Abstract

Arguments from non-causal analogy form a distinctive class of analogical arguments in science not recognized in authoritative classifications by, e.g., Hesse (1963) and Bartha (2009). In this paper, I illustrate this novel class of scientific analogies by means of historical examples from physics, biology and economics, at the same time emphasizing their broader significance for contemporary debates in epistemology.

Highlights

  • Arguments from the observed properties of a scientific model to the unobserved properties of a target typically rely on analogical reasoning: often those arguments are accepted, rejected or considered stronger than others depending on the number and kinds of relevant similarities and dissimilarities existing between model and target (Bartha, 2009; Bayler-Jones, 2013; Hesse, 1963)

  • We feel more confident that a vaccine will be effective on human beings after testing it on mice than after testing it on lizards; and more confident that a social policy will be effective in Los Angeles after obtaining positive results in San Diego than in Paris

  • This paper aims to show, by means of historical examples, that this influential classification misses an important category of arguments from analogy in science: arguments from ‘non-causal analogy’

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Summary

Introduction

Arguments from the observed properties of a scientific model to the unobserved properties of a target typically rely on analogical reasoning: often those arguments are accepted, rejected or considered stronger than others depending on the number and kinds of relevant similarities and dissimilarities existing between model and target (Bartha, 2009; Bayler-Jones, 2013; Hesse, 1963). We feel more confident that a vaccine will be effective on human beings after testing it on mice than after testing it on lizards; and more confident that a social policy will be effective in Los Angeles after obtaining positive results in San Diego than in Paris This is because mice are more similar to humans than lizards; San Diego resembles Los Angeles more than Paris does. The use of analogical reasoning as a form of inductive inference about the unobserved can be distinguished from at least one other instance of this reasoning in science. This is its role in the context of scientific illustration.

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Case‐Studies
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Why Non‐Causal?
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Why novel?
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Why important?
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