Climate Change Messaging and Mental Health

There is a strong view among climate change researchers and communicators that the persuasive tactic of arousing fear in order to promote precautionary motivation and behavior is neither effective nor appropriate in the context of climate change communication and engagement. Yet the modest research evidence that exists with respect to the use of fear appeals in communicating climate change does not offer adequate empirical evidence—either for or against the efficacy of fear appeals in this context—nor would such evidence adequately address the issue of the appropriateness of fear appeals in climate change communication. Extensive research literatures addressing preparedness, prevention, and behavior change in the areas of public health, marketing, and risk communication generally nonetheless provide consistent empirical support for the qualified effectiveness of fear appeals in persuasive social influence communications and campaigns. It is also noteworthy that the language of climate change communication is typically that of “communication and engagement,” with little explicit reference to targeted social influence or behavior change, although this is clearly implied. Hence underlying and intertwined issues here are those of cogent arguments versus largely absent evidence, and effectiveness as distinct from appropriateness. These matters are enmeshed within the broader contours of the contested political, social, and environmental, issues status of climate change, which jostle for attention in a 24/7 media landscape of disturbing and frightening communications concerning the reality, nature, progression, and implications of global climate change. All of this is clearly a challenge for evaluation research attempting to examine the nature and effectiveness of fear appeals in the context of climate change communication, and for determining the appropriateness of designed fear appeals in climate change communications intended to both engage and influence individuals, communities, and “publics” with respect to the ongoing threat and risks of climate change. There is an urgent need to clearly and effectively communicate the full nature and implications of climate change, in the face of this profound risk and rapidly unfolding reality. All such communications are, inherently, frightening warning messages, quite apart from any intentional fear appeals. How then should we put these arguments, evidence, and challenges “on the table” in our considerations and recommendations for enhancing climate change communication—and addressing the daunting and existential implications of climate change?

