Climate security paradox: Navigating India’s policy commitments amid global climate governance gaps

A SHIFT towards interest-driven, opportunity-based and more voluntary actions by combining bottom-up with top-down elements (Falkner, 2016).Interactive learning and experimentation at different levels of global governance have become highly important, and these complex global interactions are increasingly regarded not as obstacles but as opportunities for innovation and interactive learning (Sovacool, 2011).Global climate governance relates not only to the legal system of the climate regime but also to various public and private initiatives at different scales and across sectors.Scholars studying the complex multi-actor and multi-sector characteristics of the system have therefore begun to conceptualize global multi-level climate governance as an opportunity structure for the generation and diffusion of climate-related innovation.The topic of this special issues is climate governance within a multi-level and multi-sectoral global system.The work argues that global climate governance today aims essentially to activate the dynamic potential of each level of the global governance system, the level of world regions as well as the level of provinces and local communities.Horizontal peer-to-peer learning between countries, cities and regions, as well as vertical up-scaling of best practice, has created a dynamic of change.The cross-sectoral approach has become important as far as the mobilizing of economic interests (e.g. in the construction sector) and the use of co-benefits is concerned.This special issue intends to offer a better understanding of the nature and variety of, and linkages between, initiatives taken and governance functions delivered within the broader 'climate governance landscape ' (Betsill et al., 2015).It analyses various climate governance activities in the European Union (EU), India and China through a systemic perspective.The EU may be regarded as the strongest regional sub-system of the global system, although the BRICS countries of China and India play a comparable role, as countries both with a similar scope and with explicit multi-level climate policy activities.The systematic dimension of global climate governance is described in the introductory article 'Multi-level climate governance as a global system' by Martin Jnicke.The author analyses the potential of the global climate governance system, which is characterized by a multiplicity of access points and incentives for innovation and interactive learning.It is regarded as a 'multi-impulse-system', where the sum of even weak impulses from different parts of the system can play the role of a strong instrument.The global multi-level climate governance structure is also characterized by a specific global knowledge base and a global policy arena, allowing for climate-related agenda-setting and the mobilization of interests at each level.It is taken as an opportunity structure for ambitious innovation-based climate strategies based on interactive lesson-drawing from best practice.The lesson to be learned at all levels of the system is the potential for economic co-benefits related to the socio-technical system of clean-energy innovation and the global clean-energy market.The following article, 'The EU system of multi-level climate governance', by Martin Jnicke and Rainer Quitzow provides an overview of the regional structure of the global climate governance system.The authors understand the EU as a system where 'multi-level reinforcement' has been observed several times and which can be considered as a leader by example in global climate governance.They point to the fact that the EU has the world's highest share of green electricity and since 1990 has made the largest reduction to its greenhouse gas emissions.They attribute the EU's relatively successful performance in climate and energy governance to two main factors: (1) multi-level reinforcement and (2) the mobilization of economic interests at different levels of governance through low-carbon industrial policy.While the multi-impulse system has fostered

The Baku Climate Conference (COP29) is intended to address the intensifying fragmentation of global climate governance by setting new collective quantified goals (NCQGs) for climate finance and discussing critical issues such as loss and damage funds. At the conference, significant divergences persisted among countries on core issues such as climate finance, energy transition, and carbon market mechanisms, as evidenced by the ongoing negotiations and challenges in reaching a consensus on new climate finance goals. This not only mirrors the intricacies of the global governance system but also highlights the longstanding conflicts of interest among different stakeholders. Despite the hurdles impeding multilateral cooperation, South–South cooperation and regional integration efforts are gaining traction. Regional initiatives continue to advance global climate action, albeit in a limited fashion. As a key actor in global climate governance, China has taken on a more significant role by actively leveraging multilateral frameworks to promote collaboration, as evidenced by its substantial contributions to reducing greenhouse gas emissions and advancing green finance initiatives. Multilateral cooperation has been a cornerstone of China’s approach to climate change, as evidenced by its unwavering commitment to providing support to other developing nations and its leadership in global climate action. China consistently plays a constructive role in global climate governance, providing practical solutions aimed at fostering deeper integration within the global governance framework. The future of global climate cooperation hinges on the development of a more stable, just, and efficient climate governance system, as exemplified by China’s commitment to carbon reduction and its efforts to foster a fair and reasonable global climate governance framework.

