Co-evolution of payoff strategy and interaction strategy in prisoner’s dilemma game

Abstract

Abstract Co-evolutionary dynamical models, providing a realistic paradigm for investigating complex system, have been extensively studied. In this paper, the co-evolution of payoff strategy and interaction strategy is studied. Starting with an initial Gaussian distribution of payoff strategy r with the mean u and the variance q , we focus on the final distribution of the payoff strategy. We find that final distribution of the payoff strategy may display different structures depending on parameters. In the ranges u − 1 and u > 3 , the distribution displays a single-peak structure which is symmetric about r = u . The distribution manifests itself as a double-peak structure in the range − 1 u 3 although a fake three-peak structure shows up in range 1 u 2 . The explanations on the formation of different types of payoff strategy distributions are presented.