Abstract
This paper investigates climate control coalition games of developed and developing nations. It studies whether incentives exist for non-cooperating nations to join a coalition based upon issue linkage. Issue linkage is considered through increased R&D expenditures triggering improved technological innovations that advance energy efficiencies. Model calculations demonstrate that incentives exist for non-cooperating countries to join a climate control coalition if nations cooperate on technological innovations. Restrictions on trade such as sanction mechanisms against non-cooperating countries are not necessarily an incentive to join a coalition. Technological spillover effects lead to improved economic situations and increased energy efficiencies in non-cooperating countries. We compare climate control coalitions of developed and developing nations. Developing nations can benefit by climate control if it is linked with technology cooperation.
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