. While AML originally covered only property derived from crime, its measures were extended to property used to finance or carry out crimes, most notably for terrorist acts and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Though countries concluded a treaty against terrorist financing in 1999, it was not until after the events of 11 September 2001 that anti-terrorism financing norms, as part of the panoply of AML measures, were diffused around the world by UNSC resolutions. International bodies, including the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), have prepared model laws to assist countries to incorporate AML measures. The Financial Action Task Force (FATF), established in 1989 by the G7 industrialized nations, is the most important and influential body in setting detailed international standards on AML. Through replication of its norms and functions by regional bodies, the FATF’s soft law of AML measures has hardened into near universal domestic AML laws, adopted to signify the integrity of a country’s financial systems. European nations extensively adopted AML measures by treaties and directives, sometimes going beyond FATF recommendations. As AML measures have grown in number and global significance, critical literature has grown, questioning their effectiveness, whether their benefits outweigh their costs, and whether they are justified from the standpoint of principles of criminal liability and human rights law. For more criminological literature, readers may wish to consult the Oxford Bibliographies in Criminology article Money Laundering. Research for this work was fully supported by a grant from the Research Grants Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, China (Project No. 17603319). Thanks to Sean Yau and Ting Yin Lau for their research assistance.

The article first explains why the anti-money laundering (AML) regime in Hong Kong concerns cross-discipline and cross-jurisdiction issues. The author uses the recent money laundering scandal involving The Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) members as an opportunity to assess the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Recommendations on politically exposed persons (PEPs). The FIFA scandal involved financial institutions acting as intermediaries in facilitating the PEPs’ money laundering activities. Given financial institutions’ knowing or unknowing involvement in the scandal, there appears to be significant gaps in financial institutions’ ‘know your clients’ (KYC) due diligence process. The article warns that regulation on this issue is fragmented and inconsistent, as evidenced by how the risk-based approach recommended by the FATF is not observed in every jurisdiction. The article then examines the anti-money laundering regime in Hong Kong, one of the world’s main financial centres, by examining its various legislation and comparing them with the FATF Recommendations. Lastly, the article suggests improvements to Hong Kong’s AML legislation and the FATF Recommendations which are essentially a set of global AML standards. The article then explores ways to better implement the FATF Recommendations in jurisdictions that have adopted them, especially those which host the world’s financial centres.

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to examine the link between trade-based money laundering and organized crime. Trade-based money laundering (TBML) has emerged as the newest and possibly most complex method used by organized crime and white-collar crime groups for illegally laundering money in the international financial system. Using legitimate global trade streams, criminal organizations are able to transfer billions of dollars annually between jurisdictions without having to adhere to state-level currency regulations.Design/methodology/approachUsing a rational approach to understanding the behavior of criminal organizations, it is argued that TBML will continue to grow as a preferred methodology for laundering money internationally. As criminal organizations continue to be displaced from the more traditional methods of money laundering, they will look for and find TBML as a viable alternative for moving money between different jurisdictions.FindingsAs the methodology becomes more developed, the skill set will transfer to an increasing number of organized crime groups and be incorporated as a mainstream method for laundering and moving money.Practical implicationsTo stay current with contemporary money laundering schemes, law enforcement agencies will have to train their investigators to spot, investigate and collect requisite evidence for successful prosecution and disruption of TBML offences. Moreover, in the absence of a global regime for sharing trade and customs information, legislators and law enforcement agencies will have to consider how to best expedite the sharing of trade and customs information.Originality/valueThis is the only study to address TBML as an emerging money laundering technique and the transfer of the skill between organized crime groups. It further details the skills that police investigators needs to develop to successfully combat TBML.

