Climate change and moral judgement

God's Greenhouse

Behavioral science approaches to promoting sustainable action have mainly focused on cognitive processes, whereas the role of emotions has received comparably little attention. However, emotions have a great but currently not fully exploited potential to contribute to a sustainable behavior change. In this perspective, we summarize recent research emphasizing the central and indispensable role of emotion in human thinking and judgment. We discuss how these insights can promote affective reactivity toward sustainability issues, help leverage the potential of emotion to motivate action, and improve emotional climate change communication and intervention strategies. We outline a research agenda that we see as crucial for obtaining a solid evidence base on how emotions can optimally promote sustainable behavior. This paper is meant to stimulate discussion and a coordinated research effort on how emotions may be better leveraged to promote large-scale sustainable action and to promote a stronger integration of emotional strategies into the toolbox of policy makers.

The aim of this paper is to answer the question of whether moral intuitions, understood in terms of Jonathan Haidt's Social Intuitionist Model (SIM), have any normative power. The conclusion is no. And there are many separate arguments in favor of it. First, these moral intuitions cannot be objective, justifying reasons that are expected to arise in the course of making a ‘real’ moral judgment. Second, we do not even know if they actually represent the grounds for moral judgments. There are too few reasons to exclude the possibility that, when we make moral judgments, we unconsciously follow moral rules, which can be objective moral reasons. Furthermore, in Haidt's terms, moral intuitions are most probably heuristic by nature. But if they are, it is even more problematic for their normativity because they can lead to mistakes. There is also a lacuna in the research concerning problems with resolving moral dilemmas in which two strong moral intuitions are involved. Third, philosophers claim that there is some other kind of justified moral intuitions and psychologists often mistakenly mix together these two phenomena. In this paper, all of these arguments will be examined and they will serve to justify the lack of normativity of moral intuitions in the SIM.

While traditional approaches have described ethical decision-making in organizations mainly as being the result of rational deliberative thought, a steadily growing body of research indicates that moral decision-making is strongly influenced by moral intuitions and emotions. The moral intuition approach typically has two aspects: the process through which moral intuitions emerge and their content. With regard to the process, moral intuitions represent fast, automatic, evaluative reactions that are emotionally charged. An important tenet of moral intuition research refers to the primacy of intuition—the notion that moral intuitions generally drive moral decision-making. Accordingly, moral intuitions are described as starting points for rational reflection processes that follow later. On this basis, it has also been argued that the interplay of moral intuition and deliberation is malleable. Specifically, the well-formed moral intuitions of experts are thought to differ from the naive moral intuitions of novices. With increasing experience and reflection about the moral issues in one’s experiences, deliberation increasingly enables individuals to shift between intuitions and reasoning and to monitor, test, weigh, and reject both intuitions and reasons. The content of moral intuition refers to the foundations of morality, which are the underlying moral domain, specifying what individuals view as morally right or wrong. The most commonly referenced account in this field, Moral Foundations Theory (MFT), argues that moral intuitions are a function of evolutionarily developed, innate predispositions to master multiple social problems that interact with social and cultural influences. These predispositions, or moral foundations, include care, fairness, loyalty, authority, and sanctity. While empirical work on the role of moral intuition in organizations is still at an early stage, several areas have been identified that may particularly benefit from integrating moral intuition process and content. For instance, the moral intuition perspective can aid the understanding and prevention of processes through which unethical behaviors and practices, such as corruption, may be justified and normalized in organizations. Furthermore, the moral intuition perspective is increasingly used to study the moral leadership process, most notably the link between leader moral foundations and moral leader behaviors, as well as the role of (mis)fit between leader and follower moral foundations. Moral emotions are an inherent element of the moral intuition process and refer to the welfare of others and the promotion of a functioning society. It is thought that individuals experience moral emotions when they or others have violated moral standards. These emotions build the motivational force for moral action and are often placed in five clusters: other‐praising (e.g., gratitude), other‐suffering (e.g., sympathy), other‐condemning (e.g., contempt), self‐condemning (e.g., guilt), and self-approving (e.g., moral pride) moral emotions.

