Abstract
We consider a simple multi-period model where the entry cost varies with respect to the number of firms that have entered previously. In the non-cooperative outcome, there is clustered entry among the firms in the last period; hence, the full potential of learning is not expropriated. When firms are allowed to form coalitions, the non-cooperative outcome is dominated; thus, there is a gain in efficiency. We also find that full efficiency is obtained when a grand coalition is formed. The implications of policies on coalitions as well as on individual firms are also discussed.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