Purpose Money laundering and grand business corruption continue to plague the global economy, accounting for 2%-5% of the global gross domestic product. Illicit funds, produced through grand corruption, are laundered using complex layering schemes that cloak them in legitimacy by concealing their origins. Lamentably, weak anti-money laundering (AML) frameworks promote economic instability, unjust commercial advantages and organized crimes. This study aims to highlight the need for comprehensive anti-corruption and AML frameworks by critiquing the exploitable gaps in the global AML regime created by heterogeneous state-level AML regimes to date. Design/methodology/approach This study welcomes the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) and the financial action task force (FATF) recommendations but underscores the limitations of their effectiveness by investigating state-level enforcement mechanisms to determine these instruments’ true impact or lack thereof. The mutual evaluation reports (MERs) and state-level AML regimes in the UK, the USA and Canada are analyzed to illustrate the distinct implementation of international soft law in domestic legislation. Findings This study finds that UNCAC and the FATF recommendations are pivotal steps towards the establishment of a global AML regime for international business, albeit, one that remains imperfect because of the inconsistency of state-level AML frameworks. Consequently, international cooperation is needed to navigate and improve the discrepancies in varied AML legislation. Originality/value The author provides an in-depth and balanced analysis of current state-level AML developments and relies upon the recent 2016-2018 MERs to indicate the successes and flaws of various AML legislation. Therefore, this critique may guide stakeholders to construct robust AML frameworks and contributes to academic research in AML.

Enhancing Financial Inclusion Using Telecommunications Companies and Anti-Money Laundering Policies: The Case of Nigeria

Transnational organized crime and the fight against it is a significant challenge for our country. Palermo Convention The same United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime was adopted by the UN General Assembly on 15 November 2000 with the aim of promoting cooperation in the fight against transnational organized crime. The article examines in depth Article 5 of the Palermo Convention, which calls on member states to directly criminalize participation in organized crime groups. In accordance with this requirement, a number of important changes have been made in the Georgian legislative space. These include the Criminal Code of Georgia, the Law of Georgia on Organized Crime and Racketeering, as well as the Criminal Procedure Code, the Civil Procedure Code of Georgia and other legal acts. The article discusses and evaluates the results of the work of each of the above legal documents, both on a theoretical and practical level. The National Strategy for Combating Organized Crime of Georgia has been evaluated and discussed. Judicial practice has also been studied, which ultimately allows for important conclusions to be drawn. At the end of the paper we will talk about the challenges of Georgia in terms of combating organized crime, the main directions, problems and shortcomings in the fight against organized crime.

This paper examines the anti-money laundering systems of Australia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States of America (USA), the extent to which they have implemented the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) recommendations, and how compliance with these recommendations is affected by local cultural and economic factors. The paper makes use of FATF evaluation reports to compare the countries’ compliance; it examines some of the underlying cultural considerations and culture-specific ethical issues that affect the extent of compliance, and how cultural and ethical considerations may affect good governance. The findings indicate that the UK and the USA are the most advanced with regards to their compliance with the FATF recommendations and Australia and the UAE less so. The UAE is in particular found to be least compliant. We relate this finding to previous work on how a country’s legal and financial systems develop in line with its religion, culture and socio-economic situation, and examine how such local factors have affected the UAE’s financial and anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) systems. This research will be of interest to policy-makers and government agencies involved in addressing money laundering and its successful detection and prosecution.KeywordsMoney LaunderingFATFComplianceAustraliaUAEUKUSA

