Abstract
A new condition is shown to be necessary and sufficient for Coalition-Proof Nash equilibrium (CPNE) implementation in environments with complete information. This result implies that all choice functions are CPNE-implementable when individuals' utility functions are bounded with respect to all variables—except for money—and are either analytic or quasi-linear. Journal Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C72, D72, D78.
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