Despite overwhelming consensus among scientists about the reality of anthropogenic climate change (Bray, 2010; Oreskes, 2004), there remains significant reluctance on the part of citizens and politicians to take the action needed to address it. This resistance has been repeatedly identified in social research (Leiserowitz & Maibach, 2010; Leviston, Leitch, Greenhill, Leonard, & Walker, 2011; Lorenzoni & Pidgeon, 2006; McCright & Dunlap, 2011; Reser, Bradley, Glendon, Ellul, & Callaghan, 2012) and is mirrored by the lack of progress made by salient political summits (Rogelj et al., 2010). Perhaps as a response to this, scholarly journals and articles that are focused on climate change are growing. Natural scientists tell us that we know what needs to be done to avert dangerous climate change (IPCC, 2014), and economists tell us that delaying action in the short term will lead to much greater costs in the long term (Stern, 2007). Understanding public responses to climate change and developing solutions to catalyse action is a critical challenge for the social sciences, and we propose that the development and elaboration of a social psychology of climate change would be a cornerstone of such an approach. We do not make the claim that social psychology has all the answers but rather that the theories, models and research methods of social psychology can provide a powerful arsenal to complement the approaches of other disciplines. Researchers have already begun to apply social psychological theory and methods to the issue of climate change, and we highlight in the following sections examples of the insights that have flowed from this. We cannot assume, though, that our theories and findings will automatically generalise to the climate change context. As Moser (2010) has noted, there are unique dimensions to climate change that make it distinct from other environmental, risk and health issues: The causes of climate change are invisible to humans, the impacts are distal and it is complex and riddled with uncertainties. Modern urban humans are to some extent insulated from their physical environment, and the lags between the climate and social systems make it difficult for people to understand their role in influencing climate. These factors suggest the importance of developing a social psychology of climate change, empirically testing, integrating and refining existing theories and models to develop new frameworks. The notion that psychology can play a role in understanding and addressing climate change is not a new one. The American Psychological Association's Task Force on the interface between psychology and global climate change comprehensively detailed the ways in which psychological research can help to understand people's perceptions of the risks of climate change, the contribution of human behaviour to climate change, the psychosocial impacts of climate change, the ways in which people can adapt and cope with climate change and the psychological barriers that could limit climate change action (Swim et al., 2009, 2011). It is also not a new idea that social psychology can play an important role in understanding and addressing environmental problems and solutions (Clayton & Brook, 2005). Social psychology, specifically, has a long tradition of theory and research that is relevant to addressing key climate change questions. Attitudes, social cognition, persuasion and attitude change, social influence, and intragroup and intergroup behaviour, for instance, are fundamental foci for social psychology and have direct relevance for understanding the human and social dimensions of climate change. The time is ripe to understand the range of research that has been developing in social psychology on attitudes, beliefs and actions, to build upon these insights, and integrate them with knowledge from other sciences to develop models and theories indigenous to the climate change context. In the following section, we provide a brief overview of recent social psychological research that addresses three broad themes relevant to understanding and responding to climate change. These themes are as follows: (i) social psychological influences on climate change attitudes and beliefs; (ii) facilitators and barriers to climate change action; and (iii) changing climate change attitudes and behaviour. Although there is some overlap in these themes, as an organising principle they intuitively map on to key questions that arise in relation to climate change. Our aim is to highlight recent examples of social psychological research that provide interesting and important insights in relation to these themes. Swim, Markowitz, and Bloodhart (2012) have noted that much of the social psychological research on climate change has emerged since 2006; we focus in on the most recent of this research that has been published since 2010. We also outline how the studies in the special issue relate to these themes. We recognise that these are not the only areas where social psychological research and theory can make important contributions but they nevertheless relate to key questions that need to be addressed. We conclude the introduction by proposing considerations that social psychologists could take into account in their future research on climate change. A major focus in the climate change literature and the media more broadly has been on describing climate change attitudes and beliefs. In many developed nations, questions about beliefs and attitudes related to climate change have become a standard component of political polling (e.g. Gallup polls and Lowy Institute polls), and there are comprehensive national and cross-national surveys that address this topic. Examples include US research by the Yale Climate Change Communication project (Leiserowitz, Maibach, Roser-Renouf, & Smith, 2010), national surveys conducted in Australia (Leviston et al., 2011; Reser et al., 2012), and the U.K. (Pidgeon, 2012) and the Eurobarometer research conducted in Europe (The European Opinion Research Group, 2002). As the study of attitudes—their conceptualization, measurement, formation, function and relationship with behaviour—has been a cornerstone of social psychological research, social psychology can make important contributions to these assessments. Note that although social psychological theories usually distinguish between attitudes and beliefs, these terms are often used interchangeably in the climate change research domain, and for the sake of simplicity, we will usually use attitudes to encompass both attitudes and beliefs. Recent reviews of the attitude literature from 1996 to 2009 highlight significant trends and directions in this area of research (Ajzen, 2001; Bohner & Dickel, 2011; Crano & Prislin, 2006). These trends include the role of attitude strength and attitude ambivalence, the distinction between implicit and explicit attitudes, the recognition that attitudes have cognitive and affective underpinnings, and the influence of bodily and external physical cues on attitudes. Recent social psychological research on climate change particularly provides examples of the influence of bodily and external cues and the distinction between cognitive and affective aspects of attitudes, and three of the papers in the special issue address the latter issue. The work on internal bodily and external physical cues is a growing research area with a special issue of the European Journal of Social Psychology devoted to the concept of embodied cognition (Schubert & Semin, 2009). As the distal nature of climate change and the relative insulation of humans from their physical environment are thought to be key barriers to greater engagement with climate change (Moser, 2010), it is perhaps not surprising that this area of research has extended into the climate change domain. Cues that help to 'bring to life' the experience of global warming could help to overcome these psychological barriers. Risen and Critcher (2011) have shown that feelings of warmth increased beliefs in global warming and that this effect was mediated through greater ease in constructing more fluent mental images of hot outdoor images. Other studies have shown that people had greater concern about global warming and donated more money to a global warming charity when they thought that the temperature outside was warmer than usual (Li, Johnson, & Zaval, 2011), that embodied temperature influenced concern for global warming and willingness to volunteer for a global warming group (Lewandowski, Ciarocco, & Gately, 2012) and that priming heat-related cognitions resulted in greater belief in global warming and willingness to pay to reduce global warming (Joireman, Truelove, & Duell, 2010). Physical external cues, in this case the presence of bare trees in the laboratory, also increased belief in global warming (Guéguen, 2012). These studies illustrate how subtle cues can influence climate change attitudes in the moment, although the longevity of these effects on attitudes has not been explored. Another important direction in attitude research that has relevance for climate change is the recognition that attitudes have affective as well as cognitive underpinnings. This is important