Purpose – Expert assessment of organized crime (OC) group capabilities is often the basis for national threat assessments; it is rare, however, for variations in collective expert opinions of OC success factors to be systematically evaluated. The purpose of this paper is to examine the differences in how 150 criminal intelligence experts from a variety of national and organizational backgrounds sort and organize perceived attributes for OC group success. Design/methodology/approach – The paper uses the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) Sleipnir framework as a foundation for a Q-sort survey regarding the characteristics of OC group success. The survey was delivered to over 150 criminal intelligence specialists at a national conference in 2011. Descriptive statistics, seemingly unrelated regression, and biplots reveal different aspects of survey responses. Findings – Results show that perceptions of the ingredients for OC group success both vary by nationality and by analysts’ level within the hierarchy of the law enforcement structure (local, state, national). These differences are marked; particular characteristics are viewed as differentially important for the perceived success of OC groups. Furthermore, the results suggest that there are shared and structured differences in perceptions of OC group success characteristics. Research limitations/implications – The survey has identified distinct differences between the characteristics for OC group's success perceived by analysts in the USA, Canada, and beyond. Furthermore, the organizational level of the analyst (local, state, national) shapes the perceptions of success factors. It is possible variations identified merely reflect differentials in training and experience, i.e. different organizational perceptions of the same problem. That aside, the patterning of results seem likely to be based to some degree on external factors linked to OC group operations, and not just on individual characteristics of the surveyed intelligence professionals. Practical implications – The current research raises a number of questions regarding the confidence that should be placed in OC group assessments. The research has highlighted areas of professional dissonance that were not apparent from the RCMP Sleipnir research alone. Causes of the dissonance in assessments, and connections of these variations to both intelligence analysts’ experience, training, and organizational ethos; and to OC group capabilities, seem deserving of additional attention. Originality/value – Expert intelligence analyst interpretation of OC group capability is central to most national risk and threat assessments, yet the assessment processes themselves are rarely examined. This is a unique survey of over 150 intelligence personnel that highlights significant differences in perceptions of OC groups, differences that raise questions about how the authors evaluate the OC threat.

PurposeThe aim of this paper is considering that obtaining illegitimate property and obtaining property illegally is morally outrageous. The law also condemns it as a crime. The act of those who launder the proceeds of crime is also condemned. This condemnation is almost universal. So, money laundering as a way of diversion of the origin of the illegal gains into legitimate currency or other assets has been criminalized in most of the countries, including in Iran. Before criminalization of money laundering, there were different laws which referred to the case without referring to the term of money laundry. According to Article 49 of the Iranian Constitution “all proceeds of illegal sources like embezzlement, bribery, gambling and other ways should be confiscated.”Design/methodology/approachArticle 662 of the Islamic Penal Code (IPC) ratified in 1996 criminalized dealing with the proceeds of theft and Note 2 of Article 119 of the Penal Code of the Armed Forces criminalized obtaining the proceeds of embezzlement. But, in 2008, to follow the international conventions, especially Article 3 of the psychotropic substances 1988 in Vienna and also Financial Action Task Force (FATF) recommendations on Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing, the legislator ratified the anti-money laundering code (AMLC). The methodology is an analytical one. The author using an analytical method, has analyzed the subject with consideration of Iran’s situation, as well as international documents and FATF’s recommendations.FindingsThe author has studied the issue, believing that domestic regulations of Iran comply with international regulations and FATF recommendations. The current paper considers the different aspects of the AMLCs in Iran in relation to FATF recommendations.Originality/valueThe author confirms the originality of the paper and declares that he has referred all the other materials.

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to analyze the obligation of regulated entities to detect unusual and suspicious transactions and to report them to external control bodies, as established by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) recommendations, the European Community Directive and also the Spanish regulations for the Prevention of Money Laundering. This research paper also aims to create a model to identify and report suspicious transactions to improve financial institutions’ current procedures.Design/methodology/approachAccording to the Spanish regulations which comply with the FATF recommendations and the European Community Directive on the Prevention of Money Laundering, regulated entities must detect unusual and suspicious transactions. Within this framework, the present research work analyzes both criteria and procedures used by the regulated entities to report suspicious operations. It also assesses the efficiency of the reports sent to an external control body. For this purpose, both analytical and interpretative methods are used in this research paper.FindingsIn Spain, the current procedures followed by regulated entities to analyze unusual transactions are complex. This results in difficulties to report suspicious transactions involving money laundering. As a consequence, the cases of suspicious transactions reported to the external control body are often unclear and the related process is inefficient.Originality/valueThe creation of a harmonized model with the aim of detecting suspicious operations and analyzing them will improve the detection and the effectiveness of the suspicious operations procedure which are reported to the external control body. However, such unified model should take into account the currently used activities proposed by each financial institution.