Acknowledgments Editors' Note Introduction Mary Kaldor and Joseph E. Stiglitz Part 1: Social Protection Without Protectionism Introduction 1. Social Protection Without Protectionism, by Joseph E. Stiglitz 2. Scandinavian Equality: A Prime Example of Protection Without Protectionism, by Karl Ove Moene 3. Further Considerations on Social Protection, by Kemal Dervis, Leif Pagrotsky, George Soros Part 2: Protection from Violence Introduction 4. Global Security Cooperation in the Twenty-First Century, by G. John Ikenberry 5. Restructuring Global Security for the Twenty-First Century, by Mary Kaldor 6. Recent Developments in Global Criminal Industries, by Misha Glenny Part 3: Environmental Protection Introduction 7. Sharing the Burden of Saving the Planet: Global Social Justice for Sustainable Development Lessons from the Theory of Public Finance, by Joseph E. Stiglitz Appendixes to Chapter 7 8. Designing the Post-Kyoto Climate Regime, by Joseph E. Aldy and Robert N. Stavins Part 4: Urbanizing the Challenges of Global Governance Introduction 9. A Focus on Cities Takes Us Beyond Existing Governance Frameworks, by Saskia Sassen 10. Violence in the City: Challenges of Global Governance, by Sophie Body-Gendrot 11. Cities and Conflict Resolution, by Tony Travers 12. Cities and Global Climate Governance: From Passive Implementers to Active Co-Decision-Makers, by Kristine Kern and Arthur P. J. Mol Part 5: Global Governance Introduction 13. Rethinking Global Economic and Social Governance, by Jose Antonio Ocampo 14. The G20 and Global Governance, by Ngaire Woods 15. Transforming Global Governance? Structural Deficits and Recent Developments in Security and Finance, by David Held and Kevin Young Contributors' Notes

Global climate governance is an integral part of global governance. Its most prominent feature is to make the entities and means of tackling global warming diversified. At present, NGOs have a growing presence in global climate governance. Their status in UN climate change negotiations has been increasingly rising, the issues they pay attention to have attracted more attention from the international community, and they have more choices on how to hold activities. NGOs mainly serve global climate governance in three aspects: the diverse soft power that NGOs assume when they participate in global climate governance, the multiple modes that NGOs adopt when they participate in global climate governance, and the multiple roles that NGOs play when they participate in global climate governance. The reform of the global climate governance system is now at a historical turning point. China needs to continuously sharpen its capabilities and improve strategies to lead global climate governance, and strengthen and lead the construction of NGOs.KeywordsGlobal climate governanceNGOsParis Agreement

As one of the founding members of the United Nations, China has been actively promoting the process of global governance. In 2012, China proposed the concept of global governance of «a Community with a Shared Future for Mankind», aiming to promote the development of global governance system in a more fair and reasonable direction. The view on global climate governance is one of the five elements of the concept of «a Community with a Shared Future for Mankind». The theoretical and methodological underpinnings of this study are many approaches, theories, and methods from political science and related scientific fields, which give this work its interdisciplinary nature. Mainly geopolitical approach, method of comparison and method of comparison. In its long-term participation in global climate governance, China has formed a unique concept of global climate governance that focuses on win-win cooperation, fairness and reasonableness. China has made contributions to global public health governance. It helps enhance China’s voice and influence in the field of global climate governance. China’s view on global climate governance not only guides the practice of China’s participation in global climate governance, but also has great significance for the construction and future development of the current global climate governance mechanism. In the post-Paris Agreement era, it is possible for China to continue to promote and even lead the formulation and implementation of specific rules for the United Nations climate negotiations, and to make greater contributions to the construction of the global climate governance mechanism.