We report four experiments that investigate explicit reasoning and moral judgements. In each experiment, some subjects responded to the "footbridge" version of the trolley problem (which elicits stronger moral intuitions), whereas others responded to the "switch" version (which elicits weaker moral intuitions). Experiments 1-2 crossed the type of trolley problem with four reasoning conditions: control, counter-attitudinal, pro-attitudinal, and mixed reasoning (both types of reasoning). Experiments 3-4 examine whether moral judgements vary based on (a) when reasoners engage in counter-attitudinal reasoning, (b) when they make the moral judgement, and (c) by the type of moral dilemma. These two experiments comprised five conditions: control (judgement only), delay-only (2-minute wait then judgement), reasoning-only (reasoning then judgement), reasoning-delay (reasoning, then 2-minute delay, then judgement), and delayed-reasoning (2-minute delay, then reasoning, then judgement). These conditions were crossed with the type of trolley problem. We find that engaging in some form of counter-attitudinal reasoning led to less typical judgements (regardless of when it occurs), but this effect was mostly restricted to the switch version of the dilemma (and was strongest in the reasoning-delay conditions). Furthermore, neither pro-attitudinal reasoning nor delayed judgements on their own impacted subjects' judgements. Reasoners therefore seem open to modifying their moral judgements when they consider opposing perspectives but might be less likely to do so for dilemmas that elicit relatively strong moral intuitions.

