Cold War Pressures, Regional Strategies, and Relative Decline: British Military and Strategic Planning for Cyprus, 1950–1960

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to study and specify to what extent Iran will succeed in being a regional hegemon. The paper is devoted to clarification of the constitutive elements for regional hegemony. These elements will be related to an actor’s perception of its role and regional perception, and how these hegemons exert power, do these work for the public good in the region (provision) and how this regional power projects power and exerts power to influence others’ preferences and values without reference to violence (projection). For the Middle East, Iran emerged as a key player in most regional conflicts and it tried to increase its sphere of influence as a regional hegemon. Therefore the question here would be: To what extend could Iran succeed in being a regional hegemon and what are the circumstances that could enhance or constrain this Iranian ambition? So the aim of the paper is to look at three dimensions in general and see whether Iran makes a plausible candidate for regional hegemony. The paper outlines the essential traits of a regional hegemon, and the main elements that constitute a regional hegemony such as perception, provision and projection, and then analyze how Iran follows those elements by analyzing internal perceptions of the Iranian elite about Iranian regional role, regional acceptance, provision of public good, projection and finally impact of the relation with external great powers. Through analyzing its regional strategy in Syria and Iraq since 2003, the year of invasion of Iraq, since ever a political vacuum was created, that enabled Iran to extend its regional influence, after the fall of its historical regional rival, Saddam Hussein baathi regime. Design/methodology/approach The study adopts an analytical framework of analyzing a regional hegemony strategy which is approached by Miriam Prys in her study “Hegemony, domination, detachment: differences in regional powerhood” to study and analyze Iran’s regional behavior as one of regional power that is seeking regional hegemony. This analytical framework is one of the most significant analytical tools that interests in the study of the behavior of regional power and identify the constitutive dimensions for regional hegemony such as self-perception, regional perception, provision and power projection. Findings The study concludes that there are obstacles completely in front of achieving the Iranian quest to regional hegemony over the Middle East. These are the continuing US involvement in the Middle East and the consequent tense relationship between Iran and the USA. It is most unlikely that Iran will be hegemonic state over the Middle East as long as there are refusal and resistance from other regional states for Iranian regional role; as each of regional powers has tools to contain the influence of the other. The Iranian regional behavior that is sectarianism-based, whether to protect Shiite shrines and holy places or to protect Shiites in the region, such policies deepen the ideological and sectarian conflicts. It also has not provided an attractive cultural model for the peoples of the region. Research limitations/implications This paper enhances the deep analysis of the Middle East dynamics through the prospective of regional power. Also, the paper focuses on the analysis of the relation between great power and aspiring regional power and the impact on its strategies. Practical implications This study enhances the understanding of how Iranian decision-makers perceive their regional Iranian and the threats. Moreover, the tools that Iran uses its hard power and ideational one to create regional followers and change its allies’ normative and value systems to come in line with its national interests. Moreover, the study tries to measure the actual Iranian influence, its weakness and strength so that the Arab states and the West could behave in a fruitful way. Originality/value In the final analysis, the paper offers an insight into the regional behavior and the importance of external power in regional dynamics and to what extent the regional hegemon is applicable to Iran.

After the defeat of France in the summer of 1940, Great Britain was left face to face with the Nazi Germany. It managed to endure the first act of the ‘Battle of Britain’, but could not wage a full-scale war on the continent. Under these conditions, the defense of the British positions in the Mediterranean and in the Middle East became a top priority for W. Churchill’s cabinet. The author examines three episodes of Great Britain’s struggle for the Middle East in 1941 (Iraq, Syria, Iran), framing them into the general logic of the German-British confrontation during this period.The author emphasizes that potential assertion of German hegemony in the Middle East could have made the defense of Suez almost impossible, as well as the communication with India, and would have provided the Reich with an access to almost inexhaustible supplies of fuel. Widespread antiBritish sentiments on the part of the local political and military elites could contribute greatly to the realization of such, catastrophic for Britain, scenario. Under these circumstances, the British government decided to capture the initiative. The paper examines the British military operations in Iraq and Syria. Special attention is paid to the complex dynamics of relations of the British cabinet with the Vichy regime and the Free France movement. As the author notes, the sharpest disagreements aroused on the future of Syria and Lebanon, and the prospects of granting them independence. In the Iran’s case, the necessity of harmonizing policies with the Soviet Union came to the fore. The growing German influence in the region, as well as the need to establish a new route for Lend-Lease aid to the USSR, fostered mutual understanding. After the joint Anglo-Soviet military operation in August-September 1941, Iran was divided into occupation zones. Finally, the paper examines the UK position with regard to the neutrality of Turkey. The author concludes that all these military operations led to the creation of a ‘temporary regime’ of the British domination in the Middle East. However, the Anglo-French and Anglo-Soviet rivalries had not disappeared and, compounded by the growing US presence in the region, laid basis for new conflicts in the post-war period.