when considering that the high levels of risk associated with climate change means that it could elicit strong emotional responses. Cognitive approaches to understanding attitudes (e.g. expectancy-value models) have been at the forefront of how we understand attitude formation (Ajzen, 2001). From this perspective, attitudes are the outcome of a cognitive process of evaluating beliefs about the attitude object; for example, a person who has positive beliefs about a climate change policy is likely to hold favourable attitudes to that policy. Consistent with the importance of cognitive, rational processes, Tobler, Visschers, and Siegrist (2012) have shown that perceived costs and benefits of climate change policies were significant predictors of support for these policies and, in most cases, were stronger predictors of behavioural willingness and policy support than other variables (e.g. demographics, climate change concern and climate change scepticism). But there is also evidence for the affective basis of attitudes and even for the primacy of affective aspects of attitudes (Verplanken, Jofstee, & Janssen, 1998; Zajonc, 1984). Recent reviews of the attitude literature suggest that, rather than attitudes being determined by one or the other, affect and cognition are both likely to be important for the formation of attitudes (Ajzen, 2001; Crano & Prislin, 2006). For example, whether affective or cognitive aspects of attitude objects are accessed more readily depends on whether the attitude object itself is more affectively or cognitively based (Giner-Sorolla, 2004). Three articles in the current issue pick up on the cognitive and affective aspects of climate change attitudes and perceptions. Although it seems intuitively likely that having greater knowledge about climate change should be related to climate change attitudes, findings in relation to knowledge have been mixed. Some research has shown that knowing more about the causes and consequences of climate change is associated with greater climate change risk judgments (Sunblad, Biel, & Gärling, 2009), whereas other studies have shown no effects or have suggested the possibility that having more knowledge could even be negatively related to climate change beliefs for those with a politically conservative orientation (Malka, Krosnick, & Langer, 2009; McCright & Dunlap, 2011). Yet, Guy, Kashima, Walker, and O'Neill (this issue) point out that knowledge is usually measured with proxy measures such as scientific literacy or self-reported climate change knowledge rather than objective knowledge of climate change, and therefore, it is premature to dismiss the positive relationship between knowledge and attitudes. Their study used an objective measure of climate change knowledge and shows that people who are more knowledgeable have greater belief that climate change is happening, and, moreover, knowledge attenuates the negative relationship between ideology (i.e. individualism) and climate change attitudes. Van der Linden (this issue) specifically addresses how affect and cognition relate to climate change perceptions. The study investigates the relationship between personal experiences of extreme weather events, affect relating to climate change, and climate change risk perceptions. The results of the structural equation modelling of a national British sample provides support for a dual-process model whereby cognitive appraisals activate risk perceptions, and risk and affect mutually reinforce each other in a feedback loop. The paper by Leviston, Price, and Bishop (this issue) explores the role of affect in climate change responses somewhat differently in that it looks at the images people bring to mind when they think about climate change and assesses the affect associated with these images. The research explores whether the types of images that people associate with climate change might be a way of psychologically and affectively engaging or distancing themselves from climate change. It is not enough that people endorse attitudes that are in tune with scientific consensus on climate change; these attitudes need to translate into positive action, whether that is individual private-sphere behaviours such as 'green' consumerism, public-sphere non-activist behaviour such as voting for political parties with environmentally responsible policies or collective environmental activism that seeks to influence decision-makers (Stern, 2000). These types of distinctions are important as the different classes of behaviour might have quite different facilitators and barriers (Stern, 2000). Another important distinction when considering climate-change-related behaviour is the extent to which it is habitual and automatic versus reasoned and deliberative (Ouellette & Wood, 1998). Automaticity of environmentally harmful behaviour poses a serious barrier, whereas automaticity of environmentally protective behaviour makes future behaviour of this type more likely (Van Lange & Joireman, 2008). Yet another potentially important consideration is the goals associated with behaviours (Lindenberg & Steg, 2007). Behaviours can be performed for a range of reasons, and individuals' perception of their own motives could have implications for their future actions. As an example, energy conservation behaviours could be performed primarily to reduce carbon emissions or to save money; the issue with engaging in environmentally protective behaviours for non-environmental reasons is that it could undermine the development of an environmentalist identity (van der Werff, Steg, & Keizer, 2013) and reduce the likelihood of behavioural spillover (Thøgersen & Crompton, 2009). A range of social psychological theories outline the mechanisms that motivate people to take action, and these have had great reach both inside and outside of social psychology. These theories include (but are not limited to) theory of planned behaviour (Ajzen, 1991), self-determination theory (Deci & Ryan, 2000) and perspectives that foreground the role of norms (e.g. norm focus theory; Cialdini, Reno, & Kallgren, 1990) and the social identity perspective (see Hornsey, 2008 for a recent review). The theory of planned behaviour has been used to examine determinants of a range of private-sphere environmental behaviours including employees' energy-saving behaviours (Greaves, Zibarras, & Stride, 2013; Zhang, Wang, & Zhou, 2014), private landholders' carbon sequestration and trading (Thompson & Hansen, 2013), renewable energy use (Alam et al., 2014) and opposition to wind farms (Read, Brown, Thorsteinsson, Morgan, & Price, 2013). Similarly, research drawing on self-determination theory has identified that experiencing more autonomous, self-determined motivation or perceiving that the government is more autonomy supportive is related to public-sphere and private-sphere environmental behaviours (De Groot & Steg, 2010; Lavergne, Sharp, Pelletier, & Holtby, 2010). Perhaps one of the most important contributions of social psychology to understanding human behaviour has been its theorisation of the influence of social norms (e.g. Cialdini et al., 1990). From a social identity perspective, the social groups to which we belong provide guidelines for appropriate behaviour through the internalisation of group norms (Hogg & Abrams, 1988; Hornsey, 2008). We only need to consider the powerful relationship between political party identification and climate change responses to see evidence of this process (Dunlap & McCright, 2008; Fielding, Head, Laffan, Western, & Hoegh-Guldberg, 2012). According to the social identity perspective, group norms are more likely to guide environmental behaviour when the social identity is more central and salient (Fielding, Terry, Masser, & Hogg, 2008; Terry, Hogg, & White, 1999). Furthermore, in salient intergroup contexts, in-group members tend to polarise away from out-group members, and their environmental intentions and behaviour will become more in-group normative (Ferguson, & 2011; & 2012). and (this issue) our understanding of how social identity and associated in-group norms influences climate-change-related behaviour. on social identity to distinguish between dimensions of group identification and whether different dimensions are more likely to guide behaviour. that extent to which group identity is important to the and rather than among group the relationship between group norms and when those behaviours are high Although much of the research to has focused on understanding and private-sphere environmental and (van & have extended their model of with collective to understand responses to climate change (Van & 2008). on a perspective & Swim, 2011), they propose and provide evidence for for people to with the climate and In the case of climate change, is a likely to be by and to the extent that they they be more likely to take action to reduce their can also be through that to their beliefs about whether group action will be in with climate change. and (this issue) this research by determinants of intentions to in collective climate emotional specifically on and as central and social norms into the Their findings that the perceived norm intentions to take part in a climate perceptions