Despite overwhelming consensus among scientists about the reality of anthropogenic climate change (Bray, 2010; Oreskes, 2004), there remains significant reluctance on the part of citizens and politicians to take the action needed to address it. This resistance has been repeatedly identified in social research (Leiserowitz & Maibach, 2010; Leviston, Leitch, Greenhill, Leonard, & Walker, 2011; Lorenzoni & Pidgeon, 2006; McCright & Dunlap, 2011; Reser, Bradley, Glendon, Ellul, & Callaghan, 2012) and is mirrored by the lack of progress made by salient political summits (Rogelj et al., 2010). Perhaps as a response to this, scholarly journals and articles that are focused on climate change are growing. Natural scientists tell us that we know what needs to be done to avert dangerous climate change (IPCC, 2014), and economists tell us that delaying action in the short term will lead to much greater costs in the long term (Stern, 2007). Understanding public responses to climate change and developing solutions to catalyse action is a critical challenge for the social sciences, and we propose that the development and elaboration of a social psychology of climate change would be a cornerstone of such an approach. We do not make the claim that social psychology has all the answers but rather that the theories, models and research methods of social psychology can provide a powerful arsenal to complement the approaches of other disciplines. Researchers have already begun to apply social psychological theory and methods to the issue of climate change, and we highlight in the following sections examples of the insights that have flowed from this. We cannot assume, though, that our theories and findings will automatically generalise to the climate change context. As Moser (2010) has noted, there are unique dimensions to climate change that make it distinct from other environmental, risk and health issues: The causes of climate change are invisible to humans, the impacts are distal and it is complex and riddled with uncertainties. Modern urban humans are to some extent insulated from their physical environment, and the lags between the climate and social systems make it difficult for people to understand their role in influencing climate. These factors suggest the importance of developing a social psychology of climate change, empirically testing, integrating and refining existing theories and models to develop new frameworks. The notion that psychology can play a role in understanding and addressing climate change is not a new one. The American Psychological Association's Task Force on the interface between psychology and global climate change comprehensively detailed the ways in which psychological research can help to understand people's perceptions of the risks of climate change, the contribution of human behaviour to climate change, the psychosocial impacts of climate change, the ways in which people can adapt and cope with climate change and the psychological barriers that could limit climate change action (Swim et al., 2009, 2011). It is also not a new idea that social psychology can play an important role in understanding and addressing environmental problems and solutions (Clayton & Brook, 2005). Social psychology, specifically, has a long tradition of theory and research that is relevant to addressing key climate change questions. Attitudes, social cognition, persuasion and attitude change, social influence, and intragroup and intergroup behaviour, for instance, are fundamental foci for social psychology and have direct relevance for understanding the human and social dimensions of climate change. The time is ripe to understand the range of research that has been developing in social psychology on attitudes, beliefs and actions, to build upon these insights, and integrate them with knowledge from other sciences to develop models and theories indigenous to the climate change context. In the following section, we provide a brief overview of recent social psychological research that addresses three broad themes relevant to understanding and responding to climate change. These themes are as follows: (i) social psychological influences on climate change attitudes and beliefs; (ii) facilitators and barriers to climate change action; and (iii) changing climate change attitudes and behaviour. Although there is some overlap in these themes, as an organising principle they intuitively map on to key questions that arise in relation to climate change. Our aim is to highlight recent examples of social psychological research that provide interesting and important insights in relation to these themes. Swim, Markowitz, and Bloodhart (2012) have noted that much of the social psychological research on climate change has emerged since 2006; we focus in on the most recent of this research that has been published since 2010. We also outline how the studies in the special issue relate to these themes. We recognise that these are not the only areas where social psychological research and theory can make important contributions but they nevertheless relate to key questions that need to be addressed. We conclude the introduction by proposing considerations that social psychologists could take into account in their future research on climate change. A major focus in the climate change literature and the media more broadly has been on describing climate change attitudes and beliefs. In many developed nations, questions about beliefs and attitudes related to climate change have become a standard component of political polling (e.g. Gallup polls and Lowy Institute polls), and there are comprehensive national and cross-national surveys that address this topic. Examples include US research by the Yale Climate Change Communication project (Leiserowitz, Maibach, Roser-Renouf, & Smith, 2010), national surveys conducted in Australia (Leviston et al., 2011; Reser et al., 2012), and the U.K. (Pidgeon, 2012) and the Eurobarometer research conducted in Europe (The European Opinion Research Group, 2002). As the study of attitudes—their conceptualization, measurement, formation, function and relationship with behaviour—has been a cornerstone of social psychological research, social psychology can make important contributions to these assessments. Note that although social psychological theories usually distinguish between attitudes and beliefs, these terms are often used interchangeably in the climate change research domain, and for the sake of simplicity, we will usually use attitudes to encompass both attitudes and beliefs. Recent reviews of the attitude literature from 1996 to 2009 highlight significant trends and directions in this area of research (Ajzen, 2001; Bohner & Dickel, 2011; Crano & Prislin, 2006). These trends include the role of attitude strength and attitude ambivalence, the distinction between implicit and explicit attitudes, the recognition that attitudes have cognitive and affective underpinnings, and the influence of bodily and external physical cues on attitudes. Recent social psychological research on climate change particularly provides examples of the influence of bodily and external cues and the distinction between cognitive and affective aspects of attitudes, and three of the papers in the special issue address the latter issue. The work on internal bodily and external physical cues is a growing research area with a special issue of the European Journal of Social Psychology devoted to the concept of embodied cognition (Schubert & Semin, 2009). As the distal nature of climate change and the relative insulation of humans from their physical environment are thought to be key barriers to greater engagement with climate change (Moser, 2010), it is perhaps not surprising that this area of research has extended into the climate change domain. Cues that help to 'bring to life' the experience of global warming could help to overcome these psychological barriers. Risen and Critcher (2011) have shown that feelings of warmth increased beliefs in global warming and that this effect was mediated through greater ease in constructing more fluent mental images of hot outdoor images. Other studies have shown that people had greater concern about global warming and donated more money to a global warming charity when they thought that the temperature outside was warmer than usual (Li, Johnson, & Zaval, 2011), that embodied temperature influenced concern for global warming and willingness to volunteer for a global warming group (Lewandowski, Ciarocco, & Gately, 2012) and that priming heat-related cognitions resulted in greater belief in global warming and willingness to pay to reduce global warming (Joireman, Truelove, & Duell, 2010). Physical external cues, in this case the presence of bare trees in the laboratory, also increased belief in global warming (Guéguen, 2012). These studies illustrate how subtle cues can influence climate change attitudes in the moment, although the longevity of these effects on attitudes has not been explored. Another important direction in attitude research that has relevance for climate change is the recognition that attitudes have affective as well as cognitive underpinnings. This is important