The issue of nationalizing oil in Iran has already been addressed by researchers in previous studies that were characterized by comprehensiveness، However، this study attempts to shed light on the ongoing controversy in some aspects related to the British position، which were not resolved in previous studies، in light of the data which we obtained from unpublished documents and the recently published British and American documents and memoirs of decision makers in the countries concerned. There are still those who believe that the oil interests of Western companies were the most important factor in formulating the British and American decision، but there is another school that believes that the security factor and the exigencies of the Cold War were the most important factor in resolving matter the way it was done. This study is an attempt to shed further light on this controversy. The study will give special importance to the American factor and its influence on the British position during the Iranian oil crisis. The importance of the research is evident in the fact that it specializes in studying the first real attempt by a country that seeks to nationalize one of its most important resources in the Middle East in the atmosphere of the Cold War. Therefore، the study is an attempt to explain and analyze how and why the government of Muhammad Mosaddeq was seeking to nationalize Iranian oil ، and we discuss the challenges it faced in order to achieve that goal. As for the methodology of the paper، we study the debate on the subject by following the historical methodology in addressing the issues in a chronological way and critically analyzing the discourse. While doing the analyses، we compare the British archival material with that of American and the Iranian. The collected data from the archival material will be used to evaluate the previous studies in the field. As for the structure of the research، it consists of an introduction، two sections، and the conclusion. In the preface، light is shed on a historical renunciation of the Anglo-Iranian company. As for the first section، it is devoted to studying the development of British oil interests in Iran (1902-1951)، in which the conflicting British and Russian interests towards Iranian oil addressed. Besides، the differences between the views of the Iranian government and the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company during 1947-1951 on the oil crisis are explained in detail. The second topic deals with the stand of the United States of America on the oil crises and its impact on formulating British position during the Iranian oil crisis 1951-1953.While explaining the US stand on the crisis ، we will point the two distinct stages in this regard .Finally ، we explain and discuss how the US and British government had eventually reached the conclusion that a joint efforts were needed to overthrow the government of Muhammad Mossadegh on August 19، 1953. In the end study will present its most important findings.

The Second World War, as we noted in an earlier chapter, had profoundly affected Middle Eastern affairs. That conflict had deepened and widened local frustrations and resentments in ways which soon meshed with nationalist expectations, and speeded up the displacement of British influence in certain regions by her erstwhile American ally; this latter transition was most complete in the case of the Saudi Kingdom. Even so, there were grounds in 1945 for the belief that the British position throughout most of the Middle East was more defensible than it was, for example, in India, or than the French position was in Indo-China. None of the Middle Eastern countries, including Egypt, sported a credible ‘mass’ nationalist party such as Gandhi’s and Nehru’s Congress, and the endemic anti-Communism of these Islamic societies blocked one major way in which this vacuum might be filled under post-war conditions. The British had been busy identifying workable relationships with quasi-autonomous Middle Eastern regimes since at least 1918, and with sensible diplomacy this ‘line’ could be expected to hold. The intimate and pervasive presence of western economic and political power within the crevices of Middle Eastern society, compared to its more tenuous hold in much of Asia, meant that the possible permutations of Britain’s leading role could be almost endlessly refined. Nevertheless, by 1954 this leading role had been fractured in so many places that, of all the western powers active in the Middle East, the British seemed the obvious target on which Middle Eastern nationalists might concentrate their efforts.1

The researchers focused on armed conflicts, humanitarian disasters and poverty when they looked at areas such as the largely interconnected Horn of Africa and East Africa, ignoring the strategic importance of these areas in regional and international security. In fact, this region is only geographically, politically, economically and security to compete at all levels and is affected by the dynamics of conflict and international and regional cooperation and its external variables. Since the major discoveries of energy sources in the Middle East and the increasing importance of sea lanes, the region has become increasingly important in international and regional strategies. The importance of the Middle East region as part of the strategies of the international and regional powers has become at the heart of the foreign political goals of these forces, which not only strengthened their influence in the Middle East, but also extended their plans to neighboring regions in order to ensure their survival within the framework of competition in the Middle East or to protect their vital interests. Among the most interconnected areas of the Horn of Africa - East Africa is the Middle East and Arab countries close to them in particular, including Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Yemen and Sudan. There is no doubt that the objectives of the international and regional forces competing in this region have serious repercussions on the Arab regional security, especially in the Red Sea and the corridors related to it and from this race and international and regional scramble to get a real basis for the exercise of roles in this region and the extent of reflection on the overall security in the region Middle East stems from the importance of the subject.