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to determine if customers due to diligence measures laid down in Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Recommendation no. 10 can be applied to customers of currency exchange companies. Design/methodology/approach Currency exchange financial entities undertake financial transactions with occasional customers, for this reason, this research work is aimed at carrying out a study of the content of FATF Recommendation no. 10 regarding the applicability of due diligence measures to occasional customers. For this purpose, the analytical and interpretative methods have been used. Findings FATF Recommendation No. 10 about customer due diligence measures has been designed primarily for financial entities with regular customers, however, most customers of financial currency exchange companies are occasional customers. For such financial entities, customer identification is mandatory only for transactions above 15,000 USD/EUR, leaving a potential risk of money laundering for financial transactions below that threshold. Furthermore, within currency exchange companies, risk factor analysis and customers’ identity verification are performed only on regular customers. Originality/value Customer due diligence measures in currency exchange financial entities should not be subject to the transaction threshold. Moreover, it is necessary to adopt a centralized control system to avoid currency exchange companies infringement of their control systems.

Buenos Aires, Argentina—Traces of explosives, sharp metal objects, and seemingly innocent liquid containers are checked daily for every passenger trying to board a plane in the United States. A CIA document obtained by Wikileaks describes even more subtle screenings performed by undercover agents in foreign airports looking for signs of nervousness. Customs officers are trained to detect lies, inconsistencies, or unusual behavior. Still, it took years before UBS banker Bradly Birkenfeld's secret for shiny teeth was discovered. He was smuggling diamonds in toothpaste tubes on behalf of American tax evaders.But those days are over. The United States already knows of Credit Suisse bankers deceiving American immigration officers about the real purpose of their visits. Espionage-like code names to conceal clients' identities and encrypted computers are also as old as time, or at least the online universe. With all these tricks now in the open, some have been led to believe that the magic of invisible money is over. They could not be more wrong.Efforts and plots to escape a country's laws and taxes have been going on for as long as there have been taxes and their collectors. One option is to live sailing all year round in a luxury apartment of a cruise ship, effectively becoming a resident of the sea rather than any single nation. Recently, a man in Florida revived the idea of such a large vessel, officially called "Freedom Ship," while others christened it a floating tax haven. Yet more ambitious are "seasteads"—floating cities designed to experiment with innovative political systems. But none of these fantastic schemes pose any real threat to sneaky, land-based tax havens. After all, there are easier and cheaper ways to achieve the same results, without needing to leave the mainland.In order to be successful it is important to remain under the radar. One option is to approach this literally by hiding your identity. Apart from bitcoins and other virtual currencies, today the Internet offers all but limitless options to create a new profile, where imagination has an equal weight with reality, including fake photos, names, Facebook accounts, and LinkedIn work experience. Once this appears in a Google search, an identity is as real as it gets. For amateurs, it's as easy as creating a false e-mail or bogus address when registering at a webpage. For the sophisticated, changing an IP address, simulating GPS location, even using TOR ("the onion router") anonymity software could be equally effective. But black money is not like deep secrets no one should ever unearth. While it is similarly important to keep its location (and origin) hidden, black money is supposed to be used eventually. And the more liberty to spend it, the better.A superior alternative is thus to be less secretive about who you are, but smarter about where you choose to be so as to look legitimate—ideally holding a bank account or creating a company or a trust in a well-respected place. Indeed, many Western first-world countries are being strategically chosen by tax dodgers and money launderers precisely because of their law-abiding history, foreigner-friendly rules, and first-rate financial services that no one would ever (manage to) question. These are the great unknowns of the future in the hidden worlds of subterranean finance—the first real major challengers to the remote offshore islands in the Caribbean and South Pacific that have for so long been the principal stereotypes of tax havens.However contradictory it may sound, ill-gotten money has a lot to do with legality. Just as the Nazis first embarked on their economic actions against Jews within the scope of their racial laws, so trillions of dollars are held offshore under the auspices of tax havens' rules and regulations. Provisions like "no foreign country's inheritance laws may ever be invoked to invalidate a Trust created here" may appear perfectly legal, not because any honest person would ever agree with them, but because they were formally enacted and remain unchallenged. This legal framework that enables the discrete generational transfer, deposit, and enjoyment of illicit financial flows has not happened by chance, but is the result of deliberate and careful policies undertaken by major financial centers.Nevertheless, it's not only written statutes but also tacit social norms that keep the system running. Chatham House researcher Nick Shaxson describes the global community