of and group In the section, we a brief overview of theories that could help to understand climate-change-related and these approaches suggest variables to to effect change. For example, research has shown the of to influence environmentally related behaviour et al., 2013; et al., 2010; Cialdini, & 2008; Cialdini, & 2008; & 2013; et al., 2012). In this section, we focus on research that addresses key that might be when to influence climate-change-related attitudes, beliefs and actions. important direction in research has been the of how to climate change to positive in climate change attitudes and beliefs. From a social psychological perspective, one of the of is the role of attitudes in & Dickel, 2011). A of the literature to a effect of attitudes on for versus et al., 2009), and there is evidence that this is more likely when people hold strong attitudes & 2007). This that people's attitudes will influence how they to to change climate-change-related attitudes and beliefs, and research is broadly with this. greater to on climate change with their own & and are more likely to climate when it to their beliefs & 2011; & 2013). In response to this, some have climate to be more when they with the For example, with greater had greater intentions when with that behaviour as the American way of & 2010), and climate greater intentions when with that the positive effects of climate change on the development of new Hornsey, & 2012). the of more we know from the work of and that people are risk and that risk in ways that highlight the of can be more than that focus on In the of climate change where is a of the and (2011) have shown that climate change that the the but the possibility of stronger intentions to and (this issue) on the model of & 2013) to provide a for climate change In they with one of policies that in renewable energy or limit The with the policies was when the with the policy. there was more with a policy of in renewable energy an when it was in terms of whereas greater was for a policy of emissions a when it was as also that the focus of their responses to the Another key issue that be is the possibility of to climate change and the risks to human and from climate change, of and are central to the of climate change. the effects of in relation to health behaviour & & 2000) provide evidence that elicit greater attitude and behaviour change but only when the is by of responses propose that people that response are and they have the to out the they will in behaviours to the there is this in to the such as or The for to climate change is in a study by and greater of climate change among with stronger beliefs who had been with about climate change, whereas this not on more Research has also shown that of to from climate change, particularly can be made more take the perspective of the by climate change (Swim & in to climate change also when social are & 1999). For example, when were to evidence of energy use by their own they were more likely to climate change to causes than when the was about 2013). Furthermore, this greater to causes was negatively associated with climate change concern and support for climate change that help reduce identity can greater engagement with climate change. on the and (2010) that a to reduce the of of climate change and personal with climate change and environmental behaviour. Although can help reduce to climate change, and (this issue) that the for to environmental problems can undermine individuals' willingness to take environmental as progress that can to future environmental and human health problems can reduce the likelihood of engaging in environmentally behaviour. The is perceptions of that a of in an as the idea of scientific progress our the need to through individual actions. The from this research is that it is important not to scientific of the major barriers that has been identified in relation to action to address climate change is the distal nature of the et al., major consequences will in the future and are perceived as more likely to affect other those who are already most This of climate change that that reduce the between and the future or between the and other humans help to overcome this In support of this, that focus on environmental consequences of climate change help climate change engagement & 2013), and to take the perspective of a future human experiencing environmental problems environmental engagement & 2013). The research of and (this issue) to whether our human identity can influence willingness to take environmental Consistent with research, they that are related to greater willingness to in environmental is though, is that priming people who have to think about to have high related to potentially it an intergroup context. This provides evidence of the of about climate change and the need to understand the Social psychology can also point to some and to greater willingness to in to address climate change. and (this issue) that that whether have an versus an can make a to how many behaviours they consider engaging In that had out behaviours they would not consider resulted in being to in more behaviours than an where people consider what they would consider from a In this introduction to the special we highlight areas where social psychological research has important insights to understanding climate change attitudes, beliefs and what influences these and how they can be We used recent social psychological research and the papers from this current issue to illustrate key The strength of a social psychological of climate change is that it can help us to understand the of responses to climate change, for example, how attitudes can be influenced by both affect and cognition, how attitudes and beliefs can responses to climate change and people to climate change with and It can also provide and to the of climate change It is to see the and of social psychological research that addresses important questions related to climate change, although this has been a recent (Swim et al., 2012). we are to to make important contributions to this area of research, though, we propose that social psychologists should consider the following in their future We noted that there are a range of that can take to address climate change, from private-sphere behaviours to non-activist public-sphere behaviours to environmental activism (Stern, 2000). Although all of these approaches can some have greater than & 2009). have greater to influence and and to effect Despite this, social psychological research often investigates private-sphere actions. As a we can our contribution to climate change research by our focus to individual behaviours and public-sphere responses to climate change & 2008). As a we are to what is about climate change. The groups we belong to and the social we can be powerful influences on our attitudes, beliefs and the effect of political identification on climate change attitudes is a of this. area where these have relevance is in the of national and climate change As an example, and (2012) on social identity to the in that when the of individual and other become a identity can that will lead to greater likelihood of The consideration of intergroup and how these or positive responses to climate change (e.g. climate change and introduction of climate change is an area that could provide important A critical distinction made in relation to climate change is between and According to the on Climate Change the to human to reduce the impacts of climate change, whereas the latter to that can be made to human or systems that can help to the or the that would from or climate change and are even the measures will not some of climate change, and is needed to with this (IPCC, Yet the issue of psychological has been in climate change & Swim, 2011). This is for at (i) as noted some of climate change is research on is and (ii) a lack of understanding of could in that to or reduce to climate change that impacts or of other or social & social psychological research is to be a serious to the climate change research greater needs to be focused on of The need to to the distinction between and to the need for social psychologists to work with other disciplines. et we social psychologists to become with the and research of other relevant that address climate change to the relevance and reach of social psychological research in this that solutions to climate change cannot be developed by one the issue systems including and A is and social psychology can make a significant contribution by methods and theories that help social and cognitive In we in this introduction to the special issue to foreground social psychological theories and findings relevant to key climate change questions. Although social psychology can a of and the social psychology of climate change is and more needs to be done we have a of and theories that are to climate change. we this, the of social psychology is likely to be at the of climate We that the special issue can help the progress that has been made and catalyse the development of an indigenous social psychology of climate change. We social psychologists to this that we can be part of the to one of the and environmental of our