As Obama begins his second term, this article takes stock of his foreign policy approach towards the Middle East. It lays out four big arguments. First, Obama's foreign policy in the Middle East has demonstrated more continuity with the past than real change. While shifting his approach significantly from Bush's, Obama has adopted a centrist-realist approach towards the region, consistent with the dominant US foreign policy orientation. Second, from Palestinian-Israeli peace to Afghanistan, Obama's conduct testifies to the structural-institutional continuity of US foreign policy. More than in any other region in the world, presidential policy in the Middle East is hampered by institutional, bureaucratic and domestic politics. America's dysfunctional political culture has imposed severe constraints on Obama's ability to pursue an even-handed approach towards the enduring and preeminent Palestine question. Third, despite Obama's lofty rhetoric about a new start in relations between the United States and Muslim countries, the Middle East does not rank very high on his agenda. Putting America's fiscal house in order and renewing its long-term economic strength have been Obama's priorities. From the outset, Obama has been shifting US foreign policy priorities away from the Middle East to the Pacific and Asia where he and his aides believe that America's future lies. Finally, the article argues that the US finds itself in a similar position to that of Great Britain after the Second World War, at the beginning of the end of its hegemonic moment in the Middle East. The end of American hegemony in the region stems from internal and external causes, including an awakened public opinion in the Middle East, the emergence of geostrategic and geo-economic regional powers with assertive foreign policies, America's relative economic decline and the high costs of war, and the shift in US foreign policy priorities to the Asia-Pacific region.

Putin’s War in Syria: Russian Foreign Policy and the Price of America’s Absence

The 1956 Suez crisis and its aftermath have conventionally been seen as marking a turning point not merely in Anglo-American relations, but also in Britain's imperial destiny in the Middle East. From this time, it has been argued, a transfer of power took place, with the US assuming Britain's once dominant position. Some even claim that this development was welcomed by the British. Focusing on the Gulf region, this article reinterprets notions of British subservience to America and British eclipse in the Middle East. Far from anticipating a transfer of power to America in the wake of Suez, Britain clung tenaciously to its remaining assets in the region, while British statesmen were prepared to adopt policies in defiance of Washington. As regards US policy-makers, there was a marked reluctance to take over British positions in the Gulf, not least against the background of America's mounting preoccupation with the conflict in Vietnam.

Aden had long been regarded as an important strategic asset in the maintenance of Britain’s position as a world power. As late as May 1956, a junior minister, Lord Lloyd, had made clear that ‘for the foreseeable future it would not be reasonable or sensible or in the interests of the Colony’s inhabitants for them to aspire to any aim beyond that of a considerable degree of internal self-government’. The colony’s strategic importance was such that the government could not ‘foresee the possibility of any fundamental relaxation of their responsibilities for the Colony’.1 Paradoxically, as British power declined, this importance actually increased. Evicted from Egypt and Iraq, with Cyprus and Kenya uncertain, the Aden base became increasingly important. In 1960 Aden replaced Cyprus as headquarters of Middle East Command and it was described in the 1962 Defence White Paper, along with Singapore and Britain itself, as one of three vital permanent military bases. It was regarded as the key to the defence of British interests in the Middle East, the Gulf and the Indian Ocean. The problem was, however, that the British position was coming under increasing challenge from Arab nationalism, both in the colony itself and in its hinterland, the Arab protectorates that made up the Federation of South Arabia. There was every confidence, however, that by force and fraud this challenge could be contained and that, in the words of a former Governor, Sir Tom Hickinbotham, the security of Aden would be ‘maintained as long as Britain remains great’.2

The present study documents the winter aerosol optical depth (AOD) trends over the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East (EMME) region using MERRA‐2 and moderate‐resolution imaging spectroradiometer (MODIS) collection 6.1 data. A significant upward AOD trend was identified during the years 2000–2010, whereas the AOD followed a significant downward trend during the years 2010–2017. Our analysis indicates that aeolian dust is the main contributor to AOD changes. The winter AOD changes are related to meteorological factors over the EMME region. During the early period (2000–2010), a significant decrease in sea level pressure induced dry and hot southeasterly winds blowing from the desert regions in the Middle East toward the EMME, which increased the temperature and reduced the relative humidity, thus enhancing evaporation and promoting soil drying. In contrast, during the late period (2010–2017), a significant increase in sea level pressure, accompanied by an increase in the North Atlantic Oscillation (NAO) index, induced northwesterly winds from higher latitudes, which decreased the temperature and increased the relative humidity, reducing dust mobilization in the EMME, in particular, in Iraq and Egypt. This shows to what extent AOD trends in the EMME region are controlled by changing meteorological weather conditions.

