Abstract
Strong exposed‐sector unions and weak public‐sector unions are seen as having beneficial effects on macroeconomic performance. Although these effects must work through the bargaining structure, the interaction with union composition is unclarified. This paper argues that the interaction effect qualitatively differs with the bargaining type. The findings show that the performance of pattern bargaining significantly increases with growing exposed‐sector union strength whereas uncoordinated bargaining and centrally coordinated bargaining do not interact with union composition.
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