Communicating Uncertainty about Climate Change: The Scientists’ Dilemma

<p><b>Climate change is a highly pressing global issue. Addressing climate change requires co-operation on many levels, including at the individual and collective level. Appealing to fear is a common strategy employed by climate change communicators to motivate mitigation behaviours. Recently, a growing body of research has emerged where specific fear appeal frameworks, such as the Extended Parallel Process Model (EPPM) are applied to climate change communication. The EPPM postulates that fear appeals must be countered with adequate recommendations for taking protective action, termed “efficacy” messaging. According to the EPPM, providing efficacy recommendations prevents people from disengaging with fear appeals.</b></p> <p>Thus far, few studies have applied the EPPM as framework for motivating collective mitigation actions, such as taking part in protests and signing petitions. This study aims to address this research gap. Specifically, this study investigates the hypothesis that a low to moderately frightening message about the impacts of climate change combined with an efficacy message may be most effective for motivating individual mitigation actions (e.g. household energy saving). Conversely, a high fear message about the impacts of climate change combined with an efficacy message may be most effective for motivating collective mitigation actions (e.g. participating in climate protests). This hypothesis was tested using a 2 x 2 experimental design that included a message intervention administered via an online survey.</p> <p>Contrary to these hypotheses, there was no overall effect for the ‘high’ vs. ‘low’ fear message intervention on either individual or collective action intentions. Providing a specific efficacy message (vs. not) did not significantly increase individual action intentions but did significantly increase collective action intentions. Analyses also demonstrated that perceptions of severity (i.e. perceived seriousness of climate change) were more strongly associated with collective action intentions compared with individual action intentions. Overall, the study findings supported the EPPM as a framework for motivating both individual and collective action intentions to mitigate climate change.</p>

Clinician education on climate change and health: virtual learning community models

Mental health and climate change: tackling invisible injustice

Behavioral science approaches to promoting sustainable action have mainly focused on cognitive processes, whereas the role of emotions has received comparably little attention. However, emotions have a great but currently not fully exploited potential to contribute to a sustainable behavior change. In this perspective, we summarize recent research emphasizing the central and indispensable role of emotion in human thinking and judgment. We discuss how these insights can promote affective reactivity toward sustainability issues, help leverage the potential of emotion to motivate action, and improve emotional climate change communication and intervention strategies. We outline a research agenda that we see as crucial for obtaining a solid evidence base on how emotions can optimally promote sustainable behavior. This paper is meant to stimulate discussion and a coordinated research effort on how emotions may be better leveraged to promote large-scale sustainable action and to promote a stronger integration of emotional strategies into the toolbox of policy makers.