The post-war contradiction between British foreign policy aiming to become a third world power through Europe and the ‘middle of the planet’, and military strategy focused exclusively on an imperial Middle East presence, began to change in 1949. With reduced military resources only the power of prestige (what the rest of the world thinks of Britain) remained. However, by now exacerbating the contradiction between different Middle Eastern foreign policy goals, the Baghdad Pact, having little to do with countering external threats, produced internal conflicts out of its contradictions. Maintaining British middle eastern prestige became crucial just as it was threatened by the US, (disturbed by the imperial problems left by the British, particularly in Egypt) seeking to construct defence arrangements on the Northern Tier. The Baghdad Pact maintained different but equally false claims that a British military presence was necessary to ensure the defence of the Middle East from the Soviet Union. As Anglo-American relations became ones of ‘competitive cooperation’, the military adapted strategy to political needs. Bases for largely non-existent forces, and deceitfully planning to fight a war with nuclear weapons Britain could not deploy were desperate measures to impress middle eastern allies and avoid losing more prestige. The Arab rivalries and divisions the Baghdad Pact exacerbated were eventually to result in Britain becoming involved in military conflict, putting its prestige and influence on the line with more deceit and disastrous consequences for its Middle East influence.

Today the United States stands as the dominant power over the Middle East. This paper first reviews how Washington successfully pursued its three main objectivesIsrael, oil and anti-communism-in the post-World War II period. It then analyzes the present US Middle policy-making process, and suggests that it needs to be broadened to include alternative perspectives on major regional issues. last part looks forward at The New Middle East envisioned by the Clinton administration, and warns that hegemony, if pursued arrogantly, can endanger basic US national interests. Even critics, such as the author, of US Middle policy must agree that the United States today stands astride this unhappy region like a colossus. A half-century of regional involvement in every conceivable way-through diplomacy, aid, culture, education, espionage, subversion, and (not least) the projection of military power-has secured the `holy trinity' of American interests: Israel, oil, and anti-communism. Those who said it could not be done underestimated the US ability to achieve contradictory goals. Today the American president can summon the leaders of most Middle Eastern governments to endorse his regional (and domestic) political agenda. American financial officials can write the domestic economic policy for most governments in the region. US military enjoys unprecedented access and acceptance from North Africa to the Gulf. New information technologies expose Middle Eastern cultures and societies to Americandominated global values, fashions, and definitions of political 'realities.' In this essay, my first task is to describe the triumph of American policy over the past fifty years. Secondly, I will discuss the policy-making process. Finally, I will look at the present and future situation, and make some suggestions for improving US Middle policy. US POLICY SINCE WORLD WAR II World War II marked what the late ambassador to Cairo, Raymond Hare, called `the divide' in US relations with the Middle East: between our traditional national position of rejecting political responsibility in the Middle East, and our postwar acceptance of responsibility on a global or power basis. . . 1 Hardened as we now are to American realpolitik, we imagine the earlier period as an age of innocence, characterized by a virtuous avoidance of political entanglement in local quarrels and European rivalries in the region. We enjoy reading James Field's amiable account of American missionary activities.2 We are proud of the American University of Beirut and other educational enterprises which won lasting respect from Middle Easterners. We are flattered to learn from Harry Howard's study of the King-Crane Commission that the United States was better liked than the European countries.3 Even the periodic malicious depictions of Department Arabists cannot hide the contributions to smoother US-Middle relations made by US diplomats in the past.4 far side of Hare's great divide was marked by classical American idealism. near side is more complex: idealism is still there, though selectively invoked and ideologized. Increasingly, however, America presents an imperious image. Containing Soviet Communism In October 1947, as Hare tells it, American and British officials met at the Pentagon to sketch out a geopolitical blueprint for the Middle in light of the new threats of Soviet expansionism and communist ideology. Gone was the reverse Monroe doctrine of the interwar period.5 Already President Harry Truman had extended aid to Greece and Turkey to help those governments stave off communist or Soviet challenges. While still conceding Britain `primary responsibility' for the Middle and the Mediterranean, Secretary of State George C. Marshall already was contemplating an eventual leadership role for the United States in the region. Stalin's projection of Soviet power into eastern and central Europe was being echoed in Greece, Turkey, and Iran. …