when considering that the high levels of risk associated with climate change means that it could elicit strong emotional responses. Cognitive approaches to understanding attitudes (e.g. expectancy-value models) have been at the forefront of how we understand attitude formation (Ajzen, 2001). From this perspective, attitudes are the outcome of a cognitive process of evaluating beliefs about the attitude object; for example, a person who has positive beliefs about a climate change policy is likely to hold favourable attitudes to that policy. Consistent with the importance of cognitive, rational processes, Tobler, Visschers, and Siegrist (2012) have shown that perceived costs and benefits of climate change policies were significant predictors of support for these policies and, in most cases, were stronger predictors of behavioural willingness and policy support than other variables (e.g. demographics, climate change concern and climate change scepticism). But there is also evidence for the affective basis of attitudes and even for the primacy of affective aspects of attitudes (Verplanken, Jofstee, & Janssen, 1998; Zajonc, 1984). Recent reviews of the attitude literature suggest that, rather than attitudes being determined by one or the other, affect and cognition are both likely to be important for the formation of attitudes (Ajzen, 2001; Crano & Prislin, 2006). For example, whether affective or cognitive aspects of attitude objects are accessed more readily depends on whether the attitude object itself is more affectively or cognitively based (Giner-Sorolla, 2004). Three articles in the current issue pick up on the cognitive and affective aspects of climate change attitudes and perceptions. Although it seems intuitively likely that having greater knowledge about climate change should be related to climate change attitudes, findings in relation to knowledge have been mixed. Some research has shown that knowing more about the causes and consequences of climate change is associated with greater climate change risk judgments (Sunblad, Biel, & Gärling, 2009), whereas other studies have shown no effects or have suggested the possibility that having more knowledge could even be negatively related to climate change beliefs for those with a politically conservative orientation (Malka, Krosnick, & Langer, 2009; McCright & Dunlap, 2011). Yet, Guy, Kashima, Walker, and O'Neill (this issue) point out that knowledge is usually measured with proxy measures such as scientific literacy or self-reported climate change knowledge rather than objective knowledge of climate change, and therefore, it is premature to dismiss the positive relationship between knowledge and attitudes. Their study used an objective measure of climate change knowledge and shows that people who are more knowledgeable have greater belief that climate change is happening, and, moreover, knowledge attenuates the negative relationship between ideology (i.e. individualism) and climate change attitudes. Van der Linden (this issue) specifically addresses how affect and cognition relate to climate change perceptions. The study investigates the relationship between personal experiences of extreme weather events, affect relating to climate change, and climate change risk perceptions. The results of the structural equation modelling of a national British sample provides support for a dual-process model whereby cognitive appraisals activate risk perceptions, and risk and affect mutually reinforce each other in a feedback loop. The paper by Leviston, Price, and Bishop (this issue) explores the role of affect in climate change responses somewhat differently in that it looks at the images people bring to mind when they think about climate change and assesses the affect associated with these images. The research explores whether the types of images that people associate with climate change might be a way of psychologically and affectively engaging or distancing themselves from climate change. It is not enough that people endorse attitudes that are in tune with scientific consensus on climate change; these attitudes need to translate into positive action, whether that is individual private-sphere behaviours such as 'green' consumerism, public-sphere non-activist behaviour such as voting for political parties with environmentally responsible policies or collective environmental activism that seeks to influence decision-makers (Stern, 2000). These types of distinctions are important as the different classes of behaviour might have quite different facilitators and barriers (Stern, 2000). Another important distinction when considering climate-change-related behaviour is the extent to which it is habitual and automatic versus reasoned and deliberative (Ouellette & Wood, 1998). Automaticity of environmentally harmful behaviour poses a serious barrier, whereas automaticity of environmentally protective behaviour makes future behaviour of this type more likely (Van Lange & Joireman, 2008). Yet another potentially important consideration is the goals associated with behaviours (Lindenberg & Steg, 2007). Behaviours can be performed for a range of reasons, and individuals' perception of their own motives could have implications for their future actions. As an example, energy conservation behaviours could be performed primarily to reduce carbon emissions or to save money; the issue with engaging in environmentally protective behaviours for non-environmental reasons is that it could undermine the development of an environmentalist identity (van der Werff, Steg, & Keizer, 2013) and reduce the likelihood of behavioural spillover (Thøgersen & Crompton, 2009). A range of social psychological theories outline the mechanisms that motivate people to take action, and these have had great reach both inside and outside of social psychology. These theories include (but are not limited to) theory of planned behaviour (Ajzen, 1991), self-determination theory (Deci & Ryan, 2000) and perspectives that foreground the role of norms (e.g. norm focus theory; Cialdini, Reno, & Kallgren, 1990) and the social identity perspective (see Hornsey, 2008 for a recent review). The theory of planned behaviour has been used to examine determinants of a range of private-sphere environmental behaviours including employees' energy-saving behaviours (Greaves, Zibarras, & Stride, 2013; Zhang, Wang, & Zhou, 2014), private landholders' carbon sequestration and trading (Thompson & Hansen, 2013), renewable energy use (Alam et al., 2014) and opposition to wind farms (Read, Brown, Thorsteinsson, Morgan, & Price, 2013). Similarly, research drawing on self-determination theory has identified that experiencing more autonomous, self-determined motivation or perceiving that the government is more autonomy supportive is related to public-sphere and private-sphere environmental behaviours (De Groot & Steg, 2010; Lavergne, Sharp, Pelletier, & Holtby, 2010). Perhaps one of the most important contributions of social psychology to understanding human behaviour has been its theorisation of the influence of social norms (e.g. Cialdini et al., 1990). From a social identity perspective, the social groups to which we belong provide guidelines for appropriate behaviour through the internalisation of group norms (Hogg & Abrams, 1988; Hornsey, 2008). We only need to consider the powerful relationship between political party identification and climate change responses to see evidence of this process (Dunlap & McCright, 2008; Fielding, Head, Laffan, Western, & Hoegh-Guldberg, 2012). According to the social identity perspective, group norms are more likely to guide environmental behaviour when the social identity is more central and salient (Fielding, Terry, Masser, & Hogg, 2008; Terry, Hogg, & White, 1999). Furthermore, in salient intergroup contexts, in-group members tend to polarise away from out-group members, and their environmental intentions and behaviour will become more in-group normative (Ferguson, & 2011; & 2012). and (this issue) our understanding of how social identity and associated in-group norms influences climate-change-related behaviour. on social identity to distinguish between dimensions of group identification and whether different dimensions are more likely to guide behaviour. that extent to which group identity is important to the and rather than among group the relationship between group norms and when those behaviours are high Although much of the research to has focused on understanding and private-sphere environmental and (van & have extended their model of with collective to understand responses to climate change (Van & 2008). on a perspective & Swim, 2011), they propose and provide evidence for for people to with the climate and In the case of climate change, is a likely to be by and to the extent that they they be more likely to take action to reduce their can also be through that to their beliefs about whether group action will be in with climate change. and (this issue) this research by determinants of intentions to in collective climate emotional specifically on and as central and social norms into the Their findings that the perceived norm intentions to take part in a climate perceptions