T he science of climate change is one thing, but communicating the results of that science to the public is very much another. Climate change is one of the issues that will come up at the World Conference on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg, South Africa, in August 2002. But apart from when there is suffering from unexpected heat or cold, flood or drought, it is always hard to give climate change the appropriate urgency. The science itself is not in doubt. Of course there are continuing uncertainties about the proportion of natural to human-driven change, but the existence of human-driven change is clear. The conclusions of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and the main national academies of science (including that of the United States) represent a broad international consensus with little serious dissent. There the problems of communication begin. I remember the editor of a leading British broadsheet dismissing climate change as yesterday's story. News has to have a beginning and an end, and often has to be artificially polarized. A process that occurs over years or centuries is hard to report on very often. Moreover, the story carries uncomfortable implications. Making unwelcome changes now to avoid possible consequences in an uncertain future is a difficult proposition to sell to anyone. With a few honorable exceptions, politicians and economists do not calculate more than a few years ahead. There are also none so deaf as those who don't want to hear. Yet the message of climate change is being increasingly, if incrementally, registered. At the beginning of the 19th century, everyone knew that slavery was wrong. But there was a tacit conspiracy to do little or nothing about it; too many interests were at stake. Leadership, public agitation, and a few visible disasters were needed to bring slavery to an end. It also needed a new morality and sense of public and private responsibility. The Framework Convention on Climate Change of 1992 and subsequent agreements fixed large obligations on governments. None was under the illusion that the modest reduction of carbon emissions by industrial countries envisaged under the Kyoto Protocol would solve the problem, and all agreed that the arrangements for doing so were imperfect and incomplete. But at least it was a start. Public opinion in Europe, Japan, and elsewhere broadly if reluctantly accepted the idea that a change of direction was necessary, at least in the way in which energy was generated and used. The industrial countries could scarcely preach change to the rest of the world if they did not give the example. Hence the dismay when the Bush administration pulled out of the Kyoto Protocol, pleading national self-interest, and later produced a climate strategy that included substantial increases in carbon emissions. How could the most powerful country in the world, with the strongest scientific base (and yet the world's largest polluter), behave with such apparent irresponsibility? Lack of public awareness in the United States may be part of the answer. The American way of life is built on the car economy, cheap energy, and faith in market forces. Vested interests are strong in Congress and the media, and the rest of the world seems far away. Yet change is on the way. Already business is reading the signs. The notorious Global Climate Coalition, dedicated to discrediting the science that demonstrates global warming, has fallen apart. Such major companies as DuPont in the United States, BP Amoco and Shell in Europe, and Toyota in Japan aim to do better than anything in the Kyoto Protocol to curb emissions. Even the U.S. administration shows signs of unease. There is talk of greater energy efficiency and application of new technologies. The impacts of the greenhouse effect have become common parlance. And already the Chinese claim to have reduced their carbon emissions in absolute terms. They see where their real national interest lies. What, if anything, will be the message from Johannesburg? We shall see. Communicating the fact of climate change is a complex process involving political leadership, science, public pressure, and even perhaps a useful catastrophe or two to illuminate the issues. We should not forget the moral dimension: a sense of responsibility to future human generations and a respect for the totality of ecosystems.

Colombia is in a privileged position to take advantage of international climate agreements to finance sustainable development initiatives. The country is a signatory of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the Kyoto Protocol, and the Paris Agreements. As a non-Annex I party to the UNFCCC, Colombia produces low emissions in relation to global numbers (0.46% of total global emissions for 2010) and exhibits biogeographical conditions that are ideal for mitigation of climate change through greenhouse gas sequestration and emission reductions. Simultaneously, recent extreme climatic events have harshly compromised the country’s economy, making Colombia’s vulnerability to climate change evident.While these conditions should justify a strong approach to climate change communication that motivates decision making and leads to mitigation and adaptation, the majority of sectors still fall short of effectively communicating their climate change messages. Official information about climate change is often too technical and rarely includes a call for action. However, a few exceptions exist, including environmental education materials for children and a noteworthy recent strategy to deliver the Third Communication to the UNFCCC in a form that is more palatable to the general public. Despite strong research on climate change, particularly related to agricultural, environmental, and earth sciences, academic products are rarely communicated in a way that is easily understood by decision makers and has a clear impact on public policy. Messages from the mass media frequently confuse rather than inform the public. For instance, television news refers to weather-related disasters, climate variability, and climate change indiscriminately. This shapes an erroneous idea of climate change among the public and weakens the effectiveness of communications on the issue.The authors contrast the practices of these sectors with those of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) working in Colombia to show how they address the specific climate communication needs facing the country. These NGOs directly face the challenge of working with diverse population groups in this multicultural, multiethnic, and megadiverse country. NGOs customize languages, channels, and messages for different audiences and contexts, with the ultimate goal of building capacity in local communities, influencing policymakers, and sensitizing the private sector. Strategies that result from the work of interdisciplinary groups, involve feedback from the audiences, and incorporate adaptive management have proven to be particularly effective.