of offshore banking as "a peculiar mixture of characters [who] populate this world: castle-owning members of old continental European aristocracies, fanatical supporters of the American libertarian writer Ayn Rand, members of the world's intelligence services, global criminal networks, assorted lords and ladies, and bankers galore."But as Shaxson explains, silence is guaranteed by accomplices and dissenters alike. For active contributors (such as bankers, lawyers, accountants, and other service providers), it's either a complete indifference to the consequences that corruption and tax evasion may have in places like Africa and Latin America, or directly believing that they are doing the right thing by helping foreigners protect their money from political risk or unstable currencies. In some cases, it's blatantly justified as "poor people in Africa are poor because they don't work hard enough." Sadly, many of the system's foes have also learned neither to criticize nor to ask questions, otherwise they will pay the price of ostracism—losing any chance to get promoted, being socially isolated, attacked by the media, legal persecution (instead of protection for denouncing a wrong-doing), becoming a traitor, or designated as the enemy. As whistleblowers Rudolf Elmer and Antoine Deltour painfully discovered, these are not attributes specific to sparsely populated islands, but are also available in prominent countries in the heart of Europe—Switzerland and Luxembourg in particular.After the financial crisis of 2008 and recent tax scandals by major companies (and countries), a clampdown against tax havens is underway, leaving a trail of bewilderment over which will prevail or what new ones might replace them. With global household wealth calculated at $263 trillion by Credit Suisse and 11 percent of that, or $30 trillion estimated to be held offshore, stakes are high for candidates to attract these funds. Growing inequality will create even more millionaires, certainly billionaires, trying to avoid scrutiny, evade taxes, or both. It's unlikely that one country alone will be able to serve the whole offshore world. After all, most investors—legal and illegal alike—believe in the importance of diversifying. Just as in the international division of labor, tax havens have also learned to cater to specific industries or nationalities. Still, there are clues to the next illicit hotspot.Tax havens can be classified into two large groups. First are those that always come to mind—palm-filled islands scattered across the Pacific Ocean and the Caribbean, and pariah states, which neither sign treaties nor attend international conferences. Nauru in the South Pacific, for example, will still appeal to some erratic criminals, smugglers, and tax evaders. However, no big fish would dare to be (openly) related to it. In other words, it is unlikely that Nauru will be joining the major leagues of tax havens chosen by Fortune 500 companies or Forbes' list of billionaires.The second group comprises the big pretenders. A rule of thumb applied by tax havens suggests that the best way to disguise inaction is by pretending to do something. Otherwise, unwarranted attention will be drawn. Simulating cooperation may be achieved by joining multilateral conventions against corruption, transnational organized crime, or financing of terrorism, but then making subtle reservations to either limit its applications or ring-fence specific territories and colonies. A more popular strategy is to sign a treaty about exchange of bank account information while knowing ratification will never happen or not until a distant future, blaming domestic political rifts for the delay. An equivalent tactic is to run national consultations about new transparency platforms so as to democratically decide that nothing will change.An even more sophisticated ruse is not only to be part of the herd, but to become the shepherd. By ensuring that international rules will be designed and imposed by organizations that include only rich countries as their members (such as the G20 or the OECD), tax havens guarantee that 'global standards' will be consistent with their own interests. An example of this is the OECD Model Treaty to avoid double taxation, which favors capital-exporting countries (instead of developing ones) when it comes to levying taxes. This model agreement also allows big companies to avoid paying any tax at all in the countries where they operate as long as they structure their businesses carefully. This is exacerbated by the OECD Guidelines on Transfer Pricing, which are easily exploited by multinational companies that, through intra-group transactions, shift profits to low-tax jurisdictions and thus avoid paying taxes again. Some of these issues are currently being addressed by a process called BEPS, which stands for Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, but big surprise, it is also run by the OECD.It is already well known that major Internet companies and other well-known retailers make use of the so-called double Irish-Dutch sandwich strategy to avoid paying taxes "legally." It combines U.S. check-the-box rules (to choose how to classify foreign subsidiaries), setting up two companies in Ireland (one to invoice services performed somewhere else, like the United Kingdom, and the other one to "exploit" Irish tax-residency rules), a Dutch company to avoid withholding taxes when transferring profits among the two Irish companies, and finally a company in a zero-tax jurisdiction like Bermuda where profits will finally be transferred. Less understood, however, is what was (not) done to appease the outrage against big companies not paying their fair share of taxes. In an attempt to calm any sense of outrage, the end of the double-Irish was proclaimed, although surprisingly, Ireland was portrayed as the naïve innocent, while big companies and small islands were to take all the blame. The small print, however, reveals a different story.The