- https://doi.org/10.1163/22134417-00401p12
Colloquium 4: Commentary on Vazquez
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Take Notes Abstract Michael Vazquez develops a convincing account of Cicero’s Academic skepticism, according to which Cicero’s pursuit of truth serves as the central guiding principle of his philosophical approach. Vazquez demonstrates how Cicero has stable commitments, including a commitment to the primacy of virtue, which are compatible with his skepticism, as they do not rise to the level of convictions. However, Cicero never commits to a conception of the human telos . I examine four sets of issues. First, since Vazquez argues that Cicero himself serves as a model of the skeptical way of life which he recommends, I consider how the relevant modeling might work. Second, I explore in some detail the central thematic navigation metaphor from Lucullus 65–76. Does Cicero encourage his readers to rest content with following the Septemtriones , as opposed to continuing to search the skies for the Cynosura , including the lodestar itself? Third, according to Vazquez’s interpretation, Cicero’s skeptical decreta include pretheoretic beliefs, and yet I wonder whether allowing a role for such doxastic attitudes constrains the search for truth and inhibits the possibility of genuine epistemic progress. Fourth, I raise questions for the claim that veritic desire structures the Academic skeptic’s living in a way that parallels the telos for dogmatic eudaimonists, especially given that Cicero’s commitment to virtue also seems to play a guiding role in his life.
- Book Chapter
1 - 10.1163/9789047407270_011
- Jan 1, 2005
It should be evident, that John of Salisbury displays aspects of both intentionalist and teleological moral philosophy, the deployment of which is guided by a philosophical warrant grounded in a third school of thought, namely, New Academic skepticism. Substantively, John's skepticism promotes the values of liberty and moderation. Methodologically, adherence to the New Academy permits him to draw on diverse and competing philosophical approaches as seems rationally defensible to him. These observations should lead us to an historical and conceptual point. The first is the recognition that MacIntyre's imputed dichotomy between interiorized and external moral theories during the twelfth century is narrowly drawn, if not simply inaccurate. The second is that the attempt to treat Christian Stoicism and Aristotelianism as closed, hermetically sealed, and perhaps incommensurable systems of thought is deeply flawed. Keywords: Aristotelianism; Christian Stoicism; John of Salisbury; MacIntyre; moral theory; new academic skepticism
- Research Article
- 8
- 10.1007/s11229-012-0120-0
- Jun 5, 2012
- Synthese
This essay concerns the question of how we make genuine epistemic progress through conceptual analysis. Our way into this issue will be through consideration of the paradox of analysis. The paradox challenges us to explain how a given statement can make a substantive contribution to our knowledge, even while it purports merely to make explicit what one’s grasp of the concept under scrutiny consists in. The paradox is often treated primarily as a semantic puzzle. However, in “Sect. 1” I argue that the paradox raises a more fundamental epistemic problem, and in “Sects.1 and 2” I argue that semantic proposals—even ones designed to capture the Fregean link between meaning and epistemic significance—fail to resolve that problem. Seeing our way towards a real solution to the paradox requires more than semantics; we also need to understand how the process of analysis can yield justification for accepting a candidate conceptual analysis. I present an account of this process, and explain how it resolves the paradox, in “Sect. 3”. I conclude in “Sect. 4” by considering the implications for the present account concerning the goal of conceptual analysis, and by arguing that the apparent scarcity of short and finite illuminating analyses in philosophically interesting cases provides no grounds for pessimism concerning the possibility of philosophical progress through conceptual analysis.
- Research Article
- 2
- 10.1016/j.jal.2015.09.010
- Sep 30, 2015
- Journal of Applied Logic
Measuring inaccuracy of uncertain doxastic states in many-valued logical systems
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