of and group In the section, we a brief overview of theories that could help to understand climate-change-related and these approaches suggest variables to to effect change. For example, research has shown the of to influence environmentally related behaviour et al., 2013; et al., 2010; Cialdini, & 2008; Cialdini, & 2008; & 2013; et al., 2012). In this section, we focus on research that addresses key that might be when to influence climate-change-related attitudes, beliefs and actions. important direction in research has been the of how to climate change to positive in climate change attitudes and beliefs. From a social psychological perspective, one of the of is the role of attitudes in & Dickel, 2011). A of the literature to a effect of attitudes on for versus et al., 2009), and there is evidence that this is more likely when people hold strong attitudes & 2007). This that people's attitudes will influence how they to to change climate-change-related attitudes and beliefs, and research is broadly with this. greater to on climate change with their own & and are more likely to climate when it to their beliefs & 2011; & 2013). In response to this, some have climate to be more when they with the For example, with greater had greater intentions when with that behaviour as the American way of & 2010), and climate greater intentions when with that the positive effects of climate change on the development of new Hornsey, & 2012). the of more we know from the work of and that people are risk and that risk in ways that highlight the of can be more than that focus on In the of climate change where is a of the and (2011) have shown that climate change that the the but the possibility of stronger intentions to and (this issue) on the model of & 2013) to provide a for climate change In they with one of policies that in renewable energy or limit The with the policies was when the with the policy. there was more with a policy of in renewable energy an when it was in terms of whereas greater was for a policy of emissions a when it was as also that the focus of their responses to the Another key issue that be is the possibility of to climate change and the risks to human and from climate change, of and are central to the of climate change. the effects of in relation to health behaviour & & 2000) provide evidence that elicit greater attitude and behaviour change but only when the is by of responses propose that people that response are and they have the to out the they will in behaviours to the there is this in to the such as or The for to climate change is in a study by and greater of climate change among with stronger beliefs who had been with about climate change, whereas this not on more Research has also shown that of to from climate change, particularly can be made more take the perspective of the by climate change (Swim & in to climate change also when social are & 1999). For example, when were to evidence of energy use by their own they were more likely to climate change to causes than when the was about 2013). Furthermore, this greater to causes was negatively associated with climate change concern and support for climate change that help reduce identity can greater engagement with climate change. on the and (2010) that a to reduce the of of climate change and personal with climate change and environmental behaviour. Although can help reduce to climate change, and (this issue) that the for to environmental problems can undermine individuals' willingness to take environmental as progress that can to future environmental and human health problems can reduce the likelihood of engaging in environmentally behaviour. The is perceptions of that a of in an as the idea of scientific progress our the need to through individual actions. The from this research is that it is important not to scientific of the major barriers that has been identified in relation to action to address climate change is the distal nature of the et al., major consequences will in the future and are perceived as more likely to affect other those who are already most This of climate change that that reduce the between and the future or between the and other humans help to overcome this In support of this, that focus on environmental consequences of climate change help climate change engagement & 2013), and to take the perspective of a future human experiencing environmental problems environmental engagement & 2013). The research of and (this issue) to whether our human identity can influence willingness to take environmental Consistent with research, they that are related to greater willingness to in environmental is though, is that priming people who have to think about to have high related to potentially it an intergroup context. This provides evidence of the of about climate change and the need to understand the Social psychology can also point to some and to greater willingness to in to address climate change. and (this issue) that that whether have an versus an can make a to how many behaviours they consider engaging In that had out behaviours they would not consider resulted in being to in more behaviours than an where people consider what they would consider from a In this introduction to the special we highlight areas where social psychological research has important insights to understanding climate change attitudes, beliefs and what influences these and how they can be We used recent social psychological research and the papers from this current issue to illustrate key The strength of a social psychological of climate change is that it can help us to understand the of responses to climate change, for example, how attitudes can be influenced by both affect and cognition, how attitudes and beliefs can responses to climate change and people to climate change with and It can also provide and to the of climate change It is to see the and of social psychological research that addresses important questions related to climate change, although this has been a recent (Swim et al., 2012). we are to to make important contributions to this area of research, though, we propose that social psychologists should consider the following in their future We noted that there are a range of that can take to address climate change, from private-sphere behaviours to non-activist public-sphere behaviours to environmental activism (Stern, 2000). Although all of these approaches can some have greater than & 2009). have greater to influence and and to effect Despite this, social psychological research often investigates private-sphere actions. As a we can our contribution to climate change research by our focus to individual behaviours and public-sphere responses to climate change & 2008). As a we are to what is about climate change. The groups we belong to and the social we can be powerful influences on our attitudes, beliefs and the effect of political identification on climate change attitudes is a of this. area where these have relevance is in the of national and climate change As an example, and (2012) on social identity to the in that when the of individual and other become a identity can that will lead to greater likelihood of The consideration of intergroup and how these or positive responses to climate change (e.g. climate change and introduction of climate change is an area that could provide important A critical distinction made in relation to climate change is between and According to the on Climate Change the to human to reduce the impacts of climate change, whereas the latter to that can be made to human or systems that can help to the or the that would from or climate change and are even the measures will not some of climate change, and is needed to with this (IPCC, Yet the issue of psychological has been in climate change & Swim, 2011). This is for at (i) as noted some of climate change is research on is and (ii) a lack of understanding of could in that to or reduce to climate change that impacts or of other or social & social psychological research is to be a serious to the climate change research greater needs to be focused on of The need to to the distinction between and to the need for social psychologists to work with other disciplines. et we social psychologists to become with the and research of other relevant that address climate change to the relevance and reach of social psychological research in this that solutions to climate change cannot be developed by one the issue systems including and A is and social psychology can make a significant contribution by methods and theories that help social and cognitive In we in this introduction to the special issue to foreground social psychological theories and findings relevant to key climate change questions. Although social psychology can a of and the social psychology of climate change is and more needs to be done we have a of and theories that are to climate change. we this, the of social psychology is likely to be at the of climate We that the special issue can help the progress that has been made and catalyse the development of an indigenous social psychology of climate change. We social psychologists to this that we can be part of the to one of the and environmental of our