Does increased participation of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) improve the democratic quality at intergovernmental organizations (IGOs)? Multilateral institutions and global governance mechanisms have emerged during the past few decades to tackle global challenges, such as climate change. However, policy making institutions such as IGOs are often viewed as lacking democratic legitimacy. The decision- making process remains tied to nation-states represented often by non-elected delegates, yet the decisions affect people who do not have a say in the process. One remedy proposed by global governance scholars to close such democratic deficit is to include a variety of stakeholders such as non-governmental actors. I challenge the conventional wisdom that assumes the democratic potential of these actors, and unpack the “blackbox” of NGOs to assess their internal politics.To assess their role in global governance, we need to understand the substantive participation and patterns of interaction among the NGOs at the governance institutions. I construct a multilevel theoretical framework from a social network perspective to understand their participation and interaction. The theoretical framework is based on transnational social movement theory and social network theory.I draw on the example of women’s groups working at the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) annual conferences. Employing both quantitative statistical analysis and network analysis, I demonstrate an evident increase in women’s groups that participate substantively at the UNFCCC. How- ever, the growth is accompanied by inequality in participation. Not all groups that attend the UNFCCC participate in collective advocacy or network actively. The variation is associated with the capacity and social embeddedness of a given organization. Furthermore, the community working on women’s issues has become fragmented over- time. The fragmentation is a result of NGOs’ different strategies and understandings of their role in global climate governance. The institutional context of UNFCCC has also contributed to the fragmentation. Overall, these civil society actors contribute to the democratization of the UNFCCC process by adding new voices, establishing new issue linkages, and raising awareness for women’s rights and gender equality. At the same time, however, the internal inequality and the power imbalance could further exacerbate the democratic deficit in the global climate governance process.I have independently collected data on over 800 actors at the UN climate conferences. I have also conducted semi-structured, in-depth interviews with civil society representatives at the UN climate change summits in 2017 and 2018. The findings contribute to the understanding of democratic legitimacy in global governance of large-scale, transnational challenges by analyzing both macro-level network relation- ships among actors and the micro-level mechanisms among network members.

Climate issues require a coordinated global response. Greenhouse gases, such as carbon dioxide, remain in the atmosphere for a long period of time and exert a strong influence. Carbon emissions are transnational and intergenerational in nature; they also present a “free-rider” problem due to their role as global public goods. This makes it necessary for nations to go beyond their own decision-making processes and seek global cooperation to solve the problem of climate change. In fact, in the absence of supranational governance bodies, it requires transnational negotiations and consultations to build a global climate governance system. However, under existing technological systems and energy resource endowments, responding to climate change by reducing greenhouse gas emissions may impose constraints on economic development. Looking back at global cooperation in tackling climate change, we find that disputes between countries in politics, economy, science, and technology have posed challenges to the creation of a “fair and effective” global climate governance model. Of course, from a broader perspective, global climate governance has spillover effects, due to its interplay with other fields of international cooperation, such as security, trade, investment, and technology. For example, the carbon border tax proposed by the EU may have a profound impact on current international trade patterns, and high-emission industries could bear the brunt of such actions. In addition, addressing climate change and achieving sustainable development also impose new requirements for the development of global climate finance. Lastly, as a large economy, China will play an important role in promoting the establishment of a global governance system that is fair and reasonable, and focuses on win–win cooperation. For example, we believe China will be an important leader along with the US and Europe in the global response to climate change, and that it will also cooperate with “Belt and Road” countries on climate issues in its process of “going global.”

Read all about it!? Public accountability, fragmented global climate governance and the media

type="graphical" xml:id="gpol12155-abs-0002"> The European Union needs to close ranks in order to stand its ground in our globalised world.

Students of Global Governance have long shown a special interest in climate governance. Global Climate Governance features prominently in global politics, but we lack full understanding about how to describe, characterize and analyze the normative context of climate governance. For China, the policies and legal system for climate governance is still not perfect and many shortcomings in the supporting mechanisms and guarantee mechanisms to fulfill its obligations. According to the theoretical contribution of the English School, the paper argues that the Liberal Environmentalism can be interpreted as the normative system for Global Climate Governance. This system provides a useful basis for scholars and practitioners to conceptualize the climate governance dynamics influencing Global Governance. It also provides an important theoretical reference for China's participation in Global Climate Governance.