Part I: The Way to Independence Anglo-Transjordan Relations 1920-1946. Creating Transjordan. The First Years of the Principality. Suppressed Ambitions. Problems in Palestine. The Second World War. Abdullah's Efforts to Accomplish Greater Syria and Transjordanian Independence. The Implications of the Second World War on British Policy in the Middle East. TransJordanian Independence and the Anglo-Transjordan Treaty of 1946. Part II: From Independence to War 1946-1948. 1. Britain's Post-War Policy and its Influence on Transjordan. Britain Abandons Position in the Mediterranean. Britain's Decision to Leave Palestine. Abdullah's Regional Policies. 2. The Path to the 1948 War. Abdullah's Plan to Intervene in Palestine and to Expand Transjordan. The 1948 War's Prelude Abdullah Clears the Way to Expand Transjordan. The Bevin-Abulhuda Meeting. The Anglo-Transjordan Treaty of 1948. Final Political Preparations Before the War. Part III: War in Palestine. 1. Britain and the Arab Legion Before the 1948 War. Reorganization Before and During the Second World War. The Arrival of New British Officers. The Arab Legion Before the 1948 War. British Arms Supply to the Legion. 2. The Role of British Officers in the Arab Legion During the 1948 War. The Arab Legion Enters Palestine. The Battle of Jerusalem. The Withdrawal of British Officers and the British Embargo on Arms. The Ten Days Fighting. The British Officers' Conduct of War. Conceptions and Misperceptions. Part IV: The End of the War. 1. British Military Assistance to Transjordan in Case of an Israeli Attack. The Question of Implementing the Anglo-Transjordan Treaty. Debating the Question of British Military Assistance to Transjordan. Britain Prepares Military Assistance to Transjordan. The Negev and Aqaba. The Last Accord. 2. The Negotiations Between Transjordan and Israel as a Test. Case of Transjordan's Sovereignty. Renewal of Negotiations: June-November 1948. Towards and Armistice Agreement: November 1948 - April 1949. Abdullah Attempts to Achieve Legitimacy in Arab Palestine. Britain Changes its Policy: November-December 1948. Negotiations and Ultimatum: December 1948. Renewal of Direct Meetings Between the King and the Israelis. The Border in Samaria. Part V: End of an Era, 1949-1951. 1. Annexation of the West Bank and Post-War Political, Military, and Economical Implications. Timing the Annexation the British Perspective. Military Implications of Annexation in Light of the Anglo-Transjordan Treaty. The Annexation of the West Bank. Political Implications of the Annexation to the Anglo-Jordanian Relations. Jordan's Economic Problem. Greater Syria. Union with Iraq. 2. The British Assistance to the Legion. British Military Plans for the Reorganization of the Arab Legion. The British Subsidy for 1949/50 and the Question of Expanding or Reducing the Size of the Arab Legion. Renewal of Arms Deliveries. (Part Contents).

The authors seek to identify the important elements of Russian interests in the Middle East beyond Syria, to define the nature of Russian engagement in the region, and to describe the contours of a Russian strategy in the Middle East. Russia's regional strategy is an approach of ways and means, where broad principles take the place of prescribed ends; it is constantly seeking to improve its short-term economic, military, and political advantages.

The literature on traditional and critical security studies mostly point out at a paradigm shift concerning the nature of security threats and challenges either caused or impacted upon by state, non-state, and transnational actors. From a security perspective, the European Union (EU) has been one of the most influential actors in its southern neighborhood covering the Mediterranean, the Middle East, and North Africa (MENA) regions particularly due to its active foreign policy influence mechanisms including European Strategy, European Neighborhood Policy, and most recently through its Global Strategy. Nonetheless, the EU foreign policies in the MENA region after the Arab uprisings have not been very successful in terms of promoting social, political, and economic stability and cooperation; and thus, it achieved mixed results instead of integrated outcomes. This paper addresses the difficulties and expectation-capability gaps in the EU’s foreign policies in the Middle East with a particular emphasis on the changing security structure and threats in the post-Arab Spring period.  Therefore, this paper aims to assess the effectiveness of the Union’s regional strategies through the evaluation of its policies on volatile regions such as the Middle East.