The article highlights the theoretical aspects of institutionalism as the quintessence of welfare theory. A characteristic feature of the evolution of the human race is a deep transformation of the mental worldview. Based on historical analysis, it was revealed that attempts to curb human nature led to the emergence of norms and rules that determined the nature of the interaction between members of society. Norms and rules, or institutions in the modern sense of the word, have changed the worldview of society, thereby forming an idea of the welfare. In pre-institutional times (primitive societies), human well-being was perceived exclusively in a materialistic context. With the emergence of the first mental constructions accepted by members of society as a moral imperative, wealth began to acquire spiritual attributes (responsibility, altruism, caring, etc.). The quintessential notions of welfare were moral imperatives. It was revealed that the genesis of moral imperatives was determined by the institutional environment of a particular society. As a result, societies appeared with a diversified understanding of well-being, which influenced the belief in justice and the effectiveness of existing models for streamlining public life. Three types of society are considered, where nationalistic, socialist and liberal moral imperatives dominated. It is determined that the balance between adherence to the ideas of individualism and collectivism has become a determining factor in the formation of the theory of welfare. Keywords institutionalism, welfare, institutions, moral imperatives, mental constructions, society.

An argument that moral reasoning plays a crucial role in moral judgment through episodes of rational reflection that have established patterns for automatic judgment foundation. Rationalists about the psychology of moral judgment argue that moral cognition has a rational foundation. Recent challenges to this account, based on findings in the empirical psychology of moral judgment, contend that moral thinking has no rational basis. In this book, Hanno Sauer argues that moral reasoning does play a role in moral judgment—but not, as is commonly supposed, because conscious reasoning produces moral judgments directly. Moral reasoning figures in the acquisition, formation, maintenance, and reflective correction of moral intuitions. Sauer proposes that when we make moral judgments we draw on a stable repertoire of intuitions about what is morally acceptable, which we have acquired over the course of our moral education—episodes of rational reflection that have established patterns for automatic judgment foundation. Moral judgments are educated and rationally amenable moral intuitions. Sauer engages extensively with the empirical evidence on the psychology of moral judgment and argues that it can be shown empirically that reasoning plays a crucial role in moral judgment. He offers detailed counterarguments to the anti-rationalist challenge (the claim that reason and reasoning play no significant part in morality and moral judgment) and the emotionist challenge (the argument for the emotional basis of moral judgment). Finally, he uses Joshua Greene's Dual Process model of moral cognition to test the empirical viability and normative persuasiveness of his account of educated intuitions. Sauer shows that moral judgments can be automatic, emotional, intuitive, and rational at the same time.