Integrating global energy and climate governance: The changing role of the International Energy Agency

Global climate governance is one of the most complex global governance systems that is also ridden with divergent interests of states and non-state actors. Since the 2000s, the authority of UN-led global climate governance has been contested by the states declining their mitigation targets of the Kyoto Protocol and by those that find the international climate negotiations inefficient to ramp up climate action. These divergent views of states resulted in the counter-institutionalization apparent in the proliferation of minilateral forums and hybrid coalitions of climate initiatives oftentimes bringing states and non-state actors together. These non-UNFCCC partnerships have functioned to be strategic actions that put pressure on the global climate governance system to re-legitimate itself. Meanwhile, transnational actors have also contested the same system demanding a deeper cooperation that will keep the temperature goal below 2 degrees. This study argues that with its new mode of governance named hybrid multilateralism, the Paris Agreement was actually an institutional adaptation to the contestations by states and non-state actors in the forms of counter-institutionalization and politicization. It also discusses the problematic sides of the functions that non-state actors are expected to provide in this new governance mode. This paper is composed of four parts: firstly, the theoretical background that feeds into the analysis of empirical data with regard to global climate governance will be presented. Secondly, beginning from the Rio Conference, milestone developments in global climate governance will be examined by taking the contestation by the states into consideration. In the third part, the process of the politicization of climate change in which transnational actors and specifically the climate change movement demanded more decisive climate action will be explicated. In the last part, the existing legitimacy deficits with regard to non-state actors in post-Paris climate governance will be elaborated.

1. Introducing Business and Global Governance - Morten Ougaard Part I: Business as Master of Global Governance 2. Direct and Indirect Influence at the World Intellectual Property Organization - Christopher May 3. Practices (Re)Producing Orders: Understanding the Role of Business in Global Security Governance - Anna Leander 4. Unthinking the Gats: A Radical Political Economy Critique of Private Transnational Governance - A. Claire Cutler Part II: Business as Subject to Global Governance 5. Business and Global Climate Governance: A Neo-Pluralist Perspective - Robert Falkner 6. Governing Corruption through the Global Corporation - Hans Krause Hansen 7. Transnational Governance Networks in The Regulation of Finance - The Making of Global Regulation and Supervision Standards in the Banking Industry - Eleni Tsingou 8. Non-Triad Multinationals and Global Governance: Still A North-South Conflict? - Andreas Nolke and Heather Taylor Part III: Business as Partner in Global Governance 9. Rethinking Multilateralism: Global Governance and Public-Private Partnerships with the UN - Benedicte Bull 10. Iso and The Success of Regulation through Voluntary Consensus - Craig N. Murphy and Joanne Yates 11. Beyond the Boardroom: Multilocation and the Business Face of Celebrity Diplomacy - Andrew F. Cooper 12. Variations in Corporate Norm-Entrepreneurship: Why the Home State Matters - Anne Flohr, Lothar Rieth, Sandra Schwindenhammer, and Klaus Dieter Wolf

This forum article outlines a research agenda focused on linkages between the UNFCCC and other governance arrangements that also address climate change. We take as our point of departure the recognition that the UNFCCC is no longer the sole site of global climate change governance, and thus the types of linkage across what we call the global climate governance landscape including as a central node the UNFCCC are important for thinking through how improved global responses to climate change may be pursued. The forum identifies two specific types of linkage: division-of-labor linkages and catalytic linkages. We illustrate these with some examples and raise questions we believe would be useful to pursue in future research.

Climate change is a major challenge for human society in the 21st century and an important issue in the context of sustainable development governance. As the density of institutions in global climate governance increases, so does the potential for overlap and interaction between the various elements of institutions. The current global climate governance issue is no longer solely a state-centric governance model but presents a complex manifestation of a complex of mechanisms. Taking a global climate governance perspective, this paper finds that the institutional complex of global climate governance is shaped by internal factors, such as self-attribution, rights, and interest linkages. External factors include the rapid development of globalization and the non-governmental state of the international community. The internal logic of the institutional complex is based on the institutional fragmentation of multiple interested parties involved in the governance process and the interaction patterns of internal actors. The institutional complex of global climate governance has the following implications for policy-making: the strength of the institutional complex refers to the framework of decision-making; the flexibility of the arguments provides stakeholders with demands related to their interests and inspires different countries to join in the governance of global climate change.