significant change is that the end of the double Irish will only affect new companies, which had failed to take advantage of the popular scheme. Clever ones, in contrast, will have a transition period through 2020. As if this were not enough, Ireland's prime minister announced the development of a "patent box" regime, which is nothing but the option to "strategically" register patents or trademarks in a place with low taxes, even if no research and development actually took place there. This allows companies to transfer royalties wherever they want to make sure that little to no tax will be paid. No wonder big companies have little to fear from Dublin.Facts are undeniable—like American companies undertaking inversion deals to relocate to Britain as a way to avoid U.S. taxes; London's high-priced real estate sector overheated by foreigner money launderers; British Virgin Islands' surprise ranking as the world's fourth largest recipient of foreign direct investment (receiving more funds than India and Brazil combined, despite its tourist economy and 20,000 inhabitants); Cayman Islands' Ugland House, which alone serves as the residence of 18,000 companies; or Jersey's financial brochure aimed at Russian oligarchs trying to avoid both taxes and Russian inheritance laws.With all this on his plate, Prime Minister David Cameron is passionate about targeting aggressive tax avoidance. He even sent a letter—yes, a paper letter—to British Overseas Territories and Crown Dependencies regarding beneficial ownership registration (politely requesting that they identified the real individuals who own companies regardless of nominees or corporate layers). As a consequence, these tax havens collectively did not hesitate to consult on this new push to establish a truly transparent system. And in an unexpected challenge to the Empire, the Overseas Territories decided to reject the request. Striking back, Cameron decided to impose the central registries of beneficial ownership in the U.K., for whatever marginal use that will likely be in the future, though a tiny—actually giant—loophole was left. Only some trusts would have to register, but even in such a case, their information would not be accessible to the public, leaving a most opportune choice for tax dodgers and money launderers trying to avoid scrutiny.Even without any awareness of Luxleaks, the disclosure of secret tax arrangements between Luxembourg's authorities and some of the world's most important companies, allowing them to reduce their global effective tax rate to about 1 percent, the OECD's Global Forum on Exchange of Information had already highlighted the Grand Duchy in red as "non-compliant with international transparency standards." Furthermore, in an attempt to compete with Singapore, last September Luxembourg proudly inaugurated "Le Freeport," a state-of-the-art free port next to the airport. Interestingly, free ports and special economic zones are supposed to be territories with special rules—no VAT or custom duties, few controls, if any at all—because they are not considered regular parts of a country's territory, but rather logistical hubs where goods in transit are waiting to be delivered to their final destinations.Somehow inconsistent with these transit purposes, Luxembourg's free port offers no-time-limit storage of valuable goods "such as works of art, fine wines, precious metals, jewels and diamonds, vintage cars, etc." Coincidentally, Le Freeport will come in handy to all those trying to escape reporting to the tax authorities that (some) banks will need to start doing about their account holders. The safest option against these new disclosure requirements will be to keep wealth in the form of gold, art, or jewels. No place will be better suited for this than such a locale as Le Freeport. To avoid any doubt as to the real reason behind this venue, Pierre Gramegna, Minister of Finance of Luxembourg, stressed during its inauguration, "I am convinced that this project will add a new branch of excellence to our financial sector and enhance its wealth management capabilities." Expectations seem little related to the handling of goods in transit.Unbeaten at the top of Tax Justice Network's Financial Secrecy Index—a ranking of tax havens according to their secretive legal framework and their market share of financial services for foreigners—Switzerland is by far the most successful case of whitewashing. Swiss statutory banking secrecy originated with a tax evasion scandal involving Swiss banks and members of French high-society. However, it is usually—and wrongly—associated with helping German Jews during World War II. Contrary to this 'Good-Samaritan' myth, the very same Swiss Bergier Commission acknowledged that Switzerland was involved in suggesting Germany identify Jewish German passport holders with a "J," which in many cases prevented them from entering Switzerland and other countries, when trying to escape from the Nazis.In addition, Swiss banks showed concern about "Aryanization" of Jewish assets only when Jews were debtors, and the banks' credits were at stake. The Bergier Commission describes consistent attitudes even after the war. Some Swiss banks deliberately decided not to report unclaimed assets of Holocaust survivors and not to contact heirs, waiting 10 years to destroy all evidence of client relationship. Estelle Sapir's case offers a good example of this. Being a Holocaust survivor, she was easily able to recover her family's bank deposits all over Europe, except in Geneva, where the bank requested her father's death certificate and records of his deposits. The fact that he had been killed in Majdanek Concentration Camp and that she had barely managed to escape made very little difference to the bank. 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Designated non-financial businesses and professionals: A review and analysis of recent financial action task force on money laundering mutual evaluation reports