Moral intuitions and attitudes towards affirmative action in college admissions

Hall, Gartner & Forlini 1 apply ethical philosophy to tobacco harm reduction. There are parallels between the ethical analysis of product bans and of misinformation (or disinformation) about the risks of products that are available in legal market-places 2-4. I agree that vaping products can be marketed in ways that will reduce the harms of smoking, minimize causal gateway effects and promote smoking cessation. Marketing's 4Ps (Product, Place, Promotion and Price) can alter product preferences 4, 5. Tobacco harm reduction principles should be included in public health approaches 5, 6 as one ‘pillar’ of public health 7, but objections to harm reduction remain widespread [8]. Challenges to progress arise in part because thorough moral assessments are uncommon by individuals or organizations. Research on moral psychology argues that rapidly processed ‘moral intuitions’ which are influenced by emotions are critical to moral judgments, and ‘moral reasoning’ is less often the creator of moral judgments than the defender of moral intuitions 9. The classic moral principles of autonomy, beneficence/non-maleficence and justice are involved in moral psychological issues of harm/care and fairness/reciprocity, but moral psychology identifies additional important moral principles such as loyalty to group/community, respect for authority and appreciation for sanctity/purity 10. On the continuum from ‘conservative’ to ‘liberal’ positions, none of the moral values disappear, but the relative importance of these values change 10. When community standards (loyalty and authority) are violated (by disagreeing with the opinions of a distinguished medical society), contempt can be felt. When there is a ‘contamination of the pure’ (by recommending e-cigarettes which are not perfectly safe), disgust can be felt. When individual rights are violated (harm, unfairness), anger arises. The interplay of the moral emotions of disgust, contempt and anger contribute to individual positions on harm reduction issues 11, 12. An example of the emotions arising in harm reduction disputes are depicted in this dramatic dialogue, which provides links to an audio performance on the journal website 13. Individuals working in institutions or organizations are also constrained by the biases and role responsibilities of their employers or organizations. Public and professional roles can affect the moral principles that are stressed and the positions that need to be defended, especially in adversarial contexts 14. Those who work for certain ‘Disease Control and Prevention’ organizations (public or private) would probably be most vigilant for any indications of negative consequences of e-cigarettes. They would be primed (and most rewarded) to find (a) any indication that e-cigarettes might act as a causal gateway to cigarettes and (b) any evidence that e-cigarettes are ‘not safe’. It would not be surprising if their workers would be reluctant to emphasize evidence that e-cigarettes could be preventing smoking or that they are much safer than cigarettes. In contrast, those aligned with advocating e-cigarettes for harm reduction would be similarly disinclined to promote any findings consistent with the possibility of a causal gateway to cigarettes or nicotine addiction. Organizations have, in effect, party-lines and preferred positions, and these influences act to truncate the extent to which complete, ethical analyses are conducted or published on any issue. Organizations in keeping with role responsibilities are likely to have their preferred principles and their own moral intuitions that limit what they think, do and are prepared to recommend. Although thorough assessments of philosophical ethics and policy implications may change some opinions, abiding biases in individuals and organizations promote truncation of evaluations, reduce objectivity and impair progress. Players (individuals and organizations) should (a) try to consider an application of moral reasoning that is as complete as possible and (b) try not to jump to conclusions when they have encountered their ‘hot-button’ preferred issues. In conflicts where participants believe they are ‘doing good’ that urgently needs to be done, one can also expect instances of ‘white hat bias’ 15. White hat bias refers to the ‘distortion of information in the service of what may be perceived to be righteous ends’ 15. Righteous zeal may be another kind of moral psychological influence (charged with anger, contempt or disgust) that further clouds the turbulent waters of applied science on controversial issues. None.