Back to table of contents Previous article Next article ProfessionalFull AccessFaith Leader Calls for Alliance With Psychiatry Around Climate ChangeMark MoranMark MoranSearch for more papers by this authorPublished Online:5 Dec 2019https://doi.org/10.1176/appi.pn.2019.12a22AbstractDespair about climate change and its effects can be transformed into hope, says Rev. Jim Antal.Psychiatrists and faith leaders share a common cause in addressing climate change and helping people turn grief, fear, and anxiety into constructive action.That’s the message that Rev. Jim Antal delivered at this year’s IPS: The Mental Health Services Conference in New York in October. Antal is the special advisor on climate justice to the general minister and president of the United Church of Christ. From 2006 to 2018, he led the organization’s 350 churches in Massachusetts as their conference minister and president. In 2017, Yale Divinity School honored him with the William Sloane Coffin Award for Peace and Justice.“Mental health is profoundly impacted by the disruptions associated with climate change.” —Rev. Jim Antal“Our generation is living on the hinge of history,” Antal told attendees. “If civilization is to continue, science tells us that society must immediately make the greatest transitions humanity has ever managed. First and foremost, we must immediately abandon our dependence on the abundant, inexpensive fossil fuel energy that has built the modern world and replace it with renewable, sustainable, zero-carbon energy sources. And we must carry out this transition in a way that rectifies the massive inequity and inequality that our current distribution of assets represents.”People are resistant to change and frightened or overwhelmed by the scope of the problem, Antal said, and this is where psychiatrists have much to offer. “Helping people identify what would enable them to face these realities is essential” to make the necessary changes to achieve a more sustainable future. He emphasized the need to reframe the crisis around climate change as an opportunity, noting that the technology necessary to transition away from fossil fuels toward more sustainable energy is available now.Moreover, he said, the global impact of climate change requires a new understanding of grief. “Grief is now a universal blanket covering all of humanity,” he said. “It’s no longer just the individual grief we experience when we lose someone we love. Such grief isolates the individual because it’s hard for the grieving person to imagine anyone else can understand the pain he or she is feeling. But now, as a result of the actions of seven generations of humans, the experience of loss of the Earth we once knew is universal.”Antal said there are opportunities for alliance between the scientific and faith communities such as the Massachusetts-based Faith Science Alliance for Climate Leadership, which psychiatrists can join or replicate in their local areas. “The purpose of this coalition of scientists and faith leaders is to advocate for public policies in Massachusetts that address the ecological and moral emergency of climate change with bold, swift, and substantive action,” he said. “This alliance seeks to educate the people of Massachusetts on the urgency of the climate crisis and our shared responsibility both to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and to adapt to the changing climate.”James Fleming, M.D., chair of the APA Caucus on Climate Change and Mental Health and chair of the session, told Psychiatric News that psychiatrists and faith leaders who have become aware of the great risks facing human civilization due to climate disruption can support each other and collaborate to advise the public about the risks and help society cope with the consequences of climate change.“Climate-related emotions such as anxiety, dread, and grief are being transformed from individual reactions to personal situations to group phenomena in response to climate disasters and grave scientific predictions,” he said. “Psychiatrists can learn, for example, from the growing experience of faith leaders such as Rev. Antal who have started to help their congregations deal with ‘group grief.’ Hope has taken on a new meaning about a new sense of engagement in action that leads to empowerment.”Fleming is also a member of the steering committee of the Climate Psychiatry Alliance (CPA). According to its website, the CPA is a group of psychiatrists “united by the mission of assuring optimal mental health by preventing and mitigating climate change’s impact on mental health and maximizing the mental and physical health co-benefits of a sustainable, regenerative, global response.” ■Information about Rev. Antal and his work as a climate change activist is posted here. Information about the Climate Psychiatry Alliance is posted here. Information about the Faith Science Alliance for Climate Leadership is posted here. ISSUES NewArchived

As leaders of civil society, governments have a prime responsibility to communicate climate change information in order to motivate their citizens to mitigate and adapt. This study compares the approaches of the U.K. and Hong Kong governments. Although different in size and population, the United Kingdom and Hong Kong have similar climate change agendas to communicate to similarly educated and prosperous populations. The study finds that while both governments use similar means: policy, education, campaigns, internet, and social media, these have different characteristics, with different emphases in their climate change message. The United Kingdom’s top-down approach is more prominent in its legally binding policy and well-defined programs for adaptation and risk assessment. Hong Kong has more effectively embedded climate change education across the school curricula and has a more centralized and consistently branded campaign, with widespread use of visual language to connect the public to the problem. Hong Kong frames climate change as a science–society problem and has a greater focus on self-responsibility and bottom-up behavioral change. Thus, the U.K. and Hong Kong governments have polarized approaches to motivating their citizens into climate action. Moving forward, both governments should consider best practice elements of the other to develop their communication of climate change.