Money laundering poses a persistent threat to financial integrity, governance, and the rule of law by facilitating organised crime, corruption, and terrorism. In response, India has adopted an increasingly stringent anti-money laundering (AML) regime, anchored primarily in the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA), to fulfil its obligations under international instruments such as the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, 1988, the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, 2000, and the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Recommendations. This article undertakes a critical doctrinal and policy-oriented examination of India’s AML framework to assess its substantive and procedural alignment with global standards. It analyses the evolution of the PMLA, the expansion of predicate offences, and the enhanced enforcement powers vested in the Enforcement Directorate, alongside controversial provisions relating to the reverse burden of proof and restrictive bail conditions. Drawing on India’s latest FATF Mutual Evaluation Report, judicial decisions of the Supreme Court, and comparative insights from the United Kingdom and the United States, the article evaluates both formal compliance and practical effectiveness. It argues that while India has largely achieved technical compliance with international AML norms, significant challenges persist in terms of proportionality, due process, and enforcement outcomes, particularly reflected in low conviction rates. The article concludes by emphasising the need to recalibrate India’s AML regime to strike a balance between effective crime control and constitutional safeguards, as well as public trust.

PurposeThis paper aims to explore the ways in which the international standards in the field of anti-money laundering (AML) and counter-terrorist financing (CTF) have reshaped regulatory regimes in a globalised world.Design/methodology/approachThis paper deconstructs the origins and development of international standards in the field of AML and CTF dealing with longstanding legal professional privilege. This paper adopts both qualitative and quantitative research methodologies. The qualitative aspect comprises a literature review of sources, including scholarly works, Financial Action Task Force (FATF) recommendations, reports and domestic laws. The quantitative aspect analyses a unique and comprehensive table reproduced below, that indicates Australia’s compliance with all the FATF recommendations over more than a decade with full alternation to FATF’s revisions of its recommendations.FindingsThis paper demonstrates that an understanding of the influence of the FATF norms can shed light on the departure from regular lawmaking processes and emerging forms of international governance. The conclusion suggests that tranche II is coming and Australia will amend it in domestic regime to comply with the international standard, applying the AML/CTF regime to the legal profession and thus interfering with legal professional privilege. The question is not if but when.Originality/valueThis paper fills the gaps in the existing literature by contemplating the future of legal professional privilege globally and in Australia, which provides a case study of a regime that does not yet comply fully with AML and CTF international standard. This approach differs significantly from that of other literature in the field, which deals comprehensively with the theoretical foundations of legal professional privilege, as well as its practicalities and limitations, without considering the influence of the international non-binding norms.