Morals and climate decision-making: insights from social and behavioural sciences

This commentary considers two lines of inquiry into the work of Ideland and Malmberg: the role of discourse in shaping teachers’ responses to Roberts’ (2011) Visions of Science and the moral imperatives that will accompany any shifts between Vision I and II. Vision I of science has accreted to itself great power and prestige, both of which shape notions of a ‘good’ science education. Any shift towards Vision II will require serious engagement in a Foucaultian discourse into the issues of power, inclusion and exclusion that Ideland and Malmberg describe. Similarly, the moral imperatives that arise require courage to both contest the status quo in science education, and develop a reasoned, morally defensible, response to the challenge that Vision II is really a form of ideological activism.

The feature article in this edition outlines and then critically examines the Nuffield Council of Bioethics’ Report, ‘Genome Editing and Human Reproduction: Social and Ethical issues’. While Christopher Gyngell, Hilary...

“IF WE DIDN’T EAT THEM, THEY WOULDN’T EXIST” The Nonidentity Problem’s Implications for Animals (Including Humans)

The Neuroscience of Moral Judgment and Aquinas on Moral Expertise Stephen Napier CONTEMPORARY MORAL psychology is discovering some unflattering aspects of our moral intuitions. Quite simply, they are unreliable, or, at least, we have every reason to think that our intuitions are not attuned to morally relevant features of our environment. Because moral intuitions are the starting point for a person's moral judgments and reasoning, faulty intuitions can affect someone's entire system of moral beliefs. What is more, the agent whose beliefs result from these faulty intuitions would not know otherwise. As E. F. Schumacher reminded us,1 just as by the eye one can see everything except the eye through which one sees, so the moral eye can see everything except the eye through which it sees. The same is true for whole systems of moral beliefs according to which everything looks okay "from the inside" or from the perspective of the agent, but, viewed sideways on, a moral belief system may be radically disordered. This paper attempts to put contemporary cognitive science of moral judgment into conversation with Aquinas's moral epistemology. Aquinas has provided us with a cognitive therapy for our moral intuitions, one that stands as a viable remedy for the problem of faulty intuitions. My goal here is to explain why and how his moral epistemology addresses the problem of faulty intuitions. A more ambitious goal would be to argue that his [End Page 31] solution is the best solution to our epistemic predicament. Though in fact I think this is the case, I cannot argue for it here. The first section aims to highlight the problem contemporary moral psychology is discovering about our moral intuitions. The second section outlines and explains Aquinas's solution to this problem. I explain this in two stages. First, I show that Aquinas's solution to the problem of faulty intuitions is only partly the acquisition of the requisite virtues. Full rehabilitation of our moral intellects requires realizing the gifts of the Holy Spirit—in particular, understanding, knowledge, wisdom, and counsel. In the second stage I explain why the virtues and gifts are solutions to our problem. To understand why they are necessary we must understand how they operate on our moral intellects. Here I advert to recent work done on other areas of expertise with an eye toward finding family resemblances between expertise in chess and other domains, and moral expertise. We can appreciate better why the virtues and gifts are necessary if we have some grasp of how they are supposed to work, and we can see this on analogy with other forms of expertise. I. The Problem The following nomenclature will provide the framework for the remainder of our discussion. The term "intuition" in philosophy has a rather diverse meaning. Following Elijah Chudnoff2 and William Tolhurst,3 I understand intuition to mean something like an intellectual seeming analogous to a perceptual seeming. To use Aquinas's terminology, an intuition is something like an apprehension according to which "the intellect merely has a likeness of a thing existing outside the soul, as a sense has a likeness when it receives the species of a sensible thing. But when the intellect begins to judge about the thing it has apprehended, then its judgment is something proper [End Page 32] to itself."4 An intuition may be taken as an apprehension of something qua kind or species. Intuitions are intentional states in that they are about the world—"world" understood to include the perceptual environment, mathematical world, or the world of values and goods. They have a mind-to-world direction of fit, which means that they are representations of how the world actually is, or appears to be. But intuitions, as understood here, are not beliefs. One can have an intuition—a seeming—that, for example, the Muller-Lyer Illusion indicates two lines of different lengths. Click for larger view View full resolution Upon being informed that this is an illusion and/or measuring the lines, any subsequent viewing of the Muller-Lyer lines will involve a seeming that they are different lengths, but one would not believe them to be different lengths...