Global climate change’s pervasive impacts extend beyond the environment, significantly affecting mental health across diverse regions. This study offers a comprehensive multi-regional analysis spanning Asia, Africa, Oceania, Europe, and the Americas, addressing three critical gaps in existing research: (i) the necessity of a global scope given climate change’s widespread impact, (ii) the under-researched mental health dimension compared to general health effects, and (iii) the integration of climate and mental health data. Using data from 1970 to 2020, we found a strong correlation between climate change and rising mental disorders globally. Regional patterns emerged, with Asia, Africa, and Oceania showing broader associations with various mental health issues, while Europe and the Americas saw increases in anxiety and depression. This study contributes to a more comprehensive understanding of the interconnectedness between climate change, mental health, and sustainability. By addressing the mental health impacts of climate change, we can identify sustainable solutions that promote both environmental well-being and human well-being. Our findings highlight the urgent need for global action to mitigate climate change’s mental health effects and provide insights for tailored interventions and public health strategies. Additionally, socio-economic factors like unemployment, urbanisation, GDP growth, and globalisation are incorporated to explore the intricate interplay between climate change, mental health, and societal contexts, offering a clearer understanding of the mechanisms at play.

<p>Climate change communication has only been for the last four years an important subject of the external communication at the Royal Meteorological Institute of Belgium (RMI). Generally, science communication at RMI happens along the traditional (information) deficit model.</p><p>In the context of climate change communication, the institute positions itself as the source of scientific knowledge to be disseminated to the Belgian population, who is constructed as a passive recipient who needs to be informed about the physical causes and consequences of climate change. The use of this deficit communication model aims to mainstream and depoliticize climate change in order to decrease disagreement and build widespread consent for climate action (Pepermans and Maeseele, 2017).</p><p>Nevertheless, several studies have demonstrated that the deficit model is often not fit for purpose for informing policy or effectively communicating science (Ballantyne, 2016). Hence, to improve the reach of RMI’s target audiences as well as the communication of the messages, ongoing climate change communication initiatives at RMI are assessed by means of the essential elements for effective (science) communication (Who?, To whom?, How? What?, Why?, How much?, When?). </p><p>The external communication at RMI is organised along a so-called ‘antenna model’. In this organisational model, the communication is organised by a central communication service and several ‘communication antennae’ which are staff members of other services of the institute with expertise in specific scientific subjects and who also have good communication skills. Linked to the important need and increasing interest from the general public and news media for information on extreme weather and the role of climate change herein, recent assigned roles of ‘communication antennae’ or fixed contact points for these topics have been proven to be of a great added value for the climate change communication at the institute.</p><p>Other elements to assess the effectiveness of RMI’s climate change communication are based upon concrete examples and experiences, such as the warming stripes for Brussels which were presented on national television by the weather presenter during the #ShowYourStripes-day in 2021, a podcast by a well-known Belgian weather presenter and a climate scientist of RMI, a Climate Report which summarizes the important results on RMI’s climatological observations, and the past and possible future climate trends, and press releases and web articles on climate change which are mainly triggered by extreme weather events.</p><p>Overall, the assessment identifies to what extent the climate change communication at RMI happens in an efficient way, what are the priorities of the climate change communication, as well as what are the obstacles and challenges.</p>

The increasing certainty and impact of Climate Change has been increasingly and intensively communicated throughout the past decade, and is today a central subject of political discussion. Yet, little has happened in actual progress throughout the past 2 decades: emissions have risen; the rise of CO2 levels in the atmosphere as measured by the Keeling curve shows no signs of slowing down. Most international reduction targets set since 1992 have been missed, and the recent fossil fuel shortages in 2022 have shown a very limited willingness of societies to accept changes imposed by external influence and regulations. All this happened despite that climate change communication has been frequent and outspoken: Climate change impacts are already being felt around the world. Increased economic and social damage from weather-related phenomena is regularly communicated through media; End-game consequences of climate change (drowning cities, desertification, massive heat waves) are apocalyptical for some areas, with direct threats to life and well-being; Measures to mitigate climate change are known. Regulatory requirements have been raised, which require countries, companies and individuals to adapt their decisions to the altering framework required for a “carbon-free” future.   This paper reviews the communication of climate change in terms of focus (problem, causes, economic impact, solution proposals, benefits) based on web and literature research. The analysis shows a propensity of communication to be oriented towards technical terms (causes), as well as towards problems (impact and doomsday scenarios), and a lack of orientation towards solutions and benefits. The paper propose a more fruitful path through the employment of more solution oriented communication. The paper also shows that consumers as individuals can have direct influence on the extent of climate change through their consumption and behavioural patterns, and therefore need not to wait for, or be dependent on, political decisions to mitigate the effects of climate change. The paper concludes with some proposals on how to shape future communication on climate change with in the meteorological community and how to address different stakeholder groups.

Communication is a popular method to raise awareness and promote action against the impacts of climate change. However, there is little scientific evidence that climate change communication can influence individual engagement with adaptation. This study combines qualitative and quantitative data to assess long-term cognitive and behavioral changes among Swedish forest owners who took part in climate change communication. Overall, the results suggest that climate change communication has only limited direct effect on individual engagement with adaptation. While the data show that climate change communication can have strengthened forest owners’ perceived knowledgeability and belief in climate change, they had also become less concerned about climate change risks and did not change how they managed their forest. The study concludes that researchers and practitioners should learn how to better tailor climate change communication to the personal experiences and decision-making needs of their target audience and